MARSILIO FICINO

PLATONIC THEOLOGY

VOLUME 5 · BOOKS XV-XVI

ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN

LATIN TEXT EDITED BY
JAMES HANKINS
with William Bowen

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PLATONIC THEOLOGY

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Prefatory Note

This is the fifth volume in our six-volume edition of the *Platonic Theology*, and from the viewpoint of Ficino's debts to medieval scholasticism the most important. Once again Michael Allen is responsible for the translation and James Hankins for the text and critical apparatus, though each has gone over the other's work, and each has contributed in this volume to the notes to the translation.

The plan of the I Tatti Renaissance Library calls for the identification only of explicit citations, but in Book 15 in particular it is evident that Ficino is responding to a variety of unnamed or vaguely named predecessors, especially contemporary Averroist philosophers, many of whose works remain unpublished or inaccessible. A full-dress commentary on this book clarifying Ficino's complex relationship to the scholastic tradition is therefore a desideratum. In the meantime we would be pleased to hear from scholars who have corrections or further source suggestions, as there will be an opportunity in the sixth volume of this work to include addenda and corrigenda to volumes one through five.

We would like to thank Wendy Elgersma Helleman for useful drafts of both books 15 and 16. As in the previous volumes, William Bowen has provided a scanned text of the Marcel edition, which has been used as a copy text for an entirely fresh collation of the principal witnesses.

Our last volume will contain a guide to the argument of the whole work, corrigenda, concordances and various indices, besides Books 17 and 18 and other related texts.

M. A. and J. H.

THEOLOGIA PLATONICA DE IMMORTALITATE ANIMORUM

Capitula librorum Theologiae
de immortalitate animorum
Marsilii Ficini Florentini
divisae in libros XVIII

Quintus decimus liber. Solvit quaestiones Averrois de intellectu.

Cap. I Sequuntur quaestiones quinque de anima. Prima: Utrum sit unus cunctorum hominum intellectus?

Cap. II Confutatio Averrois. Quod mens sit forma corporis patet primum ex ordine naturae.

Cap. III Quomodo mens propinquat corpori.

Cap. IV Quomodo mens adsit corpori.

Cap. V Quomodo mens insit corpori.

Cap. VI Quod mens sit forma corporis patet ex opinionibus actionibusque humanis. Ratio prima. Quia homo est animal rationale.

Cap. VII Ratio secunda. Quia homo intellegit.

Cap. VIII Ratio tertia. Quia homo libere se ipsum movet.

Cap. IX Ratio quarta. Quia vires animae se vicissim tum impediunt, tum movent.

Cap. X Ratio quinta. Quia separata mens non indiget phantasia.

Cap. XI Ratio sexta. Quia intellectus uterque est virtus in anima.

The Theology on the Immortality of Souls
by Marsilio Ficino the Florentine
Divided into Eighteen Books:
Chapter Headings

Fifteenth Book: Averroes' questions
about the intellect are resolved.

Chapter 1 Five questions concerning the soul. First, is there one intellect for all men?

Chapter 2 The refutation of Averroes. That mind is the form of body is demonstrated first from the order of nature.

Chapter 3 How mind approaches body.

Chapter 4 How mind is present to body.

Chapter 5 How mind is present in body.

Chapter 6 That mind is the form of body is evident from the opinions and actions of men. First proof: Because man is a rational animal.

Chapter 7 Second proof: Because man understands.

Chapter 8 Third proof: Because man freely moves himself.

Chapter 9 Fourth proof: Because the soul's powers impede and move each other in turn.

Chapter 10 Fifth proof: Because the separated mind does not need the phantasy.

Chapter 11 Sixth proof: Because each intellect is a power in the soul.

Cap. XII Solutio rationum averroicarum de mente separata.

Cap. XIII Solutio rationum averroicarum de mente unica.

Cap. XIV Signa quod non sit mens una tantum.

Cap. XV Rationes quod non sit mens una. Prima. Quia septem inde contingunt superflua.

Cap. XVI Secunda. Quia mens species servat ac iamdiu plena omnium debet esse.

Cap. XVII Tertia. Quia quotiens duo rem eandem intellegunt, totiens omnino sequuntur absurda.

Cap. XVIII Quarta. Quia vel eadem esset multorum hominum scientia vel superfluae qualitates in eodem.

Cap. XIX Quinta. Quia contradictoria in eodem essent.

Sextus decimus liber. Quaestiones solvit Epicureorum.

Cap. I Sequitur secunda quaestio. Cur animi terrenis corporibus sint inclusi? Ratio prima. Ut cognoscant singula.

Cap. II Secunda ratio. Ut formae singulares cum universalibus formis concilientur.

Chapter 12 An unraveling of the Averroists' arguments concerning the separate mind.

Chapter 13 Refutation of the Averroists' arguments concerning the single mind.

Chapter 14 The signs that there is not just one mind.

Chapter 15 Arguments proving that there is not just one mind. First, because seven of its consequences are unnecessary.

Chapter 16 Second proof: Because the mind preserves the species and must have long since been full of them all.

Chapter 17 Third proof: Because, as often as two people understand the same thing, complete absurdities as often ensue.

Chapter 18 Fourth proof: Because either the knowledge of many men is the same, or superfluous qualities are in the same man.

Chapter 19 Fifth proof: Because there would be contradictory things in the same mind.

Sixteenth Book: The questions of the Epicureans are resolved.

Chapter 1 Next the second question: Why are rational souls imprisoned in earthly bodies? First proof: That they may know particular things.

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Cap. IV Quarta ratio. Ut anima fiat beatior.

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Cap. VI Sexta ratio. Ut mundus ornetur, colatur deus.

Cap. VII Tertia quaestio. Quam ob causam animi, si divini sunt, perturbationibus afficiuntur?

Cap. VIII Quarta quaestio. Quare animi a corporibus inviti discedunt?

Chapter 3 Third proof: That the divine ray and its formulae alike may be reflected towards God.

Chapter 4 Fourth proof: That the soul may become more blessed.

Chapter 5 Fifth proof: That the soul's lower powers may proceed to an effect.

Chapter 6 Sixth proof: That the world may be adorned and God be worshipped.

Chapter 7 The third question: If rational souls are divine, why are they afflicted with tumultuous emotions?

Chapter 8 The fourth question: Why do rational souls depart unwillingly from their bodies?

LIBER QUINTUS DECIMUS[1]

: I :

Sequuntur quaestiones quinque de anima.
Prima: Utrum sit unus cunctorum hominum intellectus?
Quod non.

1 Multa iam quae afferri solent adversus animam superioribus disputationibus confutavimus. Quinque restant, ut arbitror, dubia declaranda. Primum est, de quo peripateticus Averrois dubitavit, ne forte una sit mens hominum omnium et aeterna, multae autem animae atque mortales, ita ut nihil prosit mentis ipsius aeternitas humanis animis perituris. Secundum, de quo dubitant nonnulli: Cur animi, si divini sunt, terrenis corporibus tam infimis sint coniuncti? Tertium: Quam ob causam in his adeo perturbentur? Quartum: Cur inviti discedant? Quintum: Qualis animae status sit antequam ad corpus accedat, qualis etiam post discessum?

2 Averrois, hispanus patria, lingua arabs, Aristotelis doctrinae deditus, graecae linguae ignarus, aristotelicos libros in linguam barbaram e graeca perversos potius quam conversos legisse traditur, ut non mirum sit, si in quibusdam rebus reconditis brevissimi scriptoris mens eum latuerit. Quod illi contigisse platonicus Plethon testatur ac[2] peritissimi quique graecorum. Et quod maximum est, adversus Averroem graeca Aristotelis verba reclamant. Ait ipse Plethon Aristotelem sine controversia censuisse hominum animos esse multos et sempiternos. Subiungit nolle se Aristotelis verba pervertere, etsi Aristoteles Platonis ceterorumque philosophorum verba pervertit. Haec ille. Videtur tamen Alexander Aphrodiseus[3] Aristotelis sensum de anima pervertisse, ubi ait Aristotelem mortalem animum censuisse. Themistius aequius Aristotelem declaravit, dicens ab eo mentem quidem agentem unicam, capacem vero

BOOK XV

: I :

Five questions concerning the soul.
First, is there one intellect for all men?
The answer is no.

In the previous arguments we have already refuted many objections customarily adduced against the soul. In my view five objections needing clarification remain. The first is the objection raised by Averroes the Peripatetic: Is the mind of all men perchance one and eternal, while their souls are many and mortal, such that the eternity of this mind is of no benefit to men's perishable souls? The second objection raised by some is this: Why are souls, if they are divine, joined to such lowly earthly bodies? The third objection: Why are they so troubled in these bodies? The fourth: Why do they leave them reluctantly? The fifth: What is the status of the soul before it enters the body, and what after it departs? 1

They say that Averroes, a native of Spain but Arab speaking, was devoted to the teachings of Aristotle, but did not know the Greek language; and that he read the books of Aristotle after they had been perverted rather than converted from the Greek into a barbarous tongue.[1] So it is not surprising if, on certain particularly difficult matters, the intent of that most succinct of authors should have eluded him. The Platonist Pletho and a number of learned Greeks attest that this is what happened to him.[2] But what is most important is that the words of Aristotle in Greek contradict Averroes.[3] Pletho himself says that it is indisputable that Aristotle considered human souls to be many and to be everlasting. He adds that he does not wish to subvert the words of Aristotle, even though Aristotle subverted the words of Plato and of 2

multiplicem existimari, et utramque perpetuam. Quid vero ipse sentiat Alexander in *Quaestionibus naturalibus*[4] declarat, ubi inquit: 'Medicina etsi scientia est, tamen in opere suo ars apparet, quemadmodum anima, etsi est immortalis, tamen in corpus mortale demersa videtur esse mortalis.' Atque iterum ait noluisse mundi opificem divinos caelestesque hominum animos corporibus terrenis absque congruo quodam medio colligare. Medium vero eiusmodi spiritum vehiculumque Platonicorum more cognominat. Proclus vero non modo Platonicos, sed etiam Aristotelem affirmat immortalem animam posuisse, et eadem ratione posuisse Themistius asserit qua et Plato posuerat, atque postquam in libro *De anima* tertio probavit utrumque intellectum, scilicet agentem atque capacem, esse perpetuum, addidisse solum hunc, scilicet ex utroque mixtum, esse talem; passivam vero rationem, id est phantasiam, minime. Quam ob causam conclusisse nos post obitum humanarum rerum non reminisci, quoniam harum recordatio per conversionem ad phantasmata ac propter affectum ad corporea fieri solet. Quod ergo inquit: 'non reminiscimur', ideo Themistius vult esse additum, ut indicaret animos post obitum vivere pluresque animos, sed nihil esse mirum, si corporalium non reminiscantur; quod si perire animos putavisset, nulla fuisset ratio assignanda ob quam minime recordentur. Sed ad Averroem redeamus.

other philosophers. Thus Pletho.[4] Alexander of Aphrodisias, however, seems to have subverted Aristotle's view on the soul, when he declares that Aristotle thought the rational soul mortal.[5] Themistius gave a more balanced explanation of Aristotle when he said that Aristotle considered the agent intellect to be one but the receptive mind to be multiple, and both to be eternal.[6] But Alexander gives his own view in his *Natural Questions* when he observes, "Medicine, though it is a science, appears to be an art in its operation, just as the soul, though it is immortal, appears to be mortal when immersed in the mortal body."[7] Again, he says that the world's maker did not want to bind men's divine and heavenly souls to earthly bodies without some appropriate mean;[8] but in the manner of the Platonists he calls such a mean "spirit" and "vehicle." Proclus also affirms that not only the Platonists but Aristotle too had held the soul to be immortal,[9] and Themistius claims Aristotle had the same argument for this as Plato. He also claims that after Aristotle had proved in the third book of his work *On the Soul* that each intellect, that is, the agent and the receptive, is eternal, he had added that it is this intellect alone, combined as it is from both types, which is eternal, but that the passive reason, namely the phantasy, is not. And this is why Aristotle had concluded that "we do not remember" human affairs after death, since recollection of these affairs customarily comes from our turning back towards images and because of our desire for things corporeal.[10] On the basis of Aristotle's having added "we do not remember," Themistius supposes he was pointing out that souls live after death and are many but that their not remembering corporeals is nothing surprising. Had Aristotle believed that souls perish, he would have had no reason to point out why they do not remember.[11] But let us return to Averroes.

Narratio opinionis Averrois.

3 Averrois cum apud Aristotelem saepe legeret intellectum procul-dubio nihil habere naturae corporalis mortalisque admixtum, sic accepit ut inde tria concluderet. Primum, intellectum non esse corpus, id est non componi ex materia atque forma. Secundum, non esse qualitatem aliquam cum corpore divisibilem aut ullo modo a corpore dependentem. Tertium, non esse formam talem, ut queat corpus perficere, vivificare et regere atque ita haerere corpori, ut ex materia et intellectus substantia unum fiat compositum, cuius esse sit unum. Primum et secundum damus Averroi, tertium, si Peripateticos veteres sequimur, nullo modo concedimus. Negat substantiam intellectus esse posse formam perfectricem corporis actumque vivificum.

4 Prima illius argumentatio huiusmodi est. Si intellectus esset talis corporis actus, ex eo et corpore unum nasceretur compositum et unum esse compositi. Non potest autem ex eius congressu cum corpore unum fieri, quin ipse evadat corporis particeps. Hanc participationem non admittit mens, quam esse ostendit ratio a corporibus absolutam.

5 Secunda ratio. Si mens forma corporis esset, eodem pacto quaeque susciperet quo et materia suscipit corporalis. Quod enim est corporis forma nihil absque sua materia suscipit. Materia vero quicquid suscipit, dividuo[5] suscipit modo, unde formae rerum in ea divisae, temporales, particulares evadunt. Tales quoque caperet intellectus. Numquam igitur per suas formas universalem naturam aliquam comprehenderet.

6 Tertia ratio. Materia formas, quas possidet, non agnoscit. Ita mens, si iuncta materiae per eius consortium eodem pacto caperet quo materia, nihil prorsus agnosceret.

An account of Averroes' view.

Since Averroes read frequently in Aristotle[12] that undoubtedly intellect has no admixture of the bodily and mortal nature, he took this to imply three conclusions. The first is that intellect is not body, is not composed, that is, of matter and form; the second, that intellect is not a quality divisible along with body or in any way dependent on body; the third, that intellect is not a form such that it can perfect, give life to, and govern body, and adhere to body such that a single composite results from matter and from the intellect's substance, a composite whose being is one.[13] We grant the first and the second conclusion to Averroes, but if we follow the ancient Peripatetics, we can in no way concede the third. He is denying the intellect's substance can be the form perfecting body, can be its life-giving act. 3

His first argument is as follows. If intellect were to be body's life-giving act, a single composite would emerge from it and body and this composite would have one being. However, a single being cannot arise from a union with body unless intellect itself becomes a participant of body. But mind, which reason demonstrates is independent of bodies, does not admit of this participation.[14] 4

Averroes' second argument. If mind were the form of body, each mind would receive in the same way that matter receives. For what is the form of body without its own matter receives nothing. But whatever matter receives, it receives in a divided manner. Hence forms of things in matter become divided, temporal, and individual. Intellect would also receive them as such. So intellect would never embrace any universal nature through its own [divided] forms.[15] 5

Averroes' third argument. Matter has no knowledge of the forms it possesses. So if mind united with matter were to receive by its association with matter in the same way that matter receives, it would not perceive anything at all.[16] 6

7 Quarta ratio. Impossibile est in corpore infinitam ulla ratione esse virtutem. Mentis autem virtus est quodammodo infinita. Hinc effici vult, ut mens nullum habeat commercium cum materia.

8 Cum vero multae sint in natura species mentis, unam quandam eius speciem vult esse humanam mentem, illam scilicet quae rerum ordinem speculatur in nobis, quandoquidem in cunctis hominibus idem est secundum speciem modus intellegendi eademque anima specie, per quam una secundum speciem est in cunctis hominibus vita eademque figura. Quoniam vero una est humana mens specie, una quoque sit numero oportet, id est unica et singularis, non divisa per singulos. Nam forma, quae in se una est specie, non secatur in multas nisi adiectione materiae. At quomodo mens humana una in se existens dividetur in plures, cum nullius sit materiae particeps?

9 Praeterea si alius esset in me intellectus, in te alius, oporteret speciem illam quae est intellegendae rei similitudo aliam secundum numerum in me esse, in te aliam, secundum speciem vero eandem.[6] Cum enim rerum intellegendarum species in mente sint quasi subiecto, oportet in aliis mentibus alias esse species et distinctas. Distinctas, inquam, numero, sicut mentes distinctae sunt numero. Species autem aut formae quae multae sunt numero, unum specie, formae sunt particulares, quae ad intellegentiam conferre non possunt, quoniam universale oportet esse quod sit vere intellegendum.

10 Accedit quod, quando alius docet alium, praeceptor scientiam suam in discipulum videtur transfundere. Aut igitur eandem[7] om-

His fourth argument. It is impossible for power to be infinite 7
for any reason in body. Yet the power of mind is in a way infinite. From this Averroes wishes to prove that mind has no association with matter.[17]

Although many species of mind exist in nature, Averroes claims 8
that the human mind—that which observes the universal order in ourselves—is one particular species of mind; and he does so on the grounds that there is in all men both the same mode of understanding (in terms of its species) and the same soul (in terms of its species), and that through this soul there is one life (in terms of its species) and the same physical form in all men. But since the human mind is one in species, it must also be one in number, that is to say, be unique, individual, and not divided among individuals. For the form, which in itself is one in species, is not divided into many forms except through the addition of matter. And how can that one human mind which exists in itself be divided into many minds when it does not participate in matter at all?

If one intellect [Averroes continues] were to exist in me and an- 9
other in you, then that very species which is the similitude of the object to be understood would have to be numerically one in me but another in you, yet identical in terms of species. Now, since the species of the objects of understanding are in a mind as in a substrate, these species must be different and distinct in various minds—distinct, I say, in number, just as the minds are distinct in number. But species or forms, which, though one in species, are many in number, are particular forms which cannot contribute to understanding, since that which is truly understood must be universal.

Furthermore, when one person teaches another, the teacher 10
seems to pass his knowledge on to the pupil. And so he passes on to his pupil either the same knowledge he had himself, or knowledge identical in species but different in number. If he passes on knowledge that is identical in species but different in number, he

nino quam habebat ipse tradit discipulo, aut aliam numero, specie vero eandem. Si eandem specie tradit, sed numero aliam, eodem pacto scientiam generabit quo suum opus generare natura solet. Nempe quod per naturam agit, formam suam gignit in alio convenientem plurimum specie, numero differentem. Hoc autem pertinet ad ea quae congruunt invicem materia. Mens vero tum docentis, tum discentis est supra materiam, atque ipsa scientia non est qualitas efficax, sicut calor atque similia. Restat itaque ut eandem prorsus scientiam numero quam possidet ipse docendo communicet et discipulo. Quod fieri nequit umquam, nisi sit in utrisque unicus intellectus, ne eadem scientiae qualitas de subiecto alio in aliud transeat neve magister docendo scientiam cogatur amittere.

11 Adde quod in nostris mentibus, si diversae numero et convenientes specie fuerint, notiones cognitarum rerum specie convenient, different numero. Quae vero praeter diversitatem suam in specie aliqua congruunt, profecto in communi quadam congruunt notione. Communem huiusmodi notionem tam meus intellectus quam tuus videbit, ad quam diversas illas colliget notiones. Sic utrique huiusmodi notionem concipiemus, ego unam, tu alteram, numero quoque differentes, specie congruas. Ideo rursus ad communem aliam similiter redigemus. Atque ita in infinitum. Est autem absurdum in rebus ordinatis infinitum progressum inducere; in speciebus vero rerum ordinem esse necessarium est.

12 His rationibus concludit Averrois humanam mentem, quia sine materia est, unicam esse ac fuisse semper et fore, esse vero hanc omnium mentium infimam. Et sicut superioribus orbibus singulis

will be reproducing knowledge in the same way that nature customarily reproduces its work. Indeed, that which acts in accordance with nature begets in another its own form, a form that agrees for the most part in species but differs in number. But this pertains only to those things that agree with each other in [their] matter. The mind both of the teacher and of the pupil, however, is beyond matter, and knowledge itself is not an effective quality like heat and the like. The only option left is that the teacher in teaching communicates also to his pupil absolutely the same knowledge numerically as that which he possesses himself. But this can never happen [Averroes claims] unless a single intellect exists in both; otherwise the same quality of knowledge would cross over from one subject to another, and the teacher would be forced to lose his knowledge in teaching.[18]

11 Moreover, if our minds were different in number but agreed in their species [Averroes continues], the notions of things known in them would [also] be consonant in their species but different in number. But things, which, over and beyond their diversity, are alike in a particular species, are certainly alike in a common notion. My intellect as well as yours will perceive such a common notion, and gather those diverse notions under it. And so each one of us will conceive of that common notion—I of one common notion, you of another—and these notions will also differ in number but agree in species. Once again, therefore, we will reduce them in a similar way to another common notion. And so on to infinity. But it is absurd to introduce an infinite regression in things that have been arranged in order. It is necessary, however, that the order of things exist in the species.

12 With these arguments Averroes concludes that the human mind, inasmuch as it is without matter, is one, and has always existed, and will always exist, but that it is the lowest of all minds. And just as he assigns individual minds to the individual higher spheres, so he assigns this single mind to this inferior sphere, a

singulas mentes attribuit, ita orbi huic inferiori mentem unam, quae non huius hominis proprie vel illius, sed humanae speciei mens appelletur, ut speciei unicae sit unicus intellectus, in hoc orbe inferiori, ut nonnulli ipsum interpretantur, totus ubique. Constare quippe hunc hominem quem videmus existimat ex corpore hoc et anima sensitiva, ut nominat ipse, intellectiva vero nequaquam. Sed hanc animam sensitivam esse omnium talium animarum perfectissimam, a brutis specie differentem. Tot esse animas quot hominum corpora, oriri et occidere cum corporibus. Supremam huius animae vim appellat virtutem cogitatricem, quam Graeci nominant[8] phantasiam.

13 Addit animas bestiarum habere aestimatricem vim aliquam, per quam naturali instinctu, quod bonum sibi vel malum sit, iudicent subito, ac prosequantur et fugiant. Nostram vero animam habere vim illam cogitatricem, quae non naturae ductu feratur, sed ratione perquirat, consilio quodam deliberet, eligat ut consuluit; nihil tamen sentiat universale, sed discurrat solum per singula. Hanc ideo vocat rationem particularem; intellectum vero rationem universalem. Rationem hanc particularem locat in media cerebri particula inter imaginationem atque memoriam. Opinatur enim in prima particula sensum esse communem, qui operationes quinque sensuum in se colligat; in secunda imaginationem, earum imaginum conservatricem quas communis sensus collegerat; in tertia cogitatricem, virtutem iudicem eorum quae servavit imaginatio; in quarta memoriam, custodem iudiciorum quae cogitatrix potentia protulit. Igitur cogitatrix virtus, mediae partis regina, prae ceteris rebus inferioribus est proxima menti, adeo ut mens illi adsit ubique et intellegentiam suam per eius expleat adminiculum, dum

mind designated not properly this or that man's mind but the mind of the human species, so that there is a single intellect for that one species — as some interpret him — wholly and everywhere present in this lower sphere. Indeed, Averroes thinks: (i) that the man we see [here] consists of a body and a sensitive soul, as he calls it, but not of an intellective soul; (ii) that this sensitive soul is the most perfect of all such souls and differs in species from the beasts; and iii) that as many such souls exist as there are bodies of men, and that they are born and die together with the bodies. He calls the highest power of this sensitive soul the cogitative power (which the Greeks call the phantasy).

13 Averroes adds that the souls of beasts have a certain estimative power by which they can instinctively and instantly judge what is good or bad for them, and either pursue or flee from it. He thinks that our soul, however, has that cogitative power which is not guided by nature but seeks by way of reason, deliberates in a weighing of issues, and chooses as it has deliberated; yet it perceives nothing universal and thinks discursively only about particulars. So he calls this cogitative power the particular reason, but he calls intellect the universal reason. He locates the particular reason in the small middle part of the brain between the phantasy and the memory. For he supposes that in the first part is the common sense, which gathers into itself the operations of the five senses; in the second is the phantasy, the preserver of the senses' images which the common sense has [already] collected; in the third is the cogitative power which judges the images saved by the phantasy; and in the fourth is the memory, the guardian of the judgments which the cogitative power has produced. Thus the cogitative power, the queen of the middle part, is in comparison with all lower things the closest to mind, such that mind is everywhere present to that power and with the help of that power perfects its own understanding (this is when the images of things shining in the cogitative power prompt that mind to understand-

simulacra rerum in cogitatrice virtute lucentia mentem ad intellegendum movent. Atque haec sola est hominis cum mente communio, non quia intellectus sit pars aut forma vivifica hominis huius qui ex corpore et anima cogitatrice componitur (separatur enim intellectus ab homine et in essentia et in essendo), sed quia praesens est ubique intellectus hominis huius cogitationi atque ex hac particulari cogitatione ille universalem haurit speciem. Occasionem praebet homo intellectui ad speculandum, quemadmodum coloratum lumen oculo ad videndum. Neque ex homine hoc et mente conficitur unum esse, sed operatio una contingit, una scilicet intellectio, quae tamen non in homine est ullo modo, sed in mente sola — in mente, inquam, ab hominis cogitatione pulsata. Neque quicquam ex illa transit in hominem, sed tota completur in mente. Non intellegit homo per mentem aliquid, sed in homine mens intellegit, atque in ipsa mente artium scientiarumque sunt habitus. Cogitatrix anima unitur puero a prima eius origine, mens vero diu postea, cum simulacra in cogitatione sunt adeo pura ut moveant intellectum.

14 Affirmant Averroici duas esse non vires solummodo, sed substantias ex quibus componitur intellectus. Sane vim agentem esse substantiam unam, capacem vim substantiam alteram. Et illam natura sua lucidam formatricemque esse, hanc obscuram penitus atque formabilem; harum aeterna copula unam constare animam secundum esse, quemadmodum ex materia et forma unum secundum esse fit in natura compositum. Illam intellectum vocant agentem, hanc intellectum formabilem et capacem. Censent intellectum agentem, quia sit actus per se existens, per se intellegere se ipsum semper, ita ut respiciens essentiam suam se videat, ac per se mentes quoque supernas. Intellectionem huiusmodi esse ipsam

ing).[19] This is the only communion a man has with mind, not because intellect is a part, or is the life-giving form, of this man who is composed of a body and a cogitative soul (for intellect is separate from a man both in essence and in existence), but because intellect is everywhere present to this man's cogitation and from his particular cogitation derives the universal species. The man offers an occasion for contemplating to this [single] intellect, just as colored light offers an occasion for seeing to the eye.[20] Nor is it that one entity is fashioned from a man and from mind but rather a single operation occurs, one act of understanding, which nonetheless is not in a man in any way but in mind alone, in mind prompted by a man's cogitation. But nothing from mind passes over into a man; the entire act is accomplished in mind. Through mind a man does not understand anything, but mind does understand in the man, and in mind itself are the habits [the potential skills] of the arts and sciences. The cogitative soul is joined to a child from its very beginning, but mind much later, when the images in a soul's cogitation are pure enough to move the intellect.

14 The Averroists affirm that there are not only two powers but two substances from which intellect is compounded. Clearly the agent power is one substance, the receptive power another. The first, in accordance with its own nature, is bright and formative, while the second is wholly dark and formable; and from the eternal bonding of these two comes, with respect to its being, one soul (in nature a single thing is similarly compounded, with respect to its being, from matter and form). They call the first the agent intellect, the second the formable and receptive intellect. They think that the agent intellect, since it is self-existing act, always understands itself through itself in such a way that in regarding its own essence it sees itself and through itself the celestial minds too. Such understanding, the Averroists argue, is its very essence. But since its essence is always united to the receptive intellect, they think that it is through this same intellectual essence that the re-

eius essentiam. Quoniam vero essentia eius semper est intellectui capaci coniuncta, sequi putant ut per hanc eandem intellectualem essentiam intellectus capax intellegat semper agentem intellectum, cuius illamet tam intellectio est quam essentia; intellegat quinetiam mentes superiores. Hanc intellectionem esse in[9] intellectu universo sive anima actum unum stabilem et aeternum; esse quoque in ipsa parte eius formabili intellegentiam alteram, sempiternam quidem, sed variam, temporalem atque multiplicem, quam mutuatur a nobis. Et quia haeret propius agenti intellectui quam phantasiae, ac propter coniunctionem cum temporali phantasia temporalem sortitur cognitionem, patere putant id, quod diximus paulo ante, ut scilicet propter coniunctionem cum aeterno illo intellectu aeternam intellegentiam habeat, tanto altera clariorem, quanto intellectui agenti familiarior est quam phantasiae.

15 In nobis vero dubiam mutabilemque scientiam singulatim aucupari existimant, ita ut vivente Pythagora per simulacra rerum in Pythagorae cogitatione lucentia scientiam illam collegerit pythagoricam; decedente vero Pythagora et cessantibus illis simulacris intellectus species inde acceptas scientiamque amiserit, nam species illas a simulacris fieri atque servari. Quinetiam vivente Pythagora totiens actum suum praetermiserit intellectus apud Pythagoram, quotiens suum Pythagorae cogitatio. Una acceperit, una oblitus fuerit, receperit una. Fecisse similiter in Platone et in singulis quotidie eodem pacto. Imbui ubique ac semper variis modis per varias hominum animas et quodammodo pasci; tot accipere species quot in nobis simulacra fuerint, tamquam speculum imagines a corporibus; totidem actus edere intellegendi, habitus quoque diversos disciplinarum pro humanorum studiorum diversitate. Et quia quo-

ceptive intellect always understands the agent intellect of which the essence itself is the act of understanding and the essence alike; and it understands too the higher minds. They also conclude that this understanding is a single, stable, and eternal act in the universal intellect or soul, but that in this intellect's formable part is another understanding too, everlasting indeed but changing, temporal, and manifold, which is borrowed from us.[21] Because it adheres more closely to the agent intellect than to our phantasy but is allotted a temporal cognition on account of its union with our temporal phantasy, they accept as obvious what we said a little earlier, namely that, on account of its union with that eternal intellect, it has eternal understanding, this being clearer than its other [temporal cognition] to the extent it is more akin to the agent intellect than to the phantasy.

The Averroists think that in us, however, only a doubtful and changeable knowledge is being individually pursued. For example, when Pythagoras was alive, that [single] intellect would have garnered the assemblage of Pythagorean knowledge by way of the images of things ablaze in Pythagoras' cogitation. But when he died and the images had faded away, that intellect would have lost both the species culled from the images and the Pythagorean knowledge, for the species were created and sustained by the images. Even when Pythagoras was alive, moreover, as often as his cogitation ceased its activity, that intellect would have ceased acting in Pythagoras. That one mind would have received, forgotten, and received again. It would have done likewise in Plato and daily in like manner in other individuals. Everywhere and at every time, [the Averroists argue,] that mind is replenished in various ways through the various souls of men, and to a degree nourished. It receives as many species as there are images in us, just as a mirror receives images from bodies; and it produces as many acts of understanding and also the diverse habits [or potential skills] of the disciplines corresponding to the diversity of human studies. And

tidie innumerabilis hominum multitudo cognitioni omnium studet, quotidie hinc illum omnia discere. Atque per ipsas species haustas a simulacris nostris intellectum capacem non modo inferiora, sed denique tum in cunctis hominibus, tum in hominibus sapientissimis se ipsum cognoscere, hinc agentem intellectum, inde et mentes[10] superiores.

16 Opinantur in hoc mirabilem rerum conexionem consistere. Esse namque formas a materia penitus absolutas, ipsos scilicet angelos, inter quos non sint plures in una angelica specie angeli, sed quot sunt angeli, totidem sint species angelorum. Esse insuper formas penitus corporales in eadem specie plurimas, puta animalium animas et formas illis inferiores. Interponi compositum hoc ex homine atque ex mente—ex hominum animabus multis, mente una—quasi monstrum quoddam ingens multis cruribus et capite uno compositum, ubi et absoluta forma cum corporeis coit et corporea cum ipsa vicissim. Atque, ut par est, quod est absolutum unicum permanet in se ipso; quod est corporale fit multiplex, dum una mens innumerabilibus sufficit animabus. Et illud quidem compositum ex mente et unoquoque nostrum hominem intellectualem appellant, sed unumquemque nostrum seorsum a mente hominem cogitativum. Et primum quidem hominem affirmant aliquid intellegere, quia pars eius, id est mens, intellegit (sicut hominem solemus simum appellare quia nasus est simus), alterum vero hominem nihil penitus intellegere.

since the numberless multitudes of men daily apply themselves to the understanding of all things, that intellect daily learns all things from this multitude. Through the species derived from our images, the receptive intellect comes not only to know inferior things but eventually, in all men and in the wisest of men, to know itself, and hence the agent intellect, and thence the higher minds.[22]

16 The Averroists suppose that the marvellous connection of things is founded on this process. For forms exist that are wholly free of matter, the angels themselves, amongst whom we find, not many angels in one angelic species, but as many species of angels as there are angels.[23] Completely corporeal forms also exist, hosts of them in the same species, the souls of animals, for instance, and the forms inferior to them. But interposed [the Averroists say] is a compound made from man and from mind—from the many human souls and from one mind—like an enormous monster consisting of many limbs and one head, where the absolute form joins with things corporeal and things corporeal in turn with it. And what is absolutely one remains in itself as is fitting, but what is corporeal becomes manifold, while one mind suffices for numberless souls. And the Averroists call that compound made from mind and from each one of us the intellectual man, but each of us when separated from mind, the cogitative man. They affirm that the first [the intellectual] man understands something because a part of him, his mind, understands—we are accustomed, similarly, to calling a man snub-nosed because his nose is flat—but that the other [the cogitative] man understands absolutely nothing.

: II :

Confutatio Averrois. Quod mens sit forma corporis patet primum ex ordine naturae.

1 Magna fuit olim inter Peripateticos de mente hominis controversia, atque 'adhuc sub iudice lis est.' Dicaearchus eam esse formam aiebat tum corporis tum corporalem: corporis, quia corpus humanum vivificat; corporalem, quia e corporis sinu depromitur. Averrois contra neque formam corpoream esse neque etiam corporis. Avicenna, theologorum arabum princeps, et Alganteles mediam viam secuti, mentem asseruerunt formam quidem corporis esse, non corporalem, ut inter formas quae corporis corporalesque sunt atque formas quae neque corporales sunt neque corporis, tamquam maxime differentes, mediae quaedam formae sint, partim cum illis, partim cum his quodammodo congruentes. Merito inter formas omnino divinas, quae ita separatae a materia sunt ut coniungi non possint, atque naturales omnino, quae ita coniunctae sunt ut nequeant separari, formae interponuntur mediae, partim quidem naturales, partim quoque divinae, quae ita separatae sunt ut coniungi possint, ita coniunctae ut valeant separari. Quod quidem earum viribus actionibusque ostenditur, quae tali quadam tum coniunctionis tum separationis inter se differentia distinguuntur. Denique non ab re inter sensum, qui et in forma corporis est et indiget instrumento, atque intellectum angelicum, qui est utrinque liber, intellectus est humanus, qui in forma quidem

: II :

The refutation of Averroes. That mind is the form of body is demonstrated first from the order of nature.

There used to be a heated controversy among the Peripatetics about man's mind, and "still the dispute is before the judge."[24] Dicaearchus said that mind was both the form of body and a corporeal form: of body because it gives life to the human body, corporeal because it is produced from the body's womb.[25] Averroes, on the contrary, said that it is neither a corporeal form nor even the form of body.[26] Avicenna, the prince of Arab theologians, and Algazel took a middle position and claimed that mind is indeed the form of body but is not corporeal.[27] Thus between the two extremes—the forms which are of body and corporeal, and the forms which are neither of body nor corporeal—are certain midway forms which accord in a way partly with the former and partly with the latter. Positioned, and properly so, between the forms which are altogether divine and separated from matter (in such a way that they cannot be united with it) and the forms which are altogether natural and united with matter (in such a way that they cannot be separated from it) are these intermediary forms. They are indeed partly natural and also partly divine, and they are separated from matter in such a way that they can be united with it, but united with it in such a way that they can be separated from it. This is demonstrated in their powers and actions, which are mutually distinguished by such a diversity both of union and of separation. Finally, it is not irrelevant that between sensation, which is in the body's form and needs an instrument [i.e. a sense], and the angelic intellect, which is independent in both respects, one finds the human intellect, which is in the body's form but

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corporis est, sed nullo indiget corporis instrumento. Quae quidem sententia et communi hominum iudicio probabilior est et libris Platonis, Aristotelis, Theophrasti atque Themistii maxime consona.

2 Dicaearchum una cum Epicureis satis iam libris superioribus confutavimus. Averroem deinceps pro viribus reprobantes, Avicennae et Algantelis interpretationem, immo Platonis Aristotelisque sententiam comprobabimus. Siquidem ex fundamentis quae alias iecimus, ostendemus probabile esse ut inter formas quae solum intellegunt, ac formas quae solum vivificando corpori astringuntur, fit[11] forma media, quae et corpus vivificet et intellegat, ut divini vultus imago non succumbat ubique materiae, sed vincat alicubi. Sunt autem formae in corporibus nihil aliud quam idearum imagines divinarum, sicut figurae quae imprimuntur in cera sigilli aurei sunt imagines. Si in omnibus ceris confusa fiat impressio, inertem dices illum, qui impresserit tam inepte. Ita mens divina, quae in movenda materia est suae similitudinis avida, iners forte videbitur, si numquam sui voti compos efficiatur. Fiet autem numquam, nisi formae huiusmodi appareant in corporibus, quae ita ferme corporibus imperent suis, sicut mundo deus, atque ita in se ac deum per intellegentiam reflectantur, perinde ut deus se vertit in deum. Quippe divina mens per caelorum motum agitando materiam dicitur aliquid, immo omnia generare sive producere, quamvis non quamlibet formam vel per mutationem producat vel ex materia ipsa educat. Quoniam vero primus ipse terminus, unde generatio haec vel productio universalis sumit exordium, divina ipsa mens est, ultimus quoque terminus, quo talis generatio clau-

needs none of the body's instruments. According to men's common judgment, this view is the more probable and it is fully consonant with the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Themistius.

2 In the preceding books we have already sufficiently refuted Dicaearchus along with the Epicureans.[28] Now we shall use all our resources to reject Averroes and to prove the interpretation of Avicenna and Algazel, or rather the [original] view of Plato and Aristotle. We will demonstrate from arguments laid down elsewhere that in all probability, between the forms which alone understand and the forms which in giving life are confined to the body alone, occurs an intermediate form. This form must both give life to the body and understand in order that being the image of the divine countenance it may not everywhere be overcome by matter but somewhere overcome it. But forms in bodies are nothing else than images of the divine Ideas, just as figures that are stamped in wax are images of a gold seal. If the impression in all the pieces of wax is muddled, you will say that the man who impressed them so poorly was inept. Thus the divine mind, which in moving matter is eager for its own likeness, will seem without skill perhaps if it never achieves its wish. But achieving its wish will never happen unless such forms are to appear in bodies, forms which will rule their bodies almost as God rules the world but be reflected back upon themselves and onto God through understanding, just as God turns Himself towards Himself. Of course, the divine mind, by setting matter into motion through the movement of the heavens, is said to generate or produce something or rather all things, even though it does not produce any form whatsoever through this mutation or educe it from matter itself. But because the first terminus from which this generation or production of all things takes its origin is the divine mind itself, the last terminus wherein such generation is concluded must also be a divine mind. But the ultimate terminus of generation is in that

ditur, mens quaedam debet esse divina. Terminus vero generationis ultimus in eo est quod gignitur, eiusque est forma. Quocirca aliquam esse oportet divinam mentem quae sit materiae forma. Nam si generatio ab igne facta finitur in ignis formam, facta ab homine in hominis figuram, cur non generatio vel productio, quae a divina mente disponitur, finiatur in mentem? Non finitur generatio nisi in formam quae est propria et intima generati perfectio.

3 Si ars per instrumenta tribuit tandem materiae formam formae illi simillimam quam mens artificis continet; si corporis humani natura in generatione semen movet primo ad formam lactis, deinde sanguinis, tertio carnis, denique hominis; si ignis lignum primo ad tepidum movet, ad calidum deinde, tertio ad ignitum; quid obstat quominus divina mens moveat mundi materiam ad formas elementorum primo,[12] mixtorum secundo, plantarum tertio, quarto brutorum, quinto ad formam sui, id est mentem, quae sit corporis geniti forma, ut in nobilissimis natis parentis vultus eluceat? Movet autem[13] materiam ad inferiores formas per mutationem ex ipsa materia educendas, ad mentem vero per divinum actum potius inducendam. Si enim educeretur, mens esse non posset. Hoc autem ad divinum ordinem pertinet, ut postquam formae superiores animo rationali neque educuntur neque inducuntur, formae vero inferiores et inducuntur et educuntur, ipse animus inducatur, non educatur. Ac si tanti pretii est forma mixti ut vim actionemque habeat elementorum, forma rursus plantarum tam valida ut agat quicquid agunt inferiores, itemque forma brutorum, quis neget mentem habere vim actumque formarum inferiorum, ita ut ipsamet eius essentia, dum intellegit, sentiat quoque per corpus et alat corpus?

which is begotten and is the form of that offspring. So there has to be some divine mind that is matter's form. For if generation brought about by fire ends in the form of fire, and generation performed by man ends in the figure of a man, why shouldn't generation or production arranged by the divine mind end in a mind? Generation is not completed until it attains the form that is the proper and inmost perfection of what is begotten.

3 If through its instruments art has eventually bestowed on matter the form which most resembles the form the artist's mind contains; if the nature of the human body in generation impels the seed towards the form first of milk, then of blood, third of flesh, and finally of man;[29] and if fire causes the wood first to grow warm, next to get hot, and finally to ignite; then what prevents the divine mind from moving the world's matter towards the forms first of the elements, next of compounds, third of plants, fourth of beasts, and fifth towards the form of itself (that is, towards the mind that is the form of a generated body), so that the countenance of the parent might shine forth in its noblest offspring? The divine mind moves matter, however, through mutation to educe the lower forms from matter itself, and uses the divine act by contrast to induce mind [into the lower forms]; for were mind educed [from them], it could not be mind. But it is characteristic of the divine order that, since forms superior to the rational soul are neither educed nor induced, whereas inferior forms are both induced and educed, then the rational soul itself [as a form] is induced but not educed. And if the form of a compound is of such excellence that it possesses the power and action of its elements, and the form of plants is so effective that it can do whatever the forms beneath it do, and the form of beasts likewise, who will deny that the mind has the power and the act of lower forms such that its very essence, even as it understands, perceives also through the body's senses and nourishes the body?

4 Profecto cum natura superior totam vim naturae inferioris et includat et superet, idemque opus effectura sit quod fit ab inferiori, dummodo instrumenta eadem ipsi suppeditentur, necesse est mentem illam quae intra nos viget opus alendi et sentiendi posse peragere non minus quam animam cogitatricem. Quippe si complexionis nostrae spiritus sufficiens instrumentum menti est ad intellegentiae ministerium, quod sentiunt Averroici, multo magis ministrabit substantiae mentis ad sensum et alimoniam. Et quia natura superfluis non abundat, non inest nobis nisi[14] anima formaque una praecipua, sicuti nec[15] corporibus aliis, cum superiores formae inferiores contineant.

5 Mentem humanam esse mentium omnium infimam tum ex eo coniicimus quod ex otio migrat in actum atque e converso, tum ex eo quod intellegendi occasionem accipit a corporibus. Sic enim corporibus proxima est, quae ex potentia educuntur in actum propter materiam atque moventur extrinsecus et occasionem sumunt extrinsecus operandi. Si mentium ultima est, ideoque supremo coniungitur corpori, atque ob hanc vicinitatem ipsa a corporibus haurit otium motumque[16] externum, necesse est corpus humanum, compositorum corporum nobilissimum menti coniunctum, duo rursus a mente suscipere, actum scilicet motumque interiorem. Actus a forma suscipitur, ab anima motus interior. Ergo mens infima corporis supremi forma efficitur atque anima. Quippe sicut materia, quae ultimus terminus est corporalium, non est corpus aliquod, ita mens humana, quae mentium ultimus terminus est, non est mens aliqua separata, sed per naturam coniungitur corpori. Et quia sensibus eget ad intellectionis exordium, ut per sensus percipiat corpora eorumque quasi hauriat formas, ideo natura instituit ut tanta esset inter sensum intellectumque cogna-

Indeed, since a superior nature includes and surpasses the entire power of an inferior nature, and will perform the same work which is performed by the inferior (at least while the same instruments are available to it), then necessarily the mind which thrives in us can enact the work of nutrition and of sensation no less than our cogitative soul can. If our complexion's spirit is an adequate instrument for the mind to perform its ministry of understanding, as the Averroists suppose, then all the more will it serve the substance of the mind with regard to sensation and nutrition. And since nature does not abound in superfluities, only one soul and one principal form are present in [each of] us as they are in other bodies (since superior forms contain inferior ones). 4

We surmise that the human mind is the lowest of all minds both from the fact that it passes from inactivity into act, and back again, and from the fact that it receives from bodies the occasion for understanding. In this way it comes closest to bodies that are educed from potency into act on account of matter, and are moved externally and receive the occasion for operating externally. If the human mind is the last of minds, and thus joined to the highest body, and if it derives both rest and external motion from bodies on account of its closeness to them, then necessarily the human body, the most noble of compound bodies, being joined to [this human] mind also receives two things from it, namely act and internal motion. It receives act from the form and interior motion from the soul. Thus the lowest mind becomes the form and soul of the highest body. Indeed just as matter, which is at the lowest limit of corporeal beings, is not itself some body, so the human mind, which is at the lowest limit of minds, is not itself also some separate mind but is naturally joined to body. And since our mind needs the senses for the onset of understanding so that it can perceive bodies through the senses and drink in as it were their forms, nature has accordingly established as great a kinship as could possibly exist between sense and intellect, so that this "drinking" 5

tio quanta esse potest, quo huiusmodi haustus facillime et exquisitissime fieret. Non potest autem aut maior esse cognatio aut facilius exquisitiusque id fieri quam si in eadem substantia animae tam mens quam sensus insit.

6 Et sicut ostrea, quae omnium sensualium ultima sunt, ita propinquant arboribus, quae omnium sensu carentium sunt suprema, ut partim terrae affigantur ut arbores, partim sensu tactus utantur ut sensualia, sic intellectus humanus, infimus inter alios, ita coniungitur naturae earum formarum quae inter corporeas supremae sunt, ut partim formet corpus ut illae, partim intellegat ut mentes superiores. Merito, sicut inter ignem et aquam maxime inter se distantes est aer — inde calens ut ignis, inde humens ut aqua — sic inter angelos animasque brutas longissime differentes rationalis anima interponitur, quae et intellegat ut illi, et corpus formet ut ille. Ac si forma, quae materiae propinquior est, umbra eius est quae a materia est remotior, ut vegetativa sensitivae, haec autem intellectivae, sequitur intellectivam animam per umbram suam, ideoque per suum actum vivificum, materiae iungi.

7 Principale agens sequentia movet agentia. Principalis finis reliquos cogit fines. Materia[17] principalis ceteras materias sustinet. Principalis itaque forma reliquas, quoad fieri potest, formas format. Cum igitur in rebus naturalibus mens forma sit principalis, oportet ut ipsa formet quodammodo ceteras formas omniumque gerat vicem.[18] Quod numquam efficiet, nisi formet materiam antea per formas inferiores congrue praeparatam, atque illis quasi cessantibus illa in se ipsa vires sequentium formarum experiatur.

might occur with the utmost ease and precision. But no greater kinship could exist, nor could the drinking be accomplished more easily or with more exquisite choice, than when the mind and sense are both present in the same substance of the soul.

6 Take the example of oysters: being the most abject of all creatures having sensation, they are closest to trees which are the very highest of all things lacking sensation, so that in part they are attached to the earth like trees, and in part they use the sense of touch like creatures with sensation.[30] In the same way the human intellect, the lowest among intellects, is so united with the nature of those that are the highest among the corporeal forms that in part it forms body as the corporeal forms do, and in part it understands like the higher minds. And deservedly so! Just as between fire and water (which are most distant from one another) there exists the air, which is hot like fire on the one hand and wet like water on the other, so between angels and the souls of brute beasts (the two which most differ from one another) is interposed the rational soul, which understands like the former, but forms body like the latter. But if the form which is closer to matter is a shadow of that which is more remote from matter, as the vegetative form is a shadow of the sensitive, and the sensitive of the intellective, it follows that the intellective soul is united with matter through its own shadow, and so by its life-giving act.

7 The principal agent moves the succeeding agents. The principal end controls the other ends. First matter sustains the other types of matter. So the principal form forms the other forms to the extent that it is possible. Since among natural things the mind is the principal form, it is fitting therefore that in a way it form the other forms and govern the lot of all. It will never accomplish this unless it forms matter that has been harmoniously prepared beforehand through the lower forms; and unless, when these lower forms cease as it were, it experiences in itself the powers of subsequent forms. Moreover, if natural motion achieves its goal and the ascent

Quinetiam si[19] naturalis motus finem suum assequitur atque talis est in formarum genere ascensus ut gradatim magis magisque materiam nitantur transcendere, neque transcendant aliae, necesse est saltem formam naturalium ultimam id assequi, ac non modo formare materiam, sed etiam per aliquid sui materiam prorsus excedere. Qua parte excedit corpus ac tempus, spiritibus et aeternitati intellegendo coniungitur. Talem formam Platonici tum naturalem tum divinam appellant, quia est naturalium formarum divinarumque[20] confinium.

8 Mentes caelestium corporum gubernatrices ita sunt distributae ut unaquaeque unum primo moveat corpus, et illud quidem intrinsecus et sine medio. Multo magis mens humana unicum in primis corpus movere debet et intrinsecus sine medio agitare, cum sit vicinior corpori. Unde videtur contra naturae ordinem esse ut mens illa sublimis corpori sine medio coniungatur, infima vero per animam[21] cogitatricem.

9 Requirit insuper ordo naturae ut sit bonum purum et bonum intellectuale (intellectus purus) et intellectus animalis (anima pura) et anima corporalis. Primum deus est, secundum angelus, tertium anima rationalis. Anima vero irrationalis est quartum. Igitur nisi alicubi sit forma partim intellectualis, partim vivifica, ordo naturae confunditur, qui in eo consistit ut deus purum bonum sit, angelus bonum quidem intellectuale sit sed intellectus purus, anima rationalis sit intellectus quidem animalis sed anima pura, quia ipsa se sustinet, anima irrationalis sit anima ideo impura, quia eget corporis sustentaculo. Sic ergo quia esse in se antecedit esse in alio, et quod in se est, perfectione sua exuberat quoque in aliud, factum est ut sit bonum in se, bonum in mente, mens in se,

in the genus of forms is such that step by step they strive increasingly to transcend matter, but all other [lower] forms do not transcend it, then at least the final form of natural things must achieve this and not only form matter but also through some aspect of itself pass beyond matter entirely. And with this part whereby it exceeds body and time, it is united in understanding with spiritual beings and with eternity. The Platonists call such a form both natural and divine, since it is itself the boundary between natural and divine forms.

8 The minds governing the heavenly bodies are distributed in such a way that each individual mind moves one body primarily and does so from within and without an intermediary. All the more should the human mind move just one body primarily and set it in motion from within and without an intermediary (since it is closer to the body). Hence it seems contrary to the order of nature that the highest mind be joined without an intermediary to a body, but the lowest be joined through a cogitative soul.

9 The order of nature requires, moreover, that there exist: (i) a pure [or absolute] good; (ii) an intellectual good, a pure intellect, (iii) an ensouled intellect, a pure soul, and (iv) a corporeal soul. In this hierarchy the first is God, the second, angel, the third, rational soul, but the fourth, irrational soul. So, unless there exists somewhere a form that is partly intellectual and partly life-giving [i.e. option iii], the order of nature is confounded. For the order consists in the fact that God is the pure good, that angel is the intellectual good but the pure intellect, that rational soul is the ensouled intellect but the pure soul (since it sustains itself), and that irrational soul is therefore impure soul (since it needs the support of body). Therefore, since being in itself precedes being in another, and what exists in itself also overflows in its perfection into another, consequently there is good in itself and good in mind, mind in itself and mind in soul, soul in itself and soul in body, just

mens in anima, anima in se, anima in corpore, sicut corpus summi caeli in se, reliqua vero in ipso.

10 Quod si totum animae genus toto genere corporeo praestantius est, debet amplius esse animae genus quam corporis. Itaque infimum animalis generis summum generis corporalis exsuperat, proptereaque mirum in modum summum generis animalis summum excedit generis corporalis. Quo fit ut rationalis anima non modo corporis profunda ingrediatur alendo, sed etiam sublimia corporis supergrediatur intellegendo. Merito, quia quod excellentius est minus oportet ab eo quod deterius est pendere quam e converso. Sicut ergo animae infimae[22] quasi continentur a corporibus, et mediae quodammodo continentur et continent, ita sublimes omnino corpora continent. Non continent corpus omnino, nisi et intrinsecus penetrent et extrinsecus ambiant. Et sicut ambiendo corporis superficiem anima vitam intellectualem sumit ab alto, sic intima corporis penetrando animalem vitam tribuit infimo. Dum ambit, prout a deo est, intellectum sortitur agentem, prout residet in se ipsa, capacem possidet intellectum. Dum penetrat, prout spiritibus sese insinuat, sentit et movet; prout se immergit humoribus, alit et sustinet. Sed ad universalem rerum ordinem revertamur.

11 Deum dicere possumus esse formam quae neque haeret neque format neque formatur; animam vero irrationalem contra formari, formare, haerere; sed angelum formari quidem a deo, neque tamen haerere materiae neque formare materiam. Merito ergo inter angelum animamque irrationalem animam ponemus rationalem, tali

as the body of the highest heaven exists in itself, but the other bodies exist in it.

10 But if the entire genus of soul is superior to the entire genus of body, the genus of soul must be more extensive than that of body. Therefore the lowest of the animate genus surpasses the highest of the corporeal genus; and so the highest of the animate genus surpasses in a wondrous manner the highest of the corporeal genus. As a result the rational soul not only advances into the body's lowest parts in nourishing, but in understanding also surmounts its most exalted parts. And rightly so, since it less befits what is more excellent to depend on what is less so than the reverse. Therefore, just as the lowest souls are contained as it were by their bodies, and the intermediate souls are contained in a way and yet contain, so the loftiest souls totally contain their bodies. They do not contain the body totally unless they penetrate it internally and circle round it externally. And just as in circling round the outside of the body the soul takes intellectual life from on high, so in penetrating the inside parts of the body it bestows animal life on what is low. When it circles round, according as it comes from God, it is allotted the agent intellect, but insofar as it resides in itself, it possesses the receptive intellect. When it penetrates, insofar as it insinuates itself into the [body's] spirits, it perceives and moves; and insofar as it merges itself into the humors, it nourishes and sustains. But let us return to the universal order of things.

11 We can say that God is a form that does not adhere [to matter], does not form, and is not formed; that the irrational soul, on the contrary, is formed, forms, and does adhere; and that the angel is indeed formed by God, yet does not adhere to and does not form matter. Rightly, therefore, between the angel and the irrational soul, we will insert the rational soul that is endowed with such a nature that it does not adhere to matter, yet is formed and forms. Moreover, we must obviously fully approve the Platonic distinction in Avicenna's *Metaphysics* to the effect that in the intelli-

quadam natura praeditam, ut materiae non inhaereat, formetur tamen et formet. Praeterea multum probanda videtur distinctio illa platonica in *Metaphysicis* Avicennae, videlicet in mundo intellegibili procedendum esse ab intellegibili summo ad intellectus multos, tamquam a formatore ad vires inde formabiles, ac primum ab absoluto illo ad absolutos qui nullo modo inde declinent; deinde ad intellectus qui paulum quid ad sensibilia vergant, id est solum extrinsecus gubernanda, ita ut illis quoque quasi extrinsecus accidere eiusmodi videatur officium; tertio ad intellectus qui, quantum in natura intellectuali fieri potest, naturaliter ad sensibilia iam declinent, id est intrinsecus[23] per vitam motumque regenda. Non enim aliter et sensibilis mundus cum intellegibili perfecte connectitur, et inferiora ad superiorum exemplar pulcherrime atque optime disponuntur. Hinc autem quartus quidem, licet umbratilis, sequitur gradus, ut quidam putant, quasi nodus mentium cum corporibus, vitarum videlicet irrationalium species, quae, ut putant Platonici, tamquam umbrae quaedam mentes sequuntur per corpora procedentes. Sed ad divina iterum revertamur.

12 Deum quidem esse negat nemo. Esse vero ipsum dei non certa quadam specie determinatur essendi, per quam fiat esse tale vel tale, ne compositus sit deus ex communi natura essendi et ex aliqua addita differentia, id est essendi proprietate. Igitur esse ipsum absolutum est nullis limitibus circumscriptum, quod existit penitus infinitum, radix immensa, omnium eorum contentrix et procreatrix, quae tale habent esse vel tale. A simplici enim fonte omnis compositio manat. Igitur angeli esse habent, sed quisque illorum tale esse vel tale, id est cum hac aut illa proprietate in alia atque alia specie angelorum. Quapropter esse angeli non est infinitum sicut esse divinum. Non enim continet amplius totius essendi integram plenitudinem neque omne esse existit, sed una quadam rerum specie clauditur, per quam ad unicum essendi modum determinatur.

gible world we should proceed from the highest intelligible object to the many intellects, as from the Giver of form to the powers formed by Him.[31] First we should proceed from that [highest] absolute object to [other] absolute objects which do not depart from it at all; then to the intellects which do incline a little towards sensible objects but only in order to govern them externally (so that this office also seems to fall to these intellects as it were externally); and third to the intellects which, insofar as it is possible in an intellectual nature, already do naturally decline towards sensible objects (those to be ruled internally through life and motion). For in no other way can the sensible world be joined perfectly with the intelligible world, and can lower things be arranged in the most beautiful and excellent way on the model of higher things. Following on this, some suppose, is a fourth degree, though a shadowy one, which figuratively knots minds with bodies; and this degree consists of the [various] species of irrational lives, which, according to the Platonists, trail after minds as they proceed through bodies like sundry shadows. But let us return to things divine.

12 No one denies the existence of God. Yet the very being of God is not determined by a fixed species of being, which causes this or that entity to be, lest God be compounded from the common nature of being and from some added differentia, that is, from a property of being. Therefore He is absolute Being itself, uncircumscribed by any limits insofar as He exists as the totally infinite, the measureless root that is the container and begetter of all things having a particular being. For every composite being flows from a source that is one. Therefore angels have being, but each of them has a particular being; in other words, one or other species of the angels is endowed with this or that property [of being]. The being of an angel, accordingly, is not infinite like the being divine. For it no longer contains the complete plenitude of being in its entirety, nor does it exist as all being: rather, it is restricted to one particular universal species that limits it to just one mode of being.

13 Par enim est ut esse divinum quod ideas, id est species, antecedit perque species rebus ab ipso manantibus esse dispertit, hoc ipsum esse tradat in speciebus, ideoque diversis speciebus modos essendi diversos. Itaque esse angelicum in angelica specie terminatur. Species autem angelica, quam eandem vocamus essentiam quae esse talis est fundamentum, quodammodo est infinita, non quidem ut deus, sed quia secum ipsa permanet totamque suae speciei servat integritatem, neque quicquam in se accipit ultra speciem et speciei proprietates,[24] cum nulli inferiori naturae propinquet cuius contagione inficiatur. At si essentia haec angelica non differret ab eius esse, infinitum[25] quoque diceretur et esse, quandoquidem in se ipso et per se ipsum subsisteret. Esse vero utrinque infinitum ac per se existere dei solius est proprium. Item si esse eius ab essentia non differret, cum esse sit actus, certe angelus solus esset actus. Cum vero per potentiam solam participatio fiat, nullius alterius participaret angelus essetque undique simplicissimus, quod soli deo congruere potest.

14 Sic deus infinitus est omnino, quia solum esse existit atque esse totum et omne. Angelus finitus est secundum esse, secundum essentiam infinitus, adde et secundum virtutem quodammodo operationemque. Nullius enim deterioris obstaculo, cura, sollicitudine impeditur, quominus totam semper suam virtutem, quantacumque illa sit, exerceat operando. Forma corporis qualis est anima rationalis, quia in certa quadam existit specie sicut angelus, esse habet ipsa quoque finitum; essentiam autem partim infinitam, partim vero finitam. Infinitam quidem, quoniam nihil umquam amittit quod ad speciem suam pertineat—eius siquidem natura

For it is fitting that the Divine Being, which precedes the Ideas, 13
that is, the species, and through the species apportions being to things emanating from Itself, should give this being to the species and thus different modes of being to different species. Angelic being is therefore confined to the angelic species. But the angelic species, which is the same as what we call the angelic essence (which is the basis of its characteristic being), is in a certain manner infinite, not indeed as God is infinite, but because it remains in itself and preserves the total integrity of its species. In itself it does not receive anything beyond the species and the species' properties, since it does not approach any lower nature by whose contagion it might be infected. But if this angelic essence did not differ from the angel's being, it too would be called infinite being, since it would subsist in and through itself. But to be infinite in both ways [i.e. as essence and as being] and to exist through oneself belongs to God alone. Likewise, if the angel's being did not differ from its essence, [and] since being is act, the angel would assuredly be act alone. And since participation happens only through potentiality, the angel would be a participant of nothing else, and would be utterly and completely simple. But this is able to accord with God alone.

Thus God is altogether infinite, since He exists as being alone, 14
as wholly being and all being. The angel is finite with respect to being, but infinite with respect to essence and also in a way to power and operation. No obstacle, care, or anxiety for something inferior prevents it from always exercising all its power, however great that might be, in doing its work. A form forming the body such as the rational soul, since it exists in a particular species like the angel, possesses finite being too. Its essence, however, is in part infinite and in part finite: infinite, since it never loses anything that pertains to its species (for the species' nature is a living and rational act which it never abandons or interrupts[32]); and finite, since it admits something over and beyond the species or the rational

est actus vitalis rationalisque quem actum nec dimittit umquam nec intermittit — finitam vero, quoniam admittit aliquid ultra speciem sive principia speciei, id est affectionem hanc aut illam ad talem vel talem humani corporis habitudinem, per quam fit forma vivifica corporis[26] et ad numerum corporum numeratur. Essentia huius animae, quantum infinita est, corporis capacitatem exsuperat vitamque agit intellectualem. Quantum vero finita est, proportionem habet cum corpore cumque ipso corpoream agit vitam. Ibi vis operatioque infinita viget, hic contra finita. Forma denique corporea undique est finita secundum esse, essentiam, virtutem et actionem. Secundum esse, quia esse eius certae speciei limitibus circumscribitur. Secundum essentiam, tum quia in se accipit accidentia plurima praeter speciem, tum quia proprium vigorem omnino non servat. Nempe eius natura est actus efficax vel vitalis, subit autem in corpore passiones atque interitum. Secundum virtutem et actionem, quoniam virtus eius augetur atque minuitur, et operatio quaelibet eousque se extendit quousque instrumentorum subiectorumque conducunt affectiones. Tales sunt omnes formae anima rationali inferiores.

15 Oportet hos quatuor rerum gradus in natura existere, ut paulatim ab eo quod omnino infinitum est, per media mixta ad ea quae omnino finita sunt, descendamus. Quae quidem gradatio continuari non poterit, nisi quemadmodum in mundo intellegibili infinitum est ac finitum, ut deus et angelus, ita in mundo sensibili duae sint illorum imagines, aliquid scilicet quodammodo infinitum et aliquid omnino finitum, ut rationalis anima et forma quaevis inferior; illa quidem forma corporis est, non corporea, haec et corporis et corporea.

16 Rursus iis gradibus descendamus. Deus esse possidet a se, in se atque pro se. Angelus non a se, quoniam a deo, sed in se atque pro

principles of the species, namely this or that affection or disposition for some particular condition of the human body (via which it becomes the body's life-giving form and is numbered in accordance with the number of bodies). This soul's essence, inasmuch as it is infinite, surpasses the capacity of the body and leads the intellectual life, but inasmuch as it is finite, it is proportionate to the body and leads the bodily life with the body. Infinite power and operation flourish in the first instance, finite by contrast in the second. Finally, the corporeal form is everywhere finite with respect to being, essence, power, and action: (i) with respect to being, since its being is bound within the limits of a certain species; (ii) with respect to essence, both because it receives in itself many accidents in addition to the species, and because it does not wholly maintain its own vigor (for its nature is an efficient and life-giving act, but in the body it submits to passions and to death); and (iii) with respect to power and action, since its power is increased or diminished, and any one of its actions extends itself as far as the affective dispositions of its instruments and of things subject [to it] allow. Such are all the forms inferior to the rational soul.

15 These four universal degrees necessarily exist in nature, so that we may descend gradually from that which is entirely infinite through mixed intermediaries to those things that are wholly finite. Now, just as the infinite and the finite, namely God and the angel, both exist in the intelligible world, so this gradation could not be continuous unless two images of these existed in the sensible world, namely something that is in a way infinite, and something altogether finite—the rational soul, that is, and some kind of lower form, the first being the body's form but incorporeal, the second, the body's form but corporeal.

16 Let us descend again by way of these degrees. God possesses being from Himself, in Himself, and for Himself. The angel possesses being, not from itself because it is from God, but in itself and for itself. The form of body of the kind that is the rational

se. Forma corporis, qualis rationalis est anima, neque a se habet esse, quoniam fit ab alio, neque pro se ipsa tantum esse suum servat, quia ipsum communicat corpori; esse tamen habet in se, quia suum esse in eiusdem fundatur essentia suaeque essentiae actus est proprius, sicuti solis anima secundum Platonicos in se lucet et illuminat solem, ita tamen ut lumen proprium non amittat. Forma vero corporalis esse neque a se neque pro se habet, ut etiam anima, neque rursus in semetipsa. Ita enim est materiae dedicata ut ex ea et materia tale fiat compositum, in quo proprie esse ipsum fundetur et cuius esse sit actus; forma autem eius non sit ipsius esse proprium fundamentum. Hoc ordine carere natura non debet; careret autem, nisi esset forma quaedam corporis non corporea.

17 Huic similis videtur esse illa Procli nostri distinctio. 'Divinum', inquit, 'intellegibile ipsummet est appellandum. Intellectus autem purus sui ipsius atque in se ipso. Intellectus deinde animalis tum sui ipsius, quia esse suum in sua essentia possidet, tum alterius, quoniam ex ipsa sua rationali vita vitam aliam ratione carentem quasi imaginem diffundit in corpus. Natura post haec, id est vitalis complexio, quasi umbra propter vitam ab anima infusam in corpore iam ipso resultans, dumtaxat alterius est iudicanda, id est corporis, cum quo extenditur atque dividitur. Corpus denique ob conditionem eius ex se diversam ac penitus dissipabilem proprie alterum appellatur'. Ubi apparet in ipso rerum ordine intellectum animalem sive animam intellectualem medium obtinere.

18 Similem quodammodo ordinem Porphyrius ex mente Platonis in commentariis in *Timaeum* afferre videtur, in sex universum gra-

soul does not have being from itself, since it comes to be from another; nor does it preserve its being only for itself, since it communicates it to the body; yet it has its being in itself, since its own being is founded on its essence, and the act of its essence is its own. Similarly the soul of the sun, according to the Platonists, shines in itself, and illumines the sun, yet in such a way that it does not lose its own light. But corporeal form has being neither from itself nor for itself (as is the case with the soul) nor again in itself. For it is so consecrated to matter that from itself and from matter there emerges a particular composite on which, strictly speaking, its being is founded and of whose being it is the act; but the form of it is not the proper foundation of its being. In this hierarchy the nature[33] should not be wanting; but it would be if there were not a form of body that was incorporeal.

17 The distinction made by our Proclus appears to be similar to this. He says, "We must refer to the divine intelligible as itself, to the pure intellect as of itself and in itself, and to the ensouled intellect as not only of itself (since it possesses its own being in its essence) but also of another (since from its very own rational life it takes another life lacking in reason, and diffuses it like an image into the body). The nature which next succeeds, that is, the vital complexion, like an image reflecting in the body itself on account now of the life infused in it by the soul, must be judged as being only of another, of the body that is, with which it is extended and divided. Finally the body is properly called the other on account of its condition (it is divided from itself and completely dispersible)."[34] Here it is clear that the ensouled intellect or the intellectual soul has an intermediate position in the order of things.

18 Porphyry, who is following Plato's view, appears in his commentaries on the *Timaeus* to introduce a rather similar order in distinguishing between six degrees in the universe: some things are only being, others only becoming, others simultaneously being and becoming, others, he proves, simultaneously becoming and being.[35]

dus ita distinguens; aliqua solum esse, aliqua solum fieri, alia esse simul et fieri, alia fieri simul et esse probat. Praeterea praeponit omnibus aliquid super esse et fieri, supponit quoque omnibus aliquid sub esse atque fieri collocatum. Esse quidem dicit omnem mentium latitudinem, sive mentes in se ipsis sint sive mentes in animabus. Contra vero fieri vult latitudinem sensibilium, sive elementalia sive caelestia sint. Esse autem simul et fieri animarum genus. Ac vicissim fieri atque esse ipsam universi naturam universum vivificantem, quae quidem eorum quae fiunt summitas est. Atque quatenus per corpora distribuitur, fieri dicitur; quatenus vero per se minime corporea est, dicitur esse. Denique omnibus praeponit quidem bonum, subiicit vero materiam. Quorsum haec? Ut intellegamus non posse ordinem universi continuari, nisi sint formae intellectuales simul corporumque vivificae. Solis enim iis[27] convenire id potest, ut semper esse simul fierique dicantur: esse quidem per substantiam prorsus indivisibilem subitumque intellegentiae ipsius intuitum, fieri vero per temporalem reliquarum actionum discursionem.

19 Talem quandam formam esse oportere ratio haec pythagorica persuadet. Incubat, ut Timaeo Locrensi placet, deus pater materiae matri formas tamquam proles generaturus. Est in patre fecunditas efficax formarum omnium, est in matre fecunditas capax formarum, praecipue corporalium. Est in patre actus formarum efficax, est in matre potentia formarum capax. Nascuntur proles matri similes, multae formae videlicet quae ex materiae fundo

Additionally, he postulates before all others something that is above being and becoming, and after all others something placed below being and becoming. He says indeed that being is the entire range of minds, whether they are minds in themselves or minds in souls. On the other hand he claims that becoming is the range of sensible things, whether these are elemental or celestial. He claims that being and becoming simultaneously are the class of souls; and that becoming and being in alternation are the universe's nature which bestows life on the universe and is indeed the summit of all things that become. To the extent this nature is distributed through bodies it is called becoming, but to the extent that through itself it is not corporeal at all it is called being. Finally he sets the good above all, and matter beneath all. Why all this? That we may understand that the order of the universe cannot be continuous unless forms exist which are simultaneously both intellectual and life-giving to bodies. Of them alone can it be properly said that they have perpetual being and at the same time becoming: they have being through [their] absolutely indivisible substance and the instantaneous intuition of [their] understanding; but they have becoming through the temporal succession of the remainder of their actions.

19 The following Pythagorean argument persuades us that there has to be such a form. According to Timaeus of Locri, God as father, when He is about to beget the forms as His offspring, lies upon matter as the mother.[36] There is in the father a fertility productive of all forms, and in the mother a fertility receptive of forms, especially those of bodies. Offspring are born resembling the mother, the many forms, in other words, which emerge from the depths of matter and are eventually plunged back into it. The shape of a gold vase similarly emerges from the gold and is melted back into it. Again several of the offspring are bound to be born very like the father, so long as the father in this mating prevails over the mother. Such will be the forms leaping forth from the act

emergunt et in idem[28] denique immerguntur, sicut vasis aurei figura ex auro atque in aurum. Nascantur rursus oportet proles nonnullae patri persimiles, si modo plus aliquid pater quam mater in hoc valet congressu. Huiusmodi erunt formae ex patris actu exsilientes in materiae faciem et inde in patris actum resilientes, quemadmodum splendor a sole in aurum et in solem. Illae quidem formae matri similiores prius in materiae visceribus latent quodammodo, sicut figura vasis in auro. Latent et in animorum corporumque mundanorum virtutibus, quae sunt divini artificis instrumenta. Deus eas per mundi motus ex materiae eruit gremio et pro capacitate materiae producit in esse. Huiusmodi autem esse cuius est proprie? Compositi illius corporis quod ex hac generatione conficitur. Quare? Quia instrumentum per quod generantur a deo compositum est. Si ergo proxima causa est composita, et effectus solet proximae causae simillimus provenire, sequitur ut quod proprie gignitur sit id quod est compositum. Ei vero quod gignitur proprie convenit esse. Proprium est igitur illud esse compositi;[29] non enim fit a forma vel materia, sed composito.

20 Accedit quod tales formae materiae secundum potentiam quodammodo prius haerent quam assequantur esse. Atque in materiae gremio producuntur in esse eo ipso momento quo completur esse compositi. Quoniam vero inhaerendo secundum virtutem ipsi materiae fiunt accipiuntque esse, ideo adhaerendo secundum actum eidem materiae retinent esse, ac tamdiu sunt, quamdiu haerent. Non ergo per suum esse sunt, postquam et fiunt et sunt et permanent inhaerendo, sed per esse illius compositi cuius ipsae partes sunt quodve generationis est terminus. Ac merito, cum esse non habeant proprium, neque vim quidem ullam aut operationem propriam possident. Tales sunt formae quae matri similiores vi-

of the father into the shape of matter and leaping back from matter to the act of the father. Splendor similarly radiates from the sun to gold and reflects back to the sun. Those forms resembling the mother more first lie hidden somehow in the entrails of matter as the vase's shape in the gold. They hide too in the powers of worldly souls and bodies, those very powers that are the instruments of the Divine Creator. Through the world's movements God extracts them from the womb of matter and according to the capacity of matter leads them forth into being. But to what, properly, does such being belong? It belongs to that composite body produced from this generation. And why? Because the instrument that generates the forms has been compounded by God. If then the proximate cause is composite, and the effect customarily most resembles the proximate cause, it follows that what is generated, properly speaking, is that which is composite. But properly speaking being belongs to that which is generated. Such being is therefore proper to the composite, for it is not the result of form or matter but of the composite.

One must add to this that such forms somehow cling in potentiality to matter before they obtain being. And within the womb of matter they are brought forth into being at the very moment when the being of that composite is completed. Since indeed it is by inhering potentially in this matter that they come to be and to receive being, it is also by adhering actually to the same matter that they retain being and that they exist as long as they adhere. Thus it is not through their own being that they exist, since by inhering they come to be and exist and remain in existence, but through the being of that composite of which they themselves are the parts and which is the end product of generation; and rightly so, since they do not have their own being, nor do they possess any power or operation of their own. Such are the forms that appear more like the mother than the father. But those that appear more like the father, such as the rational souls, are produced from

dentur esse quam patri. Quae vero sunt patri similiores, quales sunt rationales animae, ex actu mero promuntur dei, ideo subito ad actum perducuntur essendi. Quapropter esse quasi in se habent prius, postea iunguntur materiae. Esse habent antequam haereant corpori, et ante corpus ordine ipso naturae esse retinent, et post corpus esse habent proprium in se ipsis. Operationem aliquam habent propriam in se ipsis, corpori non communem. Esse suum quadam ex parte impertiunt corpori, operationes aliquas in corpore edunt atque per corpus.

: III :

Quomodo mens propinquat corpori.

1 Sed quonam modo esse suum impertiunt corpori? Miscentne ipsum? Minime. Perit enim et confunditur quod miscetur. An tangunt corpus? Nequaquam. Tactus enim duorum est corporum proprius. Numquid clauduntur in eo? Neque istud. Non enim loco clauditur nisi corpus. Quid igitur agunt hae formae in corpus, quando ipsi suum esse communicant? Penetrant ipsum undique essentia sua, virtutem essentiae suae dedicant illi. Cum vero ab essentia[30] ducatur esse et a virtute profluat operatio, coniungendo essentiam impertiunt esse, dedicando virtutem operationes communicant, ita ut ex animae corporisque congressu unum evadat animalis esse, operatio una. Esse quidem hoc animae ipsius est per essentiam, per participationem fit corporis. Non immergit anima esse proprium corpori, sed corpus extollit ad ipsum. Neque capit corpus totam illius essentiae amplitudinem, sed attingit aliquid pro natura sua, neque sustinet eam, sed sustinetur.

the pure act of God, and are thus immediately drawn into the act of being. Hence they already have being in themselves as it were beforehand and are later joined to matter. They have this being before they cling to body, and in the order of nature they retain this being before body, and they have their own being in themselves after body. They have in themselves a certain operation proper to themselves and not shared with body; but in part they communicate their own being to body, and they perform certain operations in and through body.

: III :

How mind approaches body.

But how do these forms impart their being to body? Do they mingle with it? Not at all! For what is mingled is cast into confusion and perishes. Do they just touch body? By no means! For touch is characteristic of two bodies. Are they enclosed in body? Not that. For nothing except body is spatially enclosed. What then do these forms do to body when they impart their being to it? With their essence they penetrate it everywhere and give it the power of their essence. But since being is derived from essence and activity flows forth from power, in uniting [their] essence they impart being, and in giving power they impart activity of all kinds, such that from the union of soul and body emerges one animate being and one activity. Now this [one] being is soul's through essence, but becomes body's through participation. For soul does not submerge its own being in body, but raises body up to it. Nor does body assume the entire extent of that essence: it attains to just some of it in accordance with its own nature, not sustaining it but being sustained by it. 1

2 Quo autem pacto forma non extensa molem corporis impleat, plane intelleget quisquis considerabit etiam extensam formam plurimum ita se ad corpus habere ut quaelibet eius pars aeque se ad quamlibet partem materiae habeat atque vicissim. Itaque cogitare possumus quamlibet huius formae partem in singulis materiae portionibus esse easque ita formare ut tota puncto cuilibet adsit. Verum huic formae auferamus extensionem atque interim formandi corporis officium relinquamus. Possumus enim, nam formare et aliud et praestantius est quam extendi. Itaque si materia extenditur quidem, sed non format, potest aliqua[31] materiae forma formare ac non extendi. Sic videbimus individuam formam totamque simul formare [simul] materiam totam et quamlibet pariter eius partem. Ac si verum sit Pythagoricum illud, videlicet punctum motu suo lineam facere, lineam vero superficiem, superficiem denique simili motu profundum, facile cogitare poterimus punctum idem motu suo se ipsum totum individuumque per longitudinem et latitudinem profunditatemque diffundere. Hinc fit ut ubicumque dividas tangasve, reperias punctum. Quod quidem si sit accidens, a mole necessario sustinebitur. At si substantia fuerit, sicut anima in se subsistens, moli quidem aderit atque a mole seiunctum in se perpetuo permanebit.

: IV :

Quomodo mens adsit corpori.

1 Anima haec tam excellens numquid materiae informi sine medio iungitur? Semper forma perfectior imperfectiores formas intra se

But anyone will understand clearly how an unextended form is 2
able to fill the mass of a body if he considers that, with regard to [that] body, even an extended form is most often in the position of having any one part of itself equally present to any part of the [body's] matter and vice versa. And so we can suppose that any part of this form is present in the individual parts of the matter and that it forms them in such a way that the whole is present to any one point. Let us now subtract extension from this form but still leave it the task of forming the body. We are able to do this because forming is distinct from, and more important than, the act of being extended. If matter is indeed extended but does not form, then some form in matter forms but is not extended. In this way we shall see that the indivisible and entire form simultaneously forms matter as a whole and equally any one of its parts. Now if that Pythagorean saying is true, namely that by its own motion a point produces a line and a line a surface, and by a like motion finally a surface a depth,[37] we will easily be able to understand that the same point by its own motion extends itself totally and indivisibly through length, breadth, and depth. This is why you find a point wherever you divide or touch. If this point is an accident, it is necessarily sustained by the mass; but if it is a substance, like the soul subsisting in itself, it will be present to the mass but will always remain perpetually in itself apart from the mass.

: IV :

How mind is present to body.[38]

Is this soul in all its excellence joined to unformed matter without 1
any intermediary? The more perfect form always contains the less perfect forms within itself, just as a quadrangle includes the trian-

continet, quemadmodum quadrangulus[32] triangulum comprehendit. Rationalis anima, si intellegendi vim habet omnium praestantissimam, habet etiam sentiendi, alendi atque regendi. Ideo in animae rationalis virtute clauditur anima sensitiva et nutritiva, forma quoque mixtorum vita carentium. Accedit materiae rationalis anima iis omnibus praedita formis. Per[33] formam suam seu virtutem, quae mixtorum corporum vita carentium gerit vicem, haeret materiae informi quamproxime, atque in ea quatuor elementorum conflat[34] complexionem, dum partes materiae devincit in unum ac temperat elementa. Per formam suam quae plantarum habet vim, haeret corpori ex materia et complexione composito, illique elementorum complexioni tribuit motum in quamlibet loci partem, qui vita vocatur. Per formam animalium propriam iis se accommodat spiritumque procreat, sensuum instrumentum. Per formam rationalem reliquis imperat. Itaque per infimam vim suam est forma materiae, per secundam forma est corporis mixti, per tertiam plantae, per quartam forma est animalis, immo forma formarum. Ex quo fit ut rationalis anima et corpora formet magis quam reliquae formae, quia per plures virtutes format, et formet purius, quia informem materiam per pedem suum tangit comminus, per caput autem eminus prospicit.

2 Quemadmodum ignis ex quatuor caloris proprii gradibus primum gelido ligno infundit, secundum ligno iam tepido, tertium ligno per duos iam calido, quartum tribus illis gradibus insuper addit per quem fulget superne, sic animae rationalis essentia quatuor quibusdam referta gradibus — mixto, vitali, sensuali, intellec-

gle. If the rational soul has the power of understanding, the most excellent power of all, it also has the powers of perceiving, of nourishing, and of ruling. The sensitive and the nutritive soul is accordingly included in the power of the rational soul, together with the form of mixed bodies lacking life. Endowed with all these forms, the rational soul approaches matter. Through the form or power it has which governs the lot of composite bodies lacking life, it clings as closely as possible to unformed matter, producing in it the complexion of the four elements when it binds the parts of matter together and tempers the elements. Through the form it possesses having the power of plants it clings to a body, which is composed of matter and the complexion, and endows this complexion of the elements with motion towards any point whatsoever in space; and this motion is called life. Through the form proper to living beings it accommodates itself to them and begets the spirit, the instrument of the senses. Through the rational form it governs the other [three] forms. Thus through the lowest of its powers it is the form of matter, through the next lowest it is the form of composite body, through the third it is the form of plants, through the fourth it is the form of an animate creature, or rather the form of the [other three] forms. As a result the rational soul does more than the other forms to form bodies, since it forms them through more powers, and it forms them more purely: with its foot it steps on unformed matter immediately [beneath it], while with its head it gazes afar.

Just as fire brings the first of the four degrees of its own heat to 2
wood that is cold, and brings the second to wood already warm, and the third to wood already heated through the other two degrees, and then to these three degrees adds a fourth besides that causes flames to leap up, so the essence of the rational soul replete with the four degrees—of being composite, vital, sensitive, and intellective—brings the first to matter, and adds the second to the first, the third to the second, and the fourth to the third. Here it

tivo — primum materiae applicat, secundum adhibet primo, secundo tertium adiicit, tertio addit quartum. Ubi tam secundum totam essentiam, quam secundum gradus omnes materiam formare videtur, licet secundum essentiam quidem totam formet eodem modo, secundum vero omnes gradus alio atque alio. Primus siquidem forma est materiae, secundus est forma mixti corporis, tertius forma est formae vitalis, quartus est corporalium omnium forma formarum. Per tres gradus anima particularis evadit, per quartum remanet absoluta formarumque capax absolutarum. Quid mirum si in hoc eius excellentissimo gradu aliqua apparet vis operatioque divinis persimilis (quibus ex eo hic gradus fit proximus, quod fit a materia remotissimus), cum in nonnullis mixtorum corporum formis propter temperationem aliquam caelestibus corporibus congruam vis aliqua actioque resultet, aliena quidem ab elementis quibus[35] illius formae subiectum componitur, consentanea vero caelestibus quibus temperatione fit similis? Neque mirum videri debet animam, licet sit forma corporis, habere tamen virtutem aliquam corpori non communem. Quoniam angeli neque secundum essentiam neque secundum praeparationem ad essentiam ex[36] materia eruuntur, animae vero irrationales per utrumque, animarum[37] rationalium, quia mediae sunt, media debet esse conditio. Nequeunt autem ex materia per essentiam pullulare, quin secundum praeparationem ex materia pullulent. Quocirca secundum praeparationem scaturient quidem, secundum vero essentiam minime.

3 Quod si virtus essentiam sequitur, nulla virtus angeli corpori est communis. Omnis autem bestiarum virtus est animae simul et corporis, quia simul cum essentia trahitur ex materia. Virtus autem animae rationalis in sola eius essentia est, cum ea descendens ex alto. Et quoniam huiusmodi anima proportionem corporis superat, neque est in corpore, sed corpus in ipsa, corpus omnem ipsius virtutem non comprehendit. Attingit autem virtutis alicuius

appears to be forming matter by way of its whole essence and all its degrees, though it forms in an identical way by way of its whole essence, but in various ways by way of all its degrees. Indeed the first degree is the form of matter, the second, the form of composite body, the third, the form of the vital form, and the fourth, the form of all the corporeal forms. The soul becomes particular through the first three degrees; but through the fourth degree it remains absolute and receptive of absolute forms. Why is it remarkable if, in this the highest of its degrees, a power and activity appears that resembles things divine (to which this degree is closest precisely because it is furthest removed from matter); and particularly since in some forms of composite bodies a certain tempering in harmony with the heavenly bodies produces a power and action that is foreign to the elements from which the subject of that form is compounded, but in accord with the heavenly bodies it resembles because of the tempering? Nor should it seem remarkable that the soul, though the form of body, has a certain power nonetheless that it does not share with body. Since angels are not drawn from matter either by way of essence or by way of preparation for essence, but irrational souls are drawn by way of both, an intermediate condition of rational souls must exist because they are themselves intermediate. They cannot bud from matter by way of essence however: rather they can bud from matter by way of preparation. So they will blossom from matter by way of preparation but not by way of essence.

Now if power follows essence, no angel's power is common to 3
body. But every power of the beasts belongs simultaneously to soul and to body, since it is drawn out of matter at the same time as [their] essence. However, the power of the rational soul resides in its essence alone, which descends with it from above. And since a soul of this kind exceeds the body's proportion and is not in the body while the body is in it, the body does not embrace the full power of the soul. But it does attain something of that power be-

nonnihil, propterea quod anima, quae secundum praeparationem pendet quodammodo ex materia, usque adeo afficitur corpori ut interiores vires suas illi accommodet proportione quadam perque illud libenter operetur atque in illo.

4 Neque absurdum putari debet rationalem substantiam coniungi materiae, quia non potest aliter ordo naturae servari. Est enim spiritus aliquis a materia separatus, rationalis, incorruptibilis, qualis est angelus. Est et spiritus coniunctus, irrationalis,[38] corruptibilis, qualis est anima bestiarum. Distant duo haec nimium. Nempe in genere ipsius spiritus sunt, atque inter se per tres differentias differunt. Quid ergo inter haec medium est? Non spiritus aliquis, qui solum sit separatus. Talis enim esse nequit, quia oportet, si separatus est, rationalem quoque immortalemque esse. Non spiritus aliquis, qui[39] rationalis sit tantum. Oportet enim spiritum talem coniunctum insuper esse vel separatum. Non spiritus solum incorruptibilis, quoniam necesse est ipsum rationalem praeterea esse. Non spiritus separatus rationalisque tantum, nempe oportet ipsum etiam incorruptibilem ponere. Non spiritus separatus et incorruptibilis solum, nam si duo haec habet, habet et rationem, quia, cum neque sensum exerceat neque alimentum, frustra erit nisi operationem habeat rationis. Non spiritus coniunctus irrationalisque solum, talis namque etiam est mortalis. Non spiritus coniunctus immortalisque dumtaxat; qui enim cum angelis communem habet immortalem vitam, communem habet intellegentiam. Non spiritus coniunctus, rationalis atque caducus, quia si communem habet cum angelis intellegentiam, quae vitae ipsius in se ipsam reflexio quaedam est, communem habet et vitam.

5 Sit ergo oportet in corpore spiritus aliquis medius extremorum, qui et rationalis et incorruptibilis sit. Conveniat cum utrisque,

cause of the fact that the soul, which depends in a way on matter by way of preparation, is attached to the body to the extent that it accommodates its inner powers proportionately in a way to the body, and freely operates through and in the body.

Nor should one suppose it absurd for a rational substance to be 4
joined to matter, since the order of nature cannot be preserved in any other way. For there exists a certain spirit separate from matter, rational and incorruptible, and such is the angel. There exists also a spirit joined to matter, irrational and corruptible, and such is the soul of beasts. These two are furthest apart from each other, though of course they are both in the genus of the spirit; and they differ among themselves via three differentiae. What then is intermediate between them? Not some spirit that is only separate. Such is impossible, since if it is separate it must also be rational and immortal. Not some spirit that is only rational, for such a spirit too must be either joined to matter or separate from it. Not a spirit that is only incorruptible, since necessarily it is also rational. Not a spirit that is only separate and rational, for one has to assume it is also incorruptible. Not a spirit that is only separate and incorruptible, since if it has these two attributes it will also have reason, because, since it concerns itself neither with sensation nor with nourishment, it will exist in vain unless it possesses the activity of reason. Not a spirit that is joined to matter and is only irrational, for such is also mortal. Not a spirit that is joined and is merely immortal [but not rational], for he who shares an immortal life with the angels also shares an understanding with them. Not a spirit that is joined to matter and is rational and perishable, since, if it shares an understanding with the angels, one which is a kind of reflection of life itself upon itself, it also shares a life with them.

So intermediate between the extremes there must be in the 5
body a certain spirit that is both rational and incorruptible. It has to be in accord with each [extreme] since it is spirit. It differs from the angel because it is joined to matter. It differs from the beast

quia spiritus est. Differat ab angelo, quia est coniunctus. Differat a bestia, quia rationalis. Conveniat cum angelo proprie, quia immortalis. Conveniat quoque[40] cum bestia, quia coniunctus. Immo cum oporteat inter illa extrema esse medium ab utrisque quodammodo aeque distans et aeque particeps utrorumque, necesse est esse spiritum aliquem, qui partim separatus, rationalis, sempiternus sit, partim coniunctus, irrationalis atque caducus. Talis maxime humanus est animus, in cuius summo tres primae illae conditiones sunt, in infimo tres sequentes, in medio sex omnes mixtae invicem et musicis, ut Plato inquit, modulis temperatae.

: V :

Quomodo mens insit corpori.

1 At quonam pacto rationalis anima coniungitur corpori? Non ut solidum corpus solido. Nam corpora haec solida quae solo tactu iunguntur neque simul sunt omnino neque simul agunt, ut anima atque corpus simul omnino sunt, simul et operantur. Proinde omnium absurdissimum esse videtur animam, efficacissimam vitalis motionis originem, densis crassisque corporibus comparare, quae quanto magis corporeae proprietatis dicuntur habere, tanto minus naturalis actionis vitalisque motionis possidere videntur. Nempe si dividantur, remanent dissipata neque, sicuti puriora solent, mox in suam redeunt unionem. Contra vero quae quam minimum corporeae crassitudinis habent, dum videntur a solidioribus percuti, ictum facillime[41] vitant; dum penetrari, efficacissime penetrant; dum dividi, adeo in unitatem suam velociter revertuntur ut disces-

because it is rational. It accords with the angel properly because it is immortal. It accords too with the beast because it is joined with matter. Or rather, since between those two extremes it is proper to have an intermediate somehow equidistant from each of them and also participating equally in each of them, necessarily there has to be some spirit which is partly separate from matter and is rational and everlasting, and is partly joined too to matter and is irrational and perishable. Such supremely is the human soul: in its highest part we find the first three conditions, in its lowest part, the subsequent three; and in between all six conditions are mingled together and tempered, as Plato says, by the musical modes.[39]

: V :

How mind is present in body.[40]

How is the rational soul joined to body? Not as one solid body to 1
another. For solid bodies that are joined by contact alone do not exist completely together nor do they act together in the way that soul and body exist completely together and act together. Thus it is obviously the height of folly to compare the soul, the supremely effective origin of vital motion, to dense, bulky bodies, which the more they are said to be in possession of the corporeal property, the less they seem to possess of natural action and vital motion. If they are divided, they stay dispersed, nor do they soon return, as purer things usually do, to their own unity. On the contrary, things which possess the least possible corporeal thickness, though they appear to be struck by things which are more solid, evade the impact with greatest ease; though they appear to be penetrated, they themselves penetrate with utmost effectiveness; and though they appear to be divided, they revert so rapidly to their unity that

sisse ab ea minime videantur. Igitur, ut dicebamus, anima non ut solidum corpus solido iungitur.

2 Rursus non ut aqua vino. Corpora enim haec mollia mutua mixtione vim priorem amittunt ac desinunt esse quod erant. Anima cum sit incorporea neque materiam cum hoc corpore communem habeat, non potest cum corporis huius qualitate misceri atque confundi. An forte sicut calor ignis aquae? Hoc potius modo: calor siquidem non est corpus, ideo est similior animae. Sed neque id satisfacit nobis, nam pars caloris in aquae parte est, non totus in tota. Forsitan ut vox aeri? Vox enim forsitan una eademque tota est in qualibet aulae parte, cum tota audiatur in qualibet, movet aures, nuntiat aliquid intellectui, quemadmodum anima tota est in qualibet particula corporis corpus regit simul atque intellegit. Sed nescio quid fragile vox habet et passioni subiectum. In fractione aeris nascitur levique retruditur aura.

3 Sed habeo interim similius aliquid, videlicet imaginem coloris in aere ad oculos venientem. Spiritalis haec est; currit momento; attingit procul; tota occurrit ubique; venti non patitur impetum; pingit aerem; format visum. Simile admodum est id quidem, sed hoc differt, quod aerem non regit neque gubernat, sicut anima corpus. Sed ecce gubernat navem aliquam gubernator et est in navi. Num ita et anima se habet ad corpus? Non, quia gubernator navem non implet; non adest toti; non per se movet solum, sed per gubernaculum. At nunc in gubernaculo hoc inveni animam, quoniam cum per ipsum nauta regat navem, ars gubernatoria non modo in nauta est, sed et transit in gubernaculum. Tota in eo fit

they hardly seem to have departed from it. And so, as we were saying, the soul is not joined as one solid body to another.

2 Again the rational soul is not joined to body as water to wine. For these liquid bodies lose their earlier power through mutual admixture and cease to be what they were. Since the soul is incorporeal and has no matter in common with this body, it cannot be mixed and confounded with the body's quality. Is it perchance like the heat of fire in water? This analogy works better, since heat is not body and so is more like soul. But it is still not good enough for us; for a part of heat is in a part of water, not the whole in the whole. Is it then perhaps like speech in the air? For one and the same utterance is wholly present perhaps in any one part of a hall,[41] since it is heard as a whole in any one part, and it resonates in the ears and conveys something to the intellect, just as the soul is wholly present in any little part of the body, governing the body and understanding simultaneously. But speech still has something fragile about it, something subject to passion: it is born in the breaking apart of air but rebuffed by a slight breeze.

3 But I have in the meantime a better analogy, namely the image of color as it comes in the air to the eyes. For this is spiritual: it arrives in a twinkling; it affects us from afar; it is everywhere totally present [to the eye]; it is not at the mercy of a gust of wind; it paints the air; and it forms the sight. It is indeed quite similar to the soul, yet with this difference: it does not rule or govern the air as the soul governs the body. Take the pilot who both guides the ship and stands in the ship. Is this the way the soul relates to the body? No, for the pilot does not completely fill the ship; he is not present to all of it; he does not move it through his own efforts alone but by way of the rudder. But in this rudder I have now found the soul, because, since the pilot governs the ship by way of the rudder, the art of steering is not only in the pilot but is transmitted also to the rudder. The whole art is in the whole rudder and rules over it, and this art is the soul of the rudder. But this art

toto regitque ipsum; haec ipsa est anima gubernaculi. Sed haec nihil naturae suae tribuit substantiae gubernaculi, sed[42] agitat solum ipsa quidem extrinsecus agitata. Anima vero aliquid tribuit corpori et suapte natura movet.

4 Tolle, quaeso, oculos in caelum, philosophe. Caelestem quaeris animam in terra vel mari. Suspice solis lumen. Unum hoc et individuum est, ut ita dixerim, in qualibet aeris parte totum. Aerem illuminat calefacitque; ipsum vero nihil sumit ab aere neque vim alicubi patitur neque ullis sordibus maculatur. 'Fluitat aer ventis, manet lumen', ut vult Plotinus. A sole est, momento transit in aerem. A sole iterum non separatur, reflectitur et in solem. Sine ipso aer mortuus est, cum sit frigidus et obscurus, forma qualibet destitutus. Duas habet lumen qualitates, fulgorem atque calorem. Fulgorem quidem exercet in aere, non tamen tribuit aeri; calorem tribuit. Unde occidente sole non exstinguitur, ut Plotinus putat, sed una cum sole subito totum recedit[43] lumen. Caloris ad multam noctem reliquiae relinquuntur, quasi aer factus fuerit caloris particeps, non fulgoris. Sed praestet, si placet, fulgorem; non largiatur. Esse quidem lucis illius quid est aliud quam lucere? Sine illa non lucet aer, sine aere illa lucet. Siquidem vera est Plotini sententia, lumen non a perspicuo ullo pacto, sed a solo sole continue dependere ipsumque semper, utpote quod sit actus quidam ipsius perpetuus, comitari. Sed pergamus ad reliqua.

5 Accedit lux aeri; lucet ibi lux, sicut et ante in se ipsa; lucet aer, qui non ante. Per se lux illa lucet, per lucem aer. Numquid aliud

does not give anything of its own nature to the substance of the rudder: it only moves the rudder having been moved externally itself. The soul, however, does give something to the body, and moves it of its own nature.

4 Lift up your eyes, I beg you, o philosopher, to the heavens; for you are seeking the heavenly soul here on earth or on the sea. Look up at the light of the sun. It is one and undivided, so to speak, and the whole is in any part of the air. It illumines and warms the air. It does not subtract anything from air, is nowhere subject to force, is not polluted by things vile. As Plotinus says, "Air is moved about by winds, but light remains."[42] Its source is the sun and it passes instantaneously through the air. Again it is not separated from the sun, and it is reflected back to the sun. Without this sunlight, air is dead, since it is cold and dark, and deprived of any form. For sunlight has two qualities, radiance and heat. It manifests its radiance in the air, but does not bestow it on the air; yet it does bestow its heat. This is why heat is not extinguished with the setting sun, as Plotinus thinks.[43] All light suddenly fades, however, along with the setting sun. The remnants of heat are left deep into the night, as if the air had been made a participant in heat, but not in light's radiance. But the sun provides radiance, if you will: it does not give it away. What is the being of that light other than to shine? Without light air does not shine, but light shines without air. And so the Plotinian belief that light does not in any way depend on a transparent medium is true: continually light depends on the sun alone and forever accompanies it inasmuch as it is a perpetual act of the sun.[44] But let us proceed to the rest of the argument.

5 Light comes to air and light shines there as it had formerly shone in itself [whereas] the air shines as it had not shone before. The light shines through itself, but the air shines through the light. But is the shining of the light different from the shining of the air? No! Otherwise the air would remain bright when the light

est lucere lucis et lucere aeris? Nequaquam, alioquin remaneret fulgidus aer, abeunte luce. Unum igitur est lucere quo lucet utrumque, sed luci per essentiam convenit, per participationem convenit aeri. Unum igitur esse quodammodo utrisque competit. Nec est lumen in aere, quamvis ita vulgo dicatur, sed est aer in lumine, si modo quod angustius est passionique obnoxium, ampliori et impatibili continetur. Similiter hominis anima a deo demittitur in materiam; transit in eam subito; neque discedit a deo, sed utrumque simul agit: regit corpus atque etiam veritatem ipsam rerum omnium, quae est ipse deus, miro quodam, ut disputat Plotinus, modo attingit per intellectum. Rursus sicut lumen in solem reflectitur, sic ipsa in deum per voluntatem, prout semper bonitatem rerum omnium appetit, quae ipse est deus. Implet corpus sine offensione, ut aerem lumen, totaque similiter toti adest. Patiente corpore non patitur, sed sentit et iudicat passiones. Non fluit corpore labente, sed constat.

6 Duas habet vires praecipuas, iudiciariam et vitalem. Iudicium non tradit corpori, sed ipsa peragit. Vitam corpori mutuat vel largitur, quatenus vim quandam suae vitae imaginariam ipsi communicat. Unde iudicat anima sola, non corpus; vivit autem corpus et anima. Quapropter anima decedente sensus abit protinus, vestigia vero vitae manere videntur ad tempus, calor scilicet atque motus. Animae esse vivere est, quandoquidem animae essentia est vita, per quam formaliter vivit corpus. Esse quoque animantis nihil aliud est quam vivere. Non tamen aliud est vivere ipsum animae corpori copulatae, aliud ipsius compositi vivere. Immo sicut per unam eandemque vitam, id est animae essentiam, vivit utrumque,

departs. One shining therefore brightens both of them, but shining is proper to light through its essence but to air through participation. So one being is in a way proper to them both. But the light is not in the air, although it is commonly said to be so. Rather the air is in the light, if only because that which is narrowly confined and subject to passion is contained within that which is vaster and never subject to passion. Similarly, the soul of man is despatched by God into matter and at once crosses over to it. However it does not depart from God: it does both things simultaneously: it governs body and also in a marvellous way, as Plotinus explains, it attains through its intellect to the truth of all things, which is God Himself.[45] Again, just as light is reflected back to the sun, so the soul through its own will turns back to God as something always desiring the goodness of all things, which is God Himself. It fills the body without any offence, as light fills the air, and likewise it is wholly present to the whole body. It does not submit to passion when the body does, but it senses and passes judgment on the body's passions. It does not slip away when the body declines but remains steadfast.

6 Soul has two principal powers, the judgmental and the vital. It does not delegate judgment to body but enacts it itself. It does share life with or bestow life on body inasmuch as it communicates a certain power to body that is an image of its own life. Hence only soul judges, not body, while both body and soul live. Therefore, when soul departs, the sense immediately leaves, but the traces of life, such as heat and motion, appear to remain for a time. The being of soul is to live, since soul's essence is life and through life body formally lives. So the being of that which is alive is nothing other than living. Yet the living of soul joined to body is not one thing and the living of the composite another. To the contrary, just as each lives through one and the same life, that is, through the essence of soul, but soul lives through its own essence while body lives through another's, so, as the majority supposes,

sed anima per suam, corpus per alienam, ita ut plerique iudicant, per unum dumtaxat vivere utraque sunt dicunturque viventia: per suum anima, corpus per alienum. Atque, ut supra tetigimus, anima non est in corpore, quamvis ita appareat illis qui, corpus videntes quidem, animam vero non videntes, latere animam in corpore tamquam vasculo arbitrantur. Qui vero inspiciunt animam ingredientem corpus intrinsecus, extrinsecus supergredientem complectentemque et sustinentem atque moventem pulverem hunc exiguum, undique proculdubio corpus esse in anima confitentur. Quis dubitet eam esse corpore ampliorem, cum parte sui aequetur illi quodammodo, id est vitali potentia, parte excedat, id est iudiciaria facultate? Itaque corpus, tamquam angustius atque labile, in anima est ampliori prorsus et stabili, perinde ut id quod continetur in continente. Quamvis ergo tota anima adsit corpori, non tamen corpus toti adest animae, sed parti infimae solum, id est vitali.

7 Quod hinc confirmari videtur, quia cum anima sit virtute longe maior corpore et a virtute motus amplificatioque proveniat, oportet animam non modo toti adesse corpori, verum etiam secundum praesentiam, ut placet Iamblicho, corpus excedere. Et quia est indivisibilis, ubicumque est, illic est tota. Corpus autem, sicut non toti aequatur virtuti animae, sic non aequatur toti eius praesentiae. Id sensit Plato in *Timaeo*, quando dixit mundi opificem corpus in anima statuisse. Iterum in libro decimo *De republica*, ubi inquit mundi corpus inter necessitatis genua volvi, id est infima caelestis animae parte regi atque moveri. In *Phaedro* etiam animas affirmavit supra caelum caput extollere.

8 Verum quamuis anima ita corpus excedat, non tamen impossibile cuiquam videri debet eam usque adeo ad se materiam trahere,

both of them exist and are said to be alive only through one living: soul through its own, body through another's. And as we indicated above, soul is not in body, although it appears such to those who, seeing body but not seeing soul, think that soul lurks in body as though inside a little bottle. But those who observe soul entering body internally and overtaking and embracing it externally, sustaining and moving this paltry speck of dust, cannot but admit that body is everywhere in soul. For who would doubt that soul is ampler or more extended than body, when with only one of its parts, namely its vital power, it is in a way equal to body, but with another part, its faculty of judgment, it exceeds it? Hence, like something contained in something containing it, body, being less extended and perishable, is in soul, which is more extended and unchanging. Thus, although all of soul is present to body, body is not present to all of soul, but only to its lowest, that is, to its vital part.

7 What seems to confirm this is that, since soul is far superior to body in power, and since motion and extension proceed from this power, it is fitting that soul not only be present to body in its entirety but that in its presence it exceed body, as Iamblichus believes.[46] And since it is indivisible it is wholly present wherever it is. But just as body is not equal to the whole power of soul, so it is not equal to the whole presence of soul. Plato recognized this in the *Timaeus* when he said that the world creator placed body in soul,[47] and again in the tenth book of the *Republic* where he says that the body of the world revolves between the knees of necessity,[48] in other words, is governed and moved by the lowest part of the celestial soul. In the *Phaedrus* he affirmed too that souls "lift the head above the heavens."[49]

8 Although soul thus exceeds body, yet it should not strike anyone as an impossibility that soul so draws matter towards itself that one composite results. For given that it is the property of forms to perfect and to bind matter to themselves and to unite the

ut unum reddat compositum. Cum enim proprium sit formarum perficere et sibi devincire materiam et materiae partes invicem copulare, quo praestantior forma est et quo magis materiae dominatur, eo perfectius hoc efficere potest. Faciunt autem id formae quaelibet infimae. Quid obstat quominus faciant et sublimes, modo id naturaliter cupiant? Quod si angelicae minime faciunt, id ex eo provenit quod nullam prorsus inclinationem habent ad speciem aliquam animalis sua coniunctione complendam. Fieri vero hoc a mentibus Platonici omnes et Peripatetici veteres voluerunt. Nullus enim illorum repertus est, qui non affirmaverit sphaeras caelestes esse animis rationalibus animatas. Testantur id inter Platonicos prae ceteris Plotinus, Porphyrius, Iamblichus, Proclus; inter Peripateticos autem Theophrastus, Avicenna et Alganteles. Qua in re Ptolemaeus quoque et Albumasar et Zaeles et Manilius ceterique praecipui auctores astronomiae nobiscum sentire videntur, quando videlicet affirmant caelestia corpora esse divinis animabus mentibusque praedita ac tamquam animalia quaedam divina ipsi deo omnium rectori parere. Neque id quidem iniuria, nempe cum viderent nonnulla, quae ad animos pertinent, ex stellis praenuntiari, non aliter id fieri posse putabant, quam si stellae animatae sint videantque futuras hominum actiones suisque quodammodo nutibus indicent. Praeterea sicut corporum illarum radii in corpora nostra, sic animorum earundem radii in nostros animos influant. Omnia vero a causis illis ordinatissimis ordinata bonaque mitti, posse tamen ex diversa multarum circa nos causarum commixtione materiaeque defectu perverti, adeo ut Mercurialis prudentia in malitiam, Martia magnanimitas in ferocitatem, Venerea caritas in libidinem convertatur similiterque de ceteris, quemadmodum et radii solis inde quidem blandi mittuntur, sed hic saepe

parts of matter in turn, then the more outstanding the form and the more it rules matter, the more perfectly it is able to do so. But all the lowest forms do this. What [then] prevents the highest forms from doing this too, provided they desire to do it naturally? But if the angelic forms do not do it at all, it is owing to the fact that they have no inclination whatsoever, by joining with some animate species, to make up its complement. But all the Platonists and the ancient Peripatetics held to the view that minds did do this.[50] For not one of them can be found who did not affirm that the celestial spheres were animated or ensouled by rational souls. Among the Platonists especially Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus bear witness to this,[51] and among the Peripatetics, Theophrastus,[52] Avicenna,[53] and Algazel.[54] Also in this matter Ptolemy,[55] Albumasar,[56] Zaeles,[57] Manilius,[58] and all the other distinguished authorities on astronomy appear to have the same opinion as we do, given that they clearly affirm that celestial bodies are endowed with divine souls and minds, and that as particular divine animate beings they obey God Himself, the universal ruler. Nor do these authorities hold to this unjustly. For when they saw that many things pertaining to souls are pre-announced by the stars, they realized that this could not happen unless the stars were ensouled and could foresee men's actions and somehow indicate them by means of their nods [i.e. their changing configurations]. Moreover, just as the rays of the bodies of the stars influence our bodies, so the rays of the souls of these same stars can influence our souls. But these authorities declare that all things ordered and good are sent us by these causes which are supremely ordered, and yet that they can be perverted because of the permutations of the many causes acting upon us and because of matter's defect—and so perverted that Mercurial prudence is transformed into malice, Martian magnanimity into ferocity, Venerean charity into lust, and the rest similarly, just as the sun's rays are mild when despatched from the sun, but are scorching often when received

recipiuntur edaces. Verum haec iam tamquam in praesentia supervacua[44] dimittamus.

: VI :

Quod mens sit forma corporis patet ex opinionibus actionibusque humanis. Ratio prima. Quia homo est animal rationale.

1 Non solum vero rerum naturalium ordo demonstrat eandem esse animam quae in homine speculatur et sentit, ut in superioribus declaravimus, verum etiam sapientum sententiae atque operationes humanae. Omnes philosophantes in hac sententia consenserunt hominem esse speciem quandam rerum, cuius differentia propria, per quam a brutis differat, sit ipsum rationale. Oportet autem differentiam propriam ab intrinseca rei forma semper accipere. Nihil enim ab alio differt secundum speciem, nisi per naturam interiorem. Non sumitur autem rationale ab anima solum cogitatrice, quia in ea est ratio dumtaxat particularis. Homo autem ad commune bonum decusque dictis factisque rationaliter operatur. Eius igitur differentia ab universali sumitur ratione. Haec autem in mente est. Mens igitur forma illa est, per quam quisque nostrum in humana specie collocatur. Si autem fuerit secundum esse ab homine separata, ex ipsa et homine hoc species una non fieret, atque homo propter interiorem carnem carneus proprius[45] diceretur, quam propter rationem exteriorem rationalis.

2 Neque dicat Averrois hominem esse aliquid congregatum ex animali cogitativo ac mente, totumque ipsum propter alteram eius

here. But let us dismiss these matters now as being superfluous to the present discussion.

: VI :

That mind is the form of body is evident from the opinions and actions of men. First proof: Because man is a rational animal.[59]

The order of things in nature shows that it is the same soul in man that both thinks and feels, as we declared in the previous chapters, but the sayings of wise men and human activities demonstrate it too. All those who philosophize are agreed in declaring that man is a particular natural species whose characteristic differentia (by which he is distinguished from the beasts) is his rationality. But one must always take a characteristic differentia from a thing's inner form. For no one thing differs from another as to species unless it is through its inner nature [or form]. But something is not assumed to be rational on the basis merely of the cogitative soul,[60] since in it reason is particular only. But man operates rationally in words and deeds for the common good and dignity of all. Therefore his differentia is taken from the universal reason. But this is in mind. Thus mind is the form via which each one of us is located in the human species. But in terms of being, if mind were to be separated from man, then one species would not be compounded from it and man, and [so] man would be designated carnal, because of the flesh intrinsic to him, more properly than rational, because of the [universal] reason extrinsic to him. 1

So Averroes should not declare that man is something compounded from a cogitative animal and from mind, and that all of him is to be called rational because of one of his parts. This is like 2

partem rationale cognominari, sicut corpus simum, quia simus est nasus. Primo enim nasus corpori continuus est, mens autem cogitationi nequaquam. Deinde mens huiusmodi species quaedam est seorsum ab animali cogitativo, et hoc animal est species per se a mente seorsum. Non transit autem de specie in speciem separatam differentiae cognomentum. Et sicut non dicitur apud Averroem mens cogitativa et sensualis propter cogitatricem animam cui propinquat, sic neque cogitatrix anima dicetur rationalis sive intellectualis propter mentem. Neque rursus transibit cognomentum differentiae in tertium aliquod, quod ex illis efficiatur. Una enim differentia unam quandam exigit speciem atque contra. Illa vero unam speciem non conficiunt, quia neque in unam essentiam neque in unum esse congrediuntur. Omnino autem ridiculum est hominem accipere differentiam per quam est homo a mente unica et separata. Sic enim singulae personae unus homo erunt, animalia multa, et natura speciei remanebit universalis, natura generis iam facta particulari. Neque minus ridiculum est humanam speciem in eo cumulo collocare, quia sicut non erit simpliciter unum, sic non erit, ut ita loquar, ens simpliciter, neque substantialis aliqua rerum species, sed contingens acervus, eo maxime quia ex duabus rebus quae per se secundum perfectam speciem actu existunt, non fit unum per se verum, sed falsum unum, et id quidem alio vinciente. Non enim in alterius se gremium iacit quod per se omnino existere potest, neque admittit naturaliter intra se alterum quod sibi ipsum sufficit. Immo vero, cum res quaeque per actus suos invicem distinguantur, ideoque actus sit separationis principium, quae actu existunt, adversantur coniunctioni. Mens vero et animal actu subsistunt utraque, neque possunt ab alio copulari, ut in sequentibus ostendemus.

calling a [whole] body snub-nosed because its nose is flat. In the first place, the nose is joined uninterruptedly to the body, but mind is not joined to cogitation at all. Next, mind of this kind is a particular species distinct from the cogitative animal and this animal is a species per se distinct from mind. But a differentia's designation cannot be transferred from one species to another separate from it. And as mind in Averroes is not called cogitative and sensitive because of the cogitative soul it approaches, so the cogitative soul will not be called rational or intellectual because of mind. Nor again will a differentia's designation be transferred to a third entity compounded from these two. For one differentia demands one particular species, and vice versa. But these two do not produce one species, since they do not meet in one essence or in one being. It is totally ridiculous that a man would accept the differentia via which he is a man from a unique and separate mind. For all individual persons will thus constitute one man [and yet] be many animals; and the nature of the species will remain universal, while the nature of the genus will have now been made particular. To locate the human species in that aggregation is no less ridiculous, because, just as it will not be one absolutely, so it will be, if one may put it thus, neither an entity absolutely nor some substantial natural species, but rather a contingent heap. And it will be all the more so because, out of two [separate] things which exist in act of themselves, [each] in accordance with [its] perfect species, emerges something not truly one of itself, but falsely one, something with another binding it in. For that which can exist entirely on its own does not throw itself into the bosom of another, nor, when it suffices for itself, does it naturally admit another within itself. Or rather, since all things are mutually distinguished through their acts, and act therefore is the rational principle of their separation, things that exist in act are opposed to being joined. But mind and animal both subsist in act, and cannot be united by another, as we shall demonstrate in what follows.

3 Esse autem rationem universalem in anima, qua sentimus et vivimus, propterque illam nos rationales cognominari docet in libro *De moribus* Aristoteles. In primo libro inquit mentem esse in anima, sicut est in oculo visus; partes item animae duas esse, ratione carentem et rationalem. Primam distinguit in duas, in nutritivam partem quae numquam obtemperat rationi et sensitivam quae quandoque obtemperat. Alteram pariter dividit in activam rationem et speculatricem. Virtutes morales ponit in voluntate et appetitu rationi obediente, principia virtutum moralium in activa ratione, virtutes speculativas in ratione speculatrice. Idem facit in sexto, ubi etiam asserit rationalem vim esse humanae animae partem atque hanc duo agere, scilicet cognoscere et gubernare humana per prudentiam atque artem, et naturalia divinaque per sapientiam contemplari, quae intellegentia et scientia continetur. In *Problematum* libro inquit: 'Natura, parens et auctor omnium, instrumenta nobis duo inseruit, quorum opera instrumentis[46] extraneis uti valemus: Manum, inquam, corpori dedit, animo mentem. Est enim mens quoque rebus a natura nobis impertitis annumeranda, vicem sane gerens instrumenti.' Haec ibi.

: VII :

Ratio secunda. Quia homo intellegit.

1 Aristoteles hominem esse vult animal ex corpore ac mente compositum. Siquidem in libro primo *De moribus* statuit de felicitate

In his *Ethics*, Aristotle teaches that the universal reason is in the 3
soul, which gives us sensation and life, and on account of that reason we are called rational. In the first book, he says that mind is in the soul as vision in the eye; and that there are two parts to the soul, the irrational and the rational.[61] The irrational he distinguishes into two parts, the nutritive that never submits to reason, and the sensitive that does at times submit; and the rational he likewise divides into two, the active reason and the speculative. He places the moral virtues in the will and in the appetite obeying the reason; he locates the principles of the moral virtues in the active reason, and the speculative virtues in the speculative reason. He does the same in the sixth book, where he also asserts that the rational power is part of the human soul and that it does two things: it comes to know and to govern human affairs through prudence and through art; and it contemplates matters natural and divine through the wisdom which is contained in understanding and in knowledge.[62] In the treatise *On Problems*, he says, "Nature, the parent and author of all, has planted two tools in us which enable us to work with tools outside ourselves: it has bestowed the hand on the body, and the mind on the rational soul. For the mind too must be numbered among the things imparted to us by nature that play the role of an instrument."[63] All this is in the treatise.

: VII :

Second proof: Because man understands.

Aristotle holds that man is an animal composed of body and 1
mind. In the first book of his *Ethics*, he proposes to discuss the question of the happiness proper to man, a happiness consisting in the activity proper to man.[64] In the tenth book he says that the ac-

hominis propria disputare, quae in propria hominis operatione consistat. In decimo operationem hominis propriam esse inquit intellegentiam, quia sit secundum mentem, quae magis propria nobis est quam sensus; quae suprema pars animae sit. Addit nos vel mentem esse vel maxime mentem, cum tamen velit nos[47] esse compositos, quasi mens sit forma hominis maxime naturalis. In primo libro *De anima* inquit potius dicendum esse hominem per intellectualem animam intellegere quam ipsam animam intellegere. Ubi fatetur Averrois intellegentiam proprie, sicut et sensum, esse totius compositi. Unusquisque etiam experitur in se ipso se aliquid intellegere. Neque id facit nisi per intellectum. Nos quoque in praesentia, quonam pacto intellectus naturam investigaremus, nisi ipsi nos intellegeremus? Et quoniam intellectu magis pro arbitrio nostro utimur quam phantasia, quae saepe cogitur aliunde, familiarior naturaliorque nobis intellectus est quam phantasia.

2 Si Averroici interrogentur, quidnam illud sit quod intellegit proprie, cum dicit Aristoteles et Averrois hominem proprie intellegere, respondebunt neque mentem esse istud (non enim apud eos mens est homo), neque animal cogitativum, quia non habet intellegendi virtutem, sed acervum quendam[48] ex mente et huiusmodi animali, et actionem mentis, quae intellegentia est, ipsi toti ideo attribui, quia soleat actio partis saepe adscribi toti. Stultum id quidem. Primo, quia acervus talis non est in aliqua una specie aut genere uno, neque eam habet unionem per quam in una operatione, qualis intellegentia est, conveniat. Deinde, quia partis actio tunc toti adscribitur, quando pars illa vel continuatur cum altera in unam essentiam, sicut hominem videre dicimus quia videat oculus; vel in esse unum, ceu cum dicimus ignem calefacere per calefactio-

tivity proper to man is understanding, since it is in accordance with mind, which is more proper to us than sensation; it is also the highest part of the soul.[65] He adds that we are either mind or mind for the most part; and though he maintains that we are composites, it is as if mind were the most natural form of man. In the first book of *On the Soul,* he says that it would be better to say that man understands through the intellectual soul than to say that the soul itself understands.[66] And it is at this point where Averroes acknowledges that understanding, like sensation, properly belongs to the entire composite. Each person experiences in himself that he is understanding something. He does not do this except through the intellect. And how could we too at this present moment investigate the nature of intellect if we ourselves did not understand? Since by our own choice we use our intellect more than our phantasy, which is often compelled from without, the intellect is therefore more familiar and more natural to us than the phantasy.

If we ask the Averroists what it is that properly speaking under- 2
stands, when Aristotle and Averroes say that it is man who properly speaking understands, they will reply that it is not mind (since man for them is not mind), nor is it the cogitative animal (since such does not have the power of understanding), but it is a particular aggregate made from mind and such an animal. They will say also that the action of mind, which is understanding, is attributed to the whole precisely because the action of a part is often ascribed to the whole. This is foolish, firstly because such an aggregation is not in any one species or one genus and does not have the [internal] unity that properly pertains to one activity such as understanding. And it is foolish secondly because we ascribe the action of a part to the whole: either (i) when that part is joined in one essence with another—as when we say that a man sees when his eye sees; or (ii) when it is joined in one being—as when we say fire heats through the heating which comes from heat and the form which is such a part of fire that by forming matter, the other part

nem quae provenit a calore et forma, quae talis pars ignis est ut materiam, alteram ignis partem, formando ad unum esse perducat; vel in unum agitationis effectum, veluti cum dicimus animam una cum brachio ensem vibrare, quia motio talis ab anima in ensem per brachium transeat. Mens autem apud illos neque continuatur cum animali in essentiam unam, neque in unum esse, ut constat, neque etiam in unum agitationis effectum, quia intellegentia numquam mente egreditur, quo possit alteri praeter mentem communicari, neque expletur per aliquod instrumentum. Ex quo fateri coguntur contra ducem eorum Aristotelem proprie dici mentem intellegere, hominem vero intellegere dici non posse, nisi improprie admodum et absurde.

3 Neque adducant consuetum illud exemplum de caelo, quod caelum nonnumquam dicatur movere se ipsum, quia pars eius altera moveat alteram, atque ita homo intellegere, quia pars eius intellegat. Exemplum non consonat. Nam motus a mente caeli transit in caelum, intellegentia vero neque ab humana mente transit in animal, neque e converso. Sed afferent rursus aliud aeque ridiculum, quod caelum a nonnullis intellegere affirmetur, cum tamen pars eius intellegat sola. Quamvis raro id audiatur de caelo, quod intellegat, de homine vero semper, tamen quicumque illud dixerit, falso ac stulte loquetur, nisi forsan existimet mentem illam cum caelo in unam speciem convenire. Proinde quicumque aiunt omnes homines per unam mentem et illam quidem ab hominibus separatam intellegere, non minus delirant quam qui dixerint omnes per eundem oculum ab omnibus semotum singula cernere. Denique quando interrogantur quare nos operari dicimur ex eo quod separata mens operatur, respondent quia licet illa non sit forma a qua

of fire, it leads to one being [i.e. heating]; or (iii) when it is joined in the one effect of motion—as when we say the soul brandishes the sword along with the arm, since the motion passes from the soul through the arm to the sword. But according to the Averroists mind is not made continuous with an animate being in one essence or in one being, as is obvious, or even in the one effect of motion, because understanding never proceeds out of mind so that it can be communicated to anything else except mind, nor does it need any instrument to perfect it. As a result, in opposition to their master Aristotle, they are forced to acknowledge that, whereas mind can properly be said to understand, man cannot, except very improperly and absurdly, be said to understand.

3 The Averroists should not trot out their customary example of the heavens to the effect that the heavens are sometimes said to move themselves because one part of them moves another, and man is said therefore to understand because part of him understands. The example is inappropriate. For motion passes from the heavens' mind into the heavens, but understanding does not pass from a human mind into an animal or conversely. But they might then bring up another equally ridiculous example, namely that the heavens are said by many to understand, even though a part of them alone understands. Although you hear occasionally of the heavens that they understand—though you always hear it said of man—whoever asserts this is telling lies and nonsense nonetheless, unless he thinks perhaps that mind and the heavens accord in one species. Therefore, whoever says that all men understand through one mind, and that this mind is separated from men, is no less insane than those who assert that all men observe individual objects through an identical eye which is separate from them all. Finally, when the Averroists are asked why we are said to act from the fact that the separated mind acts, they will reply that, although that mind is not the form from which we derive our existence, yet from it we derive the ability to act. This reply is ri-

habeamus ut simus, ab ea tamen habemus ut operemur. Quae quidem responsio ideo ridicula est, quia idem probat per idem.

4 Afferunt Averroici arctiorem quandam, ut putant, copulam inter mentem et animalis huius phantasiam, per quam fiat homo unus atque intellegens, quia[49] mens speciem, per quam intellegit, haurit a simulacro quod sibi per sensus formaverit phantasia. Si enim species sit forma mentis, simulacrum vero forma sit phantasiae, sequi opinantur ut quotiens species cum simulacro copulatur, totiens et mens conspiret cum phantasia; copulari vero totiens, quotiens dependet species a simulacro; id vero fieri, quotiens homo aliquid speculatur. Nos huiusmodi copulam sufficere non putamus. Quo enim pacto potest species intellegibilis esse nodus quo phantasia menti devinciatur, quae talis est, ut quamdiu inhaeret simulacris phantasiae tamquam in particularibus fundamentis, particularis sit et a mente seiuncta permaneat, et cum primum in mente sit facta universalis, iam procul absit a phantasiae simulacris? Numquam ergo phantasiam nostram menti species alligabit, quae non potest in ambobus simul existere.

5 Actus quidem intellegendi in sola mente est, quod nemo negat. Mens autem id intellegere solet, cuius habet speciem et similitudinem in se ipsa. Quare ex hoc ipso quod mens speciem, per quam intellectura est aliquid, a phantasiae simulacris accipit, nullo modo id sequitur[50] ut phantasia intellegat quicquam, sed potius ut ipsa aut eius simulacra aut obiecta intellegantur. Quisquis igitur men-

diculous precisely because it is [tautologically] proving the same through the same.

4 The Averroists introduce a tighter bond, as they understand it, between that [separated] mind and the phantasy of this animate being, a bond whereby man exists as a single, intelligent being because mind drinks in a species, through which it understands, from an image which [his] phantasy has formed for itself through the senses. For if a species is the form of mind but an image is the phantasy's form, they think it follows: (i) that whenever a species is joined with an image mind too will accord with the phantasy; (ii) that whenever a species depends on an image, it will be joined to it; and (iii) that this happens whenever a man has speculative knowledge of something. But we do not believe that such a bond is strong enough. For how can an intelligible species be the knot by which the phantasy is tied to mind, when this species is such that, as long as it inheres in the images of the phantasy as in particular foundations, it is itself particular and remains apart from mind; yet as soon as it becomes universal in mind it is already far distant from the images of the phantasy? A species that cannot exist in both faculties simultaneously will never bind the phantasy therefore to mind.

5 That the act of understanding is only in mind no one denies. But mind is accustomed to understanding an object whose species and likeness it has within itself. Therefore from the fact that mind accepts a species, which is going to help it understand something, from the images of the phantasy, it does not follow in any way that the phantasy itself understands anything, but rather that its images or objects are understood. Thus whosoever asserts that, by joining mind with the phantasy, he is constituting some one understanding entity from the two, is doing nothing else but confecting one understanding entity out of understanding and the extra-mental object that is understood: it is exactly as if one were to make a single seeing entity out of seeing and the object seen. But

tem cum phantasia coniungens profitetur se ex iis duobus unum aliquid intellegens constituere, nihil plus agit quam ut ex intellegente ac re extra mentem intellecta intellegens unum conficiat, perinde ac si ex visu et re visa unum quiddam[51] efficiat videns. Nisi forte quis velit, sicut ex igne calefaciente et aere inde calefacto unum quiddam fit calefaciens, quando ignitus aer calefacit manum, ita ex mente intellegente ac phantasia, vel intellecta vel quomodocumque per intellegentiam agitata, unum edi rursus actum intellegendi, quo ambo rem extra phantasiam positam intellegant. Quod si contingeret, iam mens illa sublimis et separata vim intellectualem phantasiae communicavisset, quemadmodum ignis aeri calorem priusquam actum extrinsecus calefaciendi communicat. Immo etiam magis, quoniam actus intellegendi semper clauditur intellectu neque transmigrat foras, quo fit ut nequeat tradi cuiquam intellegentia sine mente, atque ita mens humano corpori inesset tamquam forma — quod in praesentia quaerimus — quamquam coniunctio illa fieri nequit, quoniam intellegentia non expletur per instrumentum.

6 Denique ut convincant intellegentiam universo illi acervo esse communem, connexionem talem in medium rursus adducent, ut quando phantasia imaginem rerum aliquam concipit, eadem statim suscipiatur in mente, atque in phantasia phantasma vocetur et particularis appareat atque multiplex; in mente vero vocetur intellegibilis species et absoluta penitus videatur et una. Cum tamen una eademque forma sit, quae, quoniam mentem simul format et phantasiam, unum conflat ex utrisque compositum, quod ap-

perhaps someone wants to maintain that, just as from the fire which warms and the air warmed by it there emerges a single warmth-giving entity when the fiery air warms the hand, so from understanding mind and from the phantasy, either as it has been understood or been moved in some way by understanding, there again issues a single act of understanding, wherein both [faculties] may understand the thing posited outside the phantasy. Were that to happen, mind in its sublimity and separation would have already imparted an intellectual power to the phantasy, just as fire imparts heat to air before it imparts the act of heating something externally. Or rather, more importantly, since the act of understanding is always confined to intellect and does not proceed outside it, it follows that understanding cannot be passed on to anyone without mind; and thus that mind will have been in the human body as its form—which is the goal of our present enquiry—even though [in the Averroists' erroneous opinion] that union cannot happen, since understanding is not accomplished through an instrument [like the body].

Finally in order to convince us that understanding is common 6
to that universal aggregate [of theirs], the Averroists again adduce an intermediate connection to the effect that, when the phantasy conceives any image of things, that same image is immediately received in mind; and it is called a "phantasm" in the phantasy, where it appears as both particular and multiple, but an intelligible species in mind where it appears as completely absolute and one. But since it is one and the same form, which, because it simultaneously forms mind and the phantasy, from the two produces one composite that is called man, and because understanding follows an intelligible species but this species is itself the form of a composite [i.e. man], understanding properly is assigned to the composite. For an example of this connection they will turn to the eye in which there is a visual spirit. Light, colored by way of color's image, weaves itself into the visual spirit, however, and the spirit in

pellatur homo, quoniam vero intellegentia speciem intellegibilem sequitur, species autem est forma compositi, intellegentia proprie composito assignatur. Cuius quidem connexionis exemplum ostendent[52] in oculo, in quo spiritus est visivus; lumen autem per coloris imaginem coloratum visivo spiritui se insinuat, ac spiritus vicissim penetrat lumen, ubi coloris imago, quae in lumine est, eadem penitus fulget in spiritu. Ideoque[53] ex lumine et spiritu facit unum.

7 Nos autem negabimus fieri posse ut eadem omnino forma in subiecto aeterno proximoque suscipiatur simul et corruptibili. Tam enim diversos habent modos essendi formae omnes quam diversa subiecta sunt quibus suscipiuntur. Forma igitur esse longe diversum habebit in mente et phantasia. Ubi autem esse duo sunt multumque diversa, duae quoque et diversae admodum formae sunt, quae sunt essendi principia. Quinetiam si concesserimus eandem in ambobus esse formam, neque sic quidem intellegentia communis erit. Siquidem ibi solum intellegentia est, ubi propria et intrinseca intellegendi principia sunt. Haec vero sunt duo: virtus intellectiva et intellegibilis species per modum penitus absolutum. In phantasia vero neque vis intellectiva est neque modus speciei intellegibilis absolutus. Nihil igitur nodus[54] ille conducet ad hoc ut homo intellegat, sicut neque imago coloris, licet eadem sit in lumine atque in spiritu, efficiet ut aut lumen aut congregatum ex lumine ac spiritu videat. Solus enim videt spiritus ille visivus, in quo solo est et videndi virtus et imago coloris secundum visivum modum.

8 Neque ulterius nobis obiiciant congregatum illud ideo intellegere, quia phantasia offerat intellectui quaecumque sit intellecturus. Sic enim animal quoddam similiter constituetur ex lumine atque spiritu, quod vocabitur visivum animal totumque videre affirmabitur, quia lumen spiritui offert quod videat.

9 Resipiscant igitur quandoque Averroici et cum Aristotele suo consentiant illud, quo quid actionem propriam exercet, formam

turn penetrates the light. In this case exactly the same image of color that is in the light shines in the spirit. And thus the eye makes one image from the light and the spirit.

We shall deny, however, that it is possible for the exact same 7
form to be received simultaneously both in a substrate which is eternal and closest to the form and in a substrate which is corruptible. For all the forms have as many diverse modes of being as the substrates in which they are received are diverse. Thus the form will have a being in mind which is completely different from its being in the phantasy. But where two beings exist and differ completely from each other, the forms, which are the first principles of being, are also two and differ completely. Moreover, even were we to concede that the form was the same in both [beings], understanding will still not be in common. For understanding only exists where the proper and intrinsic first principles of understanding exist. But these principles are two: an intellective power, and an intelligible species in its completely absolute mode. But in the phantasy we find neither an intellective power nor the absolute mode of an intelligible species. That knot [between the phantasy and mind] contributes nothing therefore to the fact that man understands, any more than the image of color, though it is the same in light and in the [visual] spirit, can cause either the light or the aggregate of light and spirit to see. Only the visual spirit will see, for in it alone is both the power of seeing and, in the visual mode, the image of color.

Nor can the Averroists further object to us that the aggregate 8
understands on the grounds that the phantasy offers intellect whatever it is going to understand. For with this argument, a sort of animal will be similarly constituted from light and [visual] spirit: it will be called a visual animal, and the whole animal will be declared to see, since light offers the spirit what it sees.

May the Averroists recover their senses at some point, there- 9
fore, and agree with their beloved Aristotle's view that what enacts

esse eius propriam specieique effectricem; propriam vero hominis actionem esse intellegentiam, per quam specie differat operando a brutorum actionibus, ideoque per intellectum tamquam intimam formam specie differre in essendo ab irrationalium animabus. Nonne ex hoc Aristoteles ostendit animam esse formam, quod per eam animal vivit et sentit? Homo autem intellegit, ac dumtaxat per intellectum. Itaque in ea quaestione qua principium quo intellegimus indagabat, naturam mentis denique tradidit, dicens intellectivam animae partem esse illam qua intellegimus. Quod autem plurali utitur numero, ostendit non separatum quiddam, sed nos proprie intellegere. Atque in ipsa hominis anima intellectum tum agentem collocat, tum capacem.

10 In secundo libro *De anima* definitionem omni animae communem esse hanc inquit: 'Anima est actus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis,' sive: 'Anima est principium vivendi, sentiendi, secundum locum movendi, intellegendi.' Rursus: 'Anima est id quo vivimus et quo sentimus ac intellegimus primo.' Ex his autem duabus descriptionibus concludit primam quasi per syllogismum. Cum vero non debeat syllogismus ex terminis aequivocis fieri, consequens est, ut illa dictio 'actus' idem ubique significet, id est actum corporis naturalem, quod ipse statim aperit, quando subdit divisionem substantiae in materiam eiusque formam et quod ex his[55] componitur. Dicitque animam omnem esse eam formam quae pars altera sit compositi. Iterum, ubi est intellegendi potentia, sunt etiam sentiendi et nutriendi[56] potentiae. Ac sicut triangulus est in quadrangulo, sic anima vegetativa in sensitiva,

its own action is its own form and is the producer of the species; but that the action proper to man is understanding and through this his activity differs in species from the actions of the beasts. And so by way of intellect as the inner form his being differs in species from the souls of irrational things. Doesn't Aristotle demonstrate that the soul is form from the fact that an animal lives and has sensation through the soul?[67] Man however understands, but through the intellect alone. Therefore, in the question where he was exploring the principle by which we understand, Aristotle turned finally to the nature of the mind, declaring that the soul's intellective part is the part by which we understand.[68] The fact that he uses the plural "we" shows us that understanding is not something separate, but is properly ourselves. And in the soul of man he locates both the active and the receptive intellect.

In the second book of *On the Soul,* he says that the definition 10
common to every soul is as follows: "The soul is the act of the physical organic body having the potentiality for life"; or "The soul is the rational principle of living, sensing, moving spatially, and understanding"; and again "The soul is that by which we live, and feel, and first understand."[69] From the last two definitions he infers the first as through a syllogism. But since a syllogism should not be constructed from equivocal terms, it follows that the term "act" everywhere signifies the same thing, namely the natural act of the body; and he immediately makes this clear himself when he goes on to divide substance into matter and its form, and into that which is compounded from the two. He also says that all soul is the form which is one part of the composite. Again, where the potentiality for understanding exists, the potentialities for sensation and for nurturing also exist. And just as the triangle is included in the quadrangle, so the vegetative soul is included in the sensitive, and the latter in the intellective soul. And though he may say the power of understanding is both separated (that is to say, distinguished) and separable from the other powers in the same way as

atque haec in anima intellectiva. Et quamvis intellegendi vim dicat separari, id est distingui et separabilem esse ab aliis tamquam perpetuum a caduco, tamen dicit insuper intellectum distingui ab aliis vel subiecto, ut prisci putabant qui rationem capiti, iracundiam pectori, libidinem iecori tribuere videbantur, vel distingui potius ratione quadam, sicut in eadem superficie concavum a convexo.

11 Praeterea laudat[57] eos prae ceteris, qui hominis animam esse quidem incorpoream, sed tamen corporis aliquid, id est actum talem in tali quodam subiecto arbitrarentur. Hinc in tertio libro *De anima* dicit: 'Cum intellectus non sit a corpore separatus, perscrutandum erit alias, utrum formas a corpore separatas intellegere possit.' Evidentissime autem in libro *Naturalium* secundo id aperit, ubi vult animam hominis esse formam naturalem et separatam a materia atque coniunctam. Coniunctam quidem esse dicit, quia terminus sit generationis humanae, separatam vero eam arbitror dicere propter intellegentiam. Haec vero neque de anima cogitativa neque de unica mente recte intellegi possunt. In libro etiam duodecimo *De divinis*, ubi negat formas materiis suis praecedere, sequi vero post materiam, eam dumtaxat formam concedit quae sit[58] anima intellectiva — manifeste declarat animam nostram esse formam corporis — incipere cum corpore, neque tamen desinere. Neque intellegi verba illa possunt de averroica mente, quae inter moventes causas numerabitur potius quam formales, et corpus antecedit humanum, neque corpori nostro ab ipsa genitura coniungitur. Quod est contra ordinem illum quo Aristoteles in secundo[59] libro *Animalium* utitur, ubi ab ipsa origine nobis adhibet intellectum, licet extrinsecus descendentem.[60] Theophrastus quoque et Themistius intellectum ab initio coniungi nobis atque esse animae nostrae insitum confitentur.

something eternal is from something mortal, yet he also says that the intellect is distinguished from the others either by its substrate (as the ancients supposed who apparently attributed reason to the head, anger to the breast, and desire to the liver),[70] or more likely by a particular rational principle, as in the same plane the concave is distinguished from the convex.

11 Moreover Aristotle praises those men before others who thought that the soul of man is incorporeal yet also something which belongs to a body, is a particular act, in other words, in a particular substrate. Hence in the third book of *On the Soul* he says, "Since the intellect is not separate from body, we will have to examine at another time whether it can understand forms separate from bodies."[71] He expatiates on this most clearly in the second book of *On Things Natural* [the *Physics*] where he maintains that the soul of man is a natural form that is both separate from and joined to matter: joined, he says, because it is the terminus of human generation, but separate, I believe he says, because of understanding.[72] But these statements cannot be rightly understood either of the cogitative soul or of the unique mind. Even in the twelfth book of the *On Matters Divine* [the *Metaphysics*] where he claims that forms do not precede their own matters, but rather follow matter, he does concede that only the form which is the intellective soul—our soul, he declares quite clearly, is the form of the body—begins with the body but does not end with it.[73] Those words cannot be taken to refer to the Averroistic mind, which is going to be numbered among the moving rather than the formal causes and which precedes the human body and is not joined from birth itself to our body. But this is contrary to that [chronological] order which Aristotle deploys in the second book of *On Animals*, where he attributes the intellect to us from the very beginning, even though descending from an external source.[74] Theophrastus and Themistius also acknowledge that the intellect is united with us from the beginning and is implanted in our soul.[75]

12 Quod si legitur apud Aristotelem quod genitum est fore corruptioni obnoxium, nihil ad animam, quae non per motum genita est, sed creata momento. Verum sit omne quod coepit apud Aristotelem corruptibile, dummodo natura sua sit tale; servetur tamen semper dei virtute, quod a deo processerit sine medio. Quod totum a Pythagora inventum est, a Platone probatum. Si fuit semper hominum generatio, extat nunc multitudo animarum innumerabilis, dummodo in eadem specie sint: species vero infinitae esse non possunt. Res autem eas, quae et spiritales sunt et eiusdem speciei, esse posse innumerabiles ex eo indicant[61] quidam Peripatetici, quod a colore et lumine innumerabiles imagines in aere procreantur. Sunt tamen philosophi nonnulli qui non semper fuisse generationem hominum arbitrentur. Mitto nunc pythagoricum illud, generationem scilicet sempiternam, sempiternum quoque certumque numerum animarum corpora commutantium.

: VIII :

Ratio tertia. Quia homo libere se ipsum movet.

1 Platonici et Peripatetici omnes consentiunt hominem movere se ipsum actionesque humanas ita disponi ut homo ipse qui operatur suarum operationum sit dominus. Agere autem rationaliter certo modo ratiocinando antequam exsequatur. Accipere primum universalem regulam, deinde subiungere opinionem particularem, tertio inferre conclusionem. Hoc pacto: Omne bonum eligendum; cibus ille bonus est; igitur ille cibus est eligendus. Prima argumen-

But if one reads in Aristotle that what is born is going to be 12
subject to corruption,[76] it does not apply at all to the soul, which is not begotten through motion but created in a moment. But grant that in Aristotle all that begins is corruptible (but only if it is naturally corruptible), yet what has proceeded from God without an intermediary can always be preserved by God's power. All this was discovered by Pythagoras and proved by Plato.[77] If the generation of men has been eternal, a numberless multitude of souls now exists (but only if they were all in one and the same species [since] we cannot have an infinite number of species). But certain Peripatetics point out that things that are spiritual and belong to the same species can be numberless on the grounds that numberless images are produced in the air from color and from light. Yet there are some philosophers who believe that the generation of men has not been eternal. At present I am setting aside this Pythagorean theme of everlasting generation, and of an everlasting and fixed number of souls also changing bodies.

: VIII :

Third proof: Because man freely moves himself.[78]

All Platonists and Peripatetics agree that man moves himself and 1
that human actions are so ordered that the man who acts is master of his own activities. They agree that he acts rationally by reasoning in a particular way before he executes an action: that he first accepts a general rule, then adds a particular opinion, and third draws a conclusion. To give an example: Every good must be chosen. This food is good. Therefore this food must be chosen. The first part of such an argument is the mind's alone; the second can be the phantasy's too; and the third similarly. And just as the

tationis huiusmodi[62] pars solius est mentis, secunda potest esse etiam phantasiae tertiaque similiter. Et sicut in sola mente est universalis regula iudicandi boni, ita in ea sola universalis appetendi boni voluntas. In phantasia non potest esse nisi particularis opinio appetitioque particularis. Quando affirmant hominem libere movere se ipsum, non solam mentem accipiunt, in qua movere est ad opera potius quam moveri, non solum animal, in quo moveri est et cogi ad opus potius quam libere ducere, sed ambo simul accipiunt. Quod si ambo simul speciem quandam et personam unam humanam efficiunt, mens erit forma vivifica corporis. Sin minus, nusquam reperietur aliquid quod libere moveat semetipsum, sed mens quaedam animali propinqua animal coget ad motum, sicut violentia lapidi immissa a iaciente lapidem pellit in altum. Atque ita confictum erit libertatis nomen, sicut persona hominis est conficta.

2 Omnino autem posita una, ut vult Averrois, mente, quicquid ad quaesita responderis aut absurdum erit aut nobis quidem conveniens, Averroi autem minime. Sive enim mens illa movet nos natura, certe continue similiterque movebit, sicut intellegentia caelum (nam sic illam nobis sicut caelo intellegentiam adhibent), sive voluntate aut per illam coget nos (atque ita liberi numquam erimus nihilque erit in ordine rerum quod libere moveatur) aut persuadebit, quo admisso quaeram quonam pacto ego, scilicet animal cogitativum, persuasionem illam percipio, ad quam non aliter possum quam per intellegentiam pervenire. Atque sic apparebit intellegentiam mihi propriam esse praesertim cum oporteat, si libere moveor, eandem substantiam esse quae persuadeat moveatque et quae persuadeatur atque moveatur, alioquin libertatis nomen erit inane. Sed rursus ad idem diverso quodam tramite procedamus.

universal rule for judging the good is in the mind alone, so in it alone is the universal will for desiring the good. Nothing can exist in the phantasy except a particular opinion and a particular desire. When they affirm that man moves himself freely, they are accepting not only his mind (intrinsic to which is moving rather than being moved to activity), and not only his animate being (intrinsic to which is being moved and being forced towards activity rather than being led there freely), but both together. But if both together make up a particular species and one human person, then the mind will be the life-giving form of the body. But if not, nowhere will anything be found which freely moves itself: rather, a particular mind close to a living creature will force it into motion, just as the violent impulse transmitted to a stone by a thrower forces the stone up into the sky. And so the word freedom will be a fiction, just as the human person will be a fiction.

But granted one mind in general, as Averroes supposes, then 2
any answer you have given to the above question will either be absurd or concur with our position but not with that of Averroes. For if that mind moves us naturally, it will certainly move us continuously and in the same manner, just as an intelligence moves the heavens (for the Averroists accord us a mind just as they accord an intelligence to the heavens). If, on the other hand, that mind moves us by its will, then either it will compel us through that will (and so we will never be free and nothing will exist in the universal order which might move freely), or it will persuade us; and in that case I might ask in what way can I, as a cogitative animal, grasp the very persuasion that I cannot attain except through understanding. And thus it will become obvious that understanding is proper to me, especially since, if I am to move myself freely, there has to be an identical substance that both persuades and moves and is persuaded and is moved; otherwise the term freedom will be meaningless. But let us proceed to the same goal by another path.

3 Cum compertum habeamus vivum hoc corpus a mente moveri saepissime, in illis praesertim operationibus quae, praecedente consilio, ordinatissimis modis ad finem rationalem conducunt potius quam corporeum, quaerimus utrum mens per naturalem coniunctionem substantiae suae ad substantiam corporis ipsum moveat an solummodo per imperium. Non videtur per imperium solum id facere, quia non aliter hoc faciet quam persuadendo aut praecipiendo phantasiae ut ipsa membra corporis moveat, atque ipsa movebit, si modo consenserit. Nunc autem saepenumero intellectus agitat corpus contra phantasiae sensusque affectum, appetitu sensuum reluctante. Movet itaque membra per naturalem quandam substantiae suae coniunctionem ac per esse potius quam per imperium. Proinde si plerumque contra phantasiae inclinationem, ipsa phantasia minime persuasa, mens tum sistit membra, tum movet, idque facit intrinsecus et eodem ordine quo solet phantasia movere, quis non videat tunc quasi cessare ab opere animam illam cogitativam atque esse superfluam, cum mens opera illius usurpet, mentem vero per modum naturalis formae movere, siquidem natura est intrinsecum motus statusque principium? Et cum pariat motum in membris externum, multo magis parere poterit motum intrinsecum in humoribus, qui facilius agitantur. Humores autem agitando qualitates eorum ad nutritionis opera temperabit. Rursus quanto magis vibrare poterit spiritus, qui aura vel levissima commoventur. Dum intrinsecus spiritum temperabit, sensum exercebit in spiritu. Quid igitur[63] opus est nobis geminis animabus, intellectuali et cogitatrice, cum una sufficiat, nec minus possit mens et intellegere et sentire quam cogitativa sentire et

Since we have learned that this living body most often is moved 3
by the mind, especially in those activities which, after deliberation, lead in well-ordered steps to a rational rather than a corporeal goal, we want to know whether the mind moves the body through a natural union of its own substance with the body's substance or only by issuing a command. It does not appear to do this by issuing a command alone, because it will do this in no other manner than by persuading and instructing the phantasy to move the body's limbs; and the phantasy will move them provided it has agreed. But in reality the intellect often moves the body contrary to the disposition of the phantasy and sensation, and with the desire of the senses resisting it. It therefore moves the limbs through a natural union of its own substance [with them], and through its own being rather than through a command. Consequently, if the mind—for the most part contrary to the inclination of the phantasy [or] when the phantasy has not been persuaded at all—now stops the limbs and now moves them, and if it does so internally and in the same order in which the phantasy ordinarily moves them, then who cannot see both that the cogitative soul stops as it were its activity and becomes superfluous exactly when the mind takes over its work, and that the mind moves [the limbs] by way of the natural form, since this is naturally the internal principle of motion and of rest? And since the mind produces external motion in the limbs, then *a fortiori* it will be able to produce internal motion in the humors, which are more easily set into motion. But by setting the humors into motion, it will temper their qualities so they can perform the work of nourishing. Again, how much more will it be able to make the spirits, which are unsettled by the slightest breeze, vibrate [in harmony]. When it is going to temper the spirit internally, it will engage the sense that is in the spirit. So why do we need two souls, an intellectual and a cogitative, when one would suffice, and when the mind can understand and sense no less than the cogitative soul can sense and nourish? Or rather,

alere? Immo et alere potest mens, postquam vegetatrix non alere solum potest, sed elementorum quoque motus actionesque peragere.

4 Est profecto in nobis vis aliqua, quae esse ipsum sive ens et rationem ipsam considerat communiori quodam conceptu quam sit sensibile vel insensibile, ac potest pro arbitrio aliquod intellegibile ad sensibile aliquod, immo singula et cuncta intellegibilia ad singula et cuncta sensibilia comparare. Quo fit ut eadem vis haec omnia noscat. Cum vero sensus insensibilia non attingat neque percipiat quicquam communius universo sensibilium genere, et phantasia ignoret universalia, vis illa sola mens erit. Igitur in substantia mentis vis erit omnium sensibilium discretiva, sicut in phantasia, quae certe poterit phantasia quaedam excellens sensusque intellectualis cognominari.

5 Ubi sentiendi vis est, fit et sentiendi actus, modo non desit spiritus, in quo sive passiones corporis exprimantur sive imagines qualitatum effulgeant. Spiritus autem lucidus subest menti sufficiens ad officium sentiendi. Ideoque excellens illa phantasia, quae in mentis substantia est, infusa spiritui cerebri cogitat, infusa oculorum spiritui videt, dum ex uno fonte multas effundit vires. Nempe si apud Averroem phantasia corporea substantiae intellectuali ministerium praebet ad actum intellegendi, cur non etiam apud nos spiritus, qui phantasiam corpoream comitatur, eidem mentis substantiae serviat ad exsequendum phantasiae illius actum, quae comitatur intellegentiam? Ac si membra terrestria corporis motum a mente suscipiunt atque ad exteriora transmittunt, quid obstat quominus ignei spiritus per mentis praesentiam illus-

the mind can nourish too, when [even] the vegetative [power] is able not only to nourish but also to drive the motions and actions of the elements.

4 Certainly a power exists in us that contemplates—under a more general concept than just the sensible or the insensible—both being (or existing) itself and reason itself. For it is able at will to compare something intelligible to something sensible, indeed to compare intelligibles individually and collectively to sensibles individually and collectively. The result is that this same power comes to know all these things. Since the sense does not reach as far as insensibles, however, or perceive anything more general than the universal class of sensibles, and since the phantasy has no knowledge of universals, that power will be the mind alone. Thus in the substance of the mind, as in the phantasy, will be a power that can distinguish between all sensibles, a power we can certainly call a sort of superior phantasy or intellectual sense.

5 Where the power of sensing exists the act of sensing also occurs, provided the spirit is not missing wherein the body's passions are expressed or the images of qualities set ablaze. But the lucid spirit sufficient for this task of sensing is subject to the mind. Thus that superior phantasy, which is in the mind's substance, both cogitates when it is infused into the spirit of the brain, and sees when it is infused into the spirit of the eyes, provided it dispenses [its] many powers from [its] one source [i.e. the mind]. According to Averroes, if, for the act of understanding, the corporeal phantasy ministers to the intellectual substance, then why shouldn't we too take the view that the spirit which accompanies the corporeal phantasy ministers to the same intellectual substance in order to perform the act of that phantasy which accompanies understanding? And if the earthly limbs of the body receive motion from the mind and transmit it to external objects, what prevents those fiery spirits, having been illuminated by the mind's presence, from offering to the mind's phantasy the images of the

trati imagines corporum occurentes mentis offerant phantasiae? Quamobrem in eadem mentis substantia vis intellegendi, sentiendi nutriendique locatur, in qua etiam tota vis consistit libere operandi atque movendi.

6 Quando enim aliquid per rationem acturi sumus, necessario antecedit in nobis ratiocinatio illa quam supra descripsimus. Quae si sparsa per multas substantias quasi personas fuerit, non exibit in actum. Oportet enim omnem effectum ad unam causam principalem reducere, in qua tota agendi facultas et ratio colliga⟨n⟩tur. Actionis autem humanae ratio in illa ratiocinatione consistit. Tota ergo in mentis natura concluditur, quae quidem natura sufficiens erit humanae actionis principium, tum quia in ea tota ratiocinatio est, tum quia illi etiam soli corporis obediunt membra. Oculus, lingua, manus, pedes tam facile, tam cito, tam assidue singulos paene mentis nutus percipiunt et sequuntur, ut incredibile sit mentem non esse propriam horum formam familiaremque rectricem.

: IX :

Ratio quarta. Quia vires animae se vicissim tum impediunt, tum movent.

1 Quotiens natura una duas habens dissimiles vires agendi in actum unius nimis intenditur, ab alterius actu ferme desistit. Ideo convivae acute audire lyram simul et epulas gustare vix possunt. Quod si intentissima degustatio non impediret auditum, has vires duas non unius substantiae, sed duarum esse affirmaremus substantiarum. Actus autem alendi et sentiendi intentissimi humanam intel-

bodies they encounter? This is why the power of understanding, of sensing, and of nourishing is located in the same substance of the mind wherein exists also the entire power of acting and moving freely.

For when we are about to enact something through the reason, 6
the action is necessarily preceded in us by the ratiocination we described above. Were this ratiocination scattered through many substances as through people it would never issue into act. For every effect must be led back to one principal cause where the entire power of acting and its rational principle are linked. But the principle of human action consists in that ratiocination. That ratiocination is therefore wholly included in the nature of the mind, which nature will be sufficient indeed as the principle of human action, both because all ratiocination is in it, and because the limbs of the body obey it, even it alone. The eye, tongue, hand, and feet all perceive and perform the mind's individual commands, so easily, so quickly, and so continually as it were, that it would be unbelievable if the mind were not their proper form and parental guide.

: IX :

Fourth proof: Because the soul's powers impede and move each other in turn.

Whenever one nature having two dissimilar powers of acting is 1
too intent[79] on the act of one of the powers, it almost suspends that of the other. This is why guests are scarcely able to listen to the lyre and enjoy the meal at the same time. If the intense relishing of the food did not hinder our listening, then we would assert that these two powers belonged not to one but to two substances. But the most intense acts of nourishing and of sensing do hinder

legentiam impediunt atque haec illos. Quod significat intellectum esse ipsius eiusdem nostrae animae vim, cuius est nutriendi virtus et sentiendi.

2 Respondebunt ad haec Averrois sectatores sensum et phantasiam duas esse animae nostrae vires atque ideo se invicem impedire; actu vero phantasiae propter nimiam sensuum intentionem remisso debilitari insuper mentis actum, non quia mens in eadem sit anima qua phantasia vel sensus, sed quia ad creandas et videndas species mens phantasiae indiget ministerio. Quamquam non pertinet ad Averroicos dicere phantasiam propter intentionem sensuum remitti, qui putant phantasiam esse motum factum a sensibus, neque etiam verisimile est phantasiam studio nutriendi multum debilitari, tamen dimittamus nunc alimoniam atque sensum, phantasiam vero accipiamus et mentem.

3 Ego certe hoc experior in meipso, intenta nimium phantasia, remitti humanam intellegentiam vel rationem atque contra, adeo ut vacet mens sive ratio plurimum, quando nimis imperat phantasia, etiam si sana et sobria phantasia sit, atque e converso. Quemadmodum et sensus, etiam si sanus fuerit, quando attentius circa externa versatur, distrahit phantasiam atque contra. Rursus quando in somniantibus, ebriis, iratis, amantibus, amentibus et phreneticis phantasia tota animi attentione[64] suas in se volutat imagines, nonne omne mentis humanae vel rationis iudicium consopitur? Quando autem in contemplantibus ratio divinis considerandis ardentem figit intuitum, an non silet maxime phantasia, et si quid interpellat, tacere statim a ratione iubetur, neque permittitur aut affectibus efferri nimium aut per consuetas ambages latius evagari?

human understanding and it hinders them. This indicates that the intellect is a power of our soul, the same soul to which the power of nourishing and sensing belongs.[80]

The followers of Averroes will respond to this by saying that 2
the sense and the phantasy are two powers of our soul and therefore mutually impede each other, but that the act of the mind is also weakened when the act of the phantasy is remitted owing to the excessive intensity of the senses, not because the mind is in the same soul as the phantasy or the sense, but because it needs the help of the phantasy for creating and seeing species. Although it is inconsistent for the Averroists to say that the phantasy is remitted because of the intensifying of the senses—for they think that the phantasy is the motion produced by the senses—and it is unlikely too that the phantasy is much weakened by the desire for nourishing, nonetheless for the present let us leave aside nourishment and the sense, and take up the phantasy and the mind.

I certainly experience in myself that when the phantasy is espe- 3
cially intensified, then my human understanding or reason is remitted and the reverse; and this to the point that the mind or the reason ceases activity for the most part when the phantasy is too dominant (even if the phantasy is sound and sober) and vice versa. In the same way the sense, even if it is sound, in concentrating its attention on external matters distracts the phantasy, and the reverse. Again, in those people who are dreaming or drunk or angry or in love or raving or delirious, when the phantasy, with all the attention of the rational soul, ponders its own images in itself, isn't the judgment of the human mind or the reason lulled totally asleep? But when, in people who are contemplating, the reason fixes its ardent gaze upon the consideration of things divine, doesn't the phantasy keep quite silent? And if it interrupts in any way, the reason tells it to be quiet at once; and it is not allowed to be overly carried away by feelings, or to wander too far in its usual manner. Who will then deny that the mind and the phantasy are

Quis ergo negabit mentem et phantasiam eiusdem animae vires esse, cum sua se vicissim intentione debilitent?

4 Ceterum concedamus Averroicis tantam esse motionis vicissitudinem inter mentem et phantasiam, quanta est inter communem sensum atque particularem, et sicut imago rei in oculo lucens inde in sensum relucet communem similiterque et actus videndi ab oculo in communem redundat sensum, ita a phantasia tum simulacra, tum actus in mentem continuo refulgere. Quamquam mihi videtur etiam maior esse vicissitudo inter mentem et phantasiam quam inter interiorem sensum atque exteriorem, quia a mente in phantasiam tam simulacra quam actus reverberantur, ab interiore autem communique sensu in oculum quomodo id fiat, non plane video neque ipsi declarant. Quod si et hoc quandoque fieri in somniantibus afferant, esto.

5 Inveniam rursus aliud in quo illarum vicissitudo horum vicissitudinem superet. Quippe inter mentem et phantasiam non speciei actusque tantum, verum etiam affectus habitusque mutua fit commutatio, quae inter hunc et illum fit numquam. Cum igitur menti ad phantasiam multo maior cognatio sit copulaque insolubilior quam sensui communi ad alium, et tamen sensus hic et ille in eadem anima sint, cur non mens quoque et phantasia in anima sint[65] eadem? Cur mens aeterna usque adeo erga temporalem phantasiam ferme semper afficitur ut obsequatur ipsi et blandiatur, ac dolente illa sive gaudente condoleat (ut ita dixerim) et congaudeat, nisi eiusdem naturae et substantiae fundamentum utrisque subiiciatur? Quonam pacto vis phantasiae finita vim mentis quodammodo infinitam saepe comitatur agendo, ut quousque illa specu-

powers of the same soul, since in their intensifying they weaken each other in turn?

4 For the rest, let us concede to the Averroists that the interchange of motion between the mind and the phantasy equals that between the common sense and a particular sense. Just as the image of an object shining in the eye is reflected into the common sense, and similarly the act of seeing from the eye flows back into the common sense, so the images and acts alike are continually reflected from the phantasy back into the mind. Though the interchange of motion between the mind and the phantasy seems to me even greater than that between the inner and the outer sense—since images and acts alike rebound from the mind into the phantasy—yet how this [latter] motion from the inner and common sense out into the eye takes place is not clear to me, nor do the Averroists explain it. If they are asserting, however, that this also happens at times in people who are dreaming, so be it.

5 Let me find another instance in which that interchange of the former [of the mind and the phantasy] surpasses that of the latter [of the inner and the outer sense]. A mutual exchange not only of species and act indeed, but of disposition and habit occurs between the mind and the phantasy; but this never happens between the inner and the outer senses. Since, therefore, a much greater affinity and a more indissoluble link exists between the mind and the phantasy than between the common sense and another sense, and yet both kinds of sense are in the same soul, then why shouldn't the mind and the phantasy also exist in the same soul? Why is the eternal mind almost always so drawn towards the temporal phantasy that it submits to and caresses it—and grieves and rejoices with it so to speak when it grieves or rejoices—unless a foundation of the same nature and substance underlies them both? In acting how does the finite power of the phantasy often accompany the power of the mind, which is infinite in a way, so

latur, eousque haec ipsa cogitet, nisi substantia eadem aequet utrasque?

6 Numquam fit inter aliqua duo subita, facilis, integra commutatio qualitatum, nisi communis illis materia subsit. Quapropter neque intellectus tam facile fieret umquam phantasticus aut phantasia intellectualis evaderet, neque ille irrationalis efficeretur aliquando aut illa rationalis, nisi commune subesset utrisque subiectum. Sicut enim rota altera movet alteram, quia eidem machinae innituntur, sic duo illi appetitus, rationalis scilicet et irrationalis, sese movent vicissim facillime tam impetu quam iudicio, quia in eadem animae substantia sunt. Hinc[66] Aristotelicum illud in libro *De anima* tertio: 'Quemadmodum sphaera movet sphaeram, sic concupiscentia voluntatem.' Non potest autem concupiscentia voluntatem movere, nisi sit aut quasi sphaera superior trahens inferiorem, quod nemo umquam dixerit, aut sphaera eidem artificio cui et mens connexa.

: X :

Quinta ratio. Quia separata mens non indiget phantasia.

1 Mentis natura apud Averroem non habet esse commune cum corpore, non esse proprium illi communicat. Non habet inde originem neque secundum essentiam neque secundum praeparationem ad existendum. Non conficit cum ipso speciem aliquam neque secundum numerum corporum numeratur. Itaque sicut habet essendi modum ab hoc animali penitus separatum, sic cognitionis

that the phantasy cogitates to the extent the other contemplates, unless the same substance renders them equal?

6 An exchange of qualities between two entities is never sudden, easy, and complete, unless a common matter underlies them. The intellect would never become like the phantasy so easily, or the phantasy become intellectual, or the intellect become irrational at times, or the phantasy become rational, if no common substrate underlay them. For just as one wheel moves another because they both depend upon the same machine, so those two appetites, the rational and the irrational, in turn move each other with extreme ease by impulse and judgment alike, because they exist in the same substance of the soul. Hence that saying of Aristotle's in the third book of *On the Soul*, "Just as a sphere moves a sphere, so concupiscence moves the will."[81] But concupiscence cannot move the will unless it resembles either a higher sphere dragging a lower one along (and no one has ever said that) or a sphere connected to the same machine as the mind.

: X :

Fifth proof: Because the separated mind does not need the phantasy.

1 In Averroes the nature of mind does not have being in common with body, nor does it communicate its characteristic being to body. Whether he is considering the essence of mind or its preparation for existing, body is not its source. It does not form a species together with body, nor is it divided numerically according to the number of bodies. Therefore, just as it has its mode of being totally separated from this animate being, so will it also have a mode of knowing altogether removed from body. Thus no reason

modum habebit prorsus a corpore segregatum. Quapropter nulla ratio est quae eam cogat species a phantasiae simulacris haurire atque temporali mobilique discursu ad ipsam rerum, praesertim aeternarum, scientiam indigere. Profecto erit supernis mentibus quam simillima, et illis multo propinquior quam corporum qualitatibus. Igitur illas earumque mores[67] intelleget magis quam istas. Quod est contra ducem Averrois Aristotelem, qui hanc mentem scribit nihil absque simulacris intellegere. Simulacra vero corporum sunt, non mentium. Omnino autem cum prima familiariaque humani intellectus obiecta sint, communes ipsae naturalium naturae rationesque coniunctae quidem corporibus, sed a corporibus separabiles, licet nobis ex proportione quadam potentiae ad obiectum argumentari[68] talem esse hominis intellectum, ut et coniunctus sit et possit a corpore separari et quia coniunctus est, idcirco paene semper ad simulacra se convertat.

2 Profecto quia coniunctus est, ideo se ad coniuncta convertit. Et quia modo separabili est coniunctus, ideo modo separabili se convertit, id est abstrahendo atque separando. Mentes vero quae non solum separabiles, verum etiam separatae sunt, et separabili modo et separata pariter intuentur. Proinde, ut summatim dicam, nihil mihi[69] magis videtur humanae mentis naturam esse mediam demonstrare quam naturalis eius inclinatio ad utrumque. Sive enim per intellectum vel incipiat a corporibus, mox inde se ad incorporea transfert,[70] vel[71] ab incorporeis interdum exordiatur, vicissim ad corporum simulacra labitur. Sive per voluntatem vel optet aeterna, interim inde temporalium affectu deflectitur, vel contra cupiat temporalia, vicissim inde saepe aeternorum reverentia cohibetur. Sed ad quaestionem iam averroicam revertamur.

at all exists [in it] which might compel it to derive its species from the images of the phantasy, or to need a temporal and mobile discursive process for a knowledge of things, especially eternal things. It will certainly resemble the heavenly minds as much as possible, and be far closer to them than to the qualities of bodies; and so it will understand them and their customary ways better than bodily qualities. But this runs counter to Aristotle, Averroes' master, who writes that this mind understands nothing without images.[82] And images pertain to bodies, not to minds. Moreover in general, since the first and more familiar objects of the human intellect are the common natures and reasons themselves of natural things joined to bodies but separable from them, we may argue on the basis of a certain proportion [or ratio] of power to its object that man's intellect is such that it is both joined to and can be separated from body; and because it is joined, that it almost always turns towards images.

Indeed, because the mind is joined, it turns towards the bodies 2
it is joined to. And since it is joined in a separable way, it turns itself in a separable way, namely by abstracting and by separating. But minds that are not only separable but also separated intuit in a separable way and equally intuit separate things. As a result, if I may summarize, nothing appears to me to demonstrate more that the nature of the human mind is midway than its natural inclination towards both [goals]. If this inclination is via the intellect, then either it begins from bodies and thence straightway transfers itself to things incorporeal, or it arises now and then from things incorporeal and descends in turn to bodies' images. If it is via the will, then either it chooses things eternal and is thence distracted meanwhile by a desire for things temporal, or, to the contrary, it desires things temporal, and in turn is often kept back from them by its reverence for things eternal. But let us return now to the question of Averroes.

3 Respondebunt Averroici hunc intellectum mentes quidem supernas intellegere absque simulacris phantasiae, naturas corporum minime. Nos ad haec inferemus in mentibus illis esse species corporum incorporeas, per quas de corporibus iudicant. Propterea si intellectus hic eas intellegit, ab eis accipit corporum cognitionem. Nihil ergo opus est ut a corporibus eam accipiat. Tum illi intellectum hunc asserent infimum esse, in se ipso subsistere ac nobis haerere. Quantum in se subsistit, comparari ad mentes superiores, ut perspicuum vitreumque corpus ad lucem, easque perspicere. Quantum nobis adhaeret, haurire species a simulacris et corporalia intellegere.

4 Nos ad haec primum quidem dicemus supervacuum id esse ut intellectus, qui semper inspicit corpora in corporum causis, eadem quoque semper videat in simulacris, et quae habet in aeternitate, quotidie mutuetur a tempore. Deinde non quia nobis adhaeret, a simulacris accipit species, sed quia illas hinc capit, adhaeret. Ut enim arbitratur Averrois, ex eo solum nobis coniungitur intellectus, quod speciebus formatur a nobis acceptis. Ergo considerandus est intellectus prius quasi praeparatus per quandam potentiam ad huiusmodi species capiendas quam nobis adhaereat. Non igitur per hoc, quod haeret nobis, est ad huiusmodi species praeparatus, nisi forsitan opinetur ipsum haerere nobis quantum ad naturae spectat propinquitatem, id est intellectus illius naturam esse gradu quodam nostrae animae proximam. Si ita sit, nihil amplius consequetur quam ut mens huiusmodi nostram animam moveat atque

The Averroists will counter that this intellect [of theirs] under- 3
stands celestial minds indeed without the images of the phantasy but does not understand the natures of bodies. Our rejoinder to this argument is that in those celestial minds are the incorporeal species themselves of bodies via which we make judgments about bodies. If this intellect understands these species, therefore, it receives knowledge of bodies from the species; and there is absolutely no need, accordingly, for it to accept knowledge from bodies. The Averroists will then assert that this intellect is the lowest intellect, that it subsists in itself, and that it clings to us: inasmuch as it subsists in itself, that it is to be compared with the higher minds, as a transparent and glass-like body with light, and that it sees these minds clearly; but inasmuch as it clings to us, that it derives the species from images and understands things corporeal.

To these objections we shall retort first that it is quite super- 4
fluous that the intellect, which always perceives bodies in their causes, should always see the same bodies also in images, and that it should borrow from time each day what it possesses in eternity. Next, it is not because it adheres to us that the intellect receives species from images, but because it takes species from images that it adheres to us. For according to Averroes, the intellect is joined to us only insofar as it is being formed by the species received from us. Thus the intellect must be thought of as being as it were prepared in advance via a certain potentiality for accepting the species before it adheres to us. So it was not because of the fact that it adheres to us that it was prepared for such species as these—unless Averroes is supposing perhaps that the intellect adheres to us only insofar as its nature is close to ours, is supposing, in other words, that the nature of that intellect is closest to our soul, closest by just one degree [in the universal hierarchy]. If this is so, it implies no more than that such a mind moves and forms our soul. For when a worthier degree comes close to one that is inferior, it does not receive from it, but gives to it. The sphere of the moon moves

formet.[72] Dignior enim gradus, quando propinquat inferiori, non accipit ab eo, sed tribuit. Sphaera lunae sphaeram movet ignis, non movetur ab illa. Cur ergo mens haec scientiam mutuatur ab anima potius quam mutuet? Nempe si superior est et tanto praestantior, quanto[73] arbitratur Averrois, debet ipsa quidem per se sapere solum, anima vero per ipsam, praesertim cum eodem modo mens haec coniuncta sit corpori quo et mens caelestis est caelo, ut vult Averrois. Quapropter sicut illa nihil capit a caelo, ita[74] haec nihil a corpore.

5 Neque nobis obiiciant Averroici, sicut caeleste corpus suis formis plenum est, sic eius mentem suis esse plenam; nostram vero novas semper formas accipere, sicut corpus nostrum formas suas continue variat. Obiectio haec nihil efficit. Ea siquidem artificis actio modum sumit ab instrumentis, quae per instrumenta transigitur, sicut sectio et similia. Ea vero quae in sola mente artificis permanet, ut disponendi operis consultatio, modum ab instrumentis non accipit. Quare non decet dare modum intellegentiae ex ipso corpore, per quod intellegentia non expletur.

6 Interrogabimus deinceps Averroem numquid mens, dum in nobis intellegit, perfectior fiat an imperfectior, an neutrum. Si neutrum, inanis erit perpetua haec agitatio, nihil operando proficiens; immo nec operabitur quidem, nam ad indifferentem terminum non fit motus. Si perfectior, aeternae mentis perfectio semper a simulacris temporalibus dependebit. Semper id quod est imperfectum id quod perfectius est perficiet, praesertim cum non[75] aliter velint moveri ac formari eam a phantasia nostra quam a corpore speculum. Sin imperfectior, quomodo semper[76] movetur ad imper-

the sphere of fire but is not moved by it. Why then should this mind borrow knowledge from the soul rather than lend knowledge? Surely, if it is superior to the soul and surpasses it as much as Averroes thinks, then it has to know only through itself, while the soul has to know through it; and especially since, according to Averroes, this mind is joined to body in the same way as the heavenly mind to the heavens. Wherefore, just as that heavenly mind takes nothing from the heavens, so this mind takes nothing from body.

Nor may the Averroists protest that, just as the celestial body is 5
full of its own forms, so the mind of that celestial body is full of its own forms, but that our mind always receives new forms, just as our body continually varies its forms. This objection has no weight. The craftsman's action, which is produced by way of tools, takes on its mode from the tools, as in cutting and the like; but the action which remains in the craftsman's mind alone, such as deliberation about the arrangement of the work, does not receive its mode from the tools. For this reason it is improper to give understanding a mode derived from the body, a mode through which understanding is never achieved.

Next we shall inquire of Averroes whether mind, while it is un- 6
derstanding in us, becomes more perfect, less perfect, or neither. If it becomes neither, then this endless mental activity will be in vain, nothing being gained by doing it; or rather it will do nothing at all, for no motion occurs towards an indifferent goal. If it becomes more perfect, the perfection of the eternal mind will depend always on temporal images; what is imperfect will be always perfecting what is more perfect, especially since the Averroists do not want that mind [of theirs] to be moved and formed by our phantasy in any way other than a mirror by a body. If it becomes less perfect, then how is it always being moved towards the imperfect? Through what longing does it perpetually strive for what is defective? And with what force does that which is frailer corrupt

fectum? Quo appetitu assidue nititur ad defectum? Et quod imbecillius est, qua vi semper inficit quod[77] praestantius? Nonne Averrois ipse, ubi de mentibus disputat separatis, inquit eas cum[78] per suam essentiam aeterna cognoscant, temporalia nulla cognoscere, alioquin, ut inquit ipse et ut suo utar verbo, vilescerent. Si ita est, sequitur ut ex Averrois sententia temporalis cognitio ibi defectum afferat, ubi cognitio est aeterna. Cum igitur intellectus humanus (quod ipse asserit) semper aeterna cognoscat, non modo frustra dicitur intellegere temporalia,[79] quoniam hinc perfectior non evadat, sed etiam quia fiat hinc imperfectior.

7 Ego[80] certe imperfectiorem fore mentem illam, aeternorum speculatricem, in nobis ob eam causam arbitror, quod semper hic falsis illuditur imaginibus curisque turbatur, atque hanc eius intellegentiam in rerum natura supervacuam esse, quia conferat nihil, nec ullius finis gratia sit instituta. Animis quidem nostris quid tribuit sui? Nonne particularem ratiocinationem humanus animus natura habet sua perque illam (ut putat Averrois) instruit mentem, immo saepe illudit et turbat? Universalem vero discursum neque ex se habet neque capit a mente. Non enim est capax universalium aeternarumque rationum particularis animus et mortalis. Si enim eas caperet, intellegeret sane atque intellectus esset et sempiternus. Nihil igitur confert nostris animis huiusmodi copula, nisi forte conducere putas[81] nobis ex eo mentis praesentiam, quod nos contra naturam nostram trahit invitos et falsis implicat fabulis, dum fallaci spe divinorum privat nos praesentium bonorum iucunditate. Sed neque menti prodest, ut diximus. Quae cum divina sit, non est ad hunc hominem tamquam ad finem referenda: hominem, inquam, ab illius esse seiunctum.

that which is more excellent? In discussing separate minds doesn't Averroes himself declare that since they know things eternal through their essence, they have no knowledge of things temporal, otherwise—as he says himself and to use his own term—they would become degraded? If this is so, it follows from Averroes' view that temporal knowledge introduces defect precisely there where knowledge is eternal. Thus, since the human intellect always knows eternal things (as he himself asserts), it is said to understand things temporal in vain, not only because it does not become more perfect as a result, but because it even becomes less perfect.

7 I think that that [unitary] mind, the contemplator of things eternal, will certainly be more imperfect in us precisely because with us it is always being abused by false images and troubled by cares; and I think that its understanding is in the nature of things superfluous because it confers nothing (having not been appointed for the sake of any end at all). Indeed, what does it give of itself to our souls? Doesn't our rational human soul by its own nature have a particular discursive reasoning through which, according to Averroes, it instructs mind, or rather mocks it often and troubles it? However, our soul does not receive universal discursive reasoning either from itself or from mind. For a particular and mortal rational soul is incapable of receiving the universal and eternal rational principles. For were it to receive them, it would certainly understand [them] and be an intellect and be everlasting. So a bond of this kind [between mind and soul] bestows nothing on our souls, unless perhaps you think that the presence of mind is important to us precisely because it leads us into and entangles us in false tales, against our will and our own nature, when it uses the deceptive hope of goods divine to deprive us of the joy of present goods. But this does not benefit mind, as we said. Since mind is divine, it is must not be assigned as a goal to [embodied] man, to man separated as he is from its existence.

8 Rursus cum per suam essentiam supernas rerum videat[82] causas, in quibus causae omnes mediae et effectus quilibet continentur, ideoque in illis perque illas perspiciat corporalia omnia, nihil nostris eget phantasiis et sensibus ad corporalia discernenda, praesertim quia inest illi, secundum Averroem, agens ille intellectus. Qui cum in aeterno sit actu, per quem naturam intellegibilem singulis potest sensibilibus commodare, potest et magis et prius capacem intellectum eodem intellectuali splendore replere atque in eo tum species supernarum rerum sibi ingenitas capaci offerre, tum per efficacissimam virtutem sui universales species illas in conceptus particulares deducere. Nam si potest ex particularibus contingentibus universalia fingere, potest etiam ex universalibus vel innatis vel inspectis divinitus particularia quaeque concipere, praesertim cum essentia sit capace superior atque munus hoc iam ab aevo semper expleverit. Neque rursus dicendum est tum mentem, tum animal propter compositum ex utrisque coniungi. Non enim ita iunguntur ut[83] vere unum ex utrisque conficiatur. Neque decet partes veras ad falsum totum referre quasi finem.

9 Fortasse dicent conferre copulam illam ad mundi decus et ornamentum. Ego vero non puto mundum superfluo hoc ornari figmento, immo portento, quod unicum habet caput, et illud quidem, licet divinum sit, tamen camaeleontis instar colores variat pro obiectorum varietate; crura insuper habet innumerabilia; caput manet, crura semper amputantur rursusque repullulant. Neque tolerabimus eos, si dixerint monstrum hoc ad rerum tum superio-

Again, since it sees the higher causes of things via its own es- 8
sence (and all intermediate causes and any effects whatsoever are contained in those causes) and thus perceives all corporeal things in and through these higher causes, mind never needs our phantasies and senses to discern corporeal things, especially because, according to Averroes, the agent intellect is present in it. Since this intellect is in eternal act and able thereby to accommodate an intelligible nature [i.e. a species] to individual sensibles, it can bathe the receptive intellect still more and still earlier in the same intellectual splendor; and in this splendor it presents the species of things supernal (which are innate in itself) to the receptive intellect, and draws those universal species through its own supremely effective power down into particular concepts. For if the agent intellect is able to fashion universals from contingent particulars, it can also conceive particulars of whatever kind from universals, whether innate or seen with divine aid, especially since in essence it is superior to the receptive intellect; and from all eternity it has always fulfilled this duty. Nor should one declare that mind and animate being alike are bonded on account of the composite made from them both. For they are not so bonded that something truly one is produced from them both. Nor is it fitting to refer true parts to a false whole as to their end.

Perhaps the Averroists will say that the bond [between mind 9
and soul] contributes to the world's glory and adornment. But I do not believe the world is adorned by this useless fabrication, or rather by this monstrosity which has a single head, yet, though it is divine, alters its colors, like a chameleon depending on the variety of the objects [surrounding it], and which has numberless limbs besides: its head stays but its limbs are always being broken off and are always budding again. Nor shall we tolerate these Averroists if they declare that this monstrosity is important to the connection of both higher and lower things. For how could it connect other things when it is not only not one entity in itself but

rum, tum inferiorum connexionem conducere. Quo enim pacto connectet cetera, quod ipsum in se non modo non est unum quiddam, sed neque connexionem suscipit aliquam aliunde? Unam quandam formam esse oportet in mundo quae superiores formas nectat inferioribus, nam formae unitatisque officium est connectere. Atque in ea congredi oportet formarum omnium proprietates, ita ut formae superiores remittantur quodammodo atque ad inferiores deiiciantur, inferiores autem intendantur extollanturque ad superas. In illo autem averroico monstro nec forma invenitur una communis, nec extrema invicem in se commigrant, sed dum singula quod suum est servant, remanent dissipata.

10 Denique si intellectum esse dicant ubique sub luna, frustra ibi ponent, ubi nulli umquam sunt homines, ut puta in summo aere, innavigabili aequore terraque inhabitabili. Ibi enim nihil intellectus umquam proficit neque movet quicquam. Peripatetici vero divinas mentes nusquam designant, nisi ubi accommodate regunt aliquid atque movent.

11 Quod si dixerint illic illum esse dumtaxat, ubi sunt homines, duo statim sequentur absurda. Primum, quod totus erit in duobus hominibus longissimo inter se intervallo distantibus, neque tamen erit in medio, quod natura non patitur. Alterum quod motis hominibus ipse quoque movebitur. Moveri tamen vel per se vel per accidens substantiam illam quae neque corpus sit neque forma propria corporis peripatetica secta non solet admittere. Proinde qua ratione tam divina mens homunculum oberrantem rarissimeque mente utentem quasi pedissequa passim comitetur, quis explicabit? Numquid naturali necessitate? At vero superior est et hoc neque ad esse neque ad bene esse suum indigere videtur. Sed

does not receive any connection from elsewhere? There certainly has to be one particular form in the world that can connect higher forms to lower ones; for it is the function of a form and of unity to connect. The properties of all the forms ought to combine in that particular [connecting] form such that the higher forms are in a manner remitted and driven down towards the lower forms, but the lower forms are intensified and lifted up towards the higher. But in that monstrosity of Averroes no single common form is discovered, nor do the extremities in themselves pass from the one to the other; but as long as the single parts preserve what is their own they remain dispersed.

10 Finally if the Averroists say that the intellect is everywhere beneath the moon, they will be locating it pointlessly where no men ever existed, for example in the heights of the air, in the unnavigable sea, in the uninhabitable wastes. For the intellect never serves any purpose there, nor does it move anything. But the Peripatetics nowhere appoint divine minds except where it is proper for them to govern and move something.

11 Yet if the Averroists say that the intellect exists only where men exist, two absurd consequences will immediately follow. First, it will exist entire in two men at the furthest remove from each other but not exist in the intervening distance; and this nature does not permit. Second, when men are moved, it too will be moved. Now the Peripatetic school does not ordinarily allow that the substance which is neither body nor the proper form of body be moved either by itself or by accident. Then who will explain the reason why such a divine mind, like a lackey, will everywhere accompany this bumbling little man who hardly ever uses his own mind? Is it by natural necessity? But in actual fact that intellect is superior [to such] and appears to need man neither for its being nor for its well-being. But it cannot conceivably be by [external] violence or by [others'] deliberation. Nor can one allege that it is moved when a man is moved because it is naturally adapted to the human spe-

neque violentia neque consilio licet fingere. Neque licet afferre quod ideo movetur moto homine, quia naturaliter humanae speciei accommodatur. Non enim aliter illum huic accommodant quam caelo mentem, quam tamen una cum caelo moveri non putant. Postremo, si dixerint mentem moto homine non moveri, fateri compellentur tum mentem quandoque procul ab homine, tum hominem procul a mentis praesentia vivere.

: XI :

Ratio sexta. Quia intellectus uterque est virtus in anima.

1 Quod autem intellectum agentem atque capacem duas esse affirmant essentias, ex quibus unum esse intellectualis animae constituitur, id quidem superfluum et absurdum.

2 Superfluum, quia una essentia sufficit viribus duabus instructa, ita ut per unam efficiat species, per alteram capiat, sicut et phantasia intentiones quasdam ex imaginibus haurit et haustas ipsamet recipit, et oculi animalium quae nocte vident in eadem essentia vires geminas possident: per unam imagines colorum eliciunt, per alteram capiunt. Ipsum quoque lumen colores quosdam in nubibus aut aqua et facit et suscipit. Quo autem pacto in eadem essentia duplex fundatur potentia effectrix et susceptiva? Ex diversis videlicet principiis sive relationibus. Sane lumen, prout a sole est, colores facit, prout quasi in se ipso est extra solem, suscipit. Ita et anima, quantum ex deo est, actu purissimo vim sortitur ad species

cies; for the Peripatetics adapt the intellect to man in a manner no different from the way they adapt the [celestial] mind to the heavens, yet they do not suppose that this mind is moved along with the heavens. Finally, if the Averroists say that that mind [of theirs] is not moved when a man is moved, they will be forced to admit that mind lives at times far removed from man, and that man lives far removed from the presence of mind.

: XI :

Sixth proof: Because each intellect is a power in the soul.

The Averroists' affirmation, however, that the agent intellect and 1
the receptive intellect are two essences [or substances] from which the single being of the intellectual soul is constituted is both unnecessary and absurd.

It is unnecessary because a single essence suffices if it is 2
equipped with two powers such that it produces the [various] species through one power and receives them through another. Similarly from images the phantasy derives certain intentions, and having derived them, itself receives them. Likewise the eyes of living creatures that see during the night possess twin powers in the same essence: through the one they elicit the images of colors and through the other they receive them. Light itself too in clouds or in water both makes and receives certain colors. But in what way can a twofold power, productive and receptive, be based in the same essence? Obviously because of diverse principles or relations. Indeed light, in radiating from the sun, produces colors, yet when it is outside the sun as it were and on its own it receives colors. So the soul too, to the extent that it comes from God, is allotted by the purest act the power to produce the species; but to the extent

fabricandas; quantum vero in se ipsa est infra deum, evadit quasi passiva, ac species suscipiendo formatur. Quo fit ut figmentum illud averroicum sit superfluum.

3 Est et absurdum, quoniam ex duabus essentiis, quae actu utraeque existunt, esse unum substantiale non constituitur. Duo namque existendi actus duo sunt esse, non unum. Intellectum agentem apud illos esse actu[84] substantiam quandam, postquam agit aliquid, non est dubium neque nos contra pugnamus. Quod autem adiungunt capacem quoque intellectum esse substantiam alteram ac talem ut mera potentia sit non aliter quam materia prima, non probamus. Nam si mens capax pura potentia sit, a materia prima non distinguetur, et ubicumque materia erit, erit intellegentia, ita ut lapides ipsi intellegant. Certum quidem est materiam primam esse meram potentiam. Non potest autem mera potentia in natura esse nisi una, sicut neque merus actus nisi unus atque e converso. Si enim quaecumque in potentia esse dicuntur per unam rationem communem talia sunt et quaecumque actu similiter, necessarium est ad unicum potentiarum fontem et unicum actuum pervenire.

4 Iterum si prima et communis in rebus distinctio compositiove illa est quae per potentiam fit et actum,[85] atque ex uno non fiunt multa, nisi per ordinem quendam aliorum ad alia, et ex multis similiter non fit unum,[86] nisi per huiusmodi ordinem in quo aliud ad aliud tamquam potentia refertur ad actum, sequitur ut multitudo in rebus ab ipsa potentiae actusque commixtione sumat exordium. Quo fit ut neque merus actus neque mera potentia multiplex esse valeat, postquam neque potentia, nisi per actus mixtionem, neque actus, nisi per mixtionem potentiae subit numerum. Ex quibus conficitur ut mens pura potentia esse non possit.

it is in itself beneath God, it becomes passive as it were and is formed by receiving the species. This is the reason why the [two-fold] invention of the Averroists is unnecessary.

3 It is absurd too, because one substantial being cannot be constituted from two essences, each of which exists in act. For two acts of existing are two existences, not one. With the Averroists, the agent intellect is a particular substance in act since it does something, and there is no doubt about this and we do not challenge them. However, when they add that the receptive intellect is another substance, and of such a kind that it is pure potency like prime matter, we do not agree. For were the receptive mind pure potency, it would not be distinguished from prime matter: wherever matter existed, understanding would be there, such that even the stones would understand. For it is certainly true that prime matter is pure potency. But there cannot be pure potency in nature unless it is one, just as there cannot be pure act unless it is one and vice versa. For if all things whatsoever which are said to be in potency are such through one common rational principle and likewise all things in act, we must necessarily arrive at a single source of potencies and a single source of acts.

4 Again, if in things the first and common distinction or composition is that which comes about through potency and act, and if many things do not come from one thing unless by way of a particular order of some things in relation to others, and similarly if one thing does not come from many things unless by way of this same order wherein one thing is related to another as potency to act, then it follows that the multiplicity in things takes its origin from the mixture itself of potency and act. Consequently neither pure act nor pure potency can themselves be manifold, since potency and act do not become multiple except through the mixture in the first case of act and in the second case of potency. And this is why mind cannot be pure potency.

5 Ac si dicatur mentem quoque simplicem potentiam esse non minus quam materia sit, et ab ea nihilominus discrepare, sciscitabimur qua ratione a materia differat. Plane non quantum potentia est, tum quia in hoc ipso conveniunt, tum quia per potentiam confusio regnat et chaos. Distinctio fit per actum. Adiicietur igitur menti aliquid ultra potentiam, per quod differat a potentia materiae, et id quidem aliquis actus erit. Atque hic actus, si mentis gremio sit infusus, efficiet ut mens non sit mera potentia, postquam actum habet admixtum. Sin incumbat extrinsecus, non prius efficiet ut mens a potentia materiae differat, quantum illa potentia est, quam per actum proprium agendo in mentem, actum aliquem menti intimum tribuat, per quem a potentia pura, in quantum potentia, discrepet. Talis enim discrepantia non fit nisi per actum aliquem, in quantum est actus, atque ita rursus mens non erit potentia pura.

6 Fingent Averroici mentem ideo differre a materia, quoniam mens alium actum respicit, scilicet absolutum et universalem, alium vero materia, scilicet concretum et[87] particularem. Quasi vero ipsi respectus non actus aliqui sint. Nempe si respectus mentis non sit aliud quam ipsa mentis potentia, differentiam non adhibebit. Sin aliud fuerit, erit actus. Praeterea si mens ac materia prius sunt quam respiciant formas suscipiendas, et ut sunt in se ipsis ita respiciunt, certe ex eo quod diversae inter se sunt, diversos actus respiciunt, non e converso. Neque putandum est mentem respicere actum perfectiorem quam materia ipsa respiciat, nisi ex eo quod mens est illa perfectior. Si ita est, longius discedit a nihilo et propinquius ad actum accedit summum, unde est omnis perfec-

If someone should insist, however, that mind is simple potency too no less than matter, yet is distinct from it, we shall inquire about the reason it differs from matter. Obviously it is not distinct insofar as it is potency, both because mind and matter agree in this respect, and because through potency confusion and chaos rule [not distinction]. Distinction comes about through act. Therefore added to mind will be something over and beyond potency, something whereby it differs from the potency of matter; and this will be some act. If introduced into the very womb of mind, this act will ensure that mind is not pure potency after it has the mixture of act. But if it [merely] lies on top of mind externally, it will not make mind differ from matter's potency insofar as it is potency until, by acting through its own act on mind, it gives mind some inner act whereby mind will be distinct from pure potency insofar as it is potency. For such a distinction only arises through some act insofar as it is act. And so again mind will not be pure potency. 5

The Averroists will imagine that mind differs from matter because mind regards one sort of act, namely the absolute and universal act, whereas matter regards another sort of act, namely the concrete and particular. It is as if these two regards were not [themselves] particular acts. Surely, if the regard of mind is not something other than the potency itself of mind, it will not introduce distinction. But if it is something other, it will be act. Moreover, if both mind and matter exist prior to their regarding the forms they are to receive and thus regard the forms as they are in themselves, then certainly it is because mind and matter are mutually different that they look to different acts and not the reverse. Nor must it be thought that mind looks to a more perfect act than matter itself looks to unless it is because mind is more perfect than matter. If it is so, it is much more distant from nothing and comes much closer to the highest act which is the source of all perfection. Therefore it is not potency alone. Thus if matter holds the middle 6

tio. Non igitur sola potentia est. Proinde si materia inter actum atque nihilum tenet medium, et quod infra eam consideratur non est usquam, quod super eam actus existit aut actu, quaerimus ubi locemus mentis essentiam.

7 Profecto si ipsa est aliquid, infra materiam non locabitur. An forte in eodem perfectionis gradu quo et materia constituetur? Nequaquam. Nihil enim praestantius susciperet quam materia. Accedit quod, sicut ea quae per quantitatem sunt aequalia, per eam sunt et unum, ita quae inter se secundum perfectionem aequalia sunt, perfectione sunt unum. Perfectio in forma est; per formam species. Quae ergo perfectione unum sunt, sunt unum forma et unum specie. Hinc accidit ut duae quaedam rerum species aeque perfectae[88] inter se esse non possint. Quare mens,[89] quae est alia species quam materia, in eodem perfectionis gradu cum materia non locabitur, ergo in gradu praestantiore. Si super materiam ponitur, erit actus[90] aut saltem actu, et tanto magis actu quam formae reliquae naturales, quanto longius quam omnes multis gradibus remota est a materia et actui divino propinquior. Si actu est neque in genere sensibilium collocatur, certe super rerum sensibilium actum, in genere et in specie intellegibilium: intellectualem secundum certam speciem habebit actum, sive intellegibilem. Quinetiam in genere rerum actum habebit vitalem, quo vivificet sensibilia. Quod si dicatur sic se habere ad formas intellegibiles, sicut materia se ad sensibiles habet, exemplum quidem hoc erit, utcumque poterit, verum, non tamen coget mentis essentiam esse totius actus expertem.

8 Opinabitur forsan Averroicus aliquis rationes superiores ita demum se subterfugere, si concesserit ipsam potentiae merae natu-

position between act and nothing, and if what is considered below matter nowhere exists while that which is higher than matter exists as act or in act, then we [must proceed to] ask where are we going to locate the essence of mind.

7 If the essence exists as something, it will not be located below matter. Will it perhaps be constituted in the same degree of perfection as matter? Not at all. For then it would not accept anything more excellent than matter. Besides, just as those things that are equal through quantity are also one through quantity, so those that are mutually equal through perfection are one in perfection. Perfection is in the form, and through the form comes the species. Therefore those things that are one in perfection are one in form and one in species. This is why two particular species of things cannot be equally perfect among themselves. And for this reason mind, which is a species other than matter, will not be located in the same degree of perfection as matter. It will be located, therefore, in a higher degree. If mind is placed above matter, it will be an act or at least in act; and it will be that much more in act than the rest of the natural forms to the extent it is further removed than all of them are from matter and removed by many degrees, and is closer to the divine act. If it is in act and not located in the class of sensibles, it is certainly above the act of sensible objects and in the genus and species of intelligibles: it will have either an intellectual act, one in accord with a certain species, or an intelligible act. In the genus of things, moreover, it will have a vital act by which it will give life to sensibles. But were you to suggest that its relationship to intelligible forms resembles that of matter to sensible forms, it would be a true analogy insofar as it went, yet it would not require the essence of mind to be empty of all act.

8 Perhaps one of the Averroists will suppose that he can eventually evade the above arguments if he concedes that the very nature of pure potency is not contracted to the merest point, but has within itself some latitude within which it can be intensified or re-

ram non esse ad extremum punctum coarctatam, sed habere in se aliquam latitudinem, qua intendatur et remittatur, ita ut eius perfectio naturalis in mente sit intensior, in materia vero remissior. Sed neque sic quidem subterfugere poterit. Sicut enim merus actus est actus summus, sic potentia mera summa potentia. Quod vero in aliquo genere tenet summum, id certum, ut ita dixerim, habet limitem ultra quem genus non porrigitur, citra quem quod est nondum est summum neque etiam merum.

9 Quippe qualitas non aliter cadit a sui generis summitate quam per quandam oppositi generis mixtionem. Praeterea si natura potentiae in mente est perfectior quam in materia per aliquam superadditam sibi perfectionem, mens non est potentia pura; quod si per se ipsam, tunc potentia ipsa intensior est in mente, remissior in materia. Aut ergo secundum magis aut secundum melius est intensior. Si detur primum, materia non amplius erit extrema potentia, cum sit alia quae magis potentia est; si secundum, mens non erit potentia mera, quia quod est melius summae bonitatis magis est particeps. Ea vero summus est actus. Cum igitur mens non sit potentia mera, non est in ea substantialis, sed accidentalis potentia, et quia potentia actusque congruere debent, accidentali quidem actui subiecta erit, substantiali nequaquam. Quapropter ex ipsa et substantiali actu intellectus agentis non potest tertia quaedam substantia fieri. Potentia enim secundum quid, ut inquiunt metaphysici, aliquem simpliciter actum non suscipit.

10 Putant Aristotelici intellectum capacem universales rationes rerum naturalium tunc intellegere, quando earum rerum formas absolutas intellegibilesque acceperit. Quoniam vero in se ipsis tales non sunt et fieri actu intellegibiles non aliter possunt quam per na-

mitted, such that its natural perfection would be intensified more in mind but remitted more in matter. But he will not be able to evade the issue in this way. For just as pure act is the highest act, so pure potency is the highest potency. But that which holds the highest position in any class occupies, if one may say so, the established limit beyond which the class does not extend; and that which falls short of it is not yet the highest nor is it pure even.

9 Indeed, a quality does not descend from the summit of its own class in any way other than via a certain blending in of the class opposite. Moreover, if the nature of potency is more perfect in mind than in matter by way of a particular perfection added to itself, then mind is not pure potency; but if it is more perfect by way of itself, then potency itself is more intense in mind, more relaxed in matter. It is more intense, therefore, by virtue of being either more or better. If we grant the first, matter will no longer be potency in its extreme degree, since another will exist which is potency to a higher degree; if we grant the second, mind will not be pure potency, since what is better participates more in the highest goodness. But this is the highest act. Accordingly, since mind is not pure potency, potency in it is not substantial but accidental; and since potency and act must correspond, mind will be subject to accidental but not to substantial act. Thus no third substance can arise from it and from the substantial act of the agent intellect; for potency that is relative [or accidental] cannot, as the Metaphysicians say, accept any act that is absolute.

10 The Aristotelians think that the receptive intellect understands the universal rational principles of natural things precisely when it receives the absolute and intelligible forms of those things. But since the forms it receives are not [in fact] the forms in themselves, and since they can only become the intelligible forms in act through an intellectual and active nature, the Aristotelians introduced a certain efficient intellect as the procreator of the absolute forms. If this [active] nature is a power of the agent intellect in-

turam intellectualem atque agentem, intellectum aliquem efficacem introduxerunt absolutarum formarum procreatorem. Si natura haec intellectus agentis sit virtus quaedam eidem essentiae insita cui et capax virtus innata est, quid opus est avveroica illa geminarum substantiarum congerie? Sin autem alia quaedam substantia sit hac excellentior, quae vim intellectualem transfundat per substantiam mentis capacis usque ad simulacra phantasiae, atque iis simulacris praestet vim formarum intellegibilium efficacem, quod Averroici arbitrantur, multo et prius et magis vim eandem ipsi mentis capacis subtantiae largietur. Illa substantia modo largietur stabili, haec substantia modo stabili capiet, cum utraque sit aeterna. Ipsa igitur substantia eadem quae capacem vim habet, habebit et efficacem, neque opus erit ad duo illa mentis officia substantiarum coitu geminarum. Hinc etiam error Alexandri convincitur. Qui ut ex violenta Aristotelis expositione omnem divinitatem humano generi auferret, mentes quidem capaces esse in nobis numeroque distinctas asseruit, agentem vero mentem extra homines atque unicam, in qua sola sit tota mentis divinitas, quae sit universalis causa intellegibilium specierum.

II Verum cum in omnibus rebus naturalibus sint virtutes quaedam suorum motuum effectrices, nefas est substantiam mentis humanae, naturalium omnium praestantissimam, efficace virtute privari. Et quia a virtute operatio proficiscitur, mens universalis menti nostrae non prius tribuit actum intellegendi quam virtutem intellegentiae effectricem. Quinetiam si causa universalis particulari effectui prorsus opponitur (videlicet tum ut causa effectui, tum ut universalis particulari), necesse est inter duo haec particularem causam tamquam mediam interponere. Virtus quidem solis universalis hunc hominem, qui est particularis effectus, non producit nisi per hominem alium, tamquam particularem causam atque propriam. Eadem ratione mens illa agens universalis non producet effectum hunc aut illum speciei intellegentiaeque in mente capace

serted into the same essence [or substance] in which the receptive power is innate, why do we need that Averroistic pile of twin substances? But if there is another substance more excellent than this, one which transfers intellectual power via the substance of the receptive mind down to the images of the phantasy, and furnishes the images with the active force of the intelligible forms, as the Averroists think, then it will bestow that same force much earlier and in a higher degree upon the substance itself of the receptive mind. The first substance will bestow in a stable manner, and the second substance will receive in a stable manner, since each of them is eternal. Thus the same substance having the receptive power will also have the active power; and a union of twin substances for these two functions of mind will be unnecessary. Hence the error of Alexander has also been refuted. Out of a forced interpretation of Aristotle and in order to rob the human race of all divinity, he asserted that the receptive minds in us are numerically distinct, but that the agent mind, wherein alone dwells the entire divinity of mind, being the universal cause of the intelligible species, is external to men and is unique.[83]

Since certain powers dwell in all natural things, however, and 11
effect their motions, it is impious to deprive the substance of the human mind, the most outstanding of all natural things, of an effective power. Because its activity begins from its power, the universal mind does not bestow the act of understanding on our mind until it first bestows the power effecting that understanding. Moreover, if the universal cause is altogether opposed to a particular effect (opposed, that is, both as cause to effect, and as universal to particular), we have to interpose a particular cause as a mean between the two. The universal power of the sun does not produce this man, who is a particular effect, except by way of another man as the particular and proper cause. For the same reason the universal agent intellect will not produce in the receptive mind this or that effect of a species or understanding without a particular

sine mente quadam agente particulari quae intra nos habitet. Sicut enim pro arbitrio nostro utimur ad intellegendum mente capace quasi forma quadam familiari, ita, prout libet, per efficacem mentem species fabricamus, quasi per artem propriam nobis et insitam. Scite Aristoteles mentem agentem atque capacem numquam duas essentias appellavit neque posuit super animam, sed vocavit animae partes dixitque eas duas esse differentes vires in anima. Si quis autem averroicam mentem appellaverit animam, is animae vocabulo abutetur.

: XII :

Solutio rationum averroicarum de mente separata.

1 Ex omnibus quae contra Averroem adducta sunt duo concludimus. Unum, eandem esse in homine animam quae corporalia format et formatur ab incorporeis. Hoc enim medio solum divinorum radii usque ad infima transmittuntur: si idem quod ab illis illustratur, haec illustrat. Immo et hoc medio infima ad sublimia reflectuntur: si idem regit infima, regitur a supremis. Concludimus et alterum, quod humanae mentes ad numerum hominum numerantur, ita ut vel specie invicem distinguantur, ut opinantur Magi, aut certe numero, ut posteriores theologi asseverant. Quot enim corpora hominum sunt, totidem et vitales complexiones, totidem vivificae animae, totidem animarum mentes. Ferme enim sicut ad

agent mind that can dwell inside us. For just as, in accordance with our judgment, we use the receptive mind as if it were a familiar form in order to understand, so also, as we please, do we fashion species through the effective mind, as through an art proper to and innate in us. Bear in mind that Aristotle never called the agent and receptive mind two essences, nor did he put them above the soul: he called them the soul's parts, and said they were two different powers in the soul.[84] But should anyone call that Averroistic mind a soul, he would be abusing the word "soul."

: XII :

An unravelling of the Averroists' arguments concerning the separate mind.

From all that has been adduced against Averroes we draw two conclusions. The first is that in man it is the same soul that forms corporeals and is formed by incorporeals. For the rays of divine things are transmitted to the very lowest of things only if the same [ray] illuminates the latter and is illuminated by the former; or rather, the lowest things are reflected back to things sublime only if the same [ray] rules the lowest and is ruled by the highest. The second conclusion is that human minds are counted in accordance with the number of human beings in such a way that they are mutually distinguished either by species, as the Magi think, or certainly by number, as later theologians assert. For there are just as many vital complexions, life-giving souls, and minds of [those] souls as there are bodies of men. For in general, just as complexions are distributed according to the distribution of bodies, and lives according to these complexions, so are minds distributed according to the number of life-giving souls (which minds are pow- 1

corporum distributionem distribuuntur complexiones, atque ad has vitae, sic ad vivificarum animarum numerum mentes distribuuntur, quae vires sunt animarum. Non tamen ex distinctione corporis tamquam ex causa substantiae virtutisque incorporeae distinctio, sed ab ipso formatore incorporeo provenit. Rationes vero illae Averrois, quibus ab initio quaestionis negabat intellectum esse corporis formam, nihil contra nos valent. Id enim efficiunt ut non sit forma corporalis esse proprio carens ac dependens a corpore per essentiam. Nos autem eum esse volumus non talem formam, sed in esse proprio subsistentem et materiae dominam.

2 Ceterum ut refellantur nonnullae insuper captiunculae quibus Averroici Platonicos captare obnixe student, meminisse oportet non esse praeter naturam animae humanae ut corpori coniungatur, sed animae huic sempiternae naturale esse ut semper cum sempiterno sit corpore atque caelesti, et cum temporali corpore atque terreno sit ad tempus, sicut et planetae cuique naturale est ut semper in sphaera sua sit, ad tempus autem sub tali signo vel tali. Postquam vero discesserit a corpore, naturale est rursus conciliari, ita ut seorsum a corpore maneat cum affectione quadam ad idem corpus iterum revertendi, sicut et lapis etiam sursum positus manet integer, sed interim pro viribus ad inferiora declinat, et planeta discedens a signo naturali ordine ad idem quandoque revertitur. Redituram vero quandoque animam in eiusdem corporis habitaculum, ne in sempiternum frustra sit ille naturalis affectus, Magi et Aegyptii cum Platonicis consenserunt. Alioquin violentum aliquid esset aeternum.

3 Quoniam vero per actum dei anima in se est, per qualitates vero complexionis est in corpore, et actus dei permanet sempiter-

ers of the souls). Yet the separateness of an incorporeal substance and power does not stem from the separateness of body as its cause, but from the incorporeal Giver of form Himself. But those arguments of Averroes, the ones he used from the onset of his investigation to deny that the intellect is the form of the body, cannot prevail against us. For they merely establish that the intellect is not a bodily form lacking its own being, a form depending on the body through its essence, whereas we want the intellect, not to be such a bodily form, but to subsist in its own being and to be the mistress of matter.

2 Now to the remaining issues. To confute the many fallacious arguments with which the Averroists obstinately strive to trap the Platonists, we must remember that it is not over and beyond nature for the human soul to be joined with the body; but that it is natural for this eternal soul to be joined to an eternal and heavenly body forever but only for a limited time to the temporal and earthly body. Similarly each of the planets is by nature always in its own sphere, but temporarily under this or that particular sign. But after the soul has departed from its body, it naturally yearns to be reunited [with it], such that, when separate from the body, it abides still with a certain affection for the same body and for returning once more to it. Similarly a stone remains intact in itself even when thrown aloft, yet by virtue of its powers it drops back meanwhile to what is lower; and a planet departing from its own sign in accordance with the order of nature returns at some point to that sign. For the Magi and the Egyptians agree with the Platonists that at some point the soul will return to dwell in the same body, lest its natural affection be forever in vain. Otherwise something violent [or unnatural] would become eternal.[85]

3 But since the soul exists in itself through the act of God, but exists in the body through the qualities of the complexion, and since the act of God remains forever, [while] the complexion is dissolved, the soul ceases at some point to be in the body but not

nus, complexio solvitur; desinit esse quandoque in corpore, non tamen esse desinit in se ipsa. Subsistit in suo esse, postquam seiuncta est a corpore, subsistebat similiter dum aderat corpori; sed non communicat esse sicut communicabat. Neque mirabile videri debet animam, quae ad tempus habitat corpus, posse manere seorsum a corpore incorruptam, si modo magis dependet mobile a motore quam e converso. Animus autem verus motor [verus][91] est corporis. Ergo si corpora quaedam separata ab anima manent quodammodo incorrupta, ut ossa, ungues, nervi, capilli, quae videntur tempus longissimum perdurare, idemque faciunt ligna saxaque, maxime vero balsamum, mel et oleum, quae numquam paene putrescunt, nonne animus, rector corporis, naturali ordine poterit manere semper absque corruptibili corpore incorruptus? Qui plane ostendit se in huius vitae progressione propter corruptionem talis aut talis corporis non corrumpi, cum ipse per omnem aetatem permaneat[92] idem exuatque materiam veterem, induat novam, dum corpus propter effluxum refluxumque materiae[93] continue innovatur. Sed pergamus ad reliqua.

4 Quando anima accedit ad corpus, gignitur animal per generationem corporeae complexionis spiritusque vitalis. Quando discedit, soluta complexione ac spiritu resoluto, dissolvitur animal. Neque ex aliquo contingenti hoc animal gignitur, sed ex ordinato concursu omnium naturalium causarum similiterque dissolvitur. Hoc tamen dissolutionis malum Plotinus probat ad animam idcirco non pertinere, quia ipsa se corpori non miscuerit, sed permanens in se ipsa non ex se et corpore, sed ex corpore et suo quodam vitali simulacro unum sub se irrationale animal composuerit. Sed hoc ipse viderit.

to be in itself. It subsists in its own being after it has been separated from the body, just as it used to subsist while it was present in the body; but it no longer communicates being to the body as it used to. Nor should it appear extraordinary that the soul, which dwells in the body for a time, is able to remain uncorrupted when separated from the body, if only because a mobile object [like the body] depends more on its mover than the reverse. But the rational soul is the true mover of the body. Therefore, if certain bodies separated from the soul remain in a way uncorrupted, like bones, nails, tendons, or hairs, which obviously endure for a very long time, and if pieces of wood and stones do the same, and especially balm, honey and oil, which almost never putrefy, then surely the rational soul, the body's ruler, will be able in the natural order to remain forever uncorrupted without a corruptible body? The soul clearly shows that in the progression of this life it is not corrupted by the corruption of this or that body, since it remains the same through its whole life-time, and since, as long as the body is continually renewed because of the ebb and flow of matter, it strips off its old matter and puts on new. But let us pass on to the remaining arguments.

When the soul enters the body, an animate being is born by 4
way of the generation of the corporeal complexion and the vital spirit. When it departs after the complexion has been loosed and the spirit freed, the animate being is dissolved.[86] Now this being is not born from some contingent event, but from the ordered union of all the natural causes; and it is dissolved correspondingly. Yet Plotinus proves that this evil of dissolution does not [really] pertain to the soul, because it has not mingled itself with the body. Remaining in itself, it has compounded one animate being under itself, an irrational animate being, not from itself and the body, but from the body and its own particular living image. But this is Plotinus' view.[87]

5 Sive propinquat anima materiae quantitate intercedente, non necessario extenditur, sicut neque superficies in corpore profundo fit profunda, neque linea in latitudine lata, neque punctum in longitudine longum, neque significatio vocis colorisque imago in amplo aere fiunt amplae. Materia enim ipsa potius quam anima indiget quantitate. Sive antecedit quantitatem, advenienti quantitati nequaquam subiicitur. Quippe cum per potentiam fiat susceptio, non per actum, in materia suscipitur quantitas, non in anima. Quantitas, inquam, indeterminata primum propter materiae ipsius infinitatem, deinde ad certam figuram determinata propter praesentiam animae, quae certae speciei tradit initia.

6 Nemo dubitat materiam naturali quodam ordine antecedere quantitatem. Causae quidem naturales, quia loco temporique subiectae sunt, ideo localiter et temporaliter agunt. Unde et paulatim opus transigunt, partemque tum tempore tum loco post partem. Quapropter opus eiusmodi non possunt alibi quam in materia iam extensa perficere. Deus autem, quia omnem tum localem tum temporalem divisionem exsuperat, modo agit prorsus indivisibili, individuamque potest formam ipsi materiae in eo ipso gradu quo ipsa antecedit quantitatem tribuere. Quam sicut et ceteras formas determinata quantitas comitetur non in anima, sed in materia iacens.

7 Sit unica in homine communis forma totius atque praecipua, id est rationalis anima. Sint quoque (ut placet multis) multae partium specie distinctarum formae particulares, obedientes animae: formae carnis et ossis et nervi et reliquorum ex quibus composi-

If the soul approaches matter through the mediation of quantity, the soul is not necessarily extended, any more than a surface on a three dimensional body is made three dimensional, or a line on a two dimensional surface becomes two dimensional, or a point on a one dimensional line becomes elongated, or the meaning of an utterance or the image of a color become amplified in a wide expanse of air. For matter itself, rather than the soul, needs quantity. But if the soul precedes quantity [itself], it is certainly not subject to an adventitious quantity. Since receiving occurs through potency, not through act, quantity is received in matter, not in the soul—quantity, I mean, which is at first undetermined on account of the infinity of matter itself, and then determined for the purpose of receiving a fixed shape on account of the presence of soul (which initiates a certain species). 5

No one doubts that in a particular natural order matter precedes quantity. But natural causes, because they are subject to place and time, act locally and temporally. Hence they do their work little by little, one part after another in time and in place. And this is why they cannot accomplish such work anywhere except in matter that has already been extended. But God, because He surpasses all local and temporal division alike, acts in a manner which is absolutely indivisible, and He is able to give undivided form to matter itself at the level [in the natural order] where it precedes quantity. Attending this undivided form [i.e., extension] just as it attends the remaining forms is determined quantity, which lies not in soul but in matter. 6

Grant a single common form in man, the pre-eminent form of the whole man, namely the rational soul. Grant too, as many agree, the many particular forms of the parts distinguished in their species, all obeying the soul: the forms of flesh, bones, sinews, and all the other parts from which a given composite is made, a composite which is the substrate for corporeal shape, division, and passion. Let the soul be present to a body shaped already but do 7

tum quoddam fiat, quod figurae corporeae divisionisque et passionis sit subiectum. Adsit anima corpori figurato, non figuretur. Animam vero ipsam non esse talis figurae subiectum inde patet, quod talis figura corporis et antecedit animam et succedit. Cum interrogatur de ipso totius esse, nonnulli respondent per ipsum substantiale animae ipsius esse fieri esse substantiale totius, quod partium coniunctione resultat. Esse enim animae dicunt, quo esse totius existit, quo et ipsa existit in semetipsa. Atque haec anima in pede quiescente non sistitur, sed sistit; in manu mota movet et forsitan non movetur. Sicut enim in corpore locali non subit locum, sed super locum adest et inest loco, ita in moto corpore alienum non subit motum, sed quodammodo immobiliter est in motu. Ac si currit, cum membris currentibus currit transferens, non translata. Ergo quando eodem tempore movetur manus, pes quiescit, non cogitur anima, quae tota est in utrisque, tota moveri simul atque quiescere. Sed moveatur, si placet, anima in manu, respondet Scotus, quid cogit eam interim in pede quiescere? Nonne potest in pede manente[94] ipsa moveri? Quamquam sicut non est impossibile eundem hominem simul totum motibus moveri contrariis, dum navi defertur versus orientem solem, at interim versus occidentem vel pellitur ab alio vel ipse currit in navi, ita non esset absurdum apud Aquinatem Thomam animam ad statum motumque alterius in diversis quiescere simul atque moveri.

8 Tota anima est in brachio, tota est in manu. Amputata manu, anima non truncatur neque restat in aere neque se condensat in

not let it be shaped itself. For obviously the soul itself is not the substrate for such a corporeal shape, since corporeal shape both precedes and follows the soul. To a question about the very being of the whole [man], some respond that the substantial being of the whole (which results from the joining of the parts) comes to be through the substantial being of the soul itself. For they say that the soul's being, by which the whole's being exists, is also that by which the soul exists in itself. And this soul is not stopped in the foot that is resting, but stops the foot; it causes the motion in the hand that is moved and the soul itself is peradventure not moved. For just as it does not submit to place in a body in place, but is present beyond place and present in place, so in a body which is moved it does not submit to the movement alien to it, but in a way is unmoved in motion. And if it runs, it runs with the limbs as they run, transporting, not being transported. Therefore, when a hand is moved at the same time that a foot is at rest, the soul, which is in them both as a whole, is not forced as a whole simultaneously to be moved and to rest. But let the soul be moved, if you insist, in the hand, Scotus replies,[88] then what forces it to rest meanwhile in the foot? Can't it be moved in the foot while being at rest itself? We have to admit though that just as it is possible for the same man to be moved by opposing motions (the whole of him simultaneously) when he is borne away in a ship sailing towards the east, but is either forced by another or runs on the ship himself meanwhile towards the west, so, according to Thomas Aquinas, it would not be absurd for the soul, in relation to another's rest or motion, to be at rest and moving in different things at the same time.[89]

8 The whole soul is in the arm, and the whole soul is in the hand. If the hand is amputated, the soul is not severed, and it does not remain in the air, or concentrate itself in the arm, or escape for a time, for all these are passions of bodies. Rather, the whole soul, which earlier gave life to both the arm and the hand, now gives it

brachium neque refugit tempore — omnes enim hae passiones sunt corporum — sed tota vivificat brachium solum, quae ante illud et manum vivificabat. Desinit autem esse ubi erat; non per motum, sed momento operari desinit, ubi operabatur, quemadmodum si frangatur portio aeris exigua in occidente et evanescat[95] lumen quod totum est in oriente, ut vult Plotinus, totumque in occidente, cum ea portione (in qua etiam erat totum) non frangitur, sed illuminare desinit portionem quam prius illuminabat, neque temporali fluxu in se ipsum se condensat, sicut neque ab oriente in occidentem temporali fluxu sese rarefaciendo protenderat. Momento enim se fecerat praesens, momento se facit et absens.

9 Si anima ubique tota est per corpus atque ipsa intellegit sola, intellegit et ubique. In nullo tamen membro intellegit, quia ipsa non est in membris, sed membra potius sunt in anima. Videtur tamen vulgo apud cerebrum intellegere, quoniam intellegentiam phantasia[96] plurimum comitatur; hanc vero agitatio eorum spirituum, qui sunt in cerebo, sicut affectus phantasiae comitatur agitatio spirituum eorum qui sunt[97] in corde vel iecore; affectum quidem iracundiae spiritus sequuntur cordis, affectum libidinis iecoris spiritus.

10 Si quis interroget: quidnam sentit quidve intellegit? Homo, Peripatetici[98] respondebunt, sed aliter atque aliter. Sentire enim compositi actum esse dicent. Primo, quia vis sentiendi in ipso composito est ex materia formaque mixti et anima. Deinde et actum animae, quoniam ipsius virtute fit sensus. Intellegentiam quoque

to the arm alone. But it stops being where it was and it stops operating where it used to operate not via motion [in time] but in an instant. Analogously, if in the west a thin bar of [sunset] air is dissolved and the light vanishes—the light which, according to Plotinus,[90] is wholly present in the east and wholly present in the west—then the light is not broken up with that portion of [sunset] air where it was present too as a whole. Rather, it ceases to illumine the portion it used to illumine before. Nor in the flux of time does it condense into itself, just as it did not extend itself by way of rarefaction from east to west in the flux of time. For in an instant it had made itself present and in an instant it makes itself absent.

9 If the soul is present as a whole everywhere throughout the body and it alone understands, then it understands everywhere too. Yet it does not understand in any particular limb, since it is not itself in the limbs, but rather the limbs are in the soul. To the vulgar it appears that the soul understands in the brain, because for the most part the phantasy follows understanding, and the agitation of the spirits, which are in the brain, follows this [phantasy], just as the agitation of the spirits in the heart or in the liver follows the emotions of the phantasy. The spirits of the heart certainly follow the emotion of anger, and the spirits of the liver, the emotion of desire.

10 If anyone should ask, "What then senses, or what understands?" the Peripatetics will reply, "Man." But this has diverse meanings. For they will say that sensing is the act of the composite. First, because the power of sensing in the composite itself comes both from the composite's matter and form and from the soul. Next, sensing is also the act of the soul, since sensation comes from the power of the soul. They will say that understanding too is the action of the whole composite. For though understanding is in the soul alone, and for that reason can remain in the separated soul, nonetheless when the soul is the form of the com-

esse totius compositi actionem. Quamvis enim in anima sola intellegentia sit ideoque possit in separata anima remanere, tamen dum anima est ita forma compositi ut in unum esse commune concurrat, id totum, cuius est id esse, ita per formam operari dicitur sicut et esse. Huc illud Aristotelicum tendit: 'Intellectus nullius actus est organi.' Et merito. Non enim in corpore est sicut sensus, sed in anima. Neque, sicut putavit Averrois, existimandus est esse ab homine, sed ab organo separatus. Neque rursus Alexandri more sic est exponendum, ut sensus quidem singuli singula sortiti sint instrumenta, intellectus autem ipsius corpus totum sit instrumentum. Videmus enim nobilissimas vires non quovis, sed nobilissimo solum instrumento uti, unde tactus quasi quolibet, phantasia unico atque distincto utitur. Non ergo universum corpus satisfaciet menti.

II Neque dicendum est ex omnium instrumentorum conspiratione unam consonantiam confici, qua velut instrumento intellectus utatur. Nam si ita se res habeat, intellectus instrumentis omnibus indigebit eritque maxime virium omnium organicus atque mixtus. Neque Aristotelicum illud stabit ulterius: 'Sensus quidem non est absque corpore, intellectus autem est separatus atque immixtus, nullo prorsus organo utens.' Si enim organis uteretur, talis aut talis evaderet, neque omnia ulterius cognoscere posset. Non tamen ita separatus est, quin animae substantia, in qua est, corpus vivificet, alioquin non dicerent hominem intellegere. Separatus est enim quia non est in composito sicut sensus, sed in ipsa animae substantia, quae est a composito separabilis. Neque intellegendo utitur instrumento. Quod quidem in libro *Animalium,* et[99] *De somno et vigilia* confirmavit[100] dicens, quorum sunt actiones, eorundem esse agendi virtutes; quoniam vero sentire quidem per instru-

posite such that it unites in one common being with the composite, the totality which has this being is said to operate as it exists through the form. This is the intent of the following words of Aristotle: "Intellect is not the act of any one organ." [91]And rightly so. For the intellect is not in the body as the sense is, but in the soul. Nor must one suppose, as Averroes thought, that it has been separated from man, but from the organ [Aristotle has adduced]. Nor again must one think, in the manner of Alexander, that individual senses have been allotted individual instruments but that the entire body is the instrument of the intellect itself. For we see that the most outstanding powers do not use just any instrument, but only the noblest. Hence the sense of touch uses almost any instrument, but the phantasy uses only a single distinct instrument. Therefore the whole body will not give satisfaction to the mind.

Nor should one say that a single consonance results from the 11
cooperative playing of all our instruments, a consonance that intellect uses as its instrument. If this is the case, the intellect will need all the instruments, and be the most organ- or instrument-based, the most mixed of all the powers. The assertion of Aristotle will no longer stand: "Sensation indeed does not occur without the body, but intellect is separate and unblended, and uses no organ whatsoever."[92] For were intellect to use an organ, it would become an entity of a particular kind, and no longer be able to know all things. Yet it is not so separated that the substance of the soul in which it is found does not give life to the body, otherwise they [the Aristotelians] would not say that a man understands. Yet it is separate in that it is not in the composite body like sensation, but in the soul's very substance, which is separable from the composite. Nor does it use an instrument in understanding. Aristotle confirmed this in his book *On Animals*, and *On Sleep and Waking*, when he says the powers of acting pertain to the same men as the actions themselves; but since sensing, not understanding, occurs through an instrument, the power of sensing belongs to the com-

mentum contingit, intellegere autem minime, idcirco sentiendi vim esse compositi, intellegendi animae propriam esse posse.

: XIII :

Solutio rationum averroicarum de mente unica.

1 Solvimus iam Averrois Averroicorumque rationes, quibus demonstrari putabant mentis substantiam formam corporis vitalem esse non posse. Solvamus eas deinceps, quibus unicam esse mentem Averrois conatur ostendere.

2 Ex materia, inquit, provenit formarum sub eadem specie numerus, at mens caret materia. Quamquam haec quorundam Peripateticorum sententia est, Pythagoreorum tamen Platonicorumque plurimi speciei naturam unam in plura individua fundi, non propter externam materiam arbitrantur, sed propter insitos quosdam ipsi formae modos, in quos actu perducta forma, individuum hoc aut illud evadat. Esse enim in quolibet angelo angelicam speciem ad angelicum individuum absque materiae mixtione deductam. Verum ut sequamur in praesentia partim Peripateticos, partim nonnullos Platonicorum, forte concedemus vel ex materia vel propter materiam, immo propter compositum ex materia et forma formarum numerum provenire. Formae siquidem corporales sicut ex materia quodammodo trahunt essentiam, sic et numerum sub eadem specie positum. Formae autem non corporales quidem, sed corporis, quales sunt animae rationales, quia non habent originem

posite, but the power of understanding is able to be the soul's own.[93]

: XIII :

Refutation of the Averroists' arguments concerning the single mind.

We have now refuted the arguments of Averroes and the Averroists wherein they think they have shown that the substance of mind cannot be the life-giving form of body. Let us next refute the arguments in which Averroes strives to show that mind is unique. 1

He says that the number of forms belonging to the same species arises from matter; yet mind lacks matter. Though this is the view of some Peripatetics, nonetheless most of the Pythagoreans and Platonists think that the single nature of a species is dispersed into many individuals not on account of external matter, but on account of certain modes of the form implanted in matter; and the form passes into these modes once it has been brought into act as this or that individual. For in any given angel, they think that the angelic species is drawn down into an angelic individual without the mixture of matter. But in the present discussion, to follow the Peripatetics in part, and in part several of the Platonists, let us perhaps concede that the number of forms derives either from matter or on account of matter, or rather on account of the composite made from matter and form. Indeed, just as the corporeal forms in a way derive their essence from matter, so too do they derive their number (a number posited under the same species). But forms that are indeed not corporeal though of body, forms such as the rational souls, because they do not take their origin from matter, do not take their number from it either. But because divine 2

a materia, neque ab ea numerum habent. Quia vero non modo ad divinitatis intuitum, verum etiam ad gubernacula corporum divina providentia illas instituit, sicut voluit certum esse variorum corporum, id est hominum compositorum, numerum ad sui operis ornamentum, ita certum ordinat numerum animarum.

3 Sed ut cum Plotino loquamur, quidnam[101] Platonis animam distinguit a Socratis anima? Divinus ille conceptus, qui vivificam animae platonicae vim primo ad talis cuiusdam temperavit caelestis corporis indumentum, perque hoc ad talem quandam praecipue elementalis corporis complexionem gignendam regendamque accommodavit, ita et ad sua quaedam Socratis animam. Sic ergo vivificas animarum vires discrevit propter materiam, immo propter compositum ex materia mundani ornamenti gratia; vires autem animarum earundem intellectuales discrevit ad animarum distinctionem. Sed quam ob causam? Propter alium atque alium divinitatis intuitum. Sub variis ideis frui possumus mente divina, per varia vestigia illam investigare, variis ad hunc finem callibus proficisci. Voluit sane infinita bonitas non solum corporeis, sed etiam spiritalibus oculis se ipsam infinitis, ut ita loquar, modis communicare, atque innumerabilibus paene oculis innumerabiles sui ipsius vultus ostendere. Itaque variorum animorum intellectuales oculos et affectus diversis temperavit modis, ut diverso tramite ad diversas multiplicium divinorum bonorum possessiones proficiscamur.

4 Proclus ex mente Platonis in *Timaeo* dicentis deum animas hominum alias aliis ducibus stellisque accommodasse, probat diffe-

providence has instituted forms not only to enable us to gaze upon divinity but also to serve as the rudders[94] of bodies, [and] just as it has willed a fixed number of different bodies, that is, of composite men, to exist as an ornament of its work, so too does it ordain a fixed number of souls.

3 To use the language of Plotinus, however, what distinguishes the soul of Plato from the soul of Socrates?[95] It is the divine "concept" which has tempered the life-giving power of Plato's soul first to the garment of such a soul's particular heavenly body, and then through this garment adapted it to begetting and ruling the soul's particular complexion (that of the elemental body especially). It has likewise adapted the soul of Socrates to its particular [garment and complexion]. In this way Plotinus has accordingly distinguished between the two souls' life-giving powers by means of [their] matter, or rather distinguished by means of the composite made from matter for the sake of adorning the world. But he has distinguished the intellectual powers of these same souls according to the distinction of the souls. But on what grounds? On account of the various ways of intuiting divinity. We are able to enjoy the divine mind in terms of various Ideas, to investigate it by following various tracks, and to proceed towards it as our goal along different paths. Surely infinite goodness wished to communicate itself not only to corporeal but to spiritual eyes too, and in an infinite number of ways, so to speak, and to reveal the countless features of itself to eyes which are virtually countless too. And thus it has tempered the intellectual eyes and the desires of various souls in different ways, so that we might set out on a diverse path diversely to possess the multiplicity of goods divine.

4 In accordance with Plato's view in the *Timaeus* that God has adapted the various souls of men to various guides and stars,[96] Proclus proves that differences among souls arise not from bodies or from inclinations towards bodies, but from the essential accommodation itself that God makes between the souls and their

rentias animarum non ex corporibus vel inclinationibus ad corpora provenire, sed ex ipsa essentiali accommodatione a deo facta ad differentes duces atque stellas. Unde et differentia inclinationum actionumque proveniat, tum ad aeterna videnda, tum ad temporalia gubernanda. Proinde, quemadmodum Scotus eiusque sectatores disputant, omnis natura praeter primam, quae sola purus est actus, potentiam quandam quodammodo ex se informem et aliunde formabilem habet admixtam, quae non aliter ad plures singularesque existendi modos, quam materia ad plures formas aeque se habet. Ideoque sicut humana species et equina, sic et intellectualis species quaelibet tam angelorum quam animarum in plura potest individua derivari. Confert autem mentium in eadem specie numerus ad universi ordinem omnino complendum, siquidem ordo plenus ille est, in quo tum superiora ad inferiora, tum haec ad illa vicissim, tum aequalia inter se pariter ordinantur. Ordinem vero eiusmodi in rebus corporeis plane perspicimus. At si incorporea pleniorem habent ordinem, in ipsis quoque similem ordinem, id est triplicem, cogitare compellimur. Non autem potest esse ullus inter aequalia ordo, nisi plura sub eadem specie comprehendantur.

5 Conducit rursum numerus plurimarum in eadem specie mentium ad perfectiorem ipsarum felicitatem. Nam illae se ipsas quodammodo in se invicem contuentes aequali mutuaque, ut naturaliter fieri solet, tum[102] agnitione tum familiaritate congratulantur. Denique longe pulchrius est universum, si ubique infra species, quemadmodum supra species, sit multitudo; supra quidem generali specialique, infra vero numerosa quadam varietate decora. Neque putant singulorum numerum ad id dumtaxat conducere, ut

different guides and stars.[97] Whence arises too the difference among [our] inclinations and actions, whether they are for gazing upon things eternal or for governing things temporal. Therefore, as Scotus and his followers contend,[98] every nature except the first, which alone is pure act, has mixed in with it a certain potency, which is in a way unformed of itself but capable of being formed from another source. This potency serves for plural and for singular modes of existing in precisely the same way that matter serves equally for many forms. Hence, like the human or the equine species, so any intellectual species, of angels and souls alike, can be distributed into many individuals. But the multitude of minds in the same species contributes to the perfect completion of the order of the universe, since what fulfils that order is the ordering of the higher with regards to the lower and of the lower in turn with regards to the higher and of equals equally among themselves. Clearly we perceive such an order existing among corporeal things. But if incorporeal things have a yet richer order, we are forced to consider a corresponding order, namely a triple order, in them too.[99] But no order at all can exist among equals unless the majority are included under the same species.

Again, the multitude in the hosts of minds in the same species 5
contributes to their more perfect happiness. For as in a way they gaze upon themselves in turn, they rejoice together, as naturally and usually happens [among equals], in equal and mutual recognition and friendship. Finally, the universe is far more beautiful if there is a multitude everywhere—below the species as well as above the species, the above being adorned with a variety which is that of the class and the species, the below with a variety which is numerical. Nor do they [the Scotists] consider that the number of individuals contributes only to preserving the species, since far more individuals everywhere exist even in bodies than are needed for the preservation of a species. We observe that in the individual species, moreover, nature makes many things not just for the sake

species ipsa servetur, quia etiam in corporibus longe plura individua ubique sunt quam opus sit ad speciem conservandam. Praeterea videmus naturam in singulis speciebus multa non salutis omnino, sed[103] ornamenti gratia facere. Quod in coloribus et figuris liniamentisque et dispositione quadam ordinatissima manifeste videmus. Denique finis praecipuus, cuius gratia deus omnia esse vult, haud proprie est ut sint, immo potius ut bene sint ac bene se habeant. Ac si huius gratia sunt praecipue qualiacumque sunt, certe eiusdem gratia sunt quotcumque sunt. Quapropter deus plures in eadem specie mentes non ideo esse voluit ut species ipsa sit solumque servetur, immo ut bene sit optimeque se habeat. Eiusmodi vero habitus in ornatu quodam undique vario et actione variis ubique modis beata consistit.

6 Si quis autem humanarum multitudinem animarum ad speciei salutem conferre convicerit, id nos ita concedemus, videlicet non ad ipsius animae speciem proprie, sed ad hominis compositi speciem servandam talem numerum necessarium esse. Vult enim deus plures homines esse ob id forsitan, quia humana species non servatur in uno. Nequeunt autem plures homines fieri, nisi plures quoque animae sint. Neque tam corporum quam compositorum numero specieique toti, immo universi ordini, numerus animarum servire videtur. Neque putet quispiam animas inter se idcirco differe, quia differentia respiciunt corpora. Prius enim in se ipsis differentes sunt quam differenti ratione respiciant. Haec illi. Nos iam ad propositum redeamus.

7 Quod autem subiungit Averrois, si meus intellectus ac tuus differunt numero, species rerum cognoscendarum similiter different eruntque particulares, oportet tamen quae intellegenda sunt, universalia esse, ita solvitur.

8 Non tam singularitas est quae adversatur intellegentiae, quam corporalium accidentium congregatio, siquidem singuli intellectus

of preserving the species but for ornament: we see this clearly in their colors, shapes, and features, and in an ordering that is superlatively well arranged. Finally the highest goal, for the sake of which God wishes all things to exist, is not strictly that they have being but that they have well-being and are well constituted. And if things are such as they are mainly for this reason, then certainly they are as many as they are for the same reason. This is why God wished many minds to exist in the same species, not so that the species itself might merely exist and be preserved, but rather that it might be well and be constituted in the very best way. But such a habitual condition consists in having a particular adornment that is everywhere various, and an action that is everywhere blessed with various modes.

6 If anyone should prove, however, that the multitude of human souls does contribute to the preservation of the species, we will concede it in the sense that such a number is necessary for preserving the species not strictly of the soul itself but of the human composite. For God wishes many men to exist on account of the fact perhaps that the human species is not preserved in just one man alone. But many men could not exist unless there were also many souls. However, the number of souls is not seen to preserve the number of bodies or of composite entities or to preserve the entire species or indeed the order of the universe. Nor should anyone suppose that souls differ one from another because they look to differing bodies. For they differ in themselves before they look to bodies with a differentiating reason. But this is an issue for them [the Scotists]. Let us now return to our subject.

7 Averroes adds that if my intellect is numerically different from yours, then the species of things to be known will likewise differ and be particular, and yet objects of understanding must be universals. But this can be refuted as follows.

8 It is not singularity which is opposed to understanding so much as the aggregation of corporeal accidents, given that single intel-

et singulae illorum conceptiones commodissime intellegi possunt. Adde quod sicut imago coloris in oculo non est id quod videtur proprie, sed per quod color ipse videtur, ita species et similitudo rerum in mente non est id quod proprie intellegitur, sed per quod intelleguntur rationes rerum universales. Neque est illa species in mente ita singularis ut impediat universalium rationum intellegentiam. Nam si statua quaedam, quae singularis est et corporea, communem quodammodo figuram hominum nobis refert, quanto magis species illa naturam communem, cum sit in mente, quae est ab omnibus corporum passionibus absoluta, ideoque ipsa ab iis libera sit? Unde et referet nobis rem neque certo loco clausam neque tempore. Meminisse vero oportet hunc in speciebus ordinem a plerisque poni, ut in angelis universales sint, tum quoad referendum, tum quodammodo quoad essendum spectat; in[104] brutis utroque modo particulares, in animis hominum singulares quidem sint in essendo, quia sunt in essentiis penitus singularibus, universales autem in referendo, quia sunt in essentiis a materiae limite absolutis. Sed haec ipsi viderint.

9 Afferebat praeterea nescio quid de scientia quam tradit magister discipulo, quod ex iis, quae alias tractavimus de speciebus ingenitis, facile solvitur. At enim illa Averrois argumentatio in ipsum facile retorquetur. Quippe si docentis scientia non transit in discentem neque in eo scientiam aliam generat, e duobus alterum sequitur, videlicet quod ipse idem intellectus qui est in utroque vel eundem in utroque possideat habitum, vel ex habitu quem apud unum possidet, alterum habitum generet apud alterum in se ipso. Neutrum fieri potest apud Averroem. Non primum, quia cum

lects and their single conceptions can easily be understood. Moreover, just as the image of a color in the eye is not strictly speaking what is seen but is the means by which the color itself is seen, so a species and likeness of things in the mind is not strictly speaking what is understood but is the means by which the universal rational principles of things are understood. Nor is that species in the mind so singular that it prevents understanding of the universal rational principles. For if a particular statue, which is single and corporeal, recalls for us the shape in a way common to men, then how much more will the aforesaid species refer to a common nature (since it is in the mind) which is superior to all the passions of bodies and so itself can be free of them? Hence it will refer us back to an entity that is not limited to a definite place or time. But we must remember that the majority posit the following order in the species: the species are universal in the angels, both with respect to what they refer to and in a way to their existing; they are particular in the beasts in both respects; and in men's souls they are single in their existing, because they exist in entirely single essences, but universal in what they refer to, because they exist in essences absolutely free from the constraint of matter. But let them [the majority] deal with these issues.

9 Moreover Averroes has alleged something odd concerning the knowledge that the teacher passes on to his pupil; but this can be easily refuted on the basis of the arguments we have used elsewhere concerning the inborn species.[100] In fact Averroes' argument is easily turned against him. If the knowledge of the teacher is not transferred to the pupil, and does not produce new knowledge in the latter, one of two consequences ensues: the very same intellect which is in both either has the same habit in them both, or from the habit which it has in the one it generates in itself a different habit in the other. For Averroes neither of these options is possible. The first is impossible because, since that mind of his would be knowledgeable daily of all the arts in all men, and various

sua illa mens quotidie in cunctis hominibus cunctas calleat artes, easque omnes alii alios doceant perpetua quadam successione docentium et discentium, sequitur ut habitus omnium scientiarum iidem omnino sint semper in mente. Quod aperte Averrois respuit. Non secundum, quia scientia erit qualitas efficax, quod ille negat; atque innumerabiles qualitates specie inter se similes in subiecto eodem simul erunt, quod etiam ille nequaquam admitteret.[105] Quantum enim praeter naturae propositum sit fortuita illa superfluarum qualitatum congeries, in substantia praesertim aeterna atque divina, quisquis non viderit, is erit praeter naturae propositum.

10 Postremo ratiocinabatur[106] Averrois: 'Si in duabus mentibus singularibus duae sint species singulares, licebit eas ad universalem[107] reducere, et utraque mens ad suam quandam reducet, et in utraque rursus mente utraque species evadet particularis. Quapropter licebit iterum ad aliam absque fine utrasque colligere.' Vanum id quidem. Primo, quia mentis aspectus excitatur plane a specie, non tamen terminatur in speciem (ut illam necessario tamquam obiectum inspiciat), sed per eam inspicit rationem rei universalem, quam profecto unam atque eandem, et tamquam unam duae mentes per duas species intuentur, quemadmodum duorum hominum oculi rem eandem vident per duas illius imagines. Non ergo ad hoc intendunt mentes, ut species suas ad alias reducant species, sed ut per eas rerum videant rationes. Quod si quando ad hoc intendant, non tamen in infinitum progredientur, quoniam universalem vim significationemque hae species habent. Itaque non licet eas semper tamquam singulares in alias re ipsa communiores resolvere. Sed progrediantur absque fine, si placet. Quid enim prohibet mentem, quae infinitam quodammodo habet virtutem, sine fine vagari, dummodo infinitum hunc actu cursum pera-

teachers would teach all these arts to various men in an unending succession of teachers and pupils, it follows that the habitual conditions of all the sciences would be forever and wholly identical in that mind. And this Averroes clearly rejects. The second is impossible, because science or knowing would be an active quality, which he denies; and innumerable qualities resembling one another in species would be simultaneously in the same substrate [i.e. in mind], and this too he would not admit. For whoever fails to see how much that fortuitous heap of superfluous qualities is outside the plan of nature, especially when it occurs in an eternal and divine substance, will himself be outside the plan of nature.

Finally Averroes mounted this argument: "If existing in two individual minds are two individual species, they will be reducible to a universal species. But each mind will reduce them to its own particular universal species, and in each mind each species will become particular again. Hence it will become possible again to link them to another species *ad infinitum*." This is quite futile: first because the mind's regard is clearly aroused by the species, but does not terminate in the species (as it would necessarily do if it were looking at it as an object). Rather it looks through the species at a thing's universal rational principle which is certainly one and the same; and two minds looking through two species will see the principle as one, just as the eyes of two men see the same thing through two images of it. Thus it is not the purpose of minds to reduce their own species to other species, but through the species to see things' rational principles. And if it ever were their purpose, still they will not proceed to infinity. For these species have a universal power and significance. Therefore it is impossible forever to resolve them as particular species into others in fact more general. But, if you insist, do let them proceed endlessly. For what forbids the mind, which has in a way infinite power, from wandering endlessly as long as in actuality it never completes its endless course?

gat numquam? Similis argumentatio fieri potest de notionibus et conceptibus, responsio quoque persimilis.

: XIV :

Signa quod non sit mens una tantum.

1 Postquam respondimus Averrois rationibus, reliquum est ut afferamus in medium quae sint ea signa potissimum vel argumenta, quae dissuadeant unum esse in cunctis hominibus intellectum.

2 Signum primum. Si mens adeo[108] divina est ut nullum habeat commercium cum materia, una sit initio carens et fine, tota ubique sub luna, non est verisimile eam ita esse sui ipsius ignaram ut in omnibus paene hominibus, praeter quam in uno Averroe, se numero multiplicem esse putaverit semper et putet. Ego certe[109] non solum intellego, sed etiam intellego me intellegere atque similiter me sentire. Unus ergo idemque sum, qui intellego et qui sentio — unus, inquam, per esse unum, alioquin non tamdiu et a me et ab omnibus affirmaretur eundem esse prorsus intellegentem atque sentientem, sed manifeste discerneretur intellegens a sentiente. Quo enim pacto verisimile est,[110] separatam,[111] aeternam, divinam mentem, in aeternitate omnia cognoscentem, adeo ignorare se ipsam, ut semper et ubique putet se non intellegere solum, sed etiam sentire et movere atque nutrire, cum talia, sicut opinatur Averrois, non efficiat?

3 Signum secundum. Mens veritatis locus est; veritas mentis est cibus, quo fit ut se vicissim libenter asciscant. Cum vero aut num-

A similar argument can be made about notions and concepts, and our response is also very similar.

: XIV :

The signs that there is not just one mind.

Having responded to the arguments of Averroes, it remains for us 1
to present the best signs or proofs that dissuade us [from believing] there is just one intellect in all men.

The first sign. If mind is so divine that it has no commerce 2
with matter, and is one without beginning and end, and is wholly present everywhere beneath the moon, then it is unlikely that it is so ignorant of itself as always to have thought, and to think of itself now, as being numerically multiple in almost all men, except in one alone, Averroes! Certainly not only do I understand, but I understand too that I understand and similarly that I perceive. So I am one and the same person who is understanding and perceiving—one, that is, through one being; otherwise neither I nor all men would have affirmed for so long that the person who understands is absolutely the same as the one who perceives, but we would have clearly distinguished the person understanding from the person perceiving. For how is it plausible that a separate, eternal divine mind, which knows all things in eternity, is so ignorant of itself as to think always and everywhere that it not only understands but also perceives, moves, and nourishes, when, according to Averroes, it can do nothing of the kind?

The second sign. Mind is the place of truth, and truth is the 3
food of mind, and hence they freely admit one another. But since the human mind has never or hardly ever been shown to be receptive of the position of Averroes, we may infer that his position is

quam aut vix humana mens averroicae opinionis capax efficiatur, coniicere possumus eam opinionem non esse veram. Quinetiam ipse Averrois non libero suae mentis iudicio in opinionem huiusmodi incidit, sed quia nesciebat aliter Aristotelis libros in arabicam linguam perversos interpretari. Neque sententiam profert, sed vires tentat ingenii. Solum hoc affirmat immortalem esse mentem. Esse vero unam non affirmat, sed opinatur et dubitat. Inquit autem se conari et fingere ac posteris occasionem disputandi relinquere. Et si qui eius dubitationi adstipulantur, non tam ex animi sententia hoc agunt, quam quodam ambitionis studio, ut videantur paradoxa posse defendere.

4 Merito Scotus inquit hoc paradoxon tantum abesse quod cuiquam probabile fieri unquam possit, ut neque etiam Averrois ipse sibimet persuadere potuerit. Multo vero probabilius, immo verius dixisset Averrois, si vel cum Themistio unicum intellectum introduxisset illuminantem, multos vero partim illuminatos partim illuminantes; vel cum Plotino deum posuisset tamquam solem, huic subdidisset intellectum unicum, ubique totum, quasi soli lumen, huic insuper intellectus quamplurimos quasi lumini radios, his denique animas quoque quamplurimas quasi radiis oculos; aut saltem si cum Avicenna multas mentes uni menti quasi formabiles formatori. Haec enim facile quivis capere potest et exemplo mox aliquo confirmare. Inventum vero averroicum ab omni mentis capacitate est penitus alienum. Quod autem mentes humanae inventum aliquod capere nequeant, vel inde provenit quod super eas illud est atque divinum, vel inde quod contra eas et falsum. Inventum averroicum quia de mente est, non super mentem, est ergo falsum.

not true. Besides, Averroes himself did not arrive at his opinion through the free judgment of his own mind, but because he did not know how to interpret the books of Aristotle in any other way, [given] their corrupt translation into Arabic. Nor does he offer his own view: he is testing rather his wits and their powers. He affirms only that mind is immortal. He does not affirm that it is one: he just offers an opinion and leaves it unresolved. He says, moreover, that he is making an attempt; that he is just imagining; that he is leaving the opportunity for discussion to his successors.[101] And if others agree with his wavering here, they do so as a result, not of their rational soul's decision, but of an ambitious desire to be seen as men capable of defending paradoxes.

Scotus rightly says that this paradox is so far distant from ever 4
becoming probable to anyone that even Averroes himself would be unable to persuade himself.[102] Averroes would have spoken with much more probability or rather truth, if: a) with Themistius he had introduced one single illuminating intellect, but many intellects in part illuminated and in part illuminating;[103] or b) with Plotinus he had compared God to the sun, and had taken the single intellect, which is everywhere entirely present, and subordinated it to God as light to the sun, and then taken the many intellects — as many as possible — and subordinated them to God as rays to the light, and finally taken the souls — as many too as possible — and subordinated them to the intellects as eyes to the rays [they perceive];[104] or at least c) with Avicenna he had subordinated the many minds to one mind as the formable to the giver of form.[105] Anyone can easily comprehend these alternatives and can instantly confirm them with some example. The invention of Averroes, however, is entirely alien to every mental capacity. That human minds cannot comprehend some discovery, however, stems from the fact either that it is above them and divine, or that it is contrary to them and false. The invention of Averroes, since it is about the mind but not above the mind, is for that reason false.

5 Signum tertium. Quotiens unitatem mentis excogitamus, totiens eam odisse solemus ac mentis numerum cupere, si modo cupimus supervivere. Neque arbitrandum est nos per phantasiam unitatem[112] mentis odisse. Nam si quid est in nobis odii adversus mentem, eadem mens unitatem suam odisse potest, quae et nosse. Non est autem verisimile rem divinam et beatissimam semper sui ipsius naturam aspernari, respuere et odisse.

: XV :

Rationes quod non sit mens una. Prima. Quia septem inde contingunt superflua.

1 Argumentationes autem erunt huiusmodi: Si intellectus agens perfecte se ipsum intellegit, quod Averroici confitentur, vim suam et operationem naturalem continuamque non nescit. Idcirco animadvertit se ceu[113] lucem formare continue intellectus capacis perspicuitatem. Nam si capax advertit saepe se illuminari, cur agens non advertat illuminare non video, ubi quomodo intellectus capax moveatur a simulacris non ignorat. Inde et homines singulos se regere, illuminare insuper simulacra hominum, hinc et simulacra et quicquid per illa significatur intellegit, praesertim quia, dum descendit ad sensibilia per vim intellectualem, transit quoque in illa per vim ipsam intellectivam. Itaque intellegit illa, non quia formetur ab ipsis, sed quia ipse se format in ipsa, dum formam suam na-

The third sign. As often as we use our reason to reflect on that [Averroistic] unity of mind, so do we habitually hate that unity and, so long as we have the desire to survive, desire plurality of mind.[106] Nor must we suppose that it is through the phantasy that we hate that unity of mind. For if there is in us any hatred towards mind, the mind that is able to hate its own unity is the same mind that also knows it. But for a divine and most blessed entity always to despise, reject, and hate the nature of itself is counter to the truth. 5

: XV :

Arguments proving that there is not just one mind. First, because seven of its consequences are unnecessary.

The arguments will go as follows. If, as the Averroists admit, the agent intellect understands itself perfectly, it will not be ignorant of its own power and of its natural and continual operation. Thus it is aware that, like light, it is continually forming the perspicuity of the receptive intellect. For if the receptive intellect often notices that it is being illumined, I do not see why the agent intellect does not notice that it is doing the illumining, given that it is not ignorant of how the receptive intellect is being moved by images. In the first case it understands that it is governing individual men and illumining too their images. In the second case it understands the images and whatever is signified through them, especially because, when it descends to objects of sense through its intellectual power, it also crosses over into these images through its intellective power.[107] It understands the images, therefore, not because it is formed by them, but because it forms itself into them when, 1

turalem seu formas innatas per lumen suum discretivum discernit in singula.

2 Si capax modo quodam reflexo, per speciem quam accipit,[114] attingit simulacra unde quasi accepit, cur non agens, qui speciem facit, attingat simulacra unde facit? Attingant autem oportet utrique intellectuali modo, siquidem natura sua nihil sunt aliud quam intellectus. Qui vero sic attingit simulacra, sensibilia prospicit. Cum igitur substantia mentis in parte hac agente vim habeat ad aeterna et temporalia cognoscenda, quid opus est partem illam capacem illi subiungere? An videlicet ad praeparandum et exsequendum operis huius effectum? Minime. Agens enim praeparat capacem ac phantasiae simulacra, non e converso, neque externa eget materia ad agendum, cum et interius et ab interioribus valeat operari. Postquam ergo in agente est virtus et efficax et preparatrix ad intellegendum sufficienter, superflua est virtutis capacis adiunctio ad mentem unam ex substantiis duabus conficiendam. Sed esto, iungatur vis capax agenti: haec rursus agenti subnexa in ea tam aeterna cognoscet quam temporalia. Haec quoque cognitio in universa mente ex hac parte capace supervacua est, quandoquidem non deest ex altera.

3 Iterum vis ista capax ab humanis formata simulacris in nobis temporalia noscit quae iam noverat in agente. Quo fit ut tertia haec cognitio similiter sit superflua. Si potentia videndi per sensum quendam agentem sibi coniunctum singula[115] semper videret, frustra diceretur oculum indigere potentia per quam ab exterioribus moveatur atque formetur.

through its own dividing light, it divides its own natural form or innate forms into individual things.

2 If, via the [particular] species it receives, the receptive intellect also comes into contact in some reflexive way with the images from which, as it were, it has received this species, then why wouldn't the agent intellect that makes this species also come into contact with the images from which it makes the species? But both intellects must come into contact in an intellectual way, since by their nature they are nothing other than intellects. Now the intellect that comes into contact with images in this manner looks down upon sensible objects. Since the mind's substance has the power, therefore, to know both eternal and temporal things in this its agent part, what need is there to join to it that other receptive part? Is it to prepare and accomplish the effect of this operation? Surely not. For the agent intellect prepares both the receptive intellect and the images of the phantasy, not the reverse; and it does not need external matter for acting, since it is able to operate internally and on the basis of things internal. Therefore, when the effective power and the preparation for understanding exists sufficiently in the agent part, the addition of a receptive power to assemble one mind from two substances is quite unnecessary. But even if you grant this addition of the receptive power to the agent part, the power, again joined to the agent part, will know in it eternal as well as temporal things. To have this knowing in the universal mind come from its receptive part is quite unnecessary too, since it is not lacking from its other part.

3 Again, this receptive power formed by human images comes to know the temporal things in us that it already knew in the agent intellect. Consequently, this third knowing [via images] is likewise superfluous. If the power of seeing were always to see individual objects through some agent sense joined to itself, it would be pointless to say that the eye needs a power through which it can be moved and formed by external objects.

4 Sicut ex verbis Averrois in his tribus cognitionibus superfluitas nascitur, sic et in tribus formationibus oritur. Si formatus est intellectus capax agente semel per essentiam, ut ipse putat, superfluum est iterum formari semper eodem per hominum cunctorum simulacra, superfluum quoque eodem formari quotidie per simulacra virorum sapientum atque felicium. Haec omnia superflua sequuntur ex dictis Averrois quae nos ab initio recensuimus. Quod liquido nobis ostendit opinionem eius tamquam supervacuam esse reiiciendam.

5 Iactet ergo se divinam mentem adinvenisse, quae cum in se ipsa sit sapiens, semper delirat in nobis. Et quoniam quotidie innumerabiles homines rem eandem considerant ac saepe falluntur, mens illa singulis momentis eandem rem simul millies milliesque considerat et saepe decipitur. Si superfluitatem hanc fallaciamque sibi a phantasiis iniectam mens ipsa secum animadvertit numquam, semper sui ipsius est inscia. Cuius contrarium experimur in nobis, quando fallacias proprias redarguimus. Si animadvertit quidem, non tamen intentionem suam ab iis ambagibus in se divertit cum possit, semper est mollis, semper incontinens. Potest autem aeterna mens in aeternum aciem suam a temporalium phantasiarum nugis avertere, siquidem temporalis anima saepe ad tempus a sensuum nugis sevocat semetipsam. Neque potest affectus ad singula quae sunt infra homines mentem illam in iis erroribus et turbinibus remorari, quae neque erga humanam quidem naturam sic afficitur, ut cum ipsa conspiret ad speciem fabricandam. Quo igitur pacto cum hoc animali ad intimas operationes concurret, nisi prius ad esse congrediatur? Nam et forma ignis externae materiae cale-

Just as Averroes' words produce a superfluous assumption in 4
these three kinds of knowledge, so do they in the three kinds of forming. If the receptive intellect has once been formed by the agent intellect through essence, as he supposes, it is superfluous to have it forever being formed anew by that same agent intellect through the images of all men; and also superfluous to have it being formed by that same intellect daily through the images [solely] of wise and happy men. All three superfluous assumptions follow from the words of Averroes that we reviewed from the onset. Patently this shows us that his opinion must be rejected as serving no purpose.

Therefore Averroes is boasting when he speaks of having come 5
upon a divine mind which, though in itself it is wise, is always raving in us. And since on any given day innumerable men consider the same thing and are often in error, that mind at any given moment is considering the same thing thousands of times together and often being deceived. Now, were the mind never to take note in itself of this superfluous assumption and of the deception imposed on it by images, it would always be ignorant of itself. [But] we experience the very opposite of this in ourselves when we refute our own deceptions. Were the mind to notice indeed, but not to turn its attention away from those ambiguities in order to focus on itself, even though it was able to, then it would be forever fickle, forever lacking in self-control. But the eternal mind is able eternally to turn its gaze away from the trifles of temporal phantasies, and indeed the time-bound soul often withdraws itself for a while from the trifles of the senses. Nor can desire for individual things that are lower than men detain that mind in these errors and whirling confusions, since it is not even drawn towards human nature in order to join with it to make the species. How then, unless it is first joined to this animate being for its existence, will it join it to perform internal operations? For the form of fire imparts its power to heat to external matter, since this is an external opera-

factionem quidem ipsam, quae externa operatio est, communicat, etiam si esse suum nequaquam communicaverit; calere autem per se, quae est intima operatio, solum post esse communicat.

: XVI :

Secunda. Quia mens species servat ac iamdiu plena omnium debet esse.

1 Quamquam in libro superiore ex Platonis sententia novas menti formas non advenire probavimus, declinemus tamen ad Peripateticos in praesentia ac novas fieri formas in mente capace per vim mentis agentis praesentibus simulacris concedamus, eo videlicet pacto ut simulacrum efficacem vim ad speciem creandam non adhibeat, sed occasionis impulsum, quod alias declaravimus.

2 Si tota vis speciei universalis efficiendae in agente est, ac tota vis sustinendae eiusdem est in capace virtute, profecto ab iis duobus absque simulacrorum praesentia species conservabitur. Verum habeat, si videtur, simulacrum efficacem vim ad speciem procreandam, dummodo ipsum instrumenti gerat vicem, agens vero intellectus artificis. Propterea intellectus agens, tamquam causa principalis in qua tota vis sequentium causarum concluditur, postquam semel speciem impressit menti capaci, solus ipse conservat. Siquidem species in mente vigent, etiam dum in otio torpent simulacra. Quae cum apud Averroem tamquam moventia extrinseca se ad speciem habeant, nequeunt aliter illam servare quam agendo in ipsam atque movendo. Movent autem solum ut actu sunt, non habitu.

tion, even if it has not imparted its being [as fire] in any way. But it imparts becoming inflamed as such, which is an internal operation, only after it has imparted its being as fire.

: XVI :

Second proof: Because the mind preserves the species and must have long since been full of them all.

1 Though we proved in an earlier book that according to Plato new forms do not enter the mind,[108] let us nonetheless defer to the Peripatetics for the present and allow that new forms are made in the receptive mind through the power of the agent mind when images are present; and made in such a way that an image supplies, not the effective power for creating a species, but the impulse of an occasion to do so, as we have explained elsewhere.

2 If the entire power for producing a universal species is in the agent intellect, and the entire power for sustaining it is in the receptive power, then that species will obviously be preserved by them both without the presence of images. But let the image, if you insist, have the effective power for procreating a species, as long as it assumes the role of the instrument and the agent intellect assumes the role of the artificer. In this situation the agent intellect—as the principal cause in which all the power of the subsequent causes is comprised, and after it has impressed that species on the receptive mind—is the sole preserver. For these species are active in the mind, even when the images lie idly at rest. But the images, according to Averroes, since they function with regard to a species like external movers, are unable to preserve that species otherwise than by acting upon and moving it; and they move it insofar as they are in act, not in habit.

3 Quod si species in sensu interiore manent diu prodeuntque in actum, etiamsi non serventur excitenturque ab exterioribus sensibus, quanto magis species in mente absque simulacris. Neque comparanda mens est exterioribus sensibus, qui formas absentibus obiectis amittunt. Non enim formas veras, sed imagines habent, neque ipsi vi sua conducunt ad imagines fabricandas. Mens autem veras possidet rationes, per quas veras rerum substantias comprehendit, atque ipsamet sibi eas effingit. Ideoque potest eadem virtute servare[116] qua finxit. Atqui si species mentis non aliter a simulacris quam umbrae a corporibus dependerent, nihil haberent in se praestantius quam simulacra. Ac si quid haberent sublimius, id esset munus virtutis agentis, quo etiam semotis simulacris servabuntur. Quod autem non sicut umbrae pendeant a simulacris, documento nobis esse potest, quod usque adeo radicitus infiguntur, ut imprimant habitum penitus indelebilem.

4 Neque dicendum est species ideo exiguam essentiam habere, quia universalia referant, proptereaque egere semper simulacrorum fundamento tamquam conservatore. Primum quidem, quia et plura et meliora et magis ad essentiam rerum pertinentia continent referuntque quam simulacra, ideo nobiliorem amplioremque essentiam possident. Quod si quis conceptus generis propter confusionem dispersionemque et conceptus singularium[117] propter umbratilem illorum naturam parvifaciat, facile concedemus. Species autem honorari iubet Plato. In iis enim consistit mundi perfectio et scientiae veritas; ad has ita singula referuntur ut partes ad totum atque etiam ut ad finem. Deinde, etiam si propter universa-

Now if the various species remain for a long time in the interior 3
sense and issue into act even if they are not preserved and excited by the external senses, then how much more do these same species remain in the mind without [the senses'] images. Nor should the mind be compared to the external senses, which lose the forms when their objects are absent (for they do not have the true forms but images only, and they cannot draw on their own strength to fabricate these images). But the mind possesses the true rational principles, and through them it understands the true substances of things and portrays them to itself. And so with the same power it uses to portray them it is able to preserve them. Now if the mind's species were to depend on images exactly as shadows depend on bodies, they would have nothing in themselves more outstanding than the images. But if they do have something more sublime, it must be the gift of the agent power by which they are preserved, even when the images have vanished. But the fact that they do not depend like shadows on images can serve us as proof that they are so radically fixed [in us] that they imprint [on us] a habit that is completely indestructible.

Nor can one say that the species have a tenuous essence since 4
they refer to universals and always need the foundation of images therefore as their preserver; and first because they contain and refer to things that are more and better than images, and they pertain more to the essence of things and so possess a nobler and larger essence. But if someone is [merely] assigning little weight both to the concept of the genus, owing to its confusion and dispersion, and to the concept of individuals, owing to their shadow-like nature, that we shall easily concede. Plato commands us to honor the species, however. For the perfection of the world and the truth of knowledge resides in them; and individuals are referred to them as parts to a whole and also as a goal.[109] Furthermore, even if, on account of the universal condition, the species do

lem conditionem indigent conservante, servabit eas potissimum intellectus agens, a quo naturam huiusmodi nanciscuntur.

5 Neque etiam ob hoc egere simulacris hanc speciem arbitramur, quia naturam significet in singulis existentem, quoniam si naturam tamquam absolutam significat, rem potius respicit seorsum a singulis quam in singulis, rationem scilicet aeternam rerum. Quae secundum essentiam in mente divina est, secundum vero participationes medias in sequentibus deum mentibus, secundum postremam quandam similitudinem in corporibus. Quorum imaginibus commonitus intellectus, divinitatis absolute[118] particeps, statim aut concipit speciem aut in se et supra se agnoscit ideam. Sic per ipsam speciei conditionem constat non esse eam quasi umbram simulacri prorsus instabilem, sed excellentem quandam stabilemque naturam.

6 Idem quoque ex natura mentis possumus coniectari. Profecto cera et pulvis servat ad tempus rerum figuras, rebus ipsis etiam abeuntibus. Cerebrum quoque, ut opinatur Averrois, custodit absentibus corporibus simulacra corporum. Mens autem ipsa, quae propter aeternitatem stabilis est et super motum, non suscipiet pro natura sua species stabiliter et super motum? Non servabit aeterne, quae gremio suscepit aeterno? Nonne intellectus est virtus sensu superior atque ideo magis unita? Ac propterea solus ipse facere potest omnia, quae plures sensuum vires efficiunt. Quocirca, sicut phantasia sola cognoscit quaecumque sensus quinque percipiunt, quia ipsa est illis superior, sic intellectus solus et iudicabit species et servabit, licet forte iudicare simulacra et servare non sit solius phantasiae officium, ut putat Averrois, sed iudicare phantasiae, servare memoriae.

7 Distinguuntur duo haec officia in iis inferioribus viribus. Coniungantur oportet in mente, quamquam apud Platonicos phantasia

need a preserver, the agent intellect, from whom they derive such a [dependent] nature, will most preserve them.

5 We do not think that this species also needs images precisely because that would signify a nature that is existing in individuals, since, if it signifies a nature as absolutely free, it is looking to something apart from, rather than in, individuals, namely to the eternal rational principle of things. And this principle is in the divine mind in terms of its essence, but in the minds attending upon God in terms of its intermediary participations, and in bodies in terms of its lowest particular likeness. Reminded by images of these bodies, the intellect, participating absolutely in divinity, either conceives a species immediately or recognizes an Idea both in itself and beyond itself. Thus, by way of the very status of a species, we have established that it is not some completely unstable shadow of an image, but a nature that is excellent and unchanging.

6 We can surmise the same also from the nature of the mind. Wax and dust certainly preserve the shapes of things for a time, even when the objects themselves have gone. The brain too, according to Averroes, preserves the images of bodies even when the bodies are absent. But the mind itself, which is unchanging and, because of its eternity, beyond movement, will it not accept species unchangingly and motionlessly in accordance with its own nature? Will it not preserve eternally the things it receives in its eternal bosom? Isn't the intellect a power superior to sense and thus more united? This is why it can do all the things alone that the many powers of the senses do together. Thus, just as the phantasy knows by itself whatever the five senses perceive, being superior to them, so the intellect by itself will both judge and preserve the species (though peradventure judging and preserving images is not the office of the phantasy alone, as Averroes thinks,[110] rather judging is the office of the phantasy, preserving, of the memory).

7 These two offices [of judging and preserving] are distinguished in the [two] lower powers. In the mind they are necessarily joined,

quoque memoriam propriam possidet. Quod testatur et habitus confirmatio et libera discursio ab imaginibus in imagines, quae saepe fit reminiscentiae studio. Mentem vero esse memorem illud significat, quod cum primum aliqua discimus, difficillime nos et vix ad illa conferimus; post vero diuturnum cogitationis usum promptissime pro arbitrio nostro quae olim accepimus meditamur, quasi nostra iam facta fuerint atque 'alta mente reposta.' Postquam semel in se ipsa mens nostra formavit definitiones quasdam figurarum seu numerorum seu virtutum sive angelorum sibi invicem ordine succedentes, vix primam recolere potest, quin secundam resumat et tertiam, et sicut a principio cum eas inveniret, vix eas contexuit, ita, quando rursus incidit in[119] inventas, vix dissolvit quae antea contexuerat, ac multo facilius citiusque ab aliis speciebus recurrit in alias quam soleat sensus interior, quando et ipse ad priora simulacra gradatim reminiscendo revertitur. Quod aperte declarat inesse menti memoriam multo magis quam sensui.

8 Quod si quis[120] dixerit mentem non tam formatas species definitionesque servasse quam habitum reformandi, respondebimus vim mentis eandem quae et contrahit et servat habitum, in eius naturam iam paene conversum, contrahere in intima sua speciem atque servare. Siquidem habitus fundatur in speciebus, species in habitu concluduntur. Proinde si habitus fit a mente, specie atque actu, ab aliquo istorum stabilitatem suam nanciscitur. Non a mente solum, alioquin mens posset actui quoque stabilitatem tri-

though, according to the Platonists, the phantasy possesses its own memory too. Bearing testimony to this is both the inner stability of our habit and the free discursive movement from images to images that often stems from our yearning to remember. That the mind indeed remembers is signified by the fact that when we learn things for the very first time, we barely come to grips with them and only then with considerable difficulty. Yet after we have used our reasoning powers for a period of time, we are able to reflect, very quickly and at will, upon matters we took in long ago as if they have now been made our own and "stored deep in our mind."[111] Once our mind has formed certain definitions within, whether of shapes, or numbers, or powers [virtues], or angels, following one upon another in order, thereafter it can scarcely recall the first definition without taking up the second and the third. And as in the beginning, when it first discovered these definitions, our mind wove them together with difficulty, so, when it returns to its discoveries, with difficulty it unravels what it had woven together beforehand. But it hurries from species to sundry species with much greater ease and speed than the interior sense [i.e. the phantasy] is wont to do, when, in remembering, it is gradually brought back to earlier images. And this is clear proof that memory is much more present in the mind than in the sense.

8 Were someone to say that the mind has not preserved the species and definitions it has formed, but rather the habit of re-forming them, our response would be that the same power of the mind which assembles and preserves the habit (converted as it virtually is already towards its own nature) assembles and preserves within itself a species. For the habit is founded upon the various species, and the species are included in the habit. Therefore, if the habit arises from the mind, from a species, and from act, it acquires its stability from one of these three. But it is not from the mind alone, otherwise the mind would be able to give stability to act too; and it is not from act, since act has no stability at all. Thus

buere. Non ab actu, quia nullam habet stabilitatem. A specie igitur. Ergo species stabilis permanet.

9 Neque opus est, quotiens eandem rem speculamur, totiens novas ab agente formas recipere, prioribus subito vanescentibus, si modo tam agens virtus illa pro natura sua tradidit formas, quam virtus capax pro natura sua suscepit easdem, atque utriusque natura mobilitatem corporum antecedit. Merito imagines novae semper recreantur in visu, quae a lumine creantur externo. In mente autem species permanent, eodem ipso interno lumine unde primo effluxerant firmiter illustrante; praesertim quia, si ex eo creatae sunt quod rei cognoscendae natura secreta est a mutabilis materiae passionibus, iure permanent immobiliter, ut a substantia mentis omnino stabili fiat transitus in accidens prorsus instabile, in ipsam scilicet intellegentiam, per accidens aliquod stabile, scilicet speciem. Ubi substantia semper est actu, species ex actu migrat in habitum atque contra, intellegentia ab esse in non esse atque e converso. Neque simulacris indigent species ut serventur, quippe cum ipsi etiam phantasmatum assertores confiteantur. Quamvis ad intellegendas communes corporum naturas simulacris propriis egeamus, tamen ad formarum intuitum divinarum non simulacris umquam propriis nos uti solere, sed naturis potius ipsis quas simulacra comitantur. Hinc apparet ipsas divinorum notiones in mente non a simulacris, quae per accidens confluunt, sed ab ipsa mente per antecedentem speculationem iam praeparata servari.

10 Praeterea quando platonicam illam seriem connectimus idearum, in qua speciebus ultimis medias quasdam species anteponi-

the habit comes from a species. A species remains unchanging therefore.

9 Nor is it necessary, as often as we reflect upon the same thing, that we as often receive new forms from the agent (while earlier forms quickly disappear); this is provided the agent power has transmitted the forms in accordance with its nature, just as the receptive power has received the same forms in accordance with its nature, and the nature of both powers precedes the mobility of bodies. In the sight new images are always being recreated, and properly so, for they are created by an external light. In the mind, however, the species abide, and are bathed intensely by that same internal light out of which they had first flowed; and especially because, if they have been created precisely because the nature of the object of knowledge has been kept apart from the passions of changeable matter, by rights they abide motionlessly, so that a transition occurs from the wholly stable substance of the mind to the wholly unstable accident, that is, to [the act of] understanding itself, via some stable accident, that is, a species. Where the [mind's] substance is always in act, a species passes from act into habit and the reverse, and understanding passes from being into not-being and the reverse. Nor do species need images in order to be preserved, since even the champions themselves of images acknowledge this. Though we need the appropriate images to understand the common natures of bodies, yet to intuit the divine forms we never customarily use their appropriate images but rather the very natures that the images accompany. Thus it is clear that the notions themselves of things divine in the mind are not preserved by the images that flow together accidentally, but by the mind itself, prepared already through antecedent reflection.

10 Moreover, when we link together that Platonic series of Ideas where we put certain intermediate species ahead of the lowest species, and subordinate genera ahead of them, until we ascend through many degrees to the all-embracing genera, and even tran-

mus atque illis iterum genera subalterna, donec multis gradibus ad latissima[121] genera conscendamus, transcendamus quoque genera ad eam naturam pervenientes, quae cuncta genera extrinsecus ambit, tunc sane simulacra dimittere cogimur citra species ultimas pervagantia. Quae ascensum illum nequeunt comitari, nisi forsitan universalem ordinem in singulis quoque simulacris disponamus. Quod quidem fieri revera nequit, ac si fingatur, non a phantasia fingitur, sed a mente, quae interdum notiones innovat ultra notiones, etiam si libuerit in immensum, simulacra vero non innovat. Neque prohibet quicquam, quoad mentis naturam pertinet, in aevum ita nudam simulacris pervolare. Interdum vero quousque angustiora quaeque resolvit in ampliora, eousque simulacra pingit in phantasia speciebus quodammodo respondentia, ubi species ipsae, quia praecedunt, faciunt et conservant simulacra, non e converso.

11 Phantasiam vero formari a mente ex eo perspicimus, quod subito in ipsa lucent complurima, qualia numquam aut acceperat a sensibus aut excogitaverat. Dividit quoque imagines et componit non sine aliqua ratione et in infinitum fingendo progreditur; immo a mente fingitur absque fine. Habitus quoque ac mores accipit rationales. Ac multo magis ipsa formatur a mente quam formet, quoniam si ipsa mentem format quandoque, id non aliter efficit quam a sensibus et a mentis virtute pulsata. Neque potest formas innumerabiles tradere; mens autem ex se phantasiam format et absque fine. Et potest nonnunquam sive affectu suo sive divino quodam afflatu ad intellegendum absque simulacris provocari. Quod significat quod saepe iam quaesivimus, mentem etiam dum adest corpori, sine corporis auxilio operari nonnumquam, ideoque cum ab eo discesserit, per se ipsam multo magis operaturam.

scend the genera until we arrive at that nature which from without embraces all genera [i.e. at the One], then we are compelled indeed to dismiss those images wandering on the underside of the lowest species. They cannot accompany that ascent, unless perchance we set up the universal order in individual images too. But this is quite impossible, and if conceivable, it is conceived not by the phantasy but by the mind, which sometimes introduces ultranotional notions, even to infinity if it chooses, but does not introduce images. Nothing pertaining to the nature of the mind prevents it from taking flight to eternity when it is thus stripped of images. Sometimes, however, to the extent it resolves certain more restricted images into ampler ones, the mind depicts them in the phantasy as corresponding in a way to the species; but in this case the species themselves, because they are prior to the images, are fashioning and preserving the images, not the reverse.

We perceive that the phantasy is formed by the mind from the 11
fact that many images blaze up in it suddenly of a kind that it had never either received or cogitated from the senses. The phantasy separates and arranges images too, not without some reason, and proceeds to infinity in shaping them; or rather, the phantasy [itself] is endlessly shaped by the mind. It also receives rational habits and rational manners. It is itself formed by the mind to a far greater degree than it forms the mind, since, if it ever forms the mind, it does so only when impelled both by the senses and by the power of the mind. Nor can the phantasy give the mind an endless number of forms; from itself rather the mind forms the phantasy and endlessly so. And at times the mind can be goaded into understanding without images, whether through its own desire or through a certain divine inspiration. This shows us what we have often sought for already,[112] namely that, even when present to the body, the mind can at times operate without the body's help; and so, when it has departed from the body, it will operate through itself still more.

12 Si adduxerint hic Averroici eos solere magis intellegentia memoriaque valere qui corpoream complexionem talem habeant aut talem, propterea quod notiones intellectuales a sensibus continue pendeant, peripatetice respondere poterimus certam corporis affectionem sensui per se servire, menti vero per accidens, quia mens, dum coniuncta est corpori, et per imagines sensuum quodammodo species fabricat suas, et quotiens in suas species, quas fecit servavitque, ipsa se volvit, totiens paene in imagines se revolvit. Revolvit, inquam, tum ob quandam inter illas germanitatem, tum ob consuetudinem ex conditione animae corpori copulatae conceptam. Et quamvis in qualibet complexione quotidie acumen et memoriam videamus, unde fateri cogimur haec ab altiori principio proficisci, sit tamen, si placet, sicca natura magis memor, dummodo siccitas causa per se memoriae sit in sensu, in mente vero per accidens, non solum quia sensus ipsius memoria menti quodammodo servit, ut diximus, sed etiam quia spirituum siccitas ad intima se contrahendo non impedit animam quin se colligat. Quo fit ut propter vehementem assiduamque cogitationem et acuatur intellectus et memoria confirmetur. Humiditas vero contra.

13 Ad haec autem Platonici dicerent, quot stellae sunt, totidem esse exercitus animarum, talemque naturam inde denominationemque habere. Hinc ergo dici saturnias animas ioviasque et martias et solares aliasque similiter, variasque dotes circa acumen, memoriam, voluntatem, mores, artes, fortunas ab illis habere. Omnes tamen, prout inde sunt, bonas,[122] quamvis hic ex multiplici causa-

12 Should the Averroists at this juncture argue that the men who have a more powerful understanding and memory are usually those who have such or such a bodily complexion, and accordingly that intellectual notions depend continuously upon the senses, we could retort in Peripatetic fashion that a certain affective condition of the body in itself serves sense-perception, but only accidentally serves the mind. This is because, as long as the mind is joined to the body, it not only constructs its own species in a way through the images of the senses, but also ponders these images almost as often as it ponders its own species, those it has made and preserved. It ponders, I say, on account both of a certain affinity between them, and of the familiarity spawned from the condition of the soul in union with the body. And though we daily perceive discernment and memory in any and every [human] complexion, and hence are forced to admit that they proceed from a higher principle, yet suppose, if you will, that a dry nature does have a better memory. This dryness may be the cause per se of the memory in the sense, but in the mind it is only the accidental cause, not only because the memory of the sense itself serves in a way the mind, as we have said, but also because the dryness of the spirits, in contracting themselves within, offers no bar to the soul's recollection. That is why vehement and constant cogitation sharpens the intellect and strengthens the memory. Wetness does the opposite.

13 The Platonists would say to this that the armies of souls are as many as the stars, and that they derive their peculiar nature and denomination from the stars. Hence souls are said to be saturnian, jovian, martial, solar, and similarly with the rest, and to have their various gifts from the stars, whether it be of discernment, memory, will, customs and habits, arts and skills, fortunes. Yet all these gifts, in that they derive from the stars, are good, though here on earth they often degenerate because of a manifold combination of causes. Moreover, souls are said to receive spiritual gifts from the souls and divinities of their own stars, which guide and follow

rum concursu saepe degenerent. Praeterea a suorum siderum animabus numinibusque eas tam ducentibus quam sequentibus spiritales dotes accipere, a stellarum vero corporibus corporeas atque sensuales. Quamobrem si saturniae mercurialesve hominum animae inde ad acumen atque memoriam adminicula nanciscuntur, simul etiam ab earundem stellarum corporibus certam sortiuntur affectionem in corpore, quae intellectualis muneris non causa sit, sed comes. Denique ex voluntatis vehementia attentioneque assidua magnam acuminis memoriaeque excellentiam plurimum provenire. Sed non licet hic ulterius digredi.

14 Quorsum haec? Ut averroicam illam opinionem reiiciamus, quae absolutas divinae mentis species a corporeis temporalis phantasiae simulacris tamquam a corporibus umbras asserit dependere. Platoni vero fidem adhibeamus dicenti quod semel revera fuerit intellectum oblivioni omnino mandari numquam posse, sed rei comprehensae speciem in aeterna mente verti in habitum sempiternum. Neque enim contrarium quicquam habet cuius accessu interimatur, neque umquam a subiecto deseritur. Quamobrem, si mens averroica singulis momentis per cunctorum hominum phantasias haurire omnium species affirmetur, unde res omnes intellegat — atque si haec mens initio caret, semper quoque fuit hominum generatio — certe ante nos mille annorum millibus species omnes habitusque non semel, sed innumerabiliter habuit; immo numquam primas species accepit ab aliquo, si numquam fuit homo primus intellegens. Unde per nullius simulacra species finxit, sed species eius sunt ipsamet vel ex ipsa eius essentia. Quod Aristoteles non concesserit.

15 Sed acceperit species ac iamdiu omnes. Servat autem quaecumque accipit immobiliter, si modo intellectualiter accipit, id est

them alike; but from the bodies of these stars they receive corporeal and sensual gifts. Therefore, if the saturnian or mercurial souls of men acquire aids to discernment and memory from the souls of the stars, at the same time they are also allotted from the bodies of those same stars a certain affective bodily disposition; and this disposition does not cause but accompanies an intellectual gift. Finally, they [the Platonists] assert that from the vehemence and constant attention of the will arises for the most part the especial excellence of discernment and memory. But we should not digress further.

14 Where do these arguments lead? To our rejecting the Averroist position claiming that the divine mind's absolute species depend upon the corporeal images of the temporal phantasy as shadows upon bodies. We should credit Plato, however, when he says that once something has been truly understood it can never be altogether given over to oblivion, but that the species of the thing that has been comprehended in the eternal mind is converted into an everlasting habit;[113] nor is it opposed by anything by whose advent it might be destroyed, and it is never forsaken by its substrate. Therefore, if the Averroists' mind is declared to ingest through the phantasies of all men, moment by moment, the species of all things, whence it knows all things, and if this mind lacks a beginning and the generation of men has been forever, then it has certainly possessed all the species and habits thousands of years before us, not just once but countless times. Or rather, it never received the prime species from anyone if the prime understanding human being was never there. Hence it never fashioned the species through the images of anyone, but its species are itself or from its own essence. This Aristotle would not have conceded.

15 But suppose this mind has received the species and all of them from long ago. A mind, however, motionlessly preserves whatever it receives provided it receives in an intellectual manner, that is, by way of the intellectual reason. If it has acquired individual things

secundum rationem intellectualem. Si olim adepta est singula infinite plenaque est omnium et exuberat, quid quaerit ultra? Quid sibi vult superflua haec formarum acceptio sine fine? Quapropter nihil mens nunc in nobis intellegit, cum nihil a nobis accipiat.

16 Forsitan respondebit Averrois mentem, si rei alicuius olim, puta auri, speciem possidet, non aliam rursus auri speciem nuper a phantasia mea de auro cogitante recipere, sed ipsam auri speciem, quae quantum ad me attinet quodammodo dormiebat in mente, propter auri simulacrum expergisci, atque ita mentem nuper phantasiam meam respicere et in me intellegere aurum, sicut ante intellegebat in alio. Si ita sit, nullas amplius species agens intellectus procreat, nullas excipit capax, quandoquidem iamdiu omnes species possidentur.

17 Quod quidem repugnat Averroi atque suis volentibus novas quotidie species procreari et suscipi; repugnat peripateticae sectae asseveranti intellectum esse velut tabellam cui nihil sit inscriptum. Quod quidem Averrois, dum opinionem suam tuebitur, non poterit umquam nisi inepte ridiculeque exponere. Nobis autem non dissonat qui duce Platone existimamus intellectum non cogi totiens novam hominis speciem generare, quotiens varia variorum hominum simulacra nobis obiicit phantasia, sed conceptam antea[123] speciem potius expergisci. Quemadmodum neque Socratis phantasia totiens novum Alcibiadis simulacrum in se fingit,[124] quotiens eodem die obvium prospicit Alcibiadem, sed latens intrinsecus producit in actum. Atque idem oculi facerent, si imagines custodirent.

in an infinite manner once upon a time and is full of them all to overflowing, what more does it seek? What function does this superfluous and endless accepting of forms serve? Thus mind understands nothing in us now, since it accepts nothing from us [now].

16 Perhaps Averroes will respond that mind, once it possesses the species of any one thing, for instance of gold, does not receive from my phantasy (when it has just been thinking about gold) another species of gold again; but that the species of gold, which as far as it pertained to me was in a way sleeping in that mind, is aroused by means of the gold's image. Thus that mind regards my newly arrived phantasy and understands the gold in me just as earlier it used to understand it in another. If this is so, the agent intellect does not procreate any more species nor the receptive intellect receive them, since they have long had all the species.

17 But this [response] is contrary to the position of Averroes and his students who want new species to be procreated and received daily; and it is contrary to that of the peripatetic school which asserts that the intellect is like a tablet on which nothing is written.[114] As long as he defends this opinion of his, Averroes will never be able to expound [his views], except in a manner which is silly and ridiculous. But for us who consider Plato as our guide there is no inconsistency, for we hold that the intellect is not forced to generate a new species of man every time the phantasy tosses up sundry images of sundry men, but rather that this species, having been conceived beforehand, is aroused. Likewise Socrates' phantasy does not internally invent a new image of Alcibiades every time it meets him on the same day; instead it leads into act an image hidden within.[115] And eyes would do the same if they preserved images.

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Tertia. Quia quotiens duo rem eandem intellegunt, totiens omnino sequuntur absurda.

1 Phantasia mea nunc aurum cogitat, tua quoque aurum; mens averroica nostris simulacris excitata parturit in se auri speciem et intellegit aurum. Percunctamur utrum nunc in utrisque nostrum unam capiat speciem unamque intellegentiam auri, an species geminas geminasque intellegentias, an potius speciem unam intellegentiasque geminas vel e converso.

2 Nonnulli Averrois sectatores primam divisionis huius partem sequuntur, qui ratione huiusmodi confutantur, quia si nostrorum simulacrorum diversitas nullam facit in mente diversitatem, temere nimium garriunt, quotiens asseverant mentem illam in me et in te, immo me et te aurum intellegere. Sola enim mens ipsa intelleget et in se ipsa cogitantibus nobis, quemadmodum et ipse Xenocrates in se ipso communem unam et utrisque consonam inspicit veritatem, dum Speusippum audit et Polemonem in disputando per inscitiam verbis dissentientes. Praeterea si mens eodem actu intellegendi apud me nunc et apud te intellegit aurum, cum primum apud te desinit ipsum considerare, apud me considerare pariter desinit; cuius contrarium experimur. Negabunt autem id sequi, et sicut apud nos eadem anima brachium manumque vivificat atque amputata manu desinit hanc vivificare, non illud, ita inquient

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Third proof: Because, as often as two people understand the same thing, complete absurdities as often ensue.

My phantasy is now thinking of gold and yours is thinking of gold too; the Averroist mind, aroused by our images, begets the species of gold within itself and understands gold. Our question is [fourfold]: (i) is that mind, in each of us, now grasping one species and is there one understanding of gold; or (ii) is it grasping twin species and are there twin understandings; or (iii) is there just one species rather and are there twin understandings; or (iv) the reverse. 1

[The first option.] Some followers of Averroes subscribe to the first option in this set of alternatives, but they are refuted by the following argument. If the diversity of our images does not produce a diversity in the mind, they are chattering rashly whenever they assert that this mind understands gold in me and in you, or rather understands me and you. Only the mind itself will understand, and it will understand in itself when we are thinking, just as Xenocrates himself sees a single common truth in himself and a corresponding one in both Speusippus and Polemon when he hears them in a disputation disagreeing verbally out of ignorance. Moreover, if at this moment mind understands gold in me and gold in you alike in the same act of understanding, then as soon as it stops considering gold in you it likewise stops considering gold in me. But we experience the opposite of this. The Averroists will deny that this follows, however. With us the same soul gives life to the arm and to the hand, yet when the hand is amputated it stops giving life to it but not to the arm. Similarly mind, they will declare, will stop considering in your image and only consider in 2

mentem cessantem in tuo simulacro, in meo solum considerare, quae ante et in tuo simul considerabat.

3 Exemplum non convenit, quoniam actus vivificandi transit in corpus, actus intellegendi in simulacra non descendit. Ideoque in duobus membris diversi recipiuntur actus vivificandi, actus intellegendi in mente una permanet unus. Sed exemplum hoc convenit potius: ut sicut anima per unam vitam in membris vivebat ambobus, postea per eandem vivit in uno, ita mens per eandem intellegentiam apud utrumque considerabat, per quam postea solum in altero speculatur. Sed neque exemplum hoc satis congruit, quoniam hic et illic vivere recte possumus dicere, intellegere autem hic aut illic minime, siquidem per segregationem loci intellegentia consumatur.

4 Verum numquid sicut oculus[125] eodem aspectu partem exiguae superficiei dextram simul videt[126] atque sinistram, ac interim subtracta sinistra idem ipse aspectus omnino, quo respiciebat[127] utramque, remanet integer,[128] sed solum terminatur in alteram qui prius in utramque terminabatur, ita idem actus intellegendi respicit simulacrum unum, qui duo respexerat. Hoc quoque dissonat. Primum, quia non proprie oculus videre desinit dum visio manet integra, sed videri desinit potius pars illa superficiei quae frangitur. Sed desinat videre. Quid tum? Nonne aspectus ad locales partes superficiei dirigitur, ut non ab re dici possit tam hic videre quam ibi, ideoque forte hic desinet quandoque videre, non ibi? Intellegentia vero non ad localia simulacra se protendit, sed ad rationem

mine the things it was earlier considering at the same time in yours.

3 The example is not appropriate, [however,] since the act of imparting life does pass down into the body but the act of understanding does not descend into images. This is why different acts of imparting life are received in the two members [the arm and the hand], but the act of understanding remains one in the one mind. The following example fits better: just as the soul that lived by way of one life in both limbs, later lives by way of the same life in only one limb, so the mind that used the same understanding with two people to examine [things] uses the same understanding afterwards in only one of them to speculate. But even this example is not quite satisfactory, since we can speak correctly of living in this or that place, but we cannot speak of understanding in this or that place, since understanding is accomplished by way of separation from place.

4 Do you want another analogy? Just as the eye with same glance simultaneously sees the right and left parts of a small surface area, but when the left part is meanwhile removed, its same glance which used to regard each part stays entirely whole (but it is only focused on one part, having earlier been focused on both parts), so the same act of understanding which had regarded two images now regards one image. But this analogy too does not chime, and first because the eye, properly speaking, does not stop seeing while its vision remains whole; rather, the part of the surface area that has been removed stops being seen. But just suppose the eye does stop seeing, what then? Isn't its glance directed to local parts of the surface area, so it is not inappropriate to say that it can see here as it sees there, and so at some point perhaps that it stops seeing here but not seeing there? Understanding does not reach out to images in space, however, but to the rational principle outside of all space. This is why it is incorrect to speak of it perishing

locis exclusam. Quocirca non recte dicitur hic perire, non ibi, sed aut nusquam aut tota ubique desinere.

5 Quid ergo sibi vult temeraria illa responsio: intellegentia modo duo simulacra respicit, modo unum? Non quod simulacra ipsa contueatur, altius enim suspicit. Non quod ipsa moveat, quia non ex hoc proprie mens intellegit, sed afficit ita simulacra ut ipsa vel intellegant vel ad intellegendum aliud moveant. An forte quod mens a simulacris moveatur? Si ita est, cur non dicebant mentem a simulacris respici potius quam respicere? Sed dixerint: quid significat ab iis illam respici? Num mentis species a simulacris velut umbras a corporibus dependere? Sane hoc ipsum est magnificum Averrois ipsius inventum. Neque magis ex hoc sequitur mentem in simulacris intellegere, quam aut auditum in voce audire, aut olfactum olfacere in odore. Immo quia dimissis simulacris auri ipsa per se, in absoluta atque una auri specie, uni et absolutae se insinuat auri rationi, fit ut seorsum a nobis in ipsa idea per actum unicum intellegat. Ac si quando desinit intellegere, semel ibi tota simul desinat et momento.

6 Qui autem species esse simulacrorum umbras affirmant, atque deinde speciem unam a duobus simulacris emanare, ac rursus speciem eandem quae a tuo simulacro prius solo manabat, postea etiam a meo tam tecum quam te desinente manare, similiter delirant atque illi qui affirmaverint aut unam a duobus corporibus umbram effluere aut unius corporis umbram, eo sublato, ab altero corpore conservari. Accedit ad haec quod in eodem momento una illa mens per unam speciem unamque intellegentiam de uno auro

here but not perishing there. Rather [we should attest] that it stops either nowhere or absolutely everywhere.

This rash response—namely, that understanding at one time 5
regards two images, at another regards one—what does it mean? It does not mean that it looks at the images themselves, for it looks up at something higher; or that it moves them, since it is not properly from this moving that mind understands. Rather it so affects the images that they themselves understand or move something else to understand. Does it mean perhaps that mind is moved by the images? If that is true, why did the Averroists not say that mind is regarded by, rather than that it regards, the images? But suppose they do say this. What does this notion that mind is regarded by the images mean? It doesn't mean certainly that the [various] species of mind depend on the images as shadows on bodies. This of course is the magnificent invention of Averroes himself! Nor does it follow from this that mind understands in the images any more than our hearing hears in a voice, or our smelling smells in a smell. Rather, mind, having dismissed the images of gold, through itself and in [possession of] the one absolute species of gold, insinuates itself into the one absolute rational principle of gold; and, since this is so, it follows that, separate from us and in [possession of] the Idea itself, it understands through one act. And if it ever ceased to understand, then once and for all and in a moment it would cease to be.

Those who affirm that the species are the shadows of images, 6
and that one species proceeds from two images, and again that the same species which first proceeded only from your image also proceeds later from mine, whether with you or without you, are as insane as those who would affirm either that one shadow flows from two bodies, or that the shadow of one body is preserved by another body when the first body is removed. Add to this the fact that that one mind is at the same time, through the one species and the one act of understanding concerning the one piece of gold,

ita secum ipsa dissentit, quod in me iudicat aurum spernendum esse aspernaturque, in te vero pretiosum iudicat et affectat. Tanta in iudiciis et affectibus repugnantia nequit ab uno principio, quatenus unum est, provenire. In intellegentia specieque nulla esse diversitas dicitur. Numquid ergo a simulacrorum diversitate? Minime. Nempe simulacrorum diversitas prius in speciebus intellegentiisque quam in iudiciis et affectibus differentiam pareret. Quis ergo consenserit actum unum intellegendi ad contraria iudicia terminari et repugnantes affectus, quasi idem motus possit ad contrarios terminos proficisci?

7 Confugiunt ad hoc eorum nonnulli, ut duo illa simulacra unam quidem in mente speciem faciant. Quae species, prout a duobus simulacris proficiscitur, duas parit intellegentias, quae ad discrepantes terminos diriguntur. Sed quis dixerit simulacrorum varietatem, quae speciebus propinquior est quam intellegentiis, species quidem differentes non facere, intellegentias vero diversas? Praeterea si species illa datur[129] menti cum diversis respectibus ad diversa, non datur penitus absoluta, neque sufficiens est intellegendi principium. Sin non datur ut differens, differentiam in[130] intellegentiis non parturiet. Adde quod nullus sanae mentis umquam concesserit unam agendi sive cognoscendi virtutem per unam formam in tempore uno circa obiectum idem operationes plures edere numero differentes, sicut oculus unus circa rem eandem per unicam imaginem non edit duas eodem in tempore visiones — una enim sufficit — et differentes esse nequeunt nisi a principiis differentibus. Unde si omnes homines eodem ad videndum oculo uterentur, per unam solis imaginem eodem tempore unam tantum visionem solis haberent. Similiter intellectus unus per unam auri

so at war with itself that in me it decides that the gold must be rejected (and therefore despises it), yet in you it decides the gold is valuable (and therefore covets it). So massive a contradiction in decisions and desires cannot proceed from one principle inasmuch as it is one. And no diversity is said to exist at all in the act of understanding and in a species. Does it then derive from the diversity of images? Not at all. The diversity of images would produce a difference in the species and in the acts of understanding before doing so in decisions and desires. Who would agree then that one act of understanding ends in contrary decisions and opposing desires, as though the same motion could set out for opposing goals?

[The third option.] Some of the Averroists take refuge in de- 7
claring that the two images make just one species in mind, and this species, inasmuch as it arises from two images, produces two acts of understanding that are directed to different ends. But who maintains that the variety of images—a variety that is closer to the species than to the acts of understanding—does not make different species but does make diverse acts of understanding? Moreover, if that [one] species is given to mind, a species with different respects to different objects, then it is not given it as an utterly absolute species, nor does it suffice as a principle of understanding. But if it is not given it as differing [in its respects], it will not produce difference in the acts of understanding. Moreover, no sane person would ever concede that one power of acting or knowing could produce, by way of one form at one point in time, many numerically diverse operations with regard to the same object. Similarly, one eye does not produce with regard to the same object two acts of seeing at the same time through one single image, since one suffices; and differing acts of seeing cannot exist except from differing principles. Thus, if all men were to use the same eye for seeing, they would have only one vision of the sun simultaneously through the one image of the sun. Similarly, the one intellect through the one species of gold has at any one moment a single

speciem momento uno unam auri habet intellegentiam. Neque differentiam huc afferunt duo illa simulacra, quae tamquam praeparationes quaedam, immo incitamenta ad actum praecurrunt intellegendi, non incurrunt umquam, neque concurrunt etiam necessario. Similis quoque sensuum actibus ad phantasiam est comparatio.

8 Neque defuturos arbitror inter illos, qui asserere audeant a geminis simulacris auri geminas menti tribui species, unum tamen inde intellegendi actum circa ipsum aurum provenire. Quod ideo reprobabimus, quia si simulacrorum diversitas vim tantam habet, ut in speciebus diversitatem pariat, cum tamen simulacrum atque species diversis substantiis insint, quanto magis differentia specierum differentiam intellegentiarum pariet, praesertim cum in eadem sint mentis essentia? Nonne etiam apud istos motus unus ad contrarios terminos agit, quando per unam intellegentiam contraria iudicia fiunt affectusque contrarii? Quinetiam responsuri sunt nobis interrogantibus, numquid alterutra species, seorsum ab altera sumpta, possit intellegentiam procreare, necne. Si nequit, non poterit mens rem aliquam cernere, nisi eius rei in mente imagines geminentur, quarum semper una superflua erit. Si autem potest, utraque suum actum exsequitur fiuntque gemini a geminis speciebus actus intellegendi.

9 Recentiores autem Averroici confitentur a duobus simulacris auri duas in mente eadem formas simul intellegibiles fieri, quas duae sequantur intellegentiae. Principio liceret in eos cavillari eadem illa ratione qua in nos cavillabatur Averrois, ut alias declara-

understanding of gold. Nor do those two images introduce difference here, for they are precursors to the act of understanding, being preparations of a sort or rather incitements to it: they never impinge upon it and do not even necessarily coincide with it.[116] One can elaborate a similar comparison between the acts of the senses and those of the phantasy.

8 [The fourth option.] The Averroists will not be without those, I suppose, who dare to assert that [in fact] twin species of gold deriving from twin images are given to mind, yet that only a single act of understanding concerning that very gold is the result. We shall refute this position on the following grounds: if the diversity of images has so much force that it begets diversity in the species, although the image and the species are present in different substances, then how much more will the difference of the species produce a difference in the acts of understanding, especially given that they are in the same essence of mind? Even for these [older] Averroists, doesn't a single motion act for opposing ends when opposing decisions and opposing desires emerge from one act of understanding? For what response will they make us when we ask whether either of the two species taken separately from the other could produce understanding or not? If it cannot, mind will be unable to discern some particular thing unless images of that thing are twinned in mind, and [yet] one of these twins will always be superfluous. But if it can, each of the species accomplishes its own act, and two acts of understanding arise from the two species.

9 [The second option.] The Averroists of more recent times, however, acknowledge that from two images of gold two forms do become intelligible in the same mind at the same time, and that two acts of understanding succeed them.[117] In the first place we might jeer at them with the same argument with which Averroes jeers at us, as we have shown elsewhere. It is certain that these [two] forms do not differ one from the other with respect to the species, since they both lead to our knowing one species of gold,

vimus. Certum[131] est eas formas inter se secundum speciem non differre, quandoquidem conducunt ad unam auri speciem cognoscendam suntque ambae intellectuales auri similitudines. Quod si in specie eadem solo differunt numero, in formam aliam communiorem resolvi possunt; immo et debent, si modo per eas intellegentia sit implenda. Resolvantur ergo. Quaerimus utrum communior illa forma una sit omnino in mente apud me et apud te, an differens. Si eadem, per hanc ipsam solam explebitur intellectio poteramusque ab initio unam ponere. Sin differens, similiter resolvemus. Et quia in infinitum digrederemur, praestat unam in principio ponere. Sed cavillationes huiusmodi dimittamus.

10 Si formae intellegibiles usque adeo sequantur simulacra ut fiant serventurque ab eis ac per eadem numerentur, fieri non potest quin eodem modo singulares sint ad simulacrorum singularitatem, quo et colorum imagines ad singularitatem colorum singulares existunt. Quod enim sic astringitur singularibus, necessario conditionibus eorum subiicitur. Neque conferet[132] illis mens, ut absolutae fiant. Sicut enim non sufficienter illis praestat initium temporale[133] ac perseverantiam temporalem, ita non sufficienter praestabit illis absolutam aeternae naturae communitatem. Et cum communitas absolutioque in unitate consistat, mens quae unitatem formis largiri non potest (cum ipsa sit una, sed in hoc vincitur a simulacris), communitatem quoque non largietur, sed a simulacris singularitatem praestantibus superabitur.

11 Proinde ab Averrois sectatoribus sciscitabimur de duabus hisce formis intellegibilibus auri, numquid per se ipsas differant an per subiectum in quo sunt, an per aliquod adventitium. Non per se

and both are intellectual likenesses of gold. But if within the same species they only differ numerically, they can be resolved into another more common form; or rather, they have to be resolved if understanding is to be achieved at all through them. So let them be resolved. Our question [now] is whether that more common form is, in the case of you and me alike, entirely one in mind or different. If it is one and the same, intellection will be achieved through this single form alone, and we could have posited a single form from the onset. But if it is different, we will in the same way resolve [again]. And since we will regress to infinity, it is better to posit a single form from the beginning. But let us abandon such cavils.

10 If intelligible forms do follow images so closely that they are made from, preserved by, and numbered through images, it cannot be but they are singular in accordance with the singularity of the images, in the same way as the images of colors are singular in accordance with the singularity of colors. For what is so bound to single things is necessarily subject to their conditions. Nor will mind assign these forms an absolute character. For just as the mind is not enough to provide them a temporal beginning and a temporal constancy, so too it will not be enough to provide them with the absolute universality of an eternal nature. And since universality and absoluteness consists in unity, mind, which cannot bestow unity on forms (though it is itself a unity but in this [case] is defeated by images), will not bestow universality either: rather it will be overcome by the images bestowing singularity.

11 Next we will question the followers of Averroes about those two intelligible forms of gold, whether they differ through themselves, or through the substrate in which they exist, or through something adventitious. They do not differ through themselves, otherwise, in accordance with the Averroists' own teaching, they would differ in species [and one would not be gold]. Nor do they differ through the substrate they are in [i.e. mind], which the

ipsas, alioquin secundum eorum doctrinam specie discreparent. Non per subiectum, quod unicum esse ducunt.[134] Non per aliquid peregrinum.[135] Nihil enim aliud hoc esse posset[136] quam respectus aliquis vel ad auri simulacra vel ad ipsam auri rationem. Profecto per aspectum pertinentem ad auri rationem non discrepabunt, cum ipsa sit una. Sed neque etiam per aspectum ad auri ipsius simulacra, eatenus enim forma intellegentiae confert[137] quatenus ab aspectu simulacrorum absolvitur respicitque naturam oppositam omnino simulacris, a loco videlicet ac tempore liberam. Ergo cum primum forma intellectualis effecta est, simulacra respicere desinit. Sed esto, respiciant formae illae simulacra ac differant per aspectum: certe non per aspectum simplicem discrepant, sed per duplicem. Duo igitur erunt in formis duabus aspectus, non quidem specie differentes, quandoquidem ad unam specie naturam auri referuntur; differentes itaque numero. Ceterum per quid differunt? Non per se ipsos, alioquin specie discrepabunt; non per subiectum, in una enim mente locantur. Neque dici debent ideo geminari, quia in formis geminis collocentur, nam concessum est ipsas formas per aspectus potius geminari. Non per adventitium aliquid, quoniam rursus aspectibus aspectus adiungeremus,[138] ac de posterioribus sicut de prioribus litigaremus.

12 Iterum percontamur, utrum respectus illi in formis fundentur an in simulacris. Si in simulacris, formae a simulacris respicientur potius quam respiciant. Si in formis neque ad formarum ipsarum essentiam pertinent (quia differentiam formis secundum speciem

Averroists consider is single. Nor do they differ through anything adventitious; for this could be nothing other than through the way they look either to the images of gold or to the rational principle itself of gold. Certainly they will not differ in looking to the rational principle of gold, since that is itself one; nor in looking to the images of gold itself, for a form contributes to understanding to the extent it is released from [just] looking to images and regards [instead] a nature altogether opposed to them, that is, a nature freed from space and time. Therefore, as soon as the form is rendered intellectual, it stops regarding images. But grant that those [two] forms do regard images and differ in the way they look to them. Certainly they do not differ in looking in one way, but in two ways. Accordingly, in the two forms will be two ways of looking, ways not differing of course in species, since they look to the nature of gold which is one in its species, but differing therefore in number. These [two] regards differ in what ways? They do not differ through themselves, otherwise they will differ in species; nor through their substrate, for they are located in the one mind. Nor should these regards be described as twin because they are located in the twin forms, since it has been conceded rather that the forms themselves are twin by virtue of the way they regard [the nature of gold]. Nor do they differ through anything adventitious, as again we would be piling up ways of regarding, and quarrelling about the later ones as we did about the earlier.

Once more we raise the question as to whether these twin re- 12
gards are based in the forms or in the images. If they are based in the images, the forms will be regarded by the images, and not themselves regard the images. If they are based in the forms and do not pertain to the essence of the forms (because they would then introduce difference in species to the forms), then they are added externally to the forms' essences by the images as the makers of the forms. As a result, such forms because of the individual nature of corporeal images will be particular. Anyone of sound

adhiberent), essentiis formarum adiiciuntur extrinsecus a simulacris formarum ipsarum fabricatoribus. Unde sequitur formas huiusmodi esse particulares propter ipsam corporalium singularitatem simulacrorum. Quod quantum intellegentiae puritatem impediat, nemo sanae mentis ignorat. Profecto cum simulacra ad formas tamquam agentia extrinseca comparentur, numquam efficient ut forma altera distinguatur ab altera, nisi singula simulacra formis singulis inde manantibus certas quasdam conditiones adhibeant. Quibus formae inter se non aliter discrepabunt quam simulacra invicem. Itaque absolutae formae non erunt, dum a simulacrorum angustiis[139] contrahentur. Omnino autem incredibile est duas absolutas formas in eodem subiecto reperiri solo numero differentes. Eo enim ipso quod neque ratione essentiaque different neque subiecto, cogentur per qualitates peregrinas invicem discrepare, unde absolutae non erunt. In duobus autem subiectis esse illas non est impossibile. Simul enim invicem distinguentur, quia distincta subiecta formabunt; et absolutae manebunt, quoniam a subiectis non formabuntur, quando subiecta simplicia fuerint et ab infectionibus[140] aliena.

: XVIII :

Quarta. Quia vel eadem esset multorum hominum scientia, vel superfluae qualitates in eodem.

1 Qualitates omnes tam a termino quam a conservante externo absolutae quae sunt unum specie, si in idem concurrant subiectum, fiunt etiam numero unum. Nam quae specie conveniunt, conveniunt et forma. Quod si materia insuper conveniant propter sub-

mind, however, knows how much this would interfere with the purity of understanding. Indeed, since the images are matched as external agents with the forms, they will never cause one form to be distinguished from another, unless, as individual images, they introduce certain particular conditions to the individual forms emanating from them. In these conditions the forms will not differ amongst themselves in any other way than the images differ in turn. Thus the forms will not be absolute as long as they are imprisoned within the confines of the images. It is altogether incredible, however, that two absolute forms in the same substrate should be found differing only in number. For by virtue of the fact that the forms differ neither in their rational principle and essence nor in their substrate, they must differ from one another via adventitious qualities. Hence they will not be absolute. It is not impossible, however, for them to be in two substrates; for simultaneously they will be distinguished one from another, as they will be forming distinct substrates, and they will remain absolute, since they are not going to be formed by the substrates (since the substrates are simple, they are also free from contaminations).

: XVIII :

Fourth proof: Because either the knowledge of many men is the same, or superfluous qualities are in the same man.

All qualities that are independent of a limit and of an external pre- 1
server and are one in species also become one in number if they meet in the same substrate. For those things that agree in species also agree in form. But if, because of the substrate, they also agree in matter, they are entirely one. So sweetness and redness, two qualities which are diverse in species, are simultaneously in one

iectum, omnino sunt unum. Quapropter in una vini gutta dulcedo est simul atque rubedo, quae duae qualitates diversae sunt specie, non tamen duae dulcedines ibidem sunt duaeve rubedines. Etsi imagines splendoresque qualitatum possunt in eodem esse, secundum numerum solummodo differentes — ceu duorum ovorum imagines in oculo et phantasia, ac etiam duarum candelarum lumina duo in eodem aere — quoniam ab externis dependent assidue et idcirco sequuntur eorum numerum, quorum vel imagines sunt vel lumina potius quam subiecti, illae tamen qualitates, quae et verae sunt et sequuntur subiecti naturam potius quam obiecti, unum fiunt numero per subiectum, si unum specie fuerint. Absoluta[141] mentis forma ideo vera stabilisque eius qualitas est, quia non est peregrinorum accidentium imago vel umbra vel splendor, sed intellectualis substantiae partus, substantiarum exemplar, regula veritatis ab intellectu dependens, non ab externis. Quapropter non sunt in mente formae quaedam absolutae solo inter se numero differentes.

2 Ubi contemnere licet averroicam illam obiectionem. Simulacrum, inquiunt, formae intellegibilis principium est; quot igitur occurrunt simulacra simul, totidem formae fiunt, quia simulacrorum quodlibet seorsum ab alio formam potest sufficienter efficere. Nos autem dicimus simulacrum neque esse formae principium (si modo forma universalis sit), neque mentis capacis praeparationem ad formam suscipiendam (ne prius sit in mente quam forma aut certe menti similius), sed esse occasionem quandam ad virtutis agentis incitamentum, quod etiam efficiet numquam, si in alia substantia ipsum sit in alia forma. Si vero in eadem sint anima, ut certe sunt, quomodo occasionem praebeant,[142] alias declaravimus. Quando igitur simulacrum auri sese offert, si mens formam auri

drop of wine; yet there are not two sweetnesses or two rednesses. Though the images and reflections of qualities (differing as they do only in number) are able to exist in the same being—as, for example, images of two eggs can exist in the eye and the phantasy, and even the two lights of two candles can dwell in the same air—and though they do so because they depend continually on externals and thus follow the number of the objects of which they are images or lights rather than that of the substrate, yet the qualities, which are true and which follow the nature of the substrate rather than that of the object, become through that substrate one in number if they are already one in species. Thus the absolute form of the mind is its true and unchanging quality, because it is not the image, shadow, or reflected splendor of outside accidents, but the offspring of intellectual substance, the exemplar of [lower] substances, and the rule or pattern of truth that depends on the intellect, not on externals. So in the mind there are no particular absolute forms that differ from one another only in number.

2 And here we can sweep aside the objection of the Averroists. For they say that the image is the origin [or rational principle] of the intelligible form; and that the number of forms which arise, therefore, is as many as the images which appear at the same time, since any one of the images apart from another is sufficiently capable of producing a form. But we declare that the image is neither the origin of the form (so long as the form is a universal), nor the preparation of the receptive mind for receiving the form (lest the image be in the mind before it is in the form, or certainly resemble the mind more). We maintain instead that the image is an occasion for the activation of the agent power, which it would never effect if it existed in another substance in another form. But if the images are in the same soul, as they certainly are, they do offer [such] an occasion, in the manner we have explained elsewhere. Therefore, when the image of gold presents itself, and if the mind had never accepted the form of gold beforehand, it produces this

antea numquam acceperat, ipsa producit, nacta occasionem ad producendum. Si autem produxerit alias eamque possidet, non producit aliam, sed quam possidet educit in actum. Unam vero dumtaxat producit atque educit, etiam si mille simulacra speciei eiusdem occurrerint.

3 An non animadvertis, quando mille homines oculis conspicis in theatro, et horum mille postea mille[143] simulacra recolis simul in phantasia, interim mentem ita considerare: pulchrum animal homo est, societate gaudens, solers, religiosum? Hic mens de nullo illorum mille ita pronuntiat, sed de una cunctorum communi natura, de communi animalis rationalis substantia, de communi definitione societatis ipsius, solertiae atque religionis. Unum hoc iudicium de una cunctorum hominum seu virtutum natura non potest mens commodius quam per unam speciem et similitudinem facere. Ubi apparet eam a mille hominum simulacris unam dumtaxat hominis speciem hausisse, idemque facere semper in omnibus speciei et eiusdem simulacris quantumcumque diversis, ab omnibus equorum simulacris una collectis equinam speciem unam, non autem a simulacris equi et hominis speciem unam, sed duas. Hoc in se ipso quisquis unquam aliquid intellegit experitur. Quapropter quando centum homines equum vident, centum colligunt in phantasiis[144] equi simulacra. Mens vero, si est una cunctorum, a centum simulacris provocata unam equi concipit speciem, quam una sequitur intellectio. Unus igitur erit apud centum homines actus intellegendi.

4 Quonam igitur pacto cessante uno intellegere, alius quoque non cessat? Possunt certe innumerabiles homines sibi deinceps succe-

form, having encountered the occasion for producing it. But if it has produced this form at another time and has it [already], it does not produce another form but takes the one it has and activates it. But it produces and activates only the one form, even if a thousand images of the same species have presented themselves.

3 After your eyes see a thousand men in an audience,[118] and in your phantasy you later simultaneously recall the thousand images of these thousand men, do you not notice that your mind reflects in the interim: Man is a beautiful animal, rejoicing in company, skilful, religious? Your mind is making a pronouncement here not about any one of the thousand men, but about the one common nature of them all, about the common substance of the rational animal, about the common definition of society itself, of skilfulness, and of religion. The mind cannot make this single judgement about the one nature of all men or all virtues more properly than through a species and likeness that is one. And here it is clear that the mind has derived but one species of man from the thousand images of men, and that with all the images, however diverse, of an identical species it always does the same: it derives one species of horse from all the images collectively of horses, but it derives from the [contrasting] images of a horse and a man not one species but two. Anyone who ever understands anything experiences the same thing in himself. So when a hundred men see a horse, in their phantasies they garner a hundred images of that horse. But mind, if it is all men's one mind, when it is stimulated by a hundred images, conceives but the one species of a horse, and a single act of understanding follows. So with a hundred men there will only be one act of understanding.

4 How then, when one person ceases to understand, does another man not cease too? Certainly innumerable men following one upon another are able to understand through the same act of understanding which in itself remains the same. It follows from this that the contemplation itself of temporal matters is eternal.

dentes per ipsam eandem intellectionem in se manentem intellegere. Hinc sequetur, ut ipsa temporalium speculatio sit aeterna. Quod Averrois non concedet. Non considerat mens equum, prout hic equus est, sed simpliciter secundum speciei equinae rationem universalem. Huiusmodi ratio una est, etiam si mille sint equorum mille simulacra in anima hominis una vel pluribus. Una igitur erit equi consideratio in multis hominibus. Ex tali consideratione scientiae habitus in mente contrahitur. In mente, inquam, non in phantasia, si modo actus intellegendi dispositio est ad habitum, et ubi fit dispositio, ibi fit forma, id est habitus; habitus universalis ex universalibus actibus atque formis. In phantasia vero, cum secundum Averroem sit alligata materiae, neque actus neque habitus secundum modum universalem esse potest. Unus ergo erit et idem scientiae habitus, quantum ad speciei equinae spectat considerationem, in centum hominibus. Immo vero, cum intellectus species habitusque conservet, quilibet nostrum, qui per hunc intellectum intellegit et cuius intellegentia est ea ipsa mentis intellegentia, iam nunc intellegit omnia, quaecumque praesentes homines et praeteriti cognoverunt.

5 Respondebit Averrois nos per intellectum intellegere, quatenus per simulacra nostra nobis coniungitur. Et quoniam non sunt eadem apud omnes simulacra neque affecta similiter, ideo non quicquid unus cognoscit, agnoscit et alius. Responsio talis non satisfacit. Quando enim mens iam actu speciebus est praedita, potest per se ipsam meditari, quod Aristoteles confitetur. Unde videmus nos illud cuius iam scientiam accepimus, posse quoties volumus meditari, neque simulacrorum absentia impediri. Si enim simulacra viae sunt ad species, quid opus est via postquam ad terminum per-

Averroes will not concede this. The mind does not consider the horse insofar as it is this particular horse but simply in accordance with the universal rational principle of the equine species. And such a rational principle is one, even if there are a thousand images of a thousand horses in one or many human souls. So one consideration of the horse will occur in many men; and from this consideration the habit of knowledge is contracted in the mind—in the mind, I say, not in the phantasy, if only [because] the act of understanding is the disposition for this habit; and where the disposition occurs the form occurs, that is, the habit. [But] a universal habit comes from universal acts and forms. In the phantasy, however, since, according to Averroes, this is closely tied to matter, neither act nor habit can exist in the universal mode. So the habit of knowledge inasmuch as it concerns the consideration of the species of the horse will be [for him] one and the same in a hundred men. Or rather, since the [Averroists'] intellect preserves the species and the habits, anyone of us who understands through this intellect, and whose understanding is the very understanding of that intellect, even now understands all things, everything that men past and present have known [and this is absurd].

Averroes will respond that we understand through intellect in- 5
sofar as it is joined to us through our images. And since the images are neither the same for all of us, nor disposed in the same way, it is not the case that whatever one person comes to know, another person understands. But such a response is not satisfactory. For when the mind has already been endowed with species in act, it is able to contemplate on its own, as Aristotle acknowledges. So it is clear that whenever we wish to we are capable of contemplating something the knowledge of which we have already received; nor can we be hindered by the absence of images. For, if the images are the paths to the species, why do we need a path after we have arrived at the goal? And why do we need preparation after we have acquired the habit? And this habit is so far from

venerimus? Quid praeparatione, postquam sumus habitum consecuti? Qui tantum abest quod simulacris tamquam conservatoribus egeat, ut neque etiam propriis actibus, a quibus proxime proprieque creatus est, indigere ulterius, quando confirmatus iam est, videatur. Profecto quando iam adultus est, tamquam natura se ipso viget in[145] intellectu neque dependet ulterius a simulacris neque ipsa respicit. Si ita est, habitus qui in averroico sunt intellectu iam consummati, aeque sunt omnium, quandoquidem iam absoluti sunt, neque huc magis quam illuc extra prospiciunt.

6 Igitur aeque doctus erat,[146] aeque bonus Aristippus et Socrates. Et quando discit grammaticam Plato simul et Xenophon, habitum grammaticae simillimum sibi comparant ambo. Grammaticae simillimae una est ratio; itaque habitus eius, ubicumque sint, eiusdem sunt speciei. Habitus talis in Platone atque habitus similis in Xenophonte specie unum sunt. Quod si intellectus, in quo velut subiecto sunt, est unus, unum quoque sunt numero. Nam si qua formarum ex unitate subiecti fit una, maxime talis est habitus qui transit in subiecti naturam, immo subiecti naturam usurpat ipse sibi, certam praestat proclivitatem et subiectum movet immobilis.

7 Si ergo mens una sit, aut eadem omnino erit duorum scientia — duo cogitabunt una, una desinent cogitare — aut qualitates innumerabiles speciei eiusdem in subiecto eodem erunt, et quotidie intellectus qualitates accipiet plurimas specie easdem cum iis quas habet, ac si mel singulis momentis aliam atque aliam dulcedinem acciperet suae simillimam. Atque in hoc Averrois opinio sibi plurimum adversabitur, qui in libris *De anima* ter replicavit iuxta sententiam Aristotelis omne subiectum nudum esse oportere specie qualitatis illius quam sit suscepturum.

needing images as preserving agents that, once it has been firmly established, it no longer even seems to need its own acts, those by which it was directly and properly created. Certainly, once the habit has already matured, it flourishes in the intellect on its own, naturally as it were: it no longer depends on or regards images. If this is true, then the habits that have already been perfected in the Averroistic intellect belong equally to all, inasmuch as they are now independent and do not look out in this direction any more than they do in that.

6 So [for Averroes] Aristippus and Socrates were equally learned and equally good.[119] And when Plato learned grammar at the same time as Xenophon, they both acquired for themselves a habit [or a mastery] of grammar that was completely alike. The rational principle of grammar that is totally alike is one. Thus the habits of grammar, wherever they may be, are of the same species. Such a habit in Plato and a like habit in Xenophon are one in species. But if the intellect in which these habits are found (as in a substrate) is one, the habits too are one in number. For if any of the forms becomes one from the unity of its substrate, this is especially true of the habit which passes over into the very nature of the substrate; or rather, it usurps the nature of the substrate for itself, gives [it] a certain inclination, and moves it though unmoving itself.

7 If then mind is one, either the knowledge of two men will be altogether the same, and they will both think and cease to think together; or the numberless qualities of the same species will exist in the same substrate, and the intellect will daily [but pointlessly] receive most of the qualities which are identical in species with those it already has. It's as though honey were to receive in individual moments one and then another sweetness totally identical to its own. And here the opinion of Averroes is particularly self-contradictory, for in the books *On the Soul* he has thrice repeated that according to the view of Aristotle every substrate must be free from the species of the quality it is about to receive.[120]

8 Proinde cum in nobis experiamur mentem non solum intellegere, sed etiam quod intellegat animadvertere atque ex alia intellegentia in aliam saepe similem, saepe etiam oppositam facillime se momento transferre; plurimaque in unum connectere, quinetiam multas eius qui cum disputat notiones per unius expressionem aucupari; et quod maius est, saepe quod alius habet in phantasia (quae remotior est a mente) percipere, proculdubio mirum est averroicam mentem unicam, aeternam, indivisibilem, uniformem, cunctis aeque praesentem, quod apud te intellegit, numquam apud me quod in te intellegat illud animadvertere; numquam quod in alio intuetur cum his quae contuetur in alio, copulare; numquam quod apud alium cogitat, apud alium per se ipsam augurari. Neque ad simulacrorum diversitatem licet confugere, quae et[147] extra et infra mentem sunt. Ac multa certo intelleguntur tempore, simulacro tunc neque intercedente neque per se et proprie comitante.

: XIX :

Quinta.[148] *Quia contradictoria in eodem*[149] *essent.*

1 Contradictoria tanto magis sibi invicem adversantur quam contraria, quanto maior repugnantia est inter esse atque non esse quam inter esse tale atque tale. Quapropter si contraria in idem subiectum congredi nequeunt, multo minus possunt contradictoria. Quo fit ut quisque nostrum in se ipso experiatur mentem suam num-

Therefore, since we experience within ourselves that our mind 8
not only understands but is aware too that it understands; that it often passes over in a moment and with greatest ease from one understanding to another that is often similar, but often opposite too; that it unites many things by joining them together, even trying by way of the [succinct] expression of one [notion] to catch the many notions of the person with whom it is disputing; and, even more importantly, that it often perceives what the other person has in his phantasy (which is far removed from the mind)—since all this is so, it is beyond question amazing that the Averroistic mind which is single, eternal, indivisible, uniform, and equally present to all, with you is aware of what it understands, but with me is never aware of what it may understand in you; never joins what it observes in one person with the things it sees in another; never of itself divines what it thinks about in one person in another. Nor should one take refuge in the diversity of images, which are both beyond and beneath that mind. At a given point in time many things are understood even when there is no intervening or properly accompanying image per se.

: XIX :

Fifth proof: Because there would be contradictory things in the same mind.

Contradictory things oppose each other more than [merely] con- 1
trary ones to the extent that there is a greater opposition between being and non-being than between this or that particular being. Thus, if contrary things cannot join together in the same substrate, much less are contradictory ones able to do so. Hence each of us experiences in himself that his mind never affirms some

quam rem aliquam affirmare omnino simul atque negare, velle prorsus ac nolle, etiam si plura rei ipsius simulacra in eius sint phantasia.

2 Neque nunc afferant in medium Averroici, quod imago albedinis simul atque nigredinis in oculo sunt et phantasia, ac rursus earum species simul in mente, in qua etiam sint cognitiones simul contrariorum, quoniam huiusmodi formae, quae extra animam contrariae sunt, ideo in anima non sunt contrariae, quia naturam suam amittunt; in qualitatem[150] quandam animae transferuntur, et illam quidem quodammodo imaginariam. Sed assentiri et non assentiri, velle ac nolle vim contradictoriam retinent, quia et essentialia potius quam imaginaria sunt, et circa eundem animae actum sive affectum esse significant atque non esse. Igitur quamvis albedinis nigredinisque species in visu non sint contrariae, tamen visio alicuius obiecti tamquam albi ac visio simul eiusdem tamquam nigri sic adversantur invicem, ut concurrere nequeant, quamvis visiones ipsae a diversis speciebus obiectisque continue pendeant. Sic in mente affirmatio divinae Trinitatis simul atque negatio convenire non possunt, etiam si a diversis simulacris speciebusque pendere dicantur. Sane agentium diversitas nihil prohibet quo minus effectus contrarii inter se sibi invicem adversentur seque expellant.

3 Quid ergo facit ut averroicus intellectus in Platone asserat unum ipsum esse super essentiam et ipsum bonum super mentem, in Aristotele reprobet? Certe non efficit istud varietas ulla simulacrorum. Talis enim contemplatio non aliter quam posthabitis simulacris recte peragitur. Aut quid efficit ut intellectus ille apud

thing at the very same time it denies it, willing and not willing it completely, even if numerous images of the thing dwell in his phantasy.

2 Nor can the Averroists now introduce the evidence that the image of whiteness and the image of blackness are simultaneously present in the eye and the phantasy; and also that their species are simultaneously in mind, wherein the acts of recognizing contraries simultaneously dwell too. And this is because such forms which are contraries outside the soul are not contraries in the soul, since they lose their own nature: they are transferred to a certain quality of the soul, and that quality is in a way imaginary. But giving assent and denying it, willing and not willing retain their contradictory power, both because they are essential rather than imaginary, and because they signify being and non-being with respect to the same act or disposition of the soul. Thus, although the [two] species of whiteness and of blackness are not contraries in vision, the sight of a particular object nonetheless as white and at the same time the sight of the same object as black are mutually so opposed that they cannot happen together, even though the sightings themselves depend continually on different species and objects. Thus affirmation of the divine Trinity cannot occur at the same time in the mind as the negation of it, even if they are said to depend on different images and species. For assuredly the diversity of the agents in no way prevents effects contrary to each other from mutually opposing and rejecting one another.

3 What then causes that Averroistic intellect to claim in Plato that the One itself is beyond essence and the Good itself beyond mind, but to deny it in Aristotle? The variety of images certainly does not do this. For such contemplation cannot rightly take place unless the images have been set aside. Or what causes that intellect to affirm in Plato that the sky is fire, but simultaneously to deny it in Aristotle? Would the difference between the two images do this perhaps, supposing that the mind were to judge in images

Platonem affirmet caelum esso ignem, apud Aristotelem simul neget? An duorum simulacrorum diversitas faceret quidem fortasse istud, si mens in simulacris, aut per simulacra, aut de simulacris iudicaret? Nunc vero occasione ab illis accepta statim se in se recipit ac per communem speciem iudicat in se ipsa de natura communi caeli atque ignis; ipsi vero phantasiae relinquit simulacrorum intuitum, atque etiam perexiguum, qui tanto magis debilitatur, quanto magis mentis speculatio roboratur atque contra. Quod evidentissimum argumentum est ad id, quod in superioribus tractabamus, speciem videlicet neque fieri a simulacro neque servari.

4 Numquid diversae species per occasionem diversorum simulacrorum in mente conceptae diversas illas sententias pariunt? Nequaquam. Unam enim mens accipit speciem a duobus eiusdem caeli simulacris. Sed gratia disputationis accipiat duas. Licet istae duae sint viae per quas sententiae repugnantes in mentem proficisci posse videntur, non tamen duae quaedam sunt in mente partes aut vires aut propriae formae in quibus possint discordes sententiae suscipi. Sed ad unum et individuum centrum intellegentiae colliguntur; unicus ibi et simplicissimus iudex profert sententiam. Unus autem sibimet non potest adeo manifeste in eodem tempore contradicere. Specierum duplicitas nihil ulterius potest quam varie animum instigare, si modo ipsae sint variae. Sententiam vero fert intellectus debiliori specie neglecta per aliam, perque speciei unius praevalentis imperium unam dumtaxat sententiam profert, sicut et phantasia, quamvis per varios sensus coniecturis variis agitetur, unum tamen iudicium parit atque affectum. Mentem vero idem facere in variis coniecturis apud se ipsum quilibet experitur. Quod si una illa mens per duas species in duobus hominibus ambigat

or through images or concerning images? Yet, in actuality, when the mind has received the occasion from the images, it withdraws into itself immediately, and by way of a universal species makes an internal judgment about the shared nature of sky and of fire. But it leaves an inspection of the images to the phantasy, and a very brief inspection at that, one which is increasingly weakened as the mind's contemplation is strengthened, and the reverse. And this is the clearest argument for the proposition we were maintaining in the earlier discussions, namely that the species is neither made by, nor preserved by, an image.[121]

4 Then do different species conceived in mind via the occasion provided by different images give birth to those different judgments [as Averroes believes]? Not at all. For mind receives one species from two images of the same sky. But let us assume for the sake of argument that it receives two species. Even if these two species are ways via which contending judgments are apparently able to enter into mind, yet there are not two particular parts or powers or proper forms in mind in which contending judgments could be received. Rather they are brought to a single and undivided center of understanding where a single and altogether simple judge pronounces judgment. But a single person cannot contradict himself, and so plainly, at one and the same time. The double nature of the two species can do no more, provided they are different themselves, than incite the rational soul in different ways. But intellect, having relegated the weaker of the two species, pronounces judgment through the other; and through the authority of the one prevailing species, it pronounces but one judgment, just as the phantasy gives birth to only one judgment and desire, even if it is troubled with different conjectures via the different senses. Yet any person experiences in himself that his mind in its various conjectures is doing the same thing. If that one mind is at odds in two men, however, because of the two species, and borne hither and yon, and yet because it is conscious of itself in itself and not un-

atque huc feratur et illuc, quia tamen sui ipsius conscia est in se ipsa, quid illic ambigat, non ignorat coniecturisque libratis ad partem alteram paulo momento declinat. Ac si absurdum est dicere in eodem subiecto calorem simul frigusque suscipi, etiam si a diversis[151] causis duo haec inferantur, igne videlicet atque aqua, nonne etiam ridiculum erit contrarias in mentem opiniones incidere, quamvis a diversis causis immittantur? Quod enim suscipitur, pro dispositione subiecti suscipitur. Nequit autem subiectum idem modis simul contrariis esse dispositum ad contrarias simpliciter formas accipiendas.

5 Fortior insuper erit argumentatio, si de contrariis habitibus argumentemur. Cum enim habitus confirmati a simulacris ulterius non dependeant, iamque absoluti sint etiam, quod maius est, a propriis actionibus, non possunt Averroici dicere contrarios habitus propter contraria quaedam agentia, id est simulacra, posse concurrere. Quod autem dicunt mentem duabus speciebus indutam vicem duorum gerere subiectorum quibus repugnantia capiantur, ideo non admittimus, quia non pertinet ad eos tantum speciebus confidere qui eas velut umbras putant superficiem mentis ambire. Deinde quia species apud illos peregrini et contingentis actus obtinent locum, mens vero substantiae atque subiecti. Non fiunt autem propter duas adventitias formas subiecta duo, neque suscipitur aliquid formarum ratione, sed ratione subiecti. Una igitur mens unum est subiectum, licet duas excipiat species, atque ratione ipsius, non specierum suscipitur quicquid advenit. Quomodo igitur contradictoriis pateat[152] aditus, ne fingi quidem potest.

6 Nisi forte addiderint ita se mentem habere ad speciem, sicut materiam ipsam ad quantititem. Igitur sicut materia per quanti-

aware why it is hesitating, then, having weighed its conjectures, it quickly comes down on one or other side [of the argument]. And if it is absurd to speak of the simultaneous presence of heat and cold in the same substrate, even if the two are introduced from different causes (such as fire and water), won't it also be ridiculous to have contrary opinions occurring in a mind, even though they are introduced from different causes? For what is received is received in accordance with the disposition of the substrate. But the same substrate cannot be simultaneously disposed in contrary modes to receive forms that are absolutely contrary.

The argument will be even more convincing if we are arguing 5
about contrary habits. Since confirmed habits no longer depend on images and are already free, even (which is more important) from their own actions,[122] the Averroists cannot say that it is because of particular contrary agents, namely the images, that contrary habits occur at the same time. But when they say that mind, once invested with two species, plays the role of two substrates in which the opposing [species] are received, we do not agree, because it is inappropriate for these people, who think that the species flicker over the mind's surface like shadows, to put so much faith in them. And we do not agree also, because, with these people, the species occupies the position of being a foreign and contingent act, but mind, of being both substance and substrate. Yet two substrates are not brought into existence because of two adventitious forms, and something is received not by reason of the forms but by reason of the substrate. Thus the one mind is one substrate even though it may receive two species, and it accepts what comes to it by reason of itself, not of the species. So one cannot even imagine how access to things in contradiction may be made manifest.

But perhaps the Averroists would add that the relationship of 6
mind to the species resembles that of matter itself to quantity. Therefore, just as matter extended through quantity sustains con-

tatem extensa contrarias suscipit qualitates, ita mens vestita speciebus sententias repugnantes. Exemplum minime convenit, quia quantitatem esse a materia inseparabilem arbitrantur, speciem vero menti penitus peregrinam. Praeterea materia non prius per quantitatem formas contrarias excipit, quam in diversas partes extensione secetur. Quod si Averrois mentem per ipsas species in alias atque alias mentes secari concesserit, forsitan admittemus. Ergo sicut materia, licet per quantitatem praeparata sit, non tamen in eodem sui ipsius puncto qualitates contrarias accipit, ita mens non admittit contradictoria, etiam si variis affecta fuerit speciebus. Natura quippe contradictoriorum est ut simul habitare non possint. Nequeunt autem esse simul, etiam si per medium aliquod quis illa conciliare tentaverit.

7 Adde quod repugnantia, si praeparationibus quibusdam suscipienda sunt, praeparationes exigunt repugnantes. Si modo praeparationes, quantum ad certos habitus conferunt atque cum illis proportione aliqua congruunt, tantum habitus diversos impediunt et ab eorum praeparationibus dissonant, ac si praeparationes ad repugnantia[153] per alias iterum discordes affectiones ab eodem subiecto suscipiuntur, in infinitum errabimus. Sin autem affectione nulla intercedente, absurdum id quidem est, et poterant habitus repugnantes aeque sicut affectiones sine medio suscipi. Quamobrem si mens nostra sit ad repugnantes contradictoriorum actus et habitus disponenda, opus erit prius adversantibus invicem speciebus atque etiam discursionibus dissonis, quae a speciebus discordibus excitatae, principia ratiocinandi pugnantia sumant perque dissona media ad conclusiones perveniant contradictorias. Universa haec repugnantia quae ad contradictoria distrahit ita nequit

trary qualities, so mind clothed with the species accepts opposing judgments. But the example is not at all exact, for they think that quantity is inseparable from matter, but a species is quite foreign to mind. Moreover, matter does not receive contrary forms through quantity before it is sundered into different parts in extension. Now if Averroes had conceded that mind is divided up through the species into different minds, we might perhaps agree. Thus just as matter, even when it is prepared through quantity, nonetheless does not accept contrary qualities in the same point or dot of itself, so mind does not accept things in contradiction even if it has been affected by various species. For the nature of things in contradiction is that they cannot dwell together. They cannot dwell together, however, even if someone were to try to reconcile them through some mean.

7 Take another case. If opposites have to be received by way of certain preparations, then they require opposing preparations. But if these preparations, in that they contribute to certain habits and accord with them in a certain proportion, to that extent obstruct opposing habits and clash with the preparations for them, and if preparations for opposites are received by the same substrate a second time via [yet] other discordant affections, we shall wander on to infinity. But if they are received without any intervening affection, it makes in fact no sense: opposing habits would have the capacity of being equally received, like the affections, without a mean. Thus, if our mind is to be made ready for the opposing acts and habits of things in contradiction, it will first need mutually opposing species. It will also require dissonant lines of argument, which, roused by the dissonant species, may assume opposing principles of reasoning and arrive through dissonant means at things in contradiction. All these things in opposition that drag the mind towards things in contradiction cannot be sustained by the mind without a mean, any more than things in contradiction

a mente suscipi sine medio, sicut contradictoria nequeunt. Si quaeratur medium, absque fine quaeretur.

8 Quemadmodum de contradictoriis assensionibus[154] disputavimus, ita de contradictoriis affectibus licet disserere, ut ecce, quando mens illa apud Platonem obiectum aliquod universale vult quidem atque eodem tempore apud Aristotelem non vult. Qualis affectus ad phantasias non pertinet, quae non magis attingunt universale aliquid appetendo quam cogitando. Contrarios quoque in mente videmus affectus, quando homines duo obiecta duo universalia simul volunt invicem dissidentia, et quando in rebus incorporeis alii gaudent, alii simul dolent. Denique eadem mens proba erit et improba simul, sapiens et ignorans, certa et ambigua, felix et misera. Quid dicent ad hoc? Quod ex repugnantibus actibus affectibusque repugnantes habitus in eadem mente coalescent, videlicet et contrarii et contradictorii.[155] Hoc autem ideo est omnium absurdissimum, quoniam habitus non imaginarium quiddam est, sed naturalis formae gerit vicem; naturalis autem forma proclivitasque per adventum oppositae formae proclivitatisque disperditur.

9 Diutius fortasse quam decuit de mente cum his[156] disputavimus, qui mente se privant quando eam ab humana specie segregant, quae usque adeo speciei humanae familiaris est ut neque nos mentem asciscere sine mente possimus, neque illi mentem respuere sine mente. Arbitramur autem nos in superioribus non Averroem solum confutavisse, verum etiam Mauros illos[157] qui unam esse omnium animam opinantur. Si enim in mentibus distinctio est, multo maior est in animabus diversitas, tum quia mentes humanae magis unitae sunt invicem, eo quod praestantiores sunt quam animae invicem, tum quia si sufficeret anima una nostris corporibus gubernandis, multo magis mens una sufficeret veritati comprehendendae. Unde neque credendum est nonnullis adulterinis Platonicis asserentibus viventia omnia per unam mundi animam vivere, quia non duceremur motu libero et varietate consilii, sed impetu subito velut sagittae ferremur. Et si una quadam

can be sustained. But if one were to search for a mean, one would search indefinitely.

8 Just as we have argued concerning contradictory acts of assent, we can similarly argue about contradictory desires. Look at the case when that [Averroistic] mind desires a certain universal object in Plato and does not desire it at the same time in Aristotle. Such a desire does not pertain to phantasies, which do not attain to anything universal in desiring any more than they do in thinking discursively. We also see contrary desires in mind, when two men simultaneously desire two universal objects that are mutually unlike, and when with respect to incorporeal things some men rejoice and others grieve at the same time. Finally, that same [Averroistic] mind will be simultaneously honorable and dishonorable, wise and ignorant, assured and doubtful, happy and wretched. What will they reply to this? That from opposing acts and desires opposing habits, that is, contrary and contradictory habits, coalesce in that same mind. But this is the most absurd answer of all, because the habit is not an imaginary entity: it plays the role of the natural form. But the natural form and inclination are destroyed by the advent of an opposite form and inclination.

9 Perhaps we have argued about mind longer than was warranted with men who deprive themselves of mind when they separate it from the human species—mind that is so familiar to the human species that without mind we cannot admit mind, and without mind they cannot reject mind. But in the arguments above we believe that we have refuted not only Averroes but also those Moors who think that there is one soul for all.[123] For if a distinction exists in minds, then a much greater diversity exists in souls: a) because human minds, in that they are more excellent, are more mutually united than souls are mutually united; and b) because if one soul were enough to govern our bodies, then *a fortiori* one mind would suffice to comprehend the truth. This is why we should not credit those several pseudo-Platonists who assert that all living

mundi anima spiraremus omnes, etiam una quadam super mundum mente solum specularemur. Satis autem diversitas ipsa et distinctio corporum mundanorum distinctionem significat naturarum;[158] naturarum distinctio distinctionem sequitur animarum; animarum distinctio distinctionem mentium comitatur, et mentes insitae animabus animarum retinent numerum.

10 Ridere quoque licet barbarum quendam Dinantem et Manichaeos, qui dei portiones quasdam esse nostras animas voluerunt sive deum. Nam hoc esse non posse satis ex quinque illis rerum gradibus in primo libro dispositis declaratur. Neque potest deus aut in animas multas discerpi, cum summa unitas dividi nequeat, aut materia fieri plurium animarum, ne sit vilior animabus neve summus actus gerat subiecti vicem, aut ipse in sua forma consistens mutari tam frequenter in nobis, cum sit stabile mobilium centrum, a vero in falsum, bono in malum, gaudio in dolorem atque contra. Denique si deus cunctorum esset anima, una mens esset in[159] cunctis, quod est in superioribus confutatum.

11 Quoniam vero Themistius asserit unam fuisse Platonis, Aristotelis, Theophrasti de mente sententiam, si cupimus Peripateticam hanc disputationem felici fine concludere, veritatem ipsam platonicam peripateticamque per plures dispersam interpretes ita colligamus in unum. Accipiamus ab Averroe capacem intellectum esse immortalem. Accipiamus ab Alexandro capaces intellectus esse vires quasdam animabus nostris naturaliter insitas, totidem numero

things live through the one soul of the world,[124] because, if this were so, we would not be guided by free motion and diversity of choice, but propelled by sudden impetus like arrows. And if we all breathed with the one particular soul of the world, we would also contemplate with the one particular mind above the world. But the very diversity and distinction of worldly bodies are enough to indicate the distinction of [their] natures; and the distinction of their natures follows the distinction of their souls, the distinction of their souls follows the distinction of their minds, and their minds sown in the souls preserves the number of their souls.

10 It is also permissible to deride a certain barbarian, Dinant, and the Manichaeans who want our souls to be particular portions of God or God Himself.[125] The impossibility of this position has been adequately demonstrated by way of the five degrees of being set out in the first book.[126] For God cannot be torn asunder into many souls, since the highest unity cannot be divided; nor can He become the matter of numerous souls, or else He would be viler than souls and the highest act would take on the role of being a substrate. Nor can God subsisting in His own form be changed in us so frequently, since He is the fixed center of all that changes from true to false, from good to evil, from joy to sorrow, and the reverse. Finally, if God were the soul of all, there would be one mind in all, and this has been refuted in the above.

11 Since Themistius asserts that Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus held one and the same view concerning the mind,[127] then if we wish to conclude this Peripatetic disputation on a happy note, let us thus take the Platonic and Peripatetic truth, dispersed as it is through various interpreters, and assemble it into one. Let us accept from Averroes that the receptive intellect is immortal. Let us accept from Alexander [of Aphrodisias] that the receptive intellects are certain powers naturally implanted in our souls, and that numerically there are as many of them as there are souls. Let us conclude that the souls of men are immortal. This is also the con-

quot sunt animae. Concludamus hominum animas immortales esse. Atque haec est conclusio Platonicorum Christianorumque et Arabum Theologorum priscis Peripateticis maxime consona.

clusion of Platonic and Christian theologians and of Arab ones, and it accords completely with the [view of the] original Peripatetics.

LIBER SEXTUS DECIMUS[1]

: I :

Sequitur secunda quaestio.
Cur animi terrenis corporibus sint inclusi?

1 Postquam primae quaestioni respondimus ostendimusque mentis divinitatem nostris animis convenire, secundae respondeamus ostendamusque cur animi, si divini sunt, terrenis corporibus tam infimis sint inclusi.

Ratio prima. Ut cognoscant singula.

2 Essentia dei, si modo essentia nominanda est, non unum quoddam rerum genus est, alioquin res tantum sui generis ageret, sicut aqua ea quae humida sunt non sicca facit, ignis contra sicca non humida generat. Cum vero cuncta rerum genera per suam essentiam deus efficiat, et quod efficit super omnia quae fiunt maneat, in nullo rerum genere deus est, sed super omnia genera. Igitur quando suam intuetur essentiam, cunctorum originem et exemplar, cuncta rerum genera contuetur, cunctas quoque species atque singula. Nam essentia dei principium mediumque et finis est, non specialium tantum principiorum, sed etiam singularium sub qualibet specie pervagantium. Profecto divina essentia, cum nihil in se habeat materiae simile, quae obumbrare solet cognitionem, lux est et perspicacia summa. Idcirco deus per suam essentiam proprie, tamquam per lucem efficacem discretricemque singulorum, singula

BOOK XVI

: I :

Next the second question: Why are rational souls imprisoned in earthly bodies?[1]

Now that we have responded to the first question and shown that the mind's divinity is proper to our souls, let us respond to the second question and show why rational souls, if they are divine, are imprisoned in such inferior earthly bodies. 1

First proof: That they may know particular things.

The essence of God, if indeed it should be called an essence, is not one particular genus of things, otherwise it would only do things belonging to its own genus, just as water makes things wet not dry, while fire to the contrary produces dry things not wet. But since God makes all things' genera through His own essence, and since the maker remains superior to all that is made, God is not in any natural genus, but is above all genera. Therefore when He contemplates His own essence, which is the origin and exemplar of all things, He is contemplating all the natural classes and all the species and all the individuals [in them]. For the essence of God is the beginning, middle, and end, not of the rational principles of the species only, but also of the individuals roving under any one of the species. Since it has nothing in itself resembling matter, which customarily darkens understanding, the divine essence assuredly is the light and is utterly penetrating. So God properly through His own essence, as through the effective power of light as the distinguisher of individual things, perceives individuals. Since God's essence is entirely free not only from all matter and 2

perspicit atque, cum essentia dei penitus absoluta sit non tantum ab omni materia materiaeque proprietate, sed etiam ab omni certa conditione respectuque ad hanc rem creatam aut illam, atque sit infinita, idcirco indifferenter, ut ita dixerim, se habet ad omnia. Igitur aut nihil praeter se cognoscit aut omnia. Nihil autem cognoscere dictu nefas est, cum et cognoscentium et cognitorum et cognitionis sit ratio summa.

3 Neque obiiciat nobis Averrois vilescerem, si inferiora consideret. Sane quia cognoscit se esse omnium quae infra se sunt principium, ideo novit quid sit inferius esse, igitur qua ratione[2] deficiant comprehendit. At vero dum rationem ipsam defectus ipsius agnoscit, defectum ipse non patitur. Quod si deus in ipso imperfectionis fundamento considerando, quod ab ipso alienissimum est, ipse non fit imperfectior, certe multo minus in aliis vel imperfectissimis cogitandis imperfectus evadet.

4 Quid plura? Cognitio sui aliorumque tamquam bona optabilis est. Est enim quaedam sui ipsius aliorumque possessio. Potest autem aliquis cognoscendi modus minus quam alius optabilis esse, siquidem modus, quo sensus cognoscit externus, est imperfectus; minus autem imperfectus ille, quo sensus internus; minus quoque quo ratio; minime tandem, quo mens angelica. Itaque cognitionis ille modus, quo deus discernit singula, cum sit gradibus infinitis angelico modo perfectior, imperfectionem certe nullam, immo perfectionem omnem penitus comprehendit. Talis certe est cognitionis divinae modus, qui per ipsam perfectionem fit infinitam. Denique sicut nobis finitis praestat finita quaedam scire quam ignorare, sic infinito deo convenit potius infinita quam vel nulla vel

any property of matter, but also from every determined condition and respect to this or that created thing, and since it is infinite, it relates indifferently, if one may use the word, towards all things. Consequently it understands either nothing except itself, or all things. But it is sacrilegious to say that it understands nothing, since it is the highest rational principle of all who understand, of all that is understood, and of understanding itself.

3 Nor can Averroes object to us that God would demean Himself if He considered things inferior. Indeed, because He knows that He is the principle of all things beneath Himself, He knows what it is to be inferior, and therefore understands the reason why things are deficient. Yet while He recognizes the reason for this deficiency, He does not Himself suffer the deficiency. If God is not made more imperfect, however, when He considers the very foundation of imperfection, a foundation utterly alien to Himself, then still less will He be made imperfect when He considers other things, even the most imperfect.

4 What more needs to be said? Knowledge of oneself and of others is desirable as good; for it is somehow a possession of oneself and of others. Yet one mode of knowing can be less desirable than another, seeing that the mode by which the external sense knows is imperfect, but that by which the internal sense knows is less imperfect, and that by which the reason knows is even less so; finally the mode by which the angelic mind knows is least imperfect. So the mode of knowing by which God discerns individuals, since it is infinitely more perfect in degree than that of the angelic mind, certainly does not comprehend any imperfection; rather, it entirely comprehends all perfection. And the mode of divine knowing is surely the one that through this very perfection is made infinite. Finally, just as God allows us as finite beings to know rather than not know particular finite things, so it behooves God in His infinity to gaze upon things infinite rather than upon things that do not exist or are finite. But God knows individual things ev-

finita videre. Cognoscit vero distincte ubique singula, si modo qui causam causarum perfecte tenet, et cunctas et singulas causas perfectissime possidet. Atque distincta perspectio, tamquam perfectior admodum quam confusa, magis admodum est exoptanda. Sed ne longius digrediamur, pergamus ad reliqua.

5 Angelus quoque cuncta dei opera et singula conspicit. Nempe si nostrae mentis obiectum est esse ipsum verumque commune, atque ideo ad existentia omnia veraque mens humana licet paulatim se dirigit, par est ut mens angeli, quae nostra[3] praestantior est, omnia capiat et, ut volunt Platonici, simul omnia. Sed quonam respicit angelus ut omnia videat? Numquid in corpora aciem dirigit? Nequaquam. Quia stabilis est angeli mens cernitque cuncta simul, propterea non potest ea discere a corporibus, quae cursu suo saepius permutata alias aliter et alia monstrant. Ac si modus agendi sequitur essendi modum, angelus, qui in essendo omnino est a corpore liber, erit quoque liber intellegendo, neque formabitur a corporibus, qui corporibus est excellentior et cum ipsis commercium habet nullum.

6 An forte in angelicam essentiam flectet intuitum? Flectet quidem, sed in angelo solum perspiciet angelum. Nam tantum in angelica natura videbit, quantum ipsa se porrigit. Ipsa in genere solum est angelico. Angelum igitur videbit in ipsa, reliqua rerum genera haud clare discernet. Nempe si materia cognitionem impedit, essentia vero creata nonnihil habet materiae simile informeque et fuscum, sequitur ut nulla creata mens, quatenus in se nudam quasi caliginem aspicit, visionis claritatem[4] adipiscatur, perinde ac si luna in se respiceret nondum lumine solis illustris. Ergo sicut oculus colores non cernit nisi per formas ipsas colorum, ita neque

erywhere distinctly, inasmuch as He who grasps perfectly the cause of causes most perfectly possesses each and every cause. Now a distinct perception, inasmuch as it is more perfect than a confused one, is altogether more desirable. But in order not to digress any longer, let us proceed to the remaining arguments.

5 The angel also perceives each and every work of God. If the object of our mind is being itself and what is universally true, and the human mind therefore directs itself to all existing and true things, albeit little by little, then surely it is fitting that the angel's mind, being superior to ours, should grasp all things and all things simultaneously, as the Platonists maintain. But where does the angel look in order to see all things? Does it direct its gaze towards bodies? No! Since the angel's mind is stable and it sees all things simultaneously, it cannot therefore learn about them from bodies, which, having undergone frequent changes in their onward journey, variously present themselves at various times. Now if the mode of acting follows on the mode of being, the angel, which in its being is entirely free from body, will also be free [in its] understanding; and, being more excellent than bodies and having no dealings with them at all, it will not be formed by them.

6 Perhaps the angel will direct its gaze then towards angelic essence? Certainly it will do so, but in angel it will perceive angel alone. For it will see only as much in the angelic nature as that nature itself reveals. That nature is solely in the angelic class. Therefore it will see the angel in itself, but it will not clearly discern the other classes of things. Indeed if matter impedes knowledge, but created essence possesses something similar to matter, something lacking in form and dark, then it follows that no created mind, inasmuch as it beholds darkness within its naked self as it were, can acquire clarity of vision. It is as though the moon were to reflect upon itself when it is not yet illumined by the light of the sun. Therefore, just as the eye does not discern colors except through the forms themselves of colors, so neither does the mind clearly

mens perspicue rerum videt genera nisi per ipsorum formas, siquidem forma est agendi principium. Essentia angeli solius est angeli forma, atque illa quidem quodammodo fusca. Dei vero essentia, immo veritas bonitasque, omnium est forma luxque purissima, radix, ratio et exemplar. Per hanc itaque solam tamquam per solem conspici omnia possunt.

7 Numquid ergo per ipsam dei essentiam angelus cuncta discernet? Non quidem per absolutam dei essentiam absque medio. Quo enim pacto essentia infinita potest tamquam forma finitae menti, nulla praeparatione intercedente, congruere? Oportet tamen mentem ipsam aliquam in se formam habere per quam agat intellegendo. Quapropter angelus formas et exemplaria rerum a dei essentia suscipit, atque ut oculus per solis lumen, colorum omnium effectivum, colorum eorundem suscipit formas videtque colores, ita mens angeli per dei lumen, rerum omnium effectivum, earundem rerum accipit species et intellegit. Merito deus prius pleniusque format spiritalem materiam ipsi proximam, id est mentes angelicas, quam remotissimam ab eo mundi materiam.

8 Sed multi sunt gradus mentium et multo plures quam corporum, ut Dionysius tradit Areopagita. Voluit enim optimus artifex plures in praestantibus operibus suis gradus statuere quam in operibus vilioribus. Sic[5] dei civitas erit praeclarior, si plures sint in ea nobilium et liberorum gradus, quam mercenariorum atque servorum. Talis est utique mentium ad corpora comparatio.

9 Quot[6] autem praecipui sint in angelicis gradibus ordines, satis ex Dionysii mente tum in libro *De religione* tum in *Pauli raptu* disseruimus. Quo etiam pacto Platonici in novem ordines dividant significavimus alias, quoniam videlicet angeli intellectus quidam

see the classes of things except through their forms, since form [for it] is the principle of action. The essence of the angel taken alone is the angel's form, and even that is in a way dark. But God's essence, or rather truth and goodness, is the form and purest light of all things, their root, reason, and model. Through it alone, as through the sun, all things can be perceived.

7 Is it then through God's essence itself that the angel will discern all things? Certainly it is not through God's absolute unmediated essence. For how can His infinite essence accord like a form with a finite mind with no mediating preparation? Yet the mind itself must have some form in itself through which it acts in understanding. That is why the angel receives the forms and models of things from God's essence. Just as the eye receives the forms of these same colors and sees the colors through the sun's light, the effective cause of all colors, so the angel's mind, through God's light which effects all things, receives and understands the species of these same things. As is proper, God forms the spiritual matter closest to Himself, that is, the angelic minds, first and more fully, before forming the world's matter which is most distant from Himself.

8 There are many degrees of minds, however, many more than of bodies, as Dionysius the Areopagite teaches.[2] For the best of artificers wished to establish more degrees of being in His more outstanding works than in His more lowly. So the city of God will be more glorious if it has in it more degrees of noblemen and freemen than of hirelings and slaves. And such is the relationship of minds to bodies.

9 As to the number of the principal orders in the angelic ranks, we have dealt with this sufficiently, following the position of Dionysius, in our work *On Religion* and *On the Rapture of Paul*.[3] Elsewhere we have indicated how the Platonists divide these orders into nine ranks, inasmuch as the angels are particular intellects contemplating the highest intelligible wherein they see essence,

sunt summum ipsum intellegibile contuentes, in quo essentiam, vitam, intellegentiam contuentur. Sed illic in essentia tum vita tum intellegentia est per essentiae modum. Rursus in vita sunt reliqua duo similiter per modum vitae. Item in[7] intellegentia duo similiter reliqua, id est vita et essentia per quendam intellegentiae modum. Illic igitur summum unumque intellegibile in tria dividitur perque tria deinde multiplicatur in novem.

10 Eodem quoque ordine intellectus ipsum considerantes in ordines novem distribuuntur. Atque hoc pacto angelos soli deditos contemplationi Platonici dividunt. Eos autem qui mundum quoque gubernant, quidam duodenario septenarioque partiuntur in primis secundum duodecim zodiaci signa septemque planetas. Deinde his alios quosdam angelorum exercitus addunt pro stellarum numero in quavis sphaera mundi certis officiis incumbentes, totidem quoque daemonum heroumque turbas angelis obsequentes, ac denique totidem particularium ordines animarum sese numinibus supernis accommodantes.

11 Sed mittamus nunc daemonicos heroicosque exercitus; satis est intellexisse Platonicos mentes supra nos innumeras posuisse, in quibus nominandis non solum angelorum, sed etiam archangelorum et principatuum nomina a nostris Iamblichus accipit, lumenque divinum per omnes quasi per vitra putat ad nos usque descendere. Quamobrem per innumerabiles paene spirituum mediorum gradus radius ille divinus formator mentium ad infimas usque devenit mentes, quales sunt hominum animae. Quatuor vero hic consideranda videntur. Primo quidem radius ille divinus, deinde species rerum in ipso, quas et rationes creandarum rerum ideasque vocamus, tertio mentes, quarto mentium vires.

life, and understanding.[4] But in the essence of this intelligible are both life and understanding through the mode of essence; again in its life likewise are the other two through the mode of life; and in its understanding likewise are the other two, namely life and essence, through the particular mode of understanding. Thus the highest and single intelligible is divided into three and then multiplied through the three to give nine.

10 In that same order too, the intellects contemplating the intelligible are divided into nine ranks. And this is how the Platonists divide the angels who are devoted to contemplation alone. But some of them divide the angels who also govern the world by utilizing twelve and seven, and especially the twelve signs of the zodiac and the seven planets. Then they add to these certain other hosts of angels in accordance with the number of the stars, hosts dedicating themselves to particular offices in any one sphere of the world; and in equal number they add the throngs of the demons and heroes obeying the angels; and finally in equal number they add the orders of particular souls devoting themselves to the supernal spirits.

11 For the present let us leave aside the demonic and heroic hosts. It is enough to have understood that the Platonists have located innumerable minds above us; and in naming these Iamblichus borrows the names not only of angels but of archangels and principalities too from our [theologians], and he thinks that the divine light descends through them all, as through glass, down to ourselves. This is why that divine ray, the form-giver of minds, passes down through virtually countless degrees of intermediary spirits to the very lowest minds, those of human souls. Four topics require consideration here: first the divine ray, then in the ray the species of things (species we also call the rational principles and Ideas of things to be created),[5] third the minds, and fourth the powers of the minds.

12 Radius, prout in simplicissima dei unitate consistit, unus est prorsus et simplicissimus, atque unicam ideam divino offert oculo, unam scilicet dei essentiam, sed illam quidem per multos essendi modos creandis rebus communicabilem. Qui modi apud Platonem illae ipsae ideae sunt rerum, quae per tales modos sunt producendae. Una igitur essentia dei, una est idea idearum omnium vicem gerens, perque hanc unicam deus cuncta circumspicit. Radius ille dum manat ex deo, quo longius a divina unitate procedit, eo magis fit multiplex, et qui unicam dei oculo ideam in primis obtulerat, multas iam ac plures deinceps et plurimas oculis offert angelicis, quemadmodum linea a centro producta, quae in eo individua erat, quo discedit longius, eo in plures partes extenditur. Immo quemadmodum solis radius in sole ipso unicam praefert lucis formam, multas in igne, plures in aere atque aqua, in terra quamplurimas. Sicut se habet radius ille divinus, ita et mentes in quas infunditur. Quo enim propinquior mens est unitati divinae, eo est unita magis et simplex; quo remotior, contra. Capit autem quaeque mens pro natura sua radium venientem. Quapropter simplicius supremae mentes illum capiunt, reliquae multiplicius. Unde paucae ideae a radio in sublimi mente pinguntur, in sequente plures plurimaeque deinceps. Quoniam vero quo quid simplicius magisque unitum est, eo est et potentius, ideo in altioribus mentibus vis intellegendi perspicacior viget, hebetior in sequentibus. Quo fit ut per illas ipsas pauciores ideas non pauciora videant mentes superiores quam per plures ideas reliquae; sicut medicus peritissimus

To the extent that it subsists in the unity of God in its utmost simplicity, the ray is altogether one and utterly simple, and it offers to the divine eye the unique Idea, namely the one essence of God; but to things awaiting creation it offers this Idea communicable through the many modes of being. For Plato these modes are the Ideas themselves of the things that are to be produced through the modes. Thus the one essence of God is the one Idea that plays the role of all the Ideas, and through this unique Idea God ponders all things. When that ray emanates from God, the further it departs from the divine unity, the more multiple it becomes. Having first presented to God's eye the unique Idea, it then offers to angels' eyes yet more and even more Ideas. Similarly with a line produced from the center, and having been undivided in that center, the further it extends, the more it is extended into many parts; or, better still, just as the sun's ray presents light's unique form in the sun itself, but many forms of it in fire, many more forms in air and water, and most forms of all on earth. As the divine ray changes, so do the minds into which it is infused change. For the closer the mind is to divine unity, the more unified and simple it is; and the further away, the reverse. But each mind accepts that incoming ray in accordance with its own nature. Thus the highest minds accept the ray in a simpler manner, the remaining minds in a more complex way. As a result the ray paints few Ideas on a sublime mind, but more Ideas and successively still more on a subsequent mind. But to the extent something is simpler and more united, it is also more powerful; and since this is so, the power of understanding waxes with greater perspicacity in higher minds, but becomes duller in those that follow. Consequently the higher minds see no less through fewer Ideas than the subsequent minds see through many more Ideas. Analogously, the most skilful doctor arrives through a single symptom at a prognosis for a sick person, whereas an unskilled doctor needs many more symptoms to make a diagnosis, and a totally unskilled doctor needs the most of all. A

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futuros in aegrotante casus unico praevidet signo, pluribus signis eget ad iudicandum imperitus, plurimis quoque imperitissimus. Et unico nutu intellegit sagax minister quid iubeat dominus, tardiores multis indigent verbis. Ergo tum[8] propter recentis radii simplicitatem, tum propter sublimium mentium unitatem earumque ipsarum mirabilem perspicaciam paucissimae communissimaeque in arce angelica sunt ideae, plures magisque speciales per ordinem in sequentibus.

13 Exemplum accipe veritati, ut arbitror, simile. Communissimum omnium Peripateticis esse ipsum videtur. Hoc in duo dividitur. Alterum est per se, alterum haeret alteri. Substantia illud est, hoc accidens. Substantia rursus altera corporalis, incorporalis est altera. Similiter accidens unum est qualitas, alterum quantitas. Corpus item duplex: animatum, inanimatum. Spiritus quoque, alii a corporibus separati, alii vero coniuncti. Dividitur deinceps unum quodque horum generum usque ad species ultimas, denique species quaelibet in singula infinita.

14 Deus per unam ipsius esse vel boni ideam, quae ipsa dei natura est, intellegit omnia. Primus angelus, exempli causa, duas forte habeat ideas, alteram substantiae, alteram accidentis, per quas omnia substantiarum et accidentium intellegat genera, prout radius ille divinus, qui in deo per unam ipsius esse vel boni ideam formatus erat, iam in primo angelo in geminas sese dividit formulas, dum discedit ab uno atque ideis substantiae accidentisque vestitur. Secundus angelus duplicata rursus radii varietate quatuor inde ideas accipiat, duas ad genus substantiae pertinentes, duas ad accidentis genus, unam scilicet ideam substantiae corporalis, incorporalis substantiae alteram. Rursus unam accidentis eius, quod est qualitas, alteram accidentis eius, quod est quantitas. Per has quatuor

clever servant too needs only a single nod to understand what his master is telling him to do, while the duller servants need it spelled out for them. Accordingly, both because of the simplicity of the original ray, and because of the unity of the sublime minds and their own wonderful perspicacity, the fewest and most universal Ideas are at the summit of the angelic hierarchy, while the more and more special Ideas are arranged in order in the ranks which follow.

13 Let us take an example that, I believe, is close to the truth. For the Peripatetics the most universal thing of all is being itself. This is divided into two: it is either per se or it inheres in something else; and the former is substance, the latter accident. Substance in turn is either corporeal or incorporeal. Similarly accident is either quality or quantity. Body likewise is twofold, ensouled or unensouled; and with spirits too, some are separate from bodies, others joined. Finally, every one of these classes is divided down to the very last species, and all the species are divided into infinite individuals.

14 God understands all things through the one Idea of being or the good, which Idea is God's nature itself. But allow the first angel, for instance, perhaps two Ideas, the one of substance, the other of accident, and through these let it understand all the classes of substances and of accidents, insofar as the divine ray, which was formed in God through the one Idea of being or the good, in the first angel now divides itself into two formulae when it departs from the one and is clothed with the Ideas of substance and of accident. And let the second angel receive four Ideas from the ray's variety doubled yet again: two Ideas pertaining to the genus of substance, two to the genus of accident. One is the Idea of corporeal substance, and the other of incorporeal substance; and again one is the Idea of the accident which is quality, and the other of the accident which is quantity. Through these four Ideas let the

ideas omnia rerum genera, quae sub communi substantia et accidente communi comprehenduntur, intellegat.

15 Tertius angelus per duplicatum rursus radium multipliciterque divisum octo ideas suscipiat, per quas totidem intellegat quot primus atque secundus. Ubi apparet sublimioribus mentibus universaliores ideas inesse, sequentibus paulatim minus universales, siquidem una idea in illis tantum sub se continet tantumque significat, quantum duae in his ideae. Semper enim descendendo una geminatur in duas, atque ita geminetur gradatim, quousque ordo mentium infimus, qualis est anima rationalis, tam multiplicem radium divinum accipiat, quantum ille in spiritibus potest fieri multiplex. Potest autem in illis usque ad ideas rerum ultimas dividi, ita ut totidem prae se ferat formulas quot rerum a deo creatarum sunt species, ut speciei humanae ideam habeat unam, unam equinae similiterque de aliis. Singulorum vero hominum et equorum figuras singulas radius ille non facile aut cuilibet ostendit expressas. Nam cum sit penitus absolutus, formulas prae se fert modo praecipue absoluto. Sane Platonici mentes supernas existimant, sicut ideas rerum materialium immateriales generabiliumque ingenerabiliter continent,[9] ita et particularium rerum ideas dumtaxat universales habere.

16 Cogitemus hominis animam nunc primum ex deo manantem neque dum corpus indutam, ut ab occupatione corporis libera intentionem prorsus omnem in mentem propriam dirigat, ubi pro natura sua dumtaxat accipiat radii illius perpetuo sibi adstantis et inspirantis[10] influxum. Quid per huiusmodi radium naturaliter capiet anima? Tot ideas quot sunt rerum species creatarum, unam

second angel understand all the classes of things that are included under universal substance and universal accident.

15 Let the third angel receive eight Ideas through this ray that has been further doubled and further divided; and let it understand through the eight Ideas as many as the first and the second angels do. It is obvious then that the Ideas present in the higher minds are more universal, while in subsequent minds they become gradually less universal, given that in the former one Idea contains and signifies as much in itself as two Ideas in the latter. For in its descent one Idea is twinned always into two and can thus be twinned step by step, until the lowest order of minds, the order which is rational soul, receives the divine ray in a manner as multiple as it can become in spiritual beings. In these lowest minds, however, the ray can be so divided down to the very last Ideas of things that it displays as many formulae as there are species of things created by God, with the result that it has one Idea of the human species, one Idea of the equine, and likewise for the others. But the ray does not easily reveal the particular shapes of individual men and horses, or, when they are revealed, show them to just anyone. For since it is completely absolute, it displays formulae in a wholly absolute way. The Platonists are surely right in thinking that supernal minds, as they contain the immaterial Ideas of material things and of things subject to generation in a way not subject to generation, so do they possess only the universal Ideas of particular things.

16 Let us now reflect on the human soul when it first emanates from God but is not yet clothed with a body, so that, not having to occupy a body, it may direct all of its attention entirely to its own mind. Here it can receive, in accordance only with its own nature, the influx of that ray which is perpetually assisting and inspiring it. What will the soul receive naturally through such a ray? It will receive as many Ideas as there are species of created things, one Idea of each species. What will it understand through the Idea of man? It will perceive just the nature common to all men, not

speciei cuiusque ideam. Per ideam hominis quid intelleget? Naturam tantum cunctis communem hominibus, singulos sub ea homines non videbit. Idem per ideam equi faciet et reliquorum. Itaque confusa relinquetur animae huius cognitio, cum ipsam lateat distincta progressio specierum in singula eritque naturalis appetitus eius inanis et inquietus semper affectus, qui nullo vult vero, nullo bono carere.

17 Verum cur nequit hominis anima in ultimis ideis sicut species, ita singula speciebus subiecta plane conspicere, quemadmodum angeli in suis ideis genera vident speciesque et singula? Quia ut alias disseruimus, in quolibet rerum ordine ita natura comparatum est, ut actio in summo illius ordinis sit passionis expers; passio in infimo actione privata; in mediis compositio media. Animas quoque nostras esse mentes infimas constitit. Quapropter quantum ad intellegentiam spectat deus aget solum, angelus aget et capiet, anima capiet per naturam suae mentis solum, non aget. Deus siquidem ideas effundit alio, non haurit aliunde. Primus angelus duas, ut ita dixerim, capit ideas, id est duo illa rerum latissima genera, quibus suscipiendis quodammodo patitur. His susceptis, ob efficaciam propriam illorum generum viscera penetrat speciesque omnes sequentes in eis perspicue inspicit fabricatque sibi ipsi conceptus proprios quarumlibet specierum, quos etiam derivat in singula. Atque haec non passio iam est, sed actio. Idem angelus secundus agit, et alii, ac semper posterior angelus plures ideas superne accipit patiendo, paucioresque conceptus specierum sibi est fabricaturus agendo.

18 Propterea crescit passio sensim, actio vero decrescit, quousque ad mentem infimam veniatur, quae nihil agat, sed acceptis ideis

the individual men subject to it. It will do the same with the Idea of horse, and of the rest. And so the knowledge of this soul will remain confused, since the distinct progression of species into individuals eludes it; its natural appetite too will be in vain, and its feeling always troubled, seeing that it does not wish to be deprived of any truth or of any good.

17 But why can't man's soul discern in the lowest Ideas the species and the individuals subject to the species, just as the angels perceive in their Ideas the genera, the species, and the individuals? The reason for this, as we have discussed elsewhere,[6] is that, in any natural order, nature has so arranged it that at the zenith of that order action is entirely devoid of passivity, that at its nadir passivity is entirely deprived of action, and that in the intermediate positions is a compounding of the two. It has also been agreed that our souls are the lowest minds. Hence, with regard to understanding, God will only act, the angel will both act and be receptive, and the soul will only receive via the nature of its mind but will not act. For God pours the Ideas into another but does not derive them from elsewhere. The first angel receives two Ideas, so to speak, namely the two most extensive genera of all [substance and accident], and in receiving them it is in a way passive. Having received them, the angel uses its own effective power to search into the entrails of these genera, and in them clearly perceives all the ensuing species. From these it fabricates for itself the particular concepts of the various species, which concepts it distributes into individuals. And this is not passivity but action. The second angel acts in the same way and the others too; and a lower angel, in being passive, always accepts more Ideas from on high, but in being active will fabricate fewer concepts of the species for itself.

18 Thus passivity gradually increases while activity decreases to the point where one comes to the lowest mind which does nothing but is nourished on the Ideas it receives and strives for nothing new; and its understanding is nothing other than a self-conscious

alatur, nihil moliatur novi; cuius intellegentia nihil est aliud quam susceptio idearum seipsam minime latens. Et quoniam ideae universales sunt natura, non potest mens aliqua illas absque propria actione ad distinctos singularum rerum conceptus deducere. Ideo hominis anima, quae ex ea parte qua mens est, inter mentes est ultima intellegitque solummodo patiendo, universalia in singula non distribuit. Verumtamen qua parte est divina, per centrum suum quasi dei characterem habet aliquam actionem, qua producit species vel educit, dividit vero nequaquam. Quinetiam qua parte est anima, quia non est ultima animarum, animalis corporeaeque operationis est compos. Ceterum per divinam providentiam in eo gradu locata est hominis anima, ut sicut succedit proxime mentibus, ita proxime terrena praecedat[11] corpora, qua cognatione erga inferiora haec afficitur eiusque amatorio quodam affectu se inserit. Unde corporibus copulata terrenis terrenorum omnium praestantissimis regit quidem illa perque virtutem vitalem vitales illis affert passiones intrinsecus; per sensum autem iudicat alienas passiones illatas illis extrinsecus.

19 Corpus humanum, quoniam constat quatuor elementis et in medio mundi locatur, omnium elementorum omniumque rerum circumfluentium impulsus per quinque instrumenta sensuum patitur. Impulsus huiusmodi undique a singulis rebus illatos sigillatim anima discernit per sensus, eorumque imagines ipsa animali virtute in seipsa fingit per phantasiam servatque memoriter. Quo fit ut brevi tempore phantasia singularum ferme rerum singulis plena sit formis. Hinc ratio provocata primo quidem species universales parit perque illas intuitu simplici communes concipit notiones.

sustaining of the Ideas. And since the Ideas are by nature universal, an individual mind cannot, without some activity peculiar to itself, lead the Ideas down towards distinct concepts of particular things. Hence man's soul (which is, insofar as it is a mind, the very last among minds, and only understands by being passive) does not divide universals into particulars. Nonetheless, insofar as it is divine, it does possess some action through its own center, which is as it were an impression of God; and through this action it produces, or rather educes, the species, but it does not divide them at all. Moreover, insofar as it is a soul and because it is not the last of souls, it is in control of both soul-centered and corporeal activity. Besides, man's soul has been located at this level through divine providence with the result that, just as it immediately follows upon minds, so does it immediately precede earthly bodies; and by that affinity it is drawn towards these lower bodies and implants itself in them with a particular amatory affection. And once it is joined to terrestrial bodies, the soul rules over even the most elevated of earthly things. Through its vital power it introduces vital passions to the bodies internally, but through its sense-perception it judges the passions that are alien to them and that come from without.

19 Since it consists of four elements and is placed in the midst of the world, the human body submits, via the five organs of its senses, to the shocks of all the elements and of all the things that whirl around it. Through the senses the soul everywhere discerns such shocks from individual things that are stamped on it in the manner of seals; and with its soul-power it depicts in itself through the phantasy the images of the senses and preserves them through the memory. The result is that in a short time the phantasy is filled with the individual forms of individual things or almost so. Aroused by this, the reason first begets universal species and through them, with a simple intuitive glance, it conceives of common notions. Next, from this direct intuitive glance and then

Mox vero ex hoc intuitu recto iam ab actu intellegendi in speciem intellegibilem perque hanc in simulacrum se reflectit et per simulacrum prospicit individuum, prius quidem vagum indeterminatumque, puta aliquod mel, deinde determinatum, scilicet mel hoc aut illud.

20 Sed post huiusmodi breviores actus latius in hunc modum percurrere consuevit. Quidnam est corpus hoc dulce et flavum, quod offert nunc phantasia mihi? Cur dulce? Dulciusne hoc an vinum? Tria hic ratio quaerit quae, ut Platonicis videtur, phantasiam latuerant: primum, rei illius substantiam,[12] quando quid hoc est interrogat. Secundum, qualitatis illius causam, quando cur dulce sit perquirit. Tertium, ordinem eius ad alia, quando sciscitatur num vino sit dulcius. Post haec respondet sibi ipsi tria: primum, mel hoc est. Secundum, hoc ideo dulce, quoniam humor eius pinguis est et moderate coctus. Tertium, dulcius vino est, quia dulcedo eius linguam magis diutiusque delinit. Hae rationis humanae discursiones, quoniam phantasiae sequuntur impulsum, particulares sunt et per singula pervagantur.

21 Quinetiam aggreditur alias quaestiones: quid mel? Quid dulcedo? Nunc non magis de melle hoc quam de quovis alio rogat, similiter de dulcedine qualibet. Ac neglecto proprio illo mellis simulacro, quod attulit phantasia, de communi perscrutatur universi mellis et dulcedinis ratione. Universalis haec quaestio est. Universalis fit et responsio ita: mel est apum succus, gradu secundo cali-

from the act of understanding, it turns back towards an intelligible species and through this species towards a likeness; and through the likeness it gazes down upon an individual, at first perceiving it as vague and indeterminate—as some kind of honey, for example—then as determinate—as this or that particular honey.

After such momentary acts, however, the reason customarily 20
embarks on a longer disquisition in the following manner. What is this sweet and yellow body that my phantasy is now presenting to me? Why is it sweet? Is it more sweet than wine? The reason is asking three questions here which, so it seemed to the Platonists, had eluded the phantasy: the first question, with regard to the substance of that honey, when it asks what it is; the second, with regard to the cause of its quality, when it inquires why it is sweet; and the third, with regard to its ranking vis-à-vis others, when it seeks to know whether it is sweeter than wine. After these questions, the reason gives itself these three replies: the first, this is honey; the second, this is sweet because its humor is syrupy and concocted moderately; and the third, this is sweeter than wine since its sweetness seduces the tongue more and for a longer duration. These disquisitions of the human reason, since they follow on the urging of the phantasy, are particular and they range from individual to individual.

The reason then turns to other questions. What is honey? 21
What is sweetness? It no longer asks now about this honey rather than that, or likewise about a particular sweetness. Setting aside the particular image of honey the phantasy has presented, the reason inquires into the rational principle common both to all honey and to sweetness. This is a universal question. The response is also universal: Honey is the sap of bees, warm in the second degree,[7] with a healing power, sweetest in flavor, sticky to the touch.[8] Again: sweetness is the flavor coming from the moderated concoction of an airy liquid. Having sought these general definitions of honey and sweetness for a long time, reason has found them at

dus, virtute abstergens, sapore dulcissimus, tactu pinguis. Rursus, dulcedo est sapor ex moderata humoris aerei concoctione proveniens. Has communes definitiones mellis atque dulcedinis quaesivit ratio diu et invenit tandem. Si quaesivit diu, non habebat ipsa. Accepit enim aliunde illud ad quod discurrendo pervenit. Unde ergo accepit? Non a phantasia. Ea enim si illas habuisset, obtulisset plane statim, ut simulacra obtulit; praesertim cum lux illa communis definitionis, quanto est illustrior diviniorque simulacris, tanto clarius oculis rationis ad ipsam accommodatis refulgere debuerit. Quapropter a mente ratio illas accipit, quae quoniam menti quamproxima est, eam ipsam vim adipiscitur, per quam neglectis quandoque singularibus quaestionibus ad universales se conferat quaestiones. Et quia quaerit communiter definitiones, reportat a mente communes.

22 Quaerebatur quid lucri a corpore proveniret. Plurimum proculdubio. Nempe si remanet extra corpus anima cum primum nata est, universalia cognoscet quidem, singula vel virtute propria vel radio divino per ipsam comprehenso non cernet, quia mens eius ultra ideas ultimas non descendet; ratio vero in mentis quiescet[13] intuitu. In hoc autem corpore propter sensus ratio consuescit per singula currere, singula applicare communibus, communia in singula derivare. Per singula currit hunc in modum: hoc est dulce et flavum. Ergo est mel. Singula communibus applicat ita: hoc est dulce. Omne dulce est humidum moderate coctum. Ergo hoc est humidum ita coctum. Communia vero sic adhibet singulis: omne dulce et flavum est mel. Hoc igitur, quia tale est, est mel.

23 Sic[14] assuefacta ratio, quando animus fuerit separatus, communes mentis ideas facile in singulas distribuet notiones, quia ratio

last. If it had to seek them for a long time, then it did not itself possess them. For what it arrives at discursively it has received from elsewhere. From where, then, did it receive the definitions? Not from the phantasy. For had the phantasy possessed them, clearly it would have presented them, as it presented the images, immediately; and more especially since the light of a general definition, to the extent that it is more radiant and divine than images, must be clearer and more refulgent to the eyes of reason, accommodated as they are to the light. So the reason receives definitions from the mind, and, since the reason is as close to the mind as possible, it acquires the very power that enables it, once particular questions have been set aside, to turn to universal questions. And since it seeks definitions in a universal manner, it brings universal definitions back from the mind.

22 We were asking what advantage accrues [to the soul] from the body. Undoubtedly an enormous advantage. For if the soul remains outside the body as soon as it is born, it will certainly know universals; but it will not discern particulars either with its own power or with the divine ray it seizes for itself, since its mind will not descend further than the lowest Ideas, while its reason will remain at rest in the mind's intuition. But in this body, and because of the senses, the reason is accustomed to discoursing through particulars, to applying particulars to universals, and to drawing universals down into particulars. It proceeds through particulars as follows: This is sweet and yellow. So this is honey. But it applies particulars to universals thus: This is sweet. Whatever is sweet is something moist that has been concocted moderately. So this is moist and concocted moderately. Then it applies universals to particulars as follows: All that is sweet and yellow is honey. So this, since it is such, is honey.

23 Trained in this way, the reason, when the rational soul has been separated from the body, will easily distribute the universal Ideas of the mind into particular notions. It will do so because, just as

sicut hic sua quadam temporali discursione divinum illud et efficax animae centrum caputque mentis provocat, ut formulas in mente latentes paulatim educat in lucem et in rationem usque traducat, ita illic subito continuoque affectu per diuturnam consuetudinem generato formulas inflammabit, ut per quasdam rerum singularum scintillas excussae quandoque ex mente coruscent in rationem. Quapropter Plato in *Epistolis* atque *Legibus*, Plotinus quoque in libro *De animorum immortalitate* concedunt animis separatis inesse nostrarum rerum sensum aliquem atque curam. Quod quidem Plotinus sic accipi vult, ut eatenus animadvertant humana, quatenus superest ipsis habitus aliquis vel affectus ad corporea vergens; quo tandem sublato, tanta attentione divinis incumbant, ut singula quae inter nos contingunt aut non videant aut (sicuti solent qui aliquid intentissime cogitant) se videre talia non advertant.

24 Eadem ferme de rerum humanarum reminiscentia ratio est. Nam Plato alibi recordari concedit, alibi Lethaeum inquit oblivionis flumen inter vitae huius atque alterius fluere regionem. Recordari enim quamdiu erga illa, quae hic senserant, afficiuntur, deinde minime. Animas vero quae labuntur in corpus, eatenus divinorum oblivisci, quatenus sese in corpus immergunt. Cum primum emergunt et quantum emergunt, tunc primum atque tantum reminisci.

25 Sunt autem animae multae, ut et priscis et nostris placet theologis, quae haec aut illa, hic aut ibi, non affectu, sed providentia

here, by way of its own temporal discursive process, it [already] rouses that divine and effective center of the soul, the mind's head, so that it gradually brings the formulae hiding in the mind out into the light and leads them into the reason; so there too it will ignite the formulae by way of the sudden, continual desire generated [in it] through long custom, so that, having been ignited through the particular sparks of single things, the formulae will at some point blaze out from the mind into the reason. Hence Plato in his *Letters* and *Laws*,[9] and also Plotinus in his treatise, *On the Immortality of Souls*,[10] concede that some feeling and concern for our affairs remain in souls even after they have been separated [from bodies]. For Plotinus this means that such souls take note of human affairs to the extent that a certain habit or affection inclining them towards bodily things lingers in them. When this habit vanishes, they apply themselves to things divine with such attentiveness that either they do not see the particular things happening amongst us, or (as often occurs with those who think with utmost intensity about something) they do not notice the things they do see.

24 The reason, the same reason virtually, is concerned with remembering human affairs. For in one place Plato concedes that [souls] remember, and in another he says that Lethe, the river of oblivion, flows between the region of this life and that of the other.[11] For souls remember as long as they are affected with respect to the things they had experienced here, but afterwards not at all. But Plato concedes that the souls who fall into the body become oblivious of things divine to the extent that they immerse themselves in the body. As soon as they emerge from it, and to the degree they do emerge, then to that degree and only then do they remember.

25 But there are many souls, as the theologians both of antiquity and of our own time agree, who govern various bodies in various places, not by desire, but by a certain providence apportioned

quadam a deo distributa gubernant. Adde quod in *Republica* scribit Plato animas quae hic aliquo affectu se noverant, sese illic agnoscere atque ferme ad se invicem similiter affici. Avicenna quoque in *Metaphysicis* ait animas tum beatas tum miseras in altera vita, perseverante ad tempus habitu quodam a sensibilibus contracto, posse imaginari quae hic prius vehementiore affectu imaginabantur. Sed haec nunc tamquam minus necessaria dimittamus.

: II :

Ratio secunda.
Ut formae singulares cum universalibus formis concilientur.

1 Mirabilis profecto virtus est haec humana ratio animae rationalis propria, per quam sumus homines. Accipit a phantasia singula, a mente communia, et in unum congregat utraque, et sicut in homine mortalia cum immortalibus copulantur, sic in huiusmodi ratione temporalia simulacra speciebus iunguntur aeternis. Quod nisi in mundo efficeretur alicubi, restaret formarum[15] series interrupta. Fieri autem nequit, nisi rationalis animus terreno corpori coniungatur.

: III :

Ratio tertia. Ut tam radius divinus
quam eius formulae reflectantur in deum.

1 Facit in hoc iterum aliud mirabilius, quoniam divinus ille radius idearum plenissimus, postquam ad animam usque descendit, tran-

them by God. Moreover, in the *Republic* Plato writes that souls who knew and were drawn towards each other down here, recognize each other up there and are likewise generally drawn towards each other.[12] Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* also says that souls, the blessed and the miserable alike, are able in that other life, as long as a certain habit acquired from sensibles endures for a while, to imagine the things they have imagined here first under the goad of more vehement desire.[13] But let us for the present dismiss these less relevant matters.

: II :

Second proof: That souls may unite particular with universal forms.

This human reason, which is proper to the rational soul and 1
makes us men, is certainly a marvelous power. It receives particulars from the phantasy and universals from the mind and unites them. And as in man mortal things are joined with immortal, so in this reason temporal images are united with eternal species. Unless this union were realized somewhere in the world, however, the hierarchy of forms would remain interrupted. But it cannot be realized unless the rational soul is united to an earthly body.

: III :

Third proof: That the divine ray and its formulae alike may be reflected towards God.

In the body the soul again accomplishes something else which is 1
still more marvelous, since the divine ray, which overflows with

sit per vitalem animae vim perque naturam in mundi materiam, in qua fingit extremas quasdam atque umbratiles similitudines idearum, quemadmodum lumen fingit imagines colorum in speculo, immo quemadmodum per lumen umbrae corporum designantur in terra. Tales autem similitudines sive umbrae discedunt[16] ab ipsa divinitate quamplurimum, nam ex puris impurae fiunt, dum a contrariis inquinantur, ex unitis dissipatae, ex communibus singulae, ex stabilibus prorsus instabiles.

2 Si res quaeque suam originem repetunt, unde percutiens terram solis radius in solem inde reflectitur, quid mirum has quoque umbratiles similitudines idearum occulto quodam instinctu pristinam puritatem requirere, atque radium ipsum earum fictorem, postquam descendit, vicissim ad ascendendum ardenter[17] anniti? Frustrane tantus conatus erit? Minime. Quis succurret? Non animae bestiarum, quae solis singularibus simulacris inhiant. Non mentes illae nostris praestantiores, quae cum non habeant corpora omnibus omnium corporum subiecta procellis, particulares quaslibet passiones formasque quorumlibet corporum non suscipiunt. Sola restat hominis anima, quae propter terrenum corpus singulorum corporum singulis quodammodo pulsata tumultibus, assumit quidem ipsa per sensum has a mundi materia infectas similitudines idearum, colligit autem eas per phantasiam, purgat extollitque per rationem, ligat deinde cum universalibus mentis ideis. Ita radius ille caelestis, qui ad ima defluxerat, refluit ad sublimia, dum similitudines idearum, quae fuerant in materia dissipatae, colliguntur in phantasia, et impurae purgantur in ratione, et singulares tandem in mente evadunt universales, sic hominis anima iam labefactatum restituit mundum, quoniam eius munere spiritalis olim mundus,

Ideas, having descended all the way to the soul, passes through the soul's vital power and nature into the matter of the world. In this matter it sketches out the last, particular, and shadowy likenesses of the Ideas in the manner light paints the images of colors in a mirror, or rather light outlines the shadows of bodies on the earth. But such likenesses or shadows are as far distant as possible from the divinity itself. From being pure, they become impure (when they are stained by contraries); from being united, they become dispersed; from being universals, they become particulars; and from being changeless, they become totally changeable.

If all things return to seek their own source, and the sun's ray 2
striking the earth is therefore reflected back to the sun, why is it marvelous that these shadowy imitations of Ideas, through some hidden instinct, also seek their pristine purity again, and that the ray which fashions them, having descended, strives ardently to reascend in turn? Will such a great effort be in vain? No! Who will hurry to assist it? Not animals' souls which gape at particular images alone; and not those minds which are superior to our souls, and which, since they do not have bodies exposed to all the tempests afflicting all bodies, do not endure any of the particular passions and forms of any given bodies. There remains the human soul alone, which, having been struck in a way, on account of its earthly body, by the particular disturbances of particular bodies, itself receives through the sense the likenesses of the Ideas, likenesses polluted by the world's matter. It collects them, however, through the phantasy, and purifies and elevates them through the reason, and finally binds them to the universal Ideas of the mind. Just as the celestial ray, having descended to the depths, returns to the heights when the Ideas' likenesses, which had been dissipated in matter, are collected in the phantasy, the impure are purified in the reason, and the particular are made universal in the mind, so now the soul of man restores the fallen world, because, with the soul performing its office, the world, which was once spiritual but

qui iam corporalis est factus, purgatur assidue atque evadit quotidie spiritalis.

3 Radii ab amplo solis orbe demissi in angustum foramen altissimi parietis conum faciunt per pyramidem, et in ipso foramine obliquantur usque adeo ut transversi traducantur ab ipso, et in suppositum pavimentum cum decidunt, orbem fulgidum configurent tanto ampliorem, quanto remotius a foramine fuerit pavimentum, ubi solaris globi latitudinem adaequaturi videntur,[18] si aequali spatio deciderint a foramine atque a sole defluxerant. Hoc autem in nostris oculis assequuntur. Nam qui in pupilla coacti sunt in angustum et ab ipsa traducti in animum, in ipso animo solis magnitudinem implent, ubi vere de solis magnitudine iudicatur. Ex quo apparet tanto[19] animum distare ab oculis, quanto solaris orbis supereminet oculos.

4 Idcirco et in caelo secundum Aegyptios et caelestis est animus, qui terrenos oculos aeque supereminet atque caelum. Influxus quoque idearum a supernis mentibus demissi in corpora ex amplissimis angustissimi fiunt,[20] dum ex universalibus omnino particulares evadunt; a corporibus tandem reflexi in hominis animum pristinam recipiunt amplitudinem. Unde evidenter ostendunt humanam mentem ita ferme a corporibus esse remotam sicut et mentes superiores. Ideoque cum aeque a mortalibus seiuncta sit ac divinae mentes, aeque immortalem existere; praesertim cum formas ab aeternitate ad tempus partesque temporis usque prolapsas aeternitati restituat.

has now become corporeal, is continually purified, becoming spiritual day by day.

3 The rays dispatched from the vast orb of the sun into the narrow aperture of a very high wall make a pyramid-like cone. In the aperture they are bent to such an extent that they pass through it crosswise; and when they fall onto the pavement beneath they form the shape of a luminous circle that expands the further the pavement is from the opening. Here the rays give the appearance that they would [eventually] equal the breadth of the sun's orb were they to fall from the aperture by a distance equal to the distance they had flowed from the sun. They do the same in our eyes. For the rays that are contracted tightly in the pupil, and transmitted thence to the soul, expand in the soul to the magnitude of the sun; and here the magnitude of the sun is truly judged. This shows that the rational soul is as far from our eyes as the solar orb is high above our eyes.

4 So the rational soul that is superior alike to earthly eyes and to the heavens is both in the heavens, according to the Egyptians, and itself heavenly. The influences too of the Ideas that are dispatched from the supernal minds into bodies, from being totally expanded, are totally contracted when they go from being universal to being wholly particular. Reflected at last from bodies back into man's soul, they reacquire their original amplitude. Hence it is evident that the human mind is almost as far removed from bodies as the higher minds are; and that, since it is separated from mortal things by the same measure as the divine minds, it is equally immortal, and especially since it returns those forms, which have fallen from eternity into time and into time's parts, back to eternity.

: IV :

Quarta ratio. Ut anima fiat beatior.

1 Confert praeterea descensus animae in corpus ad animae ipsius beatitudinem. Si quis enim hebetior ingenio sit ac semper corpore validus, quanti facienda sit bona valetudo corporis ignorabit. Aegrotet oportet quandoque ut ea comparatione saltem pretium sanitatis agnoscat et recuperata iterum sanitate suavius perfruatur. Anima hominis mentibus omnibus obtusior comparatione indiget ad plenissimum rerum maximarum iudicium. Ergo mundanis agitata procellis, quam quietus dulcisque sit in deo portus, et hic rectius vaticinabitur et illic discernet acutius, intentius adhaerebit, fruetur et dulcius. Quam quidem rationem Plotinus non mediocriter probare videtur, maxime vero Porphyrius, qui animam[21] inquit saepius mala haec expertam, tandem omnino haerere parenti, numquam ad haec ulterius redituram. Forsitan et ipse deus instituit divina gaudia superioribus quidem mentium gradibus natura obtingere, ordini vero inferiori laboribus comparari, ut[22] essent et qui nascendo beati fierent, et qui se vivendo beatos efficerent, ne aut sublimes spiritus pluris quam sint aestimentur, cum aliunde beatitudinem nanciscantur, aut inferiores spiritus contemnantur, cum ipsimet sibi sint beatitudinis auctores. Quid si angeli, utpote qui sunt remotiores a tempore, statim ut orti sunt, per subitam quandam in deum conversionem momento beatitudinem promerentur? Nos autem[23] longiori circuitu felicitatem similem adipiscimur, et quod naturae deest, industriae nostrae rependitur; ac

: IV :

Fourth proof: That the soul may become more blessed.

The descent of the soul into the body contributes, furthermore, to 1
the blessedness of the soul itself. For whoever is dull in his wits and strong in body will not know how to value his good health. One must be sick from time to time so that by way of comparison at least one may recognize the value of health, and with renewed pleasure enjoy one's renewed health. Man's soul, being more obtuse than all minds, needs this comparison in order to make the most comprensive judgment about the weightiest matters. Thus, shaken by the storms of this world, it will prophesy more accurately here, and discern more keenly there, how calm and pleasant is the refuge in God; it will cling to it with greater intensity and enjoy it with greater pleasure. Plotinus seems to approve highly of this proof;[14] and Porphyry especially when he says that the soul which has experienced these ills too often eventually will cling completely to its parent and no longer ever return to them.[15] Perhaps God Himself has ordained that divine joys naturally fall to the lot of the higher ranks of minds, but are purchased in the lower rank by labors, so that those who have been blessed from birth and those who have become blessed from living might both exist; and that the sublime spirits might not be valued more than they are, since they acquire their blessedness from elsewhere, nor the lower spirits despised, since they are the authors for themselves of blessedness. What does it matter if the angels, in that they are more removed from time, should directly they are born and through what is, as it were, an immediate turning towards God, be given blessedness in a moment? We, however, acquire a like happiness through a much more circuitous route, and what is lacking in our nature is offset by our industry; and while our en-

dum honesti piique laboris tolerantia cum imbecillitate nostrae originis compensatur, quodammodo excellentiam aequantes angelicam[24] aequamus et praemia.

2 Ita quatuor in bono gradus reperiuntur. Deus a se tantum bonum habet suum, corporea ab alio tantum, angelus et animus non modo ab alio, quia a deo, verum etiam a se, quia sibimet bonum praestant, sed angelus actu aeterno, animus temporali. Neque mirari debemus animum posse non modo ad extremum digredi malum sicut miseri, sed etiam ad summum progredi bonum sicut angeli. Primus enim liberque motus nusquam nisi in infinito[25] habet terminum.

: V :

Quinta ratio.
Ut vires animae inferiores ad effectum progrediantur.

1 Conducit insuper haec habitatio non ad rationem mentemque solum, sicut exposuimus, verum etiam ad tres illas inferiores animae vires: phantasiam, sensum et nutriendi virtutem, quas animae inesse oportet non minus quam mentem et rationem, si modo inter angelos ac bestias obtinet medium. Inanis quidem et inquieta est vis illa, quae numquam prodit in actum. Harum trium virium absque corpore non est actus, aut certe non incipit sine corpore; sine corpore,[26] inquam, terreno operationes suas tum singulas tum

durance of a noble and devout labor makes up for the weakness of our origin, yet in equaling in a way the angelic excellence we share also its rewards.

Thus in [possessing] the good are found four degrees. God pos- 2
sesses His own good only from Himself. Corporeal beings possess their good only from another. The angel and the rational soul possess their good not only from another, since they receive it from God, but also from themselves, since they furnish good to themselves. But the angel does so in an eternal act, the soul in a temporal one. Nor should we be surprised that the soul is able not only to wander down to the lowest evil, like the damned, but also to advance up to the highest good, like the angels. For the first, free motion has a terminus nowhere except in infinity.

: V :

Fifth proof:
That the soul's lower powers may proceed to an effect.

This cohabitation [of soul and body] benefits not only the reason 1
and the mind, as we have explained, but also the three lower powers of the soul: the phantasy, the sense, and the power of nutrition which no less than the mind and the reason must be present in the soul, if indeed it has a position midway between the angels and the beasts. Now a power that never proceeds to action is both useless and restless. Without the body no act of these three powers occurs, or certainly none begins without the body; without the earthly body, I repeat, the powers do not realize their operations whether individually or collectively. Furthermore, Plotinus says that through its actions the soul clearly perceives its own powers and nature, and that unless all its powers are displayed it will not

integras non exsequuntur. Adde quod Plotinus ait animam per actiones perspicue vires suas naturamque perspicere, ac nisi omnes edantur, se suaque perfecte non cognituram. Quoniam vero omnino mobiles temporalesque sunt earum actus atque effectus, par est ut ad aliquod tempus agant, ut ad tempus operetur quod agit temporaliter temporalia, idcirco datur eiusmodi corpus ad tempus. Sed quoniam operatio mentis atque eius pedissequae rationis continua esse potest ad obiecta perpetua, merito in perpetuum operantur tribus aliis viribus quandoque vacantibus.

2 At quam ob causam adeo brevis hic est animae habitatio? Respondet Plotinus, ut citius deposita sarcina proficiscatur ad meliora. Brevis aetas sufficit ad munera haec explenda, quorum huc gratia venit. Quo autem modo conveniens est animo sempiterno, ut modo descendat in terras, modo ascendat,[27] et quasi ludens modo in corpore sit, modo sit extra corpus? Forsitan, ut Plotinus existimat, non opus est ut ad haec officia moveatur loco ac tempore animus, per descensum atque ascensum. Ut enim super locum tempusque, quae sunt corporis passiones, natus ex deo est, ita extra loci temporisque limites permanet, non aliter ex deo pendens quam ex sole lumen totum ubique per aerem.[28] Hoc Plotinum arbitror ab Aegyptiis didicisse, qui animam opinantur immensae praesentiae dei secundum essentiam suam participem esse, quandoquidem secundum virtutem operationemque fit particeps immensae intellegentiae voluntatisque divinae per interminabilem interminabilis veritatis intuitum et bonitatis affectum. Quare secundum eos non esset dicendum ut modo hic sedeat, modo transeat illuc, sed potius ut nunc det vitam terrae, postea non det, sicut lumen non mutatum loco nunc oculum apertum illuminat, post clausum minime. Sed hoc ipsi viderint.

perfectly know itself or what belongs to it.[16] But since the acts and effects of these powers are wholly changeable and temporal, it is fitting that they act for a certain time, seeing that what acts upon temporal things in a temporal fashion operates for a time. Thus this body is granted for a certain time. But since the operation of the mind and of the reason, its attendant, are able to continue uninterruptedly with regard to unchanging objects, they are perpetually active, and justly so, even when the other three powers are idle.

2 But why is the soul's living with the body so brief? Plotinus replies that it is in order that when it has laid aside its burden it can proceed more quickly to better things.[17] A short time suffices to fulfill the offices for whose sake it came hither. But in what way is it appropriate for the eternal soul at one time to descend to earth, at another time to ascend, and, as in a game, to be at one time inside the body and at another outside it? Perhaps Plotinus is right in thinking that the soul does not need to be moved in place and time, through descent and ascent, for it to fulfill these offices. For just as the soul is born from God beyond place and time, which are the passions or experiences of the body, so it remains beyond the limits of place and time and depends on God in the same way that light wholly and everywhere through the air depends on the sun. I think Plotinus learned this from the Egyptians who thought, with respect to its own essence, that the soul participates in God's measureless presence, since, with respect to its power and operation, it is made a participant in [His] measureless understanding and divine will by way of its boundless contemplation of boundless truth and its boundless desire for goodness. This is why according to the Egyptians one should not say that the soul is now staying here and now passing on there, but rather that at present it gives life to the earth, but will not do so later. Similarly light, without changing place, illuminates the eye now it is open, but will not do so after it is closed. But this is their argument.

3 Quorsum hic ludus in tribuenda corpori vita et auferenda? Satis, ut arbitror, diximus. Dat enim vitam ut illa expleat munera quae narravimus. Aufert, ne diutius a melioribus vacet muneribus propter viliorum operum ministeria. Atque ut stellae ad explendum officium sibi a deo iniunctum oriuntur oculis nostris et occidunt, spiritus quoque permulti fabricatis saepe novis corporibus modo oculis se nostris obiiciunt, modo se[29] subtrahunt, sic hominum animae alias in corporibus apparent, alias delitescunt. Hic triplex ostensionis apparet gradus. Animae stellarum oculis hominum sese monstrant semper atque continue, licet alias aliis. Animae sequentium spirituum semper, non tamen continue. Semper, quoniam omnibus saeculis id agunt. Non continue, quoniam intermittunt. Animae nostrae neque semper neque continue.

4 Quod si non est contra naturam, ut a sublimibus corporibus aliquid descendat momentis singulis ad inferiora rursusque ascendat, ut radii siderum atque flammae, non est etiam contra naturam aliquot e sublimibus spiritibus huc quasi descendere quotidie atque ascendere. Item consentaneum videtur Platonicis, ut quemadmodum angelicae vitae semper a corporibus separatae sunt, brutae vero numquam separatae, sic mediae duae sint, tum animae feliciores, quae semper partim separatae, partim coniunctae sint absque actionis ullius impedimento, tum etiam minus felices, quae aliquando segregatae sint, aliquando vero coniunctae, coniunctae, inquam, elementali corpori, quod intellectualem quodammodo impedit actionem. Nam aethereum corpus apud Platonicos semper habent, apud Christianos autem tale quoddam corpus tandem

What is the purpose of this game of giving life to the body and 3
taking it away? We have, I think, said enough. For the soul gives life so that it can perform the offices we have described; and it takes life away so that it is not too long absent, because it is ministering to inferior operations, from its better offices. Just as the stars rise and set before our eyes in fulfilling the office imposed on them by God, and also many spirits, their bodies often constructed anew, now present themselves to our eyes and now withdraw themselves, so human souls at times appear in bodies and at times hide away. We see three levels of manifestation here. The souls of stars show themselves to men's eyes always and continuously, though differently to different people. The souls of spirits attending these stars show themselves always but not continuously: always, because they do so in all ages; not continuously, since they do so intermittently. Our souls show themselves neither always nor continuously.

If it is not unnatural that on particular occasions something 4
should descend from sublime bodies to inferior bodies and re-ascend (for instance, the rays of stars and flames), it is also not unnatural that every day some few from among the sublime spirits should descend as it were hither and re-ascend. Now the Platonists apparently agree that just as angelic lives are always separate from bodies, but brute lives are never separate, so there are two intervening means: there are the more fortunate souls who are always partly separate and partly joined without this being an obstacle to any [intellectual] action; and there are those less fortunate who are at times separated, at times joined, but joined to an elemental body, and this does in a way impede intellectual action. For according to the Platonists our souls have an ethereal body always, whereas for Christians our souls will have such a body always [only] in the end.[18] I will pass over the fact that the Platonists think that not just our souls but the souls too of many demons change their own bodies at times.[19] Clearly they suppose

semper habebunt. Mitto quod Platonici non nostras solum, sed multorum quoque daemonum animas propria quandoque mutare corpora putant. Profecto divinam bonitatem tum effundere se in alia, tum alia ad se convertere arbitrantur; inde animas habere ut corpora regant, inde ut se ad incorporea conferant, et quae perfecte utrumque simul facere possunt corpora non mutare, quae vero aliter sese habent merito permutare.

Oritur hic illa vulgarium diffidentia. Quid hoc? Defuncti non redeunt, non videntur, non agunt quicquam. Redire quidem sub aliis figuris Platonici putant. Sed revera quid opus est redeat ad pugnam veteranus et emeritus miles? Si secundum naturam esset reditus ad pugnam, redirent utique omnes. Si est contra naturam, noli alicuius reditum quaerere. Contra naturam certe est reditus supervacuus, si fuit secundum providentiae leges abire hinc illos, qui munus[30] impleverant. Accendit sphaera ignis saepe flammam in aere, flamma paulo post redit in sphaeram. Noli quaerere crebriorem illius flammae descensum. Naturalis sibi est perpetuus ille cum sphaera circuitus; contra naturam est descendere rursus. Ac licet animus per naturam essentiae tertiae, Iani bifrontis instar, utrumque respiciat, corporeum scilicet et incorporeum, tamen quia sublimioribus mentibus amplior providentia, inferioribus angustior convenit, et animus noster illarum omnium infimus est, angustissima sibi convenit providentia, unde et brevi[31] regit caeleste corpus et ad breve tempus terrenum. Et quando corporeum simul incorporeumque[32] mediocriter respicit, aeque exercet utrumque essentiae tertiae munus. Quod in hac vita contingit.

that the divine goodness at one time pours itself out into some things and at another time draws others back into itself; hence that souls have the wherewithal both to rule bodies and to convert themselves towards bodiless things; and that the souls which can simultaneously accomplish both of these perfectly do not change bodies, while those which behave otherwise do change them and properly so.

At this point the distrust of the untutored public emerges [and they ask]: Why so? The dead do not return, are not seen, no longer do anything. The Platonists think that they certainly do return in other shapes.[20] But in fact, why should a retired veteran return to fight again? If it were natural for him to return to combat, then everyone would return; if it were unnatural, do not look for the return of anyone at all. A pointless return is certainly against nature if it was according to the laws of providence that those who had fulfilled their office departed hence. The sphere of fire often ignites a flame in the air, but the flame returns to its own sphere shortly thereafter. Do not look for a more frequent descent of that flame. Natural to it is its perpetual revolution within its own [fiery] sphere; it is contrary to its nature to descend again. Granted that the rational soul, by way of its nature as the third [the intermediate] essence, may look in either direction like Janus with his double face toward the corporeal and the incorporeal.[21] Nevertheless, since an ampler providence is proper to higher minds, and a more restricted one to inferior minds, and since our soul is the lowest of all minds, proper to it is the most restricted providence. Hence it governs a celestial body briefly and an earthly body briefly. And when it tranquilly regards the corporeal and the incorporeal together, it exercises both offices of the third essence equally. This happens in our present life. After this life, however, when the soul becomes, on account of its purity, more attentive to incorporeal things, then it regards corporeal ones more negligently. Or when it is immersed, on account of its impurity, in the lowest

Quando vero post hanc vitam vel propter puritatem incorporeis incumbit attentior, tunc prospicit corporea negligentius, vel propter impuritatem corporibus mergitur[33] infimis, tunc humanae gubernationis auctoritate privatur. Quippe cum humana vita inter divinam ferinamve sit media, animus, dum agit mediam, extremam quoque attingit utramque; dum declinat ad alteram extremarum[34] (quod quidem et nunc incipit facere et explet[35] postea cum decesserit), mediam attingit paulum, extremarum alteram minime.

6 At cur non videntur animae defunctorum? Deum, angelos, aerem non vides, ob hoc tamen esse non negas. Cur non agunt quicquam? Agit omnia deus, agunt angeli, actiones illorum ita non animadvertis, sicut non vides illos. Quid prohibet animas a terrenorum corporum vinculis iam solutas movere corpus aethereum vel aereum, nostris oculis invisibile? Quid prohibet eas rationem phantasiamque nostram cogitationibus, visionibus, signis quotidie commonere, nos autem haec nonnumquam unde veniant ignorare? Saepe enim invisibilium motiones invisibiles sunt. Avenzoar Albumaron, medicus arabs, scribit se a medico nuper defuncto per somnum accepisse optimum oculo suo aegrotanti remedium. Multa generis eiusdem quotidie[36] nobis eveniunt. Plato in libro *Legum* nono tradit eorum qui occisi sunt animas saepe interfectores hostiliter insequi. Unde forte contingit, ut occisi hominis vulnus etiam iacente cadavere in eum qui vulneraverat, si modo ille cominus instet vulnus ipsum inspiciens, sanguinem rursus eiiciat. Quod quidem evenire nonnunquam Lucretius affirmavit et iudices observarunt.

7 Confirmat Platonis sententiam Posidonius Stoicus ex eo quod duo quidam Arcades familiares cum Megaram venissent, alter ad

bodies, then it is deprived of its authority in governing human affairs. Indeed, since human life is midway between the divine and bestial life, the rational soul, when it lives the intermediate life, also attains the life at either extreme; but when it inclines towards one of the extremes [the divine life]—and this it certainly begins to do in this life and afterwards carries to completion when it has died—then it barely attains the intermediate life and the other extreme [the bestial life] not at all.

6 But why are the souls of the dead not seen? You do not see God or the angels or the air, yet you do not deny their existence because of this. Why don't they do anything? God does all things and the angels do things, yet you do not notice their actions just as you do not see them themselves. What prevents souls already free from the shackles of earthly bodies from moving an ethereal or airy body invisible to our eyes? What prevents them from cautioning our reason and our phantasy from day to day by means of thoughts, visions, and signs, but prevents us sometimes from not knowing their source? For the motions of invisible things are often invisible. An Arab doctor, Avenzoar Albumaron, writes that in a dream he received the best remedy for his diseased eye from a doctor who had recently died.[22] Many of these kinds of things happen to us daily. In the ninth book of the *Laws* Plato reports that the souls of those who have been killed often pursue with hostility those who have killed them.[23] Whence it happens perhaps that the wound of a slaughtered man, even when he lies as a corpse, spits blood back at the person who had wounded him if the latter draws near to inspect the wound. Lucretius has affirmed that this happens from time to time, and judges too have observed it.[24]

7 The Stoic Posidonius supports Plato's view with this story:[25] "Two Arcadian friends when they came to Megara turned, one of them to lodge with an innkeeper and the other with a friend. Having dined, they went to bed. During the night the first one appeared in a dream to the other at the friend's house begging him

cauponem divertit, alter ad hospitem. Qui ut cenati quieverunt, nocte visus est in somnis ei qui erat in hospitio, ille alter orare ut subveniret, quod sibi a caupone interitus pararetur. Hic primo perterritus somno surrexit, deinde cum se collegisset idque visum pro nihilo habendum esse duxisset, recubuit. Tum ei dormienti ille idem visus est rogare, ut quoniam sibi vivo non subvenisset, mortem suam saltem ne inultam esse pateretur; se interfectum a caupone in plaustrum esse coniectum et supra stercus iniectum; petere ut mane ad portam adesset, priusquam plaustrum ex oppido exiret. Hoc ergo somnio[37] is commotus, mane bubulco praesto ad portam affuit. Quaesivit ex eo quid esset in plaustro. Ille perterritus fugit, mortuus erutus est. Caupo re patefacta poenas dedit.

8 Beneficii quoque memores esse animas defunctorum ex hoc coniiciunt Stoicorum nonnulli, quod Simonides cum ignotum quendam proiectum mortuum vidisset eumque humavisset haberetque in animo navem conscendere, moneri visus est ne id faceret ab eo quem sepultura affecerat: si navigasset, eum naufragio periturum. Rediit Simonides; ceteri naufragium fecerunt. Haec omnia docent aliquid in nos agere animas defunctorum.

: VI :

Ratio sexta. Ut mundus ornetur, colatur deus.

1 Sed ut disputationem superiorem fine congruo concludamus, voluit divinus artifex mundi opus sibi quam simillimum facere. Tale est autem, si ubique sit ratione plenissimum. Profecto ut in ipso

to come to his aid because the innkeeper was plotting his death. At first this man was terrified and started from his sleep; but having recovered his senses, he decided that his vision was not worth worrying about and returned to bed. Then, while he was sleeping, the same friend appeared and pleaded with him, since he had not come to help him while he was still alive, that at least he should not let his death go unavenged; for he had been killed by the innkeeper, thrown in a cart, with manure heaped on top. And he besought his friend to be at the gate in the morning before the cart left town. So in the morning, thoroughly shaken by this dream, the man waited for the ox-driver at the gate. He asked him what he had in the cart. The terrified ox-driver fled, and the dead man was dug out. When this crime became known, the inn-keeper was punished."

8 Several of the Stoics conjecture that the souls of the deceased also remember favors, for example, Simonides,[26] having seen the exposed corpse of some unknown person, had buried it, and was intending to embark on a ship when he was warned in a vision not to do so by the man whom he had buried: if he did sail away, he would perish in a shipwreck. Simonides turned back while all the others were wrecked. All these instances teach us that the souls of the dead do perform things for us.

: VI :

Sixth proof: That the world may be adorned and God be worshipped.

1 In order to provide an appropriate conclusion for the foregoing discussion, we maintain that the divine Maker of the world wished to make His work as much as possible like Himself—which is the

ratio est et uniformis simul et omniformis, sic in opificio suo animam unam rationalem esse voluit atque multas, unius scilicet sphaerae unam multasque multarum. Et quia sphaera quaelibet suum imitatur totum, ideo multas etiam in sphaera qualibet collocavit, ita ut sicut sphaera sphaeras,[38] sic anima animas contineret. Tot vero saltem esse animas statuit in supremo, quot[39] stellae, quae cum sphaeram imitentur suam, singulae quoque circa centrum proprium revolvuntur propriorumque motuum proprios sunt sortitae motores. Probabile enim est illas ultra sphaerae vitam proprias quoque vitas habere, si modo praestantiora corpora sunt quam animalium terrenorum, quae proprias nacta sunt vitas.

2 Mitto quod singulae caelestium animae et proprium circa intellegibilia intellectualem habent motum et communem circa corporea animalem una cum universali sphaerae anima, geminosque hos animarum motus sequuntur gemini motus in stellis, proprius simul atque communis. Sic vero sphaerae minores perfecte imitantur maiores, quod rationales similiter multas continent animas, quae et communem in fato et propriam in seipsis habent conditionem. In omni igitur mundi sphaera ultra communem sphaerae cuiusque animam viventia multa instituit rationalia, ut alias disputavimus. Quare oportuit in media quoque mundi sede talia quaedam esse, ut esset in membris omnibus rationalium turba quamplurima, quae hoc ornet colatque dei templum atque deum artificem canat et laudet. Id agunt in altioribus sphaeris mentes aliae, id agunt humanae mentes in terra. Neque pectus hoc mortale futurum est, quod assidue aeternum dei resonat nomen.

case if it is everywhere altogether filled with reason. As reason in God Himself is simultaneously both uniform and omniform, so in His handiwork He wanted there to be one rational soul and many souls, namely the one soul of the one [world] sphere, and the many souls of the many [subordinate] spheres. And since every sphere imitates its whole, He also placed many souls in every sphere in order that, just as a sphere contains spheres, so its soul might contain souls. But He decided that in the world above there should be at least as many souls as there are stars, which, since they imitate their own sphere, also revolve as individuals around their own center and are allotted their own movers of their own motions. For over and beyond the life of the sphere, they probably have their own individual lives too, if only because their bodies are more outstanding than those of earthly animals that do possess their own lives.

2 Let us pass over the facts: (a) that the individual souls of celestial beings have their own intellectual motion around intelligible objects as well as a shared vital motion around corporeal objects, shared with the universal soul of their sphere; and (b) that the twin motions in the stars, the particular together with the shared, follow upon these twin motions of the souls. Thus the smaller spheres perfectly imitate the greater, because they similarly contain many rational souls who possess a condition that is shared in [its] destiny but proper to them. So in this world's every sphere the Maker has placed many living rational beings in addition to the soul common to each sphere, as we argued elsewhere.[27] Hence such beings must have existed in the middle abode of the world too, so that an enormous throng of rational beings might exist in all its parts, a throng which embellishes and serves this temple of God and sings and praises Him as the Maker. Other minds do this in the higher spheres; human minds do it on earth. And this breast too, which ceaselessly resounds with God's eternal name, will not be mortal in the future.

3 Nemo vero ob hoc diffidat esse multos in planetarum sphaeris habitatores, quod unicus in qualibet earum planeta suspiciatur. Immo vero quia descendendo a summo semper, ut Platonici putant, numeralis habitantium crescit turba, ideo in summo caelo ipsi stellarum numero dux unus,[40] id est ipsa sphaerae anima sufficit. Sed quoniam in singulis planetarum circulis habitant plures quam in summo atque inferiores, idcirco pluribus opus est ducibus. Quocirca duos in singulis duces, id est animam sphaerae et planetae animam, illic deus instituit. Habitatores autem eiusmodi animalia vocant angelica, daemonica, heroica deinceps atque humana ex anima rationali et corpore sphaerae suae congrue constituta, quae tamen non videantur, quia vel minus lucis vel minus solidi habent quam stellae atque planetae. Neque id quidem mirum, cum nec sphaerae etiam, in quibus sunt, videantur. Sequi vero eos et natura et motu et denominatione planetam suum, sicut planeta sphaerae animam, et sicut sphaera animam universi.

4 Denique concludunt, si in extremis utrinque mundi sphaeris rationales sunt multi, merito et in mediis esse multos. Nos autem quasi vicissim concludimus, si deus divinis mentibus circumfusas ornavit sphaeras, iure et mediam[41] divinis mentibus exornavit. Neque spernenda est habitatio terrae, quae medius chorus est templi divini, quae tantarum sphaerarum stabile fundamentum. Neque parvifaciendum est quod circa eam ceterae volvuntur

No one doubts, however, that many beings dwell in the planetary spheres simply because just one planet is seen in each of the spheres. Rather, in descending from the summit, the crowd of indwelling beings always increases in number, according to the Platonists;[28] and this is why in the highest heaven itself just one leader suffices for the number of the stars, namely the soul of the [starry] sphere. But since more beings and inferior ones dwell in the individual circles of the planets than at the summit, more leaders are needed; and so God has established two leaders there in the individual circles, namely the soul of the sphere and the soul of the planet. The Platonists, however, call the beings dwelling in these spheres—angelic, demonic, and then successively heroic and human—ensouled beings, constituted as they harmoniously are from a rational soul and a body of their own particular sphere. Yet they are not visible, since they possess either less light or less density than the stars and planets; nor is this very extraordinary, since even the spheres in which they dwell are invisible. But in nature, motion, and name these indwelling beings follow their own planet, just as the planet follows the soul of its sphere and the sphere follows the soul of the world. 3

Finally the Platonists conclude that if many rational beings dwell in the world's two extreme spheres, then it is fitting that many dwell in its intermediate spheres too. But we conclude in our turn as it were that if God has adorned the encircling spheres with divine minds, then He has rightly adorned with divine minds the sphere in the middle too. Nor must we spurn [their] dwelling upon this earth, for it is the middle chorus of the temple divine and the solid foundation of such immense spheres. Nor must one underestimate the fact that the other spheres revolve around it as on an axis. And what of the fact that the rays of all the celestial beings flowing together on this earth are mingled together here, and acquire marvelous power in a marvelous union? What of the fact that the face of the green earth, as varied as the heavens, is 4

sphaerae tamquam cardinem. Quid quod caelestium omnium radii in eam confluentes miscentur hic virtutemque mira unione mirabilem consequuntur? Quid quod facies terrae viridis, instar caeli varia, perspicuis corporibus tribus involvitur, aqua aereque et igne, ac repercussa siderum radiis eos congregat in splendorem? Ideo si in luna constitutus globum hunc inde prospiceres, talis tibi forsitan videretur qualis tibi nunc a terra luna videtur, putaresque eos qui hic habitant esse caelestes stellamque aliquam habitare. Idcirco Pythagorici terrae globum aqua et aere suoque igni quasi velaminibus suis circumvolutum sphaeram mundi unam ac stellam quandam nominaverunt. Et Plato terram vocat deam antiquissimam deorum omnium qui sint intra caelum. Addit ingentes terrae regiones habitari nostris admodum altiores, ubi lapides, metalla, plantae, animalia sint nostris mirum in modum praestantiora atque pulchriora, ubi homines diutissime vivant modicisque alimentis, cum pretiosissima sint, odoribusque feliciter nutriantur. Mitto quod Diodorus Pliniusque narrant alicubi homines solo etiam odore nutriri. Illud certe mirabile, quod Olympiodorus platonicus scribit, Aristotelem vidisse hominem qui dormiret numquam soloque aere radiis solis exposito viveret. Haec illis ferme similia, quod in divinis hortis quasi campis Elysiis homines sola arboris vitae gustatione immortales vivere potuissent.

5 Sed ut ad institutum ordinem revertamur, Timaeus, Moysen imitatus,[42] inquit deum in principio igneum caelum terramque creasse quasi praecipua mundi membra, atque, ut duo haec aptius inter se vinciret, aerem mox aquamque interiecisse, quasi non sui, sed illorum gratia sint inventa. Quod si liceret paulo latius, ut saepe solemus, cum antiquis nostris confabulari, referrem equidem praecipuam propriamque naturam ignis lucem esse potius quam

enveloped in three transparent bodies, water, air and fire, and, when struck by the rays of the stars, assembles them in splendor? If you were positioned on the moon and looked down at our orb, it would probably appear similar to the way that the moon now appears to us from the earth; and you would think that those dwelling down here on earth were celestial beings who dwelt upon some star. This is why the Pythagoreans have called the orb of the earth, which is enwrapped in water, air, and its own fire as in its own veils, the one sphere of the world and a kind of star.[29] And Plato calls earth the "oldest goddess of all the deities who are [born] within the heavens."[30] He adds that the vast regions of the earth, which are far higher than our regions, are inhabited; and that stones, metals, plants, and animals there are marvelously superior and more beautiful, and that men live a very long time and are abundantly nourished on spare amounts of food (since these foods are so rich) and on fragrant perfumes.[31] I shall not dwell on what Diodorus and Pliny relate about a place where men are even fed on fragrance alone.[32] Certainly, what the Platonist Olympiodorus writes is extraordinary, namely that Aristotle had seen a man who never slept and who survived only on air, air exposed to the sun's rays.[33] Quite similar to these accounts is the fact that in the gardens divine, as in the Elysian fields, men could live on the taste alone of the tree of life as immortals.

However, let us return to our established plan. In imitation of 5
Moses, Timaeus says that in the beginning God created the fiery heavens and the earth as the two principal parts of the world; and that, in order to bind these two to one another more fittingly, He next inserted air and water as if they had been invented not for their own sake, but for that of the others.[34] But if we may converse a little more, as we often do, with our ancients, I would add that the special and peculiar nature of fire is light rather than heat: first because light is more divine, second because it acts more rapidly, and third [because] it diffuses itself much further. Fourth, unlike

calorem. Primo, quia illa divinior est. Secundo, quia illa citius agit. Tertio, latius se diffundit. Quarto, non sicut calor, abeunte igne, quasi ceteris quoque communis quodammodo in calefacto relinquitur, sed tamquam igni maxime propria nullique permixta, suum ubique sequitur ignem. Quinto, quia ignis, quo magis alienae soliditati miscetur, eo fervet magis lucetve minus; contra vero quatenus in puritatem propriam restituitur, eatenus urit minus lucetve magis.

6 Quorsum haec? Ut intellegamus caelum esse ignem, cuius proprium sit actu quidem lucere, virtute vero calere, ut non immerito dici possit caelestem ignem esse lumen, cuius[43] calefactoria virtus nulli per se noxia sit, sed blanda omnibus atque salutaris. Unde et aethereus sub luna ignis quodammodo caelestem secutus aerem proximum non consumit. Quod autem virtus, quae in supremo igni tantum salutaris est et blanda, penes ignem inferiorem a superiori specie differentem mordax, ut ita loquar, evadat, hinc efficitur, vel quod asperitati terrenae miscetur, unde in solidiori siccioriique materia vehementius[44] urit, vel quod reflexione quadam cogitur et quasi vim patiens vim et infert. Ideo in liberiori aere tangenti ubique blanditur, sed inter concava percussa percutit atque speculo concavo violentius repercussa, violentius et ipsa repercutit. Quamvis autem totum caelum per ignem potissimum describatur, tamen cetera quoque elementa, sed modo caelesti, subiungunt. Igitur in caelo ubique praevalet ignis, sed alibi una cum quadam caelestis terrae soliditate, quod patet in manifestioribus stellis, quae, quoniam soliditate quadam obsistunt radiis ocu-

heat which, when the fire has vanished, is also common as it were to what remains and somehow left in that which is heated, light, as something completely peculiar to fire and unmixed with anything else, everywhere follows after its own fire. And fifth, because the more fire is mixed with a dense material alien to it, the more heat it produces but the less light. Contrariwise, to the extent it is restored to its own purity, the less heat it produces but the more light.

Where does all this lead to? That we may understand that the 6
heavens are fire whose property in act is to illumine, in power is to heat. Thus not unjustifiably one can say that the heavenly fire is light, whose heating power is not harmful to anyone per se but is agreeable and wholesome to all. Hence the sublunar ethereal fire too, guided in a way by the celestial fire, does not consume the air immediately next to it. But its power, which is so wholesome and agreeable in the highest [celestial] fire, takes on, as it were, a mordant quality in the lower fire (different as it is from the higher kind). As a result, either because it is mixed with earthy hardness, it burns more vehemently in denser and drier matter, or because it is compelled by a kind of reflection, in suffering a sort of force, it itself exerts force. For this reason the fire is everywhere caressing to the touch in the freer air; but when struck between concave [mirror surfaces] it strikes [in turn], and when struck back more violently still from a concave mirror, it too strikes back more violently. Though the heavens as a whole are best depicted by way of fire, however, the other elements too are mingled therein, but in a celestial way. Thus fire everywhere prevails in the heavens. But it is mingled in some places with a certain density of celestial earth; we see this in the brighter stars, which, because they resist (given a certain solidity) the rays of our eyes, can be clearly discerned even though they are utterly remote. In other places, however, fire is conjoined now with the particular property of celestial water and waxes in the orb that is especially milky, and so we see the stars

lorum, ideo licet remotissimae sint, tamen perspicue discernuntur. Alibi vero ignis, subiuncta quadam caelestis aquae proprietate, viget in orbe praecipue lacteo, ideoque ibi stellae, quantum fert aquae natura, videntur. Denique passim ignis addita aerea quadam perspicuitate regnat. Quo efficitur ut in sphaeris plurimum, dum pro sui aerisque natura non obsistit oculis, non videatur. Quod autem quaedam elementorum naturae in caelo sint, omnes astrologi confitentur. Hinc campi apud poetas Elisii. Hinc[45] et illud 'Beati mites, quia ipsi possidebunt terram.' Hinc et David et Moyses aquas per caelestia fundunt.

7 Iterum quorsum haec? Ut concludamus, si elementa quodam caelesti modo in caelo reperiuntur, posse vicissim in elementis quoque elementali quadam conditione caelestia similiter reperiri, maxime vero in terrae globo, quod alterum praeter caelum mundi est fundamentum. In quo licet terra praevaleat, sicut in caelo ignis, tamen perinde atque in caelo aqua, aer ignisque adiunguntur.[46] Denique super lunam ignis, infra vero terra ubique regnat. Atque etiam prope ipsum mundi centrum per terrenos hiatus flumina ignis et aeris et aquae undique fluunt. Quamobrem nemini mirum videri debet, et caelestes animas ad terrena demitti et vicissim peregrinos habitatores terrae ad caelestia quandoque remitti. Denique qualiscumque terra sit, huius homo est dominus. Est utique deus in terris. Neque[47] minus divinus putandus est hominis animus, quia corpore fragili circumdetur, sed ideo divinissimus, quoniam etiam in faece terrena, si modo terra sit vilis, contra tum loci naturam tum corporis sarcinam tam divina opera peragit, ut dum inferiora gubernat, a superioribus non discedat.

8 Platonici omnes, quibus consentit Dionysius Areopagita, naturale divinarum mentium officium esse censent[48] ut maneant in

there as the nature of water allows us. Finally, when the air's particular transparency has [also] been added, fire reigns everywhere. Accordingly, for the most part fire is not seen in the spheres, as long as, in accordance with the nature both of itself and of the air, it does not present an obstacle to our eyes.[35] Now all the astrologers admit that the natures of the elements exist in a way in the heavens. Hence the poets sing of the Elysian fields.[36] Hence too the verse: "Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth."[37] And hence both David[38] and Moses[39] pour "waters" through the heavens.

But again, why pursue these matters? It is so we may conclude 7
that if the [four] elements can be found in a celestial mode in the heavens, then celestial things likewise can be found in turn in an elementary condition also in the elements, and mostly in this globe of earth, which is the second foundation for the world along with the heavens. Though earth certainly prevails in this globe as fire prevails in the heavens, yet water, air, and fire are added to it as they are in the heavens. Finally, fire reigns above the moon, yet earth reigns everywhere below it. Even close to the world's very center, however, through the earth's gaping crevices, rivers of fire, air, and water pour forth on every side. So it should come as no surprise to anyone that celestial souls are sent down to things earthly, and that pilgrim souls dwelling on earth are in turn sent back at times to things celestial. Finally, whatsoever the earth is, man is its master. He is surely a god on earth. Nor must one suppose man's rational soul to be any less divine because it is enclosed in a fragile body. Rather for that reason it is utterly divine, since, even in the filth of this earth (if earth indeed is vile), and contrary alike to the nature of its location and the burden of its body, it nonetheless accomplishes divine tasks, such that in ruling over things inferior it never departs from higher things.

All the Platonists—and Dionysius the Areopagite concurs[40]— 8
agree that the natural office of the divine minds is: a) to remain in

natura sua, ut providendo agendoque procedant, ut se suamque originem agnoscendo convertantur ipsae sequentiaque convertant. Igitur anima, tamquam divina, tria haec pro viribus explet atque ad hanc inferiorum gubernationem non tam amatorio affectu allicitur propter affinitatem quam ingenito quodam providentiae studio propter naturae praestantiam. Nam praestantissima quaeque intimae perfectionis exuberantia sese[49] latissime propagant atque, ut Plotinus ait, ipsum bonum effuso splendore procreat intellectum. Intellectus quoque, dum explicatur, animam exprimit rationalem. Anima ipsa se propagans vitam efficit formamque corpoream. Hinc Dionysius Areopagita: 'Certe divina unitas cunctis unita invicem unit cuncta, dum ea quae inter se sunt aequalia, propter qualitatis similitudinem in unum congregat mutua quadam consensione; inferiora vero propter indigentiam ad superiora convertit fruendi cupiditate, superiora propter abundantiam ad inferiora deflectit studio providendi, quo divinam providentiam imitentur.' Animas autem rationales divinam providentiam modi quatuor imitari Platonici disputant.

9 In primo quidem gradu animam mundi collocant, in qua universalis circa mundum sub deo sit providentia, per quam omnibus omnia largiatur. In secundo vero duodecim sphaerarum animas, in quibus universalis particularis providentia sit, per quam videlicet mundanis omnibus nonnulla distribuant. In tertio animas tum stellarum tum numinum quorumlibet in quavis sphaera mundi regnantium, apud quas[50] esse censent providentiam particularem universalem, qua scilicet nonnullis mundi membris, quae ipsis

their own nature, b) to proceed by providing and by doing, and c) to be themselves converted by recognizing themselves and their own origin, and to convert things dependent on them. Thus the soul, inasmuch as it is divine, also fulfills these three offices as best it can; and it is drawn to the task of governing lower things, not so much by an amorous desire due to [any] affinity with them, as by an inborn devotion to providence due to the excellence of [its] nature. For all that are truly excellent propagate themselves as widely as possible from the abundance of their inner perfection. The good itself, as Plotinus says, begets the intellect from its abundant splendor.[41] Intellect too, as it is unfolded, moulds the rational soul. The soul, propagating itself, produces life and corporeal form. This is why Dionysius the Areopagite writes: "Certainly the divine unity is united with all things and unites them all in turn: a) when it takes all that are equal among themselves, on account of their likeness of quality, and gathers them into one in a certain mutual consent; b) when it converts lower things, on account of their poverty, towards higher things by their longing to enjoy them; and c) when it deflects higher things, on account of their abundance, towards lower things by their concern to provide for them (wherein they imitate divine providence)."[42] But the Platonists maintain that rational souls imitate divine providence in four ways.[43]

9 On the first level they locate the World Soul wherein exists the universal providence with regard to the world below God; and through it God bestows all things on all. On the second level they locate the souls of the twelve spheres wherein exists the universal-particular providence through which the souls distribute various [goods] to all mundane things. On the third level the Platonists locate the souls both of stars and of all the spirits ruling in any one sphere of the world; and they suppose that existing among these is the particular-universal providence whereby the souls can distribute individual [goods] to those several parts of the world which are in harmony with them. On the fourth level, finally, are particu-

congruunt, singula tribuant. In quarto denique particulares animas, illas videlicet quae ab intellegibili ad sensibile vicissimque recurrunt, quarum esse providentiam particularem adeo putant ut aliqua iam tantum aliquibus impartiant, praeterea multis vitarum cursibus impleant quae et superiores paucioribus periodis agunt et prima unico circuitu complet. Sane Plotinus Proclusque disputant quemadmodum unus mundi circuitus multos complectitur — saturnios, iovios, martios, solares aliosque deinceps — sic unum animae mundanae per species suas circuitum intimum multos animarum particularium continere, quippe cum sublimior anima longiorem circa intellegibilia orbem peragat, inferior breviorem.

10 In his equidem recitandis prolixior esse volui, quoniam Platonici per haec potissimum tam ea, quae in hoc capitulo sunt, quam quae in capitulo praecedente tanguntur, explanari confirmarique existimant. Sed talia quaedam ipsi viderint. Mihi vero narravisse sufficiat.

: VII :

Tertia quaestio. Quam ob causam animi, si divini sunt, perturbationibus afficiuntur?

1 Quaerebatur tertio quam ob causam animi, si divini sunt, perturbationibus sunt subiecti. Sed nemo id umquam admiraretur, si quandoque consideraremus nulli menti corpus fuisse tributum onerosius quam humanae. Profecto mentes sphaerarum, siderum

lar souls, those who run back and forth in turn from intelligibles to sensibles. The Platonists think that the providence of these souls is particular insofar as they now impart some [goods] only to some individuals, and furthermore that they complete in many courses of lives what higher souls complete in fewer periods and the first soul completes in a single circuit. Plotinus and Proclus argue indeed that just as a single world circuit embraces many other circuits—the saturnian, jovian, martian, solar, and so on—so one inner circuit of the World Soul through its own species contains [within] the many circuits of particular souls, since a higher soul enacts a longer orbit around intelligibles, a lower soul a shorter one.[44]

In treating these topics I intended to be more comprehensive 10
because the Platonists believe that they best explain and confirm the subjects dealt with in this chapter, as well as those in the preceding one. But such topics are their concern. Let it suffice that I have talked about them.

: VII :

The third question:[45] If rational souls are divine why are they afflicted with tumultuous emotions?

The third question asks why are rational souls, if they are divine, 1
subject to tumultuous emotions. But nobody would ever wonder about this if we ever took into account that no mind was given a more burdensome body than the human mind. Indeed the minds of the spheres, of the stars, and of the higher demons preside over simple bodies, which by way of their particular unity of similar parts are so steadfastly constituted that nothing of themselves ebbs away (and hence nothing new should flow in). On the other hand,

atque daemonum sublimiorum simplicibus praesunt corporibus, quae sua quadam similium partium unitate usque adeo constant ut non effluat sui quicquam; ideoque nec influat novi quicquam oportet. Naturali rursus agilitate ita vergunt ad motum, ut levissimo illarum mentium nutu vivant et moveantur. Contra corpus humanum ex elementis quatuor pugnantibus est compositum et aquae terraeque pondere retardatur. Quapropter partium suarum tum dissensione paene quolibet momento dissolvitur, tum pondere decidit fitque ad vitam ineptius pigriusque ad motum. Propter ipsam quoque interiorem dissensionem, in qua humores invicem se expellunt, effluit aliquid semper e corpore ac rursus oportet ut influat. Quare ad corpus huiusmodi conciliandum, movendum, instaurandum impensissima opus est animae nostrae attentione. Huc tendit platonicum illud: sublimia corpora ad sublimes accedunt animas, inferiores animae accedunt ad corpora, quia videlicet illa illis facillime cedunt, haec vero his difficillime. Quod si sublimiorum illarum mentium aliqua[51] corporis nostri claustris ad decennium clauderetur, forsitan non multo minus quam noster animus fatigaretur onere et cura sollicitaretur, ac illius divinitati diffideremus, ut modo nostrae diffidimus.

2 At dicet aliquis mundi animam corpus habere ex quatuor compositum elementis adversantibus invicem, neque tamen[52] ea cura fatigari, ut nostro corpore nostram. Sic est plane, sed ipsa elementa, quae corporis mundani sunt membra, non elementorum aliorum partes sunt, sed tota et integra elementa. Non sunt extra loca naturalia, sed in suis quaeque disposita regionibus. Non sunt confusa invicem undique, sed propriis sedibus sunt discreta. Non sunt externis subiecta corporibus. Nullum enim corpus extra

given their natural agility, these simple bodies are so inclined toward motion that they live and are moved by their minds whenever they give the slightest indication. The human body, to the contrary, is composed of four warring elements and impeded by the weight of water and of earth. Hence at almost any moment it is dissolved by the mutual dissension of its parts and stumbles under its weight and becomes less adapted to life and too sluggish for motion. Because too of its internal dissension (where the humors mutually repel each other), something is always ebbing out of the body and must necessarily flow in again. Hence our soul must devote the closest attention to reconciling, moving, and restoring such a body. The following Platonic formulation alludes to this: the highest bodies approach [or accede to] the highest souls while lower souls approach [or accede to] bodies, and this is because the highest bodies withdraw from [or cede to] their souls with greatest ease while lower souls withdraw from [or cede to] bodies with greatest difficulty.[46] But if one of those higher minds were imprisoned for a decade within the confines of our body, it would perchance become as tired of its burden as our rational soul does, or not much less so, and troubled with caring for it; and we would doubt its divinity, just as we now doubt our own.

Yet someone will say that the World Soul has a body com- 2
pounded of the four mutually opposed elements, but that it does not become fatigued with caring for it as our soul becomes fatigued caring for our body. This is clearly true, but the elements that are parts of the World Body are not in turn parts of other elements; rather they are elements whole and entire. They are not outside their natural locations, but all are arranged in order in their own regions. Nor, again, are the elements everywhere mutually confused, but they remain separated in their own abodes. They are not subject to external bodies; for there is no body outside the world. Our body's fire, to the contrary, is not fire in its entirety, but some part only of the greater fire; and the same goes for

mundum.[53] Contra vero corporis nostri ignis non totus est ignis, sed pars aliqua amplioris; sic reliqua tria. Idcirco imperfecta sunt huius corporis elementa. Sunt etiam extra loca ipsorum propria, propterea ignis et aer qui sunt in nobis semper hinc fugiunt ad sublimia, aqua terraque ad infima decidunt. Difficillimum vero est imperfecta perficere, conciliare pugnantia, extra locum naturalem corpora detinere. Sunt etiam in nobis quatuor illa permixta in qualibet particula corporis, quo fit ut pugna passim ferveat vehementior. In mundo autem alicubi discernuntur quodammodo pacatiusque quiescunt.

3 Multa quoque et ingentia extra nos sunt quae nobis undique imminentia corpus affligunt. Quibus oneribus et laboribus neque anima mundi premitur neque etiam elementorum animae, quarum corporibus quicquid accedit aut decedit, vix atomi unius momentum habet. Temperata quoque est undique restitutio, neque usquam naturalis dissonat harmonia; harmonia, inquam, sphaerarum saluti conducens. Sed neque illae, quamvis divinissimae, possunt usque adeo sphaerarum impetum cohibere, quin et elementorum partes et composita corpora se invicem devorent atque perdant, et illuviones ignis et aquae mundum saepe perturbent. Atqui qualitates eiusmodi repugnantes non possent a caelo aliquo pacto produci atque duci, nisi in eo earum virtutes essent; neque in caelo essent, nisi in motoribus conditoreque caelorum. Sed in deo una forma sunt, ratione dumtaxat distinctae; in angelis vero formis insuper distinguuntur; in animabus motu insuper ac tempore; in caelo etiam loco simulque virtute; sub caelo denique effectu atque repugnantia.

4 Quorsum haec? Ut intellegamus sphaerarum elementalium animas haud tantam habere potentiam, ut qualitates, quae in caelo

the other three elements [in us]. So the elements of this our body are imperfect. They are even outside their proper places; this is why the fire and air that are in us always escape to the highest regions, while the water and earth sink down to the lowest. But it is very difficult to perfect imperfect things, to reconcile opposites, and to detain bodies outside the place natural to them. For in ourselves too, in every particle of our body, the four elements are mingled pell-mell, with the result that everywhere their struggle rages with great vehemence, while anywhere in the world they are in a way distributed and more at peace.

3 There are many overwhelming things also outside us that, menacing us on all sides, afflict our body. The World Soul is not oppressed by these burdens and labors, nor too are the souls of the elements, for whatever approaches, or departs from, their bodies hardly possesses the force of a single atom. Everywhere too there is a balanced exchange, and nowhere is the natural harmony made dissonant, the harmony that contributes to the preservation of the spheres. But the souls [of the elements], utterly divine though they are, cannot restrain the impetuous motion of their spheres enough to stop both the parts of the elements and the composite bodies from devouring and destroying one another, or floods of fire and water from often troubling the world. And yet such opposing qualities could not be produced and ruled by the heavens in any way, unless the powers of these qualities were also in the heavens, and not in the heavens, if not in the heavens' movers and in their Author. In God, however, these qualities are one in form and distinct only in reason. But in angels they are distinguished also in their forms; in souls, in motion and time besides; in the heavens, in place and simultaneously in power as well; and finally beneath the heavens, in their effect and mutual opposition.

4 Where is this leading to? That we may understand that the souls of the elemental spheres do not have sufficient power to take hold of these qualities, which in the heavens do not fight among

inter se non pugnant, ita moderentur atque concilient, ut sub caelo non pugnent invicem et[54] interimant. Sunt qui dicant caelestem substantiam praestantia sua illas conciliare, materiam vero, quae sub elementis est deformis, instabilis, inefficax, neque illas simul capere posse neque conciliare. Utcumque sit, apparet elementorum animas, si animas habent, illas omnino simul pacare non posse, quod neque etiam mundi anima potest, ut non mirum sit animas nostras in contemperandis humoribus adeo laborare et in regione dissonantiae dissonare. Omnino autem assignata superioribus animabus est tam facilior quam felicior gubernatio. Quod si noster animus mundani corporis gubernaculis praesset ut illae, eadem fortasse qua illae facilitate disponeret. Sed erant etiam in particulas terrae mentes aliquae mittendae divinae, ne mundi rex minus in terrae partibus quam in caelis elementisque totis celebraretur: hoc nostris obtigit animis.

5 Scribit Hippocrates mutationes,[55] quae et repentinae sunt et maxime ad oppositum, maximos diuturnosque morbos inferre. Plato vero in libro *De republica* septimo animam in corpus labentem repente a summa luce in extremas tenebras ruere arbitratur, ut non mirum sit eam diutissime caecutire atque turbari. Auget turbationem eius, ut disputat Proclus in *Timaeo*, quod ab unitate in multitudinem dissonantem, a statu in mutationem omnis ferme quietis expertem delabitur, unde distrahitur semper et quasi affecta vertigine titubat et vacillat. Neque eam permittit facile a tot fluctibus tantisque procellis emergere sua illa vitalis umbra naturaliter corpori tradita, erga quam ceu prolem amore vehementer affi-

themselves, and so moderate and reconcile them that beneath the heavens they do not fight and destroy each other. There are those who say that the celestial substance reconciles these qualities by its own preeminence, but that matter, being lower than the elements, lacking form, unstable, and inactive, cannot simultaneously sustain and reconcile them. However that may be, clearly the souls of the elements, if they have souls, cannot keep all the elements at peace together, for not even the World Soul can accomplish that. Hence it is not surprising that our souls labor so much in tempering the humors and in this region of dissonance are themselves dissonant. It is absolutely true that the work of governing assigned to the higher souls is easier as it is the more successful. If our rational soul were to be in control of the governance of the world's body as those souls are, perhaps it would dispose of its task with the same ease as they do. But some divine minds had to be dispatched to the earth's individual parts too, lest the king of the world be celebrated less in the earth's parts than in all the heavens and the elements. This lot falls to our souls.

5 Hippocrates writes that changes which are sudden and mostly in the opposite direction lead to the most severe and most prolonged illnesses.[47] In the seventh book of the *Republic* Plato thinks that the soul falling into the body plunges suddenly from the summit of light into pitch darkness, so that it is no wonder that for the longest time it remains blind and perturbed.[48] Its perturbation is increased, as Proclus argues in his commentary on the *Timaeus*,[49] because in sinking from unity into dissonant multiplicity, it plunges from stability into a change lacking virtually all repose, whence it is always distracted; and suffering from a sort of dizziness, it wavers and vacillates. What stops the soul escaping easily from so many floods and raging storms is its own vital shadow or reflection, transmitted to the body naturally, and for which, as for its own offspring, the soul feels a passionate love. As the shadow suffers day by day, the soul too in its own manner

citur, atque illa quotidie patiente, ipsa quoque suo modo compatitur. Forte vero quamdiu anima seipsam nequaquam animadvertit, nihil aliud se putat esse quam umbram palam in flumine corporis apparentem, quemadmodum Plato in septimo *De republica* docet. Neque aliter turbata hac umbra ipsa quoque se turbat quam si pueri rudes, cum videant umbras suas in aqua confundi, graviter lamententur.

6 Talem vero in animabus ordinem Platonici ponunt, alias videlicet in generationem, id est generabile corpus, numquam descendere, quales sint animae vel divinae vel proximae, alias descendere quidem in generationem et a meliori vita in minus bonam, ita tamen ut inde nequaquam inficiantur malumve aliquod subeant, quales inter daemones heroesque connumerant, alias descendere iam simul atque quodammodo vitiari, sed purgari posse iterum seque rursus ad meliora transferre. Addunt in summis animabus neque secundum essentiam neque secundum actionem vitium reperiri, sed in infimis animarum umbris secundum utrumque. In nostris autem vitiari quidem actionem posse, essentiam vero nequaquam.

7 Plerique putant humanae vitae difficultatem hinc insuper augeri, quod motus et habitus animae, quatenus intellectualis rationalisque est, circuitus esse debeat. Similis quoque aetherei vehiculi motus atque figura. In corpore vero composito anima vegetando, sentiendo, progrediendo rectum quodammodo subit motum, dimisso circuitu. Vehiculum quoque motum figuramque suam mutare compellitur. Quod etsi secundum substantiam non destruitur, quia, ut quidam putant, materia caret, tamen secundum figuram motumque turbatur. Quae tunc demum recipiet, cum primum

shares in the suffering. But for a long while perhaps the soul does not notice itself, or think of itself as anything other than a shadow appearing on the surface of the body's stream, as Plato teaches us in the seventh book of the *Republic*.[50] When this shadow is troubled, the soul too becomes upset. The exact analogy would be with ignorant children, who, upon seeing their shadows drowning in water, burst into bitter tears.

6 The Platonists propose the following order among souls.[51] Some never descend into generation, that is, into a body subject to generation; and these are the divine souls or those next to the divine. Others do descend into generation, and descend from a better life into one less good, yet only in such a way that they are not at all infected thereby, and do not submit to anything evil; these souls the Platonists number among the daemons and heroes. Other souls descend, but as soon as they do so they are in a way polluted; yet they can be purified again and can restore themselves to what is better. The Platonists add that no defect is found in the highest souls with regard either to their essence or to their action, but that it is found among the lowest shadows of souls with regard to both. In our souls, however, action can be corrupted, but not essence.

7 Most of the Platonists suppose that the difficulty of human life is also increased because the motion and habit of our soul, to the extent that it is intellectual and rational, ought to be a circuit; and likewise the movement and shape of our ethereal vehicle too.[52] But the soul in the composite body, in providing life, in sensing, and in locomotion, submits in a way to motion in a straight line, and the circuit is abandoned. The vehicle too is forced to change its own [circular] motion and shape, and though it is not destroyed with respect to its substance, since, as some [Platonists] think, it lacks matter, yet it is perturbed with respect to its shape and motion. It will eventually get these back [intact] as soon as the rational soul, elevated to its head (i.e. its mind), is entirely restored to its habit,

animus in caput suum, id est mentem erectus in habitum suum prorsus restituetur. Quem tamdiu amisisse videtur omnino, quamdiu per intemperantiam caput, id est mentem figit humi, pedes autem, id est inferiores animae vires extollit in altum. Quo quidem habitu nihil aut deformius aut laboriosius potest excogitari.

8 Sed cur non est datum nobis aereum corpus aliquod in quo terram[56] coleremus et liberius specularemur caelestia? Quoniam aeri sui adsunt spiritus, defuissent hoc modo terrae. Ac si corpora simplicia ratione non carent, debent aliqua rursus composita terrenaque corpora ratione pollere, ut mundus hic corporeus ita totus sit rationalis, sicut spiritalis ille mundus, ad cuius exemplar hic est factus, totus est ratio. Voluit autem pater ille optimus sacerdotes suos qui in sphaeris superioribus eum cantant, manere ibi semper eosdem, quoniam propter loci felicitatem sine labore illic agunt vitam. In terris vero sacerdotes suos diuturnas moras trahere noluit, quoniam non debetur labor perpetuus aut longus[57] iis qui sedulo deum laudant. Ideo demittit huc eos quotidie atque revocat, ut per successionem in terris fiat semper, quod fit per eandem vitam semper in caelis. Mitto quod multi etiam in aere animas daemonum heroumque putant corpora quamvis tardius, tamen aliquando in melius permutare.

9 Verum habeat, dicet quispiam, noster animus corpus onerosius quam mentes aliae, atque ideo sollicitetur quandoque, et magis quam aliae a speculando prohibeatur, cur autem fragilius corpus habet quam bestiae? Non quia fragilius habet corpus, ideo putandus est minus esse divinus, immo quia est divinior, corpus habere

the habit it appears to have wholly lost through intemperance while it fixes its head (i.e. its mind) upon the earth, but lifts its feet (i.e. the lower powers of the soul) on high. Nothing can be considered more deformed or more troublesome than this [intemperate] habit.[53]

8 But why were we not given some airy body in which we might care for the earth and more freely contemplate celestial things? [The answer is that] since the air has its own spirits present, they would have been absent in this way from the earth. And if simple bodies do not lack reason, then in some composite and earthly bodies reason has to prevail in order that this corporeal world may be wholly rational, just as the spiritual world (upon which this corporeal world is modeled) is wholly reason. But the Best of Fathers wanted the priests who sing His praises in the higher spheres to remain there unchangingly, for they live life without labor there because of the happiness of the place. But He did not want His priests to spend a long time on earth, since perpetual or long lasting labor does not befit those who praise God zealously. Hence He dispatches them hither daily and He recalls them in order that succession might always accomplish on earth what is accomplished in the heavens through that same [unchanging] life. I shall pass over the fact that many believe that, even in the air, the souls of demons and heroes change their bodies, albeit more slowly [than we do], yet occasionally for the better.

9 Granted, someone will assert, our rational soul does have a body that is more burdensome than that of other minds, and hence that it is at times troubled and prevented more than other souls from contemplating. But why does it have a body weaker than a beast's? It is not because it has a weaker body that we must suppose the soul is less divine; to the contrary, it is because it is more divine that it has a weaker body. Elsewhere we have argued that our body is the most well-tempered of all earthly bodies and most resembles the heavens, so that it may minister more tran-

fragilius. Disputavimus alias corpus nostrum esse terrenorum omnium temperatissimum caeloque simillimum, ut caelestis animi muneribus pacatius ministerium praebeat. Hanc vero temperantiam necessario sequitur imbecillitas. Complexio in qua nimis excedit calor, vix a calore et frigore laeditur. Nam calor ingens remissiores calores exsuperat, ut eius comparatione vix appareant, et frigoris impetum frangit. Ac si in aliqua complexione frigus excellat, non quaelibet frigiditas extrinsecus iniecta percipitur, et aestus facile toleratur. Similiter ubi humiditas aut siccitas praevalet. Ubi vero hae quatuor qualitates mediocres sunt et consona temperatione miscentur, quaecumque nova qualitas advenit, excedere cogit aliquam ipsarum quatuor qualitatum, qua excedente, prioris complexionis consonantia perit et naturalis habitus dissipatur. Ergo quia necessaria fuit homini complexio terrenorum omnium temperatissima, haec vero quibuslibet offensiunculis laeditur, consequens fuit ut imbecilla esset corporis humani natura.

10 Huic tamen imbecillitati subvenit diligens artium nostrarum industria, qua fit ut temperantia nostra contra mundi procellas diutius perseveret. Sic enim adaequavit omnia divinus artifex, ut in bestiis cum imbecillitate animae vires[58] dotesve corporis, in nobis autem cum corporis imbecillitate vires animi compensaret,[59] atque ita significaret bestiarum animas morti corporis deputatas esse; nostras autem vitae mentis perpetuae dedicatas, quas tamen oporteat semper extra patriam laborare. Nam temperata complexio, quae speciei humanae maxime naturalis est, ut diximus, ob innumerabiles causas, tum ab initio in multis, tum quotidie in singulis undique dissonare compellitur. Ideoque continua et impensissima attentione animae opus est, etiam si minime advertamus, ad temperationem ipsam naturae restituendam.

quilly to the offices of the heavenly soul. But weakness necessarily accompanies this temperance. The complexion in which heat is excessive is hardly impaired by heat and cold. For a vast amount of heat overwhelms the more moderate kinds of heat, so that in comparison with the former these are hardly noticed; and it smashes the onslaught of cold. And if cold predominates in some complexion, then any random coldness introduced from outside is not perceived, and heat too is easily tolerated. The like happens where humidity or aridity prevail. But where these four qualities are moderated and mixed in harmonious proportion, then any newly arriving quality whatsoever forces some one of the four qualities to become excessive; and when this happens, the harmony of the earlier complexion dissolves and the natural habit is dissipated. Therefore, because the most tempered complexion possessed by all earthly things was necessary for man, but this is impaired by any and every small offense, it followed that the nature of the human body was weak.

Yet the diligent exercise of our arts and skills comes to the rescue of this weakness and ensures that our temperance is able to withstand the storms of the world for a long time. For the divine Creator has balanced all things, so that in the animals He has compensated for the weakness of their soul with the powers and gifts of their body, but in us He has compensated for the weakness of our body with the powers of our rational soul. He has thus shown that the souls of the animals are destined to die with their body, but that our souls are consecrated to the endless life of the mind, souls that must labor, nonetheless, always outside their native land. For the tempered complexion that is most natural to the human species is forced, for numerous reasons, as we said, to be out of harmony everywhere: in many men from the beginning, and every day in individuals. And so the soul needs unceasing and most lavish attention, even if we are hardly aware of it, in order to restore temperance itself to its nature.

11 Durissimus hic perpetuusque vegetatricis potentiae labor, non solum et remittit admodum et intermittit mentis intentionem, unde quasi mente non utimur, sed etiam multis nos clam perturbationibus afficit et quasi somniantes exagitat. Nempe dum in qualitatibus his aut illis contemperandis obnixius operatur, ipsa interim ad haec congruis suis seminalibus rationibus utens, suscitat sensim in superiore sensu imagines affectusque ad qualitates illas maxime pertinentes. Igitur in tractanda bile latenter insurgit ira vel ad irascendum proclivitas. In agitando sanguine laetitia vana. In pituita taedium et pigritia. In atra bile timor et maeror. Saepe vero adeo imagines affectusque huiusmodi invalescunt, ut vacante omnino circa talia ratione sequatur insania. Praeterea in multis dum crassiores spiritus tenuare molitur, hebetissimos arguit. Dum in aliis laxiores spiritus congregare studet, contemplationis assiduitati memoriaeque ineptos ostendit. Quod si quando spirituum siccitatem colligere animum dicimus, sic accipi volumus, non ut agat in animum, sed ut animus in congregandis spiritibus non laboret, unde cogatur a contemplatione diverti. Denique sicut sensus exterior, dum circa molesta[60] versatur, offenditur, sic et interior, plurimum intrinsecas spirituum offensiones percipiens a variis illatas humoribus atque causis, molestas imagines affectionesque suscitat.

12 De causis onerosae gubernationis iam satis. De vitiis autem animi, etsi nonnihil diximus, aliquid insuper est dicendum. Anima quoniam in medio mentium corporumque confinio creata est, non so-

This exhausting and incessant labor of our vegetative power not 11
only drastically remits and actually interrupts the concentration of the mind (to the point almost that we do not use the mind at all), but afflicts us with many hidden perturbations, and vexes us as though we were dreaming. Indeed, while this power struggles to temper the various qualities, using meanwhile the seminal rational principles it has in harmony with them, it gradually arouses in the higher sense the images and desires that most pertain to these qualities. Thus in roiling the bile, it secretly awakens in us anger or the proclivity for anger; in agitating the blood, vain exuberance; in agitating the phlegm, disgust and indolence; in agitating the black bile, fear and sorrow. But such images and such desires are often so overpowering that insanity ensues if we lack the reason wholly to deal with them. Moreover, in many men, when the vegetative power strives to thin out the thicker spirits, it is testifying to their extreme sluggishness, but in other men, when it diligently tries to congregate the thinner spirits, it is demonstrating that they are ill suited to a constant concern with contemplation and memory. But whenever we say that the dryness of the spirits "collects" the rational soul, this must be understood to mean, not that the dryness acts on the soul, but rather that the soul, in congregating the spirits, does not labor at this to the point of being forced to turn aside from contemplation. Finally, just as the exterior sense, while it deals with troublesome matters, is afflicted, so the interior sense too, in perceiving mostly the inner vexations of the spirits, vexations occasioned by the various humors and causes, awakens harmful images and desires.

But enough about the causes of this burdensome governing [of the 12
body]. Something more must be said, however, about the vices of the rational soul, although we have mentioned it. Since the soul was created on the borderline between minds and bodies, it not only yearns for things divine but is also joined to matter by a natu-

lum divinis inhiat, verum etiam naturali providentia et amore materiae iungitur, atque in ea per umbratilem quandam vitae suae communionem animatum corpus disponit, deinde ipsum tamquam opus suum et prolem propriam diligit. Amor animam naturalis corpori iunxit, amor eam naturalis in corpore detinet. Amor idem quotidie ipsam ad cultum corporis provocat. Mitto quod Plato in *Legibus* probat Plotinusque comprobat: animam, cum antecedat corpus eique dominetur, non tam a corpore corporeum affectum habere, quam per affectum eiusmodi suum sese in corpus immergere. Quae quidem sententia Zoroastri et quodammodo Moysi convenit dicentibus mala corporis a culpis animae proficisci. Sed utcumque sit, anima quidem corpus amat, onerosi autem et fragilis natura corporis postulat, ut vitalis animae virtus summo nixu sustentet ipsum et moveat, atque ut sensus et phantasia, quae prodesse corpori possunt quaeve obesse, assidue circumspiciant ac pro corpore quasi animae filio cupiant, timeant, laetentur et doleant.

13 A prima origine tres eiusmodi vires huiusmodi opus aggrediuntur, tanta quidem intentione[61] propter recentis corporis fabricam, ut nulla paene sit animae attentio ad rationem, priusquam adulto corpore et purgatis sensibus remittatur operis huius intentio. Verum cum primum ratio exspergiscitur, summa cum difficultate imperium phantasiae diuturno usu in anima confirmatum debilitat, quippe cum arduum sit vel naturae vel habitui repugnare. Hic autem tam contra confirmatum ultra naturam habitum, quam contra naturalem affectum est pugnandum. Id tamen diligentiori disciplina tandem assequitur. Sed interim ipsa etiam ratio propter na-

ral providence and love; and through a certain shadowy sharing of its own life it disposes the ensouled body in matter. Thereafter it cherishes that body as if it were its own handiwork and its own offspring. A natural love has united the soul with the body, and a natural love detains it in the body. The same love incites it to nurture the body from day to day. I will skip over what Plato proves in the *Laws* and Plotinus confirms: namely, that the soul, since it precedes the body and rules over it, does not derive a corporeal desire from the body so much as immerse itself in the body through its own desire for it.[54] This view certainly accords with that of Zoroaster and in a way with that of Moses when they affirm that the misfortunes of the body arise from the faults of the soul.[55] However that may be, the soul loves the body. But the nature of the irksome and fragile body demands: (a) that the vital power of the soul use its utmost strength to sustain and move the body, and (b) that the sense and phantasy must continually look to the things which can be useful to or which oppose the body, and must desire, fear, rejoice, and lament on behalf of the body, which is as it were the soul's son.

13 From the very beginning these three powers [the vital power, the sense, and the phantasy] approach such a task with especial intensity because they are in the workshop of a new body. As a result the soul's attention to reason is almost nil until the intensity of this [its first] labor is remitted, the body having matured and the senses been purified. But as soon as the reason is awakened, it is with greatest difficulty that it disables the power of the phantasy made strong in the soul through continual use (since it is very difficult to oppose nature or habit). Yet at this point it must struggle against both a preternaturally strengthened habit and a natural desire. With more rigorous discipline, nonetheless, it finally prevails. But in the meantime reason itself also cherishes those three inferior powers as if they were its sisters or daughters, because of its natural kinship with them and because of its providence; and

turalem cognationem providentiamque tres illas inferiores diligit vires quasi germanas aut filias. Ideo saepe illis obsequitur. Illae corporis naturaliter agunt curam. Igitur et ratio per illas amore declinat ad corpus. Ex diuturna declinatione habitum sibi ipsi contrahit proclivius inclinandi. Habitum huiusmodi vitium, immo etiam quendam, ut ita dixerim, interitum appellamus, quoniam, sicut in multis fieri solet animalium speciebus, postquam vis inferior in corpore fabricando naturalibus se circum filis involverit, saepe vis superior coeptum opus solidiori paulatim contexit tela, atque sub durissima tandem textura se clam includens, ipsa se perdit; non prius in lucem resurrectura[62] quam textura concreta frangatur.

14 Quamobrem non vitiatur animus divinus a corpore neque cogitur, sed ipse amore animati corporis (quod et opus suum et instrumentum est) ad ipsum e[63] suo statu sponte se deiicit, ut ad se illud extollat. Neque desunt inter Platonicos qui dicant, praesertim Hermias, quosdam esse daemones generationis fautores, qui inclinationem animae ad corpus naturaliter augeant. Certe Plato in libro *De pulchro*, quasi sicut Moyses, inquit daemonem quendam ab initio voluptatem plurimis malis immiscuisse. Mitto quod in *Epistolis* ait daemonem bona publica turbavisse. Sed de his in sequentibus. Redeamus interim ad animae providentiam.

15 Cum omnium divinarum mentium proprium sit quod superiora intuentur quodve inferioribus provideant, idem quoque animae nostrae est proprium, quae non modo corpus suum, sed etiam terrenorum omnium et ipsius terrae corpus curat et colit. Sed haec providentia, quanto gravior est, quia res curat fragiliores ineptioresque ad ordinem observandum, tanto magis distrahit a

this is why it often indulges them. The powers naturally take care of the body, and so by means of these powers reason also inclines lovingly towards the body. After inclining day after day it acquires the habit for itself of inclining more and more willingly. We call this kind of habit a vice, or rather a sort of death, because, as is the usual case with many species of animals, after a lower power, in fabricating the body, has entwined itself in the natural threads, a superior power often takes up the work that has already been started, and little by little weaves it in a denser web. Secretly enclosing itself in what is eventually the tightest weave, it loses itself; and it will not to be resurrected into the light until the impenetrable texture is unraveled.

14 Hence the divine rational soul is not vitiated by, or compelled by, the body; but through its love of the ensouled body (which is its handiwork and instrument) it voluntarily casts itself down from its own level so that it may raise the body up to itself. Now among the Platonists there is no lack of those who declare, and especially Hermias,[56] that there are particular demons (the patrons of generation) who naturally intensify the soul's inclination for the body. In his treatise on beauty [i.e. the *Phaedrus*] Plato declares, as Moses does almost, that from the beginning a certain demon mixed pleasure with many ills.[57] I will pass over the fact that in his *Letters* he says a demon has disturbed the public good.[58] But more of these matters in what follows. Let us return in the meantime to the soul's providence.

15 Since it is proper for all divine minds to contemplate higher things or to provide for lower things, it is likewise proper for our soul to nurture and cherish not only its own body but also the body of all earthly things and of the earth itself. But the more difficult this providing is, since it is caring for things which are too weak and foolish to observe the [universal] order, the more it distracts the soul from contemplating higher things. And yet not entirely so. For in every age we seek all truth through the intellect,

superioribus speculandis, neque tamen omnino. In omni enim aetate per intellectum omne verum inquirimus,[64] per voluntatem omne bonum amamus, per operationes deum, qui omne revera bonum est, colimus. Tria haec honestatis officia significant animam, etiam in tanta maris huius tempestate, caelestia semper suspicere, quibus suspiciendis vehementiore illorum amore quotidie capitur. Amore huiusmodi fervescente, defervet paulatim corporis amor, per quem vitiatus fuerat animus, et vitii maculae abolentur. Quapropter animus numquam cogitur[65] aliunde, sed amore se mergit in corpus, amore emergit e corpore.

16 Huc tendit divinum illud. 'Qui amat animam suam in hoc mundo, perdit eam. Qui hic odit, in vita aeterna recepit eam'. Qualis autem in hoc pelago fiat videaturque, sic in decimo *De republica* Socrates exprimit: 'Quemadmodum si quis marinum Glaucum longo iam tempore undis attritum atque distortum, praeterea petris, alga, ostreis obsitum viderit, non marinum, sed silvestre potius animal opinabitur, sic nos dum animam terrenis affectibus et habitibus distractam circumfusamque videmus, terrenum quiddam potius quam caeleste nos videre putamus. Verum si nudaverimus eam consideraverimusque puram atque divinorum amore iam ex hoc pelago emergentem, proculdubio cognoscemus animam, propterea quod divinis aeternisque cognata sit, talia quaedam appetere, et cum primum pura evaserit, tangere cumque iis[66] in serena luce versari eaque consuetudine divinam prorsus evadere.' Hactenus Socrates.

17 Quando igitur vitiari animam dicimus, non tam amittere sua quam aliena, id est inferiora, in se admittere[67] intellegi volumus. Huiusmodi autem vitium naturam non perdit, sed occupat. Sed

we love all good through the will, and we worship God who is truly all good through our deeds. These three offices of righteousness signify that the soul, even as it is tossed about in the mighty tempest of this sea [of life], always gazes up at heavenly things, and in gazing up at them it is daily seized by a yet more vehement love of them. When the soul glows with such a love, then the love for the body, which had defiled the rational soul, gradually cools and the stains of vice are washed away. Thus the rational soul is never under external compulsion: out of love it immerses itself in the body, and out of love it issues from the body.

16 This is what is meant by that divine saying, "Whoever loves his own soul in this world, loses it. Whoever hates it here, receives it in the life eternal."[59] But the kind of life that happens, or seems to happen, on this [tempestuous] sea Socrates describes in the tenth book of the *Republic* as follows: "Whoever glimpses the sea[-god] Glaucus worn and disfigured from his long sojourn in the waves, all covered moreover with pebbles, sea-weed, and oyster shells, will think of him as not a sea but a wood creature. Likewise, when we witness the soul distracted and overwhelmed by earthly desires and habits, we regard ourselves as an earthly rather than a heavenly being. Were we to uncover the soul, however, and consider it in its purity when it has already emerged from this sea through a love of things divine, we would surely know that the soul, because it is akin to things divine and eternal, yearns for such; and that, as soon as it has emerged in its purity, it attains them and dwells with them in the light serene, and in this company becomes altogether divine."[60] Thus Socrates.

17 When we say, therefore, that the soul is defiled, we mean not that it loses its own things but rather that it admits into itself things alien, that is, inferior. Such a vice does not destroy the soul's nature but it does take possession of it. Lest someone should think, however, that our soul is corporeal because it appears to be daily tainted by corporeal causes, it behooves us to lis-

ne quis nostrum animum ob id esse corporeum opinetur, quod corporeis quotidie causis infici videatur, operaepretium est audire divinum Paulum apostolum clamantem non esse nobis colluctationem adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus multas daemonum turbas, quae in hoc caliginoso aere inter nos versantur. Hos autem prisci theologi, quod Origenes Augustinusque confirmant, aereo corpore indutos, motu agiles, perspicaces sensu, mirabili rerum scientia praeditos arbitrantur; aereisque corporibus suis aereo spiritui nostro penitus illabi, atque sicut quilibet homines per indicia externa quodammodo, ac peritissimi quique praecipue intrinsecos augurantur affectus, ita sagacissimos daemones non per externa solum inditia, sed etiam per ipsos nostrorum spirituum motus, qui a phantasia saepius incitantur, attentiores quotidie notiones acrioresque affectus, unde proprie spiritus ipsi moventur, aucupari. Hinc ergo fieri, ut qua via quemque perturbare facilius valeant, rectissime calleant atque ipsi perturbatione quadam affecti nos quotidie turbent.

18 Perturbationis huius motum ita potissimum fieri arbitramur. Movent sane aereum in nobis spiritum aerei daemones, quo quidem quasi vibrato et humores moventur in corpore et in phantasia imagines excitantur. Sed quonam pacto? Nempe in sanguineo corpore sanguinem imaginesque quodammodo similes saepius commoventes ad inanes animum voluptates alliciunt. In cholerico vero bile convenientibusque bili imaginibus irritatis iras et proelia suscitant. Sed in phlegmatico, dum pituitam augent congruaque simulacra, ignavia et torpore nos occupant. Denique cum in melancholicis atram incitant bilem, timorem maeroremque incutiunt, phantasiam falsis territant umbris, animum opinionibus saepe fal-

ten to the divine apostle Paul proclaiming that we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against the many legions of demons which dwell among us in this fog-laden air.[61] The ancient theologians — and Origen and Augustine confirm this[62] — think of these demons as being clothed with an airy body, and as being agile in their motion, perspicacious in their sense, and endowed with a marvelous knowledge of things. They suppose that with their airy bodies they plunge deep into our airy spirit, and that just as some men, especially those with the greatest experience, somehow predict inner feelings from external signs, so every day these demons, who are supremely subtle and who use not just external signs but even the very motions of our spirits — motions which are prompted often by the phantasy — these demons, I say, try to catch both the more focused notions and the sharper desires by which, strictly speaking, our own spirits are moved. The theologians suppose, therefore, that the demons know the best possible way easily to perturb each person, and that, troubled themselves by a sort of perturbation, they trouble us from day to day.

18 We believe that the motion of such perturbation occurs for the most part in the following manner. Clearly the airy demons move the airy spirit in us, and when the spirit has so to speak vibrated, the humors too are moved in the body and images are aroused in the phantasy. But how? In the sanguine body certainly the demons entice the rational soul to empty pleasures by often moving the blood and the images in a way resembling blood. But in the choleric [body] they excite angry tempers and conflicts by way of bile and the irritated images accompanying bile. But in the phlegmatic [body], by augmenting the phlegm and the images accompanying it, they fill us with sloth and torpor. Finally in melancholic bodies they induce fear and gloom by arousing the black bile; and they alarm the phantasy with deceitful shadows, and they trick the soul with opinions that are frequently false. All of this the demons can do, especially by way of stirring up the black bile. Serapion and

sis illudunt. Id totum posse a daemonibus fieri, praesertim atrae bilis incitamento, Serapion et Avicenna ex antiquorum philosophorum sententia narrant atque ipsi non negant. Non enim consentaneum est divinam mentem a sensibus aliter quam ad idem daemonibus contendentibus adeo falli atque impugnari. Sed eiusmodi invidorum ambitiosorumque daemonum violentiam expugnari Platonici per philosophiam et sacrificia posse putant, quod *Orphici* nobis *Hymni* demonstrant. Christus autem, verus medicus animorum, ieiunio atque oratione hoc[68] fieri praecipit. Si dei ipsius oraculum philosophice liceret exponere, ieiunium interpretarer abstinentiam ab his rebus quae talem aut talem vel augent humorem vel imaginem affectumque movent. Orationem vero exponerem tam vehementem in deum conversionem, ut et animus stimulos daemonum non advertat, et daemones expugnare mentem deo deditam se posse diffidant.

19 Sed disputationem iam concludamus. Nemo igitur dicat animam hominis ob hoc minus esse divinam, quod in curando corpore sollicitetur, quod vitietur. Multo enim durior menti nostrae provincia quam reliquis mentibus assignatur. Neque vitiatur a corpore anima, sed ipsa nimium corpus amando se vitiat, ipsa se purgat. Neque putandum est ex eo deesse nobis divinitatem, quod anxii multo magis quam bestiae vivimus. Immo ex hoc maxime divini sumus, quod privati ad tempus habitatione patriaque caelesti, scilicet quamdiu dei vicarii sumus in terra, sollicitamur continue, etiam si hoc minime advertamus, caelestis patriae desiderio, neque ulla terrena oblectamenta consolari in hoc exilio mentem humanam possunt rerum cupidam meliorum.

Avicenna record this as the view of the ancient philosophers but do not deny it themselves.[63] For one would not expect a divine mind to be so deceived and attacked by the senses if the demons were not party to these attacks. But the Platonists think that the violence of such envious and ambitious demons can be overcome through philosophy and sacrifices; and the *Orphic Hymns* demonstrate this to us.[64] But Christ, the true healer of souls, teaches us that we can accomplish this by fasting and prayer.[65] If I may expound on the oracle of God Himself philosophically, I would interpret fasting to mean abstinence from those things that either augment a certain humor or move an image and desire. But prayer I would interpret as meaning a turning back towards God which is so intense that the rational soul pays no regard to the promptings of the demons, and the demons despair of being able to conquer a mind devoted to God.

19 But let us conclude this discussion. No one should say therefore that man's soul is less divine because it is preoccupied with caring for the body, [or] because it is defiled by it; for the province assigned to our mind is much more difficult than that assigned to other minds. Nor is the soul corrupted by the body. Rather by loving the body too much, it corrupts itself and [afterwards] it purifies itself. Nor should we suppose that divinity is wanting in us because we live with greater disquiet than the animals. Rather, we are entirely divine precisely because, separated for a while from our home and native heavenly seat—as long as we are here on earth, that is, as God's representatives—we are continually troubled by the desire for our heavenly homeland, even if we hardly notice it. In this exile here, the earth's various delights cannot console the human mind yearning as it does for better things.

: VIII :

Quarta quaestio. Quare animi a corporibus inviti discedunt.

1 Quarta nobis quaestio proposita fuit: quare, si caelestes anima sunt, a terris tam inviti discedunt? Primum quidem non omnes inviti discedunt. Nam Theramenes, Theodorus Cyrenaeus, Cleombrotus, et omnino omnes Hegesiae Cyrenaici auditores sponte ac libentissime decedebant, gymnosophistae quoque Indorum philosophi et Getae Thraciae populi, apud quos lugebantur puerperia natique deflebantur, funera quoque festa erant et veluti sacra lusu cantuque celebrabantur. Mitto innumerabiles alios milites, cives, philosophos, religiosos. Mitto primitias Christianorum. Mitto quod non omnes morientes lugent, lugent autem nascentes omnes, et quasi inviti a lacrimis terrenum hoc iter auspicantur tamquam exilium.

2 Deinde in iis[69] etiam qui mortem horrent, non tota, ut ita loquar, anima expavescit. Siquidem ea pars nostri, quae discedendo pergit in melius, non modo semel non discedit[70] invita, sed etiam quotidie sponte discedit. Quid per philosophiam moralem aliud agimus quam ut animam ab affectu corporis seiungamus? Quid per philosophiam speculatricem aliud quam ut rationem a sensibus sevocemus? Totum hoc philosophiae studium, ut inquit Plato, est meditatio mortis, siquidem mors est animae a corpore liberatio. Nec terribilis mors est philosophis atque similibus, quoniam

: VIII :

The fourth question: Why do rational souls depart unwillingly from their bodies?[66]

The fourth question posed by us was this: If souls are heavenly beings why do they depart so unwillingly from earth? First, not all souls depart unwillingly. For Theramenes,[67] Theodorus of Cyrene,[68] Cleombrotus,[69] and the entire group of those who sat at the feet of Hegesias the Cyrenaic[70] departed willingly and most freely; and so did the Gymnosophists, the philosophers of the Indians, and the Getae, a tribe of Thrace, who grieved and wept over childbirth and the newly born, while their funerals were festive and celebrated with game and song as if they were sacrificial occasions.[71] I forbear mentioning a host of others, soldiers, citizens, philosophers, and men devout; and I forbear mentioning the very first Christians. I set aside the fact that not all who are dying lament, but that all who are being born do lament, and that they enter upon this earthly journey as an exile, unwillingly it would seem from their tears. 1

Next, even in those who are terrified of death, not the entire soul, if I may say so, is terrified. For the part of us that in leaving proceeds to something better leaves not just once and unwillingly but every day and willingly. For what else do we do through moral philosophy but disjoin the soul from its desire for the body? And what else do we do through contemplative philosophy but sequester the reason from the senses? The entire study of philosophy, as Plato says, is a meditation on death, since death is the soul's liberation from the body.[72] Death is not frightening for philosophers and others akin to them, since for them it is like a member of their family and home. Nor are they ignorant of what the habit of the pure soul is going to be after death. For it will most resemble the 2

familiaris illis et domestica est, nec latet eos[71] qualis futurus sit post obitum puri animi habitus. Talis enim erit, qualem ferme experiuntur quotidie in summo contemplationis fastigio, tranquillus videlicet atque serenus, et idearum formulis quasi stellarum radiis circumfusus, et divini solis splendore coruscans. Hinc propheta Daniel: 'Fulgebunt docti tamquam splendor firmamenti, et qui multos ad iustitiam erudierint, tamquam stellae in perpetuas aeternitates.' At ea pars animae abit invita, quae corpori dumtaxat alendo atque tuendo tributa est, quoniam abeundo naturali quodam officio vacat et amicum deserit suum.

3 Quinetiam ratio in plerisque amat nimium inferiorem hanc animae partem, quo fit ut quodammodo eius doleat detrimento. Plotinus autem non partem animae vocat proprie, sed simulacrum quoddam animae substantialis umbratile. Probat enim hominem esse ipsam rationalem animam, quae quidem permanens in seipsa sub se generat animal, neque ex se et corpore proprie animal componit unum, sed potius ex corpore tali atque vitali quodam sui simulacro membris infuso. In quo quidem animali sensus illi sint qui externa corpora cum quadam passione percipiunt, phantasia quoque et confusa prorsus et perturbata. In ipsa vero animae rationalis substantia sit impatibilis universalisque sensus, non ad sensibilia, sed ad imagines passionesque, quae in sensibus animalis illius sunt, aspiciens. Sit et ratio quae suspicit mentem. Et quatenus ipsa tum in se regitur, tum in mentem erigitur, separatione proficere atque gaudere. Quatenus autem quodam providentiae munere et format animal et respicit iam formatum, commercio quodam cum corpore delectari. Sed pergamus ad reliqua.

4 Nonnulli etiam cruciatum, qui in discessu sentitur, magis metuunt quam discessum, quem vel suavem fore quasi soporis op-

habit experienced daily by the philosophers at the very summit of contemplation, one that is tranquil and serene and encircled by the formulae of the Ideas as if they were the rays of stars: a habit refulgent with the splendor of the divine sun. Hence the prophet Daniel [exclaims]: "Those who are wise shall shine as the splendor of the firmament, and those who have instructed many in justice shall shine as the stars in endless eternities."[73] But that part of the soul assigned to the body merely for nourishing and protecting does depart unwillingly, since in leaving it no longer performs an office natural to it: it is deserting its friend.

3 In most people, moreover, the reason loves this inferior part of the soul too fervently, and so it grieves in a way over its loss. But Plotinus does not call this part a part of the soul, properly speaking, but rather a shadowy reflection of the substantial soul.[74] For he proves that man is the rational soul itself, which, remaining steadfast in itself, generates beneath itself a living being. Strictly speaking, this soul compounds a single living being, not from itself and from the body, but rather from the body and a certain vital image of itself diffused through the [body's] members. In this living creature are those senses that perceive external bodies with a certain passion, and also the phantasy that is altogether confused and disturbed. But in the very substance of the rational soul is an impassible and universal sense looking not to sensibles, but rather to the images and passions that dwell in the senses of that living creature. There too is the reason that looks to mind. And inasmuch as the soul is ruled in itself and raised towards mind, it progresses and rejoices in its separation [from the body]. But inasmuch as it gives form to a living being, and looks to that which is already formed, and does so out of its particular providential duty, it is delighted by a certain commerce with the body. But let us proceed to the rest of the argument.

4 Many are more afraid of the agony that is felt in the departure than of the departure itself. But Timaeus teaches us that this de-

pressionem Timaeus docet, si resolutione quadam fiat propter naturae maturitatem, non autem suffocatione propter incontinentiam. Plurimi autem hoc dolent discessu, quoniam[72] non putant se suis operibus visionem meruisse divinam, unde efficitur ut diuturnas aut perpetuas mentis tenebras expavescant. Adde quod plurimi vitae huius blandimenta quibus ab initio irretiuntur aegre relinquunt.

Sunt et qui propriae divinitati diffidant, quia divinum purae mentis splendorem inspexere numquam, sed mortalem corporalium simulacrorum caliginem animae per sensus infusam. Et qui splendorem mentis rationis oculis nondum philosophia purgatis acriter intuentur, radiis eius reverberantur hebescuntque et ambigunt. Nam cum nihil sit oculis rationis magis praesens quam ipsa mentis substantia, non est verisimile eam propter minimam sui lucem esse nobis ignotam, sed propter maximam. Qui ergo et puram mentem et purgatis oculis rationis inspiciet, is non modo non diffidet, sed ipsam reverebitur tamquam numen. Sed licet diffidant nonnulli, plurimi tamen confidunt. Et illi ipsi qui videntur diffidere, sperant simul se fore perpetuos. Neque potest umquam spes huiusmodi ex animo nostro penitus exstirpari, utpote quae sit nobis naturaliter insita. Solent illae spes esse fallaces, quae aut casu quodam aut usu a sensibus habent originem, qualem profecto non habet aeternitatis opinio, cum sensus nihil percipiat nisi caducum, et cogat nos suspicari quandoque, ne forte qui decesserunt e vita nihil sint amplius, postquam videntur nusquam. Itaque immortalitatis spes naturalem sequitur rationis instinctum, cum eam speret animus non modo non conferentibus sensibus, sed invitis. Ego[73] certe nihil magis soleo admirari, quam quod nostrum id quisque

parture will be agreeable, as when sleep overcomes us, if it comes from the dissolution that follows on the maturing of our nature, and not from the suffocation resulting from excess.[75] But most grieve at this departure because they do not suppose, in light of their deeds, that they deserve the divine vision; hence they fear the long-enduring or never-ending shadows of the mind. Furthermore, most leave the pleasures of this life, the pleasures by which they are ensnared from the onset, with considerable pain.

There are those too who doubt their own divinity, since they 5
have never looked upon the divine splendor of pure mind but only on the mortal gloom of bodily images, a gloom diffused through the soul by the senses. And there are those who gaze intently upon the mind's splendor with the eyes [simply] of reason, eyes not purified yet by philosophy, and they are dazzled by its rays and become blind and grope about. Since nothing is more present to the eyes of reason than the substance itself of mind, it is probable that mind is going to be unknown to us not because of its dimness, but because of its brightness. The person, therefore, who is going to look upon pure mind with the now purified eyes of the reason will not doubt it but venerate it even as a divinity. And though some may doubt, yet the majority have trust. And the very ones who appear to doubt simultaneously hope that they will live forever. And such a hope can never be completely erased from our rational soul, seeing that it is naturally innate in us. Hopes having their origin in the senses, whether from some happenstance or use, are usually deceptive. But our view of eternity is not a hope based on the sense, since the sense does not perceive anything except the transitory, and it forces us at times to suspect that those who have perchance departed this life are nothing any more, since they are nowhere seen. The hope of immortality therefore follows the natural instinct of the reason, since the rational soul hopes for immortality, not with the help of the senses, but despite their unwillingness. Certainly nothing usually amazes me more than the fact that

speret, quandoquidem semper inter caduca versamur, neque tamen sperare desinimus. Quod quidem significat hanc spem naturae firmitate constare.

6 Illud quoque considerandum arbitror, quod videlicet non esset mirum homines, etiam si evidentiores de immortalitate rationes haberent quam de reliquis omnibus, adhuc tamen magis hac in re rationibus ipsis diffidere quam in ceteris. Quod enim amamus multum, ei multum metuimus. Nihil autem magis quam vitam diligimus sempiternam, ob eam maxime rationem, quia maxime naturalis est nobis. Omnino autem ex ipso mortis metu coniectari possumus aliquem nobis sensum superfore post mortem. Nam si animus ideo timet mortem, quia perpetuas odit tenebras, atque a diversitate naturae odium proficiscitur, perpetua lux est animus, aut saltem tenebras sempiternas non aliter discernit quam per lucem aliquam sempiternam; hanc absque immensa luce contueri non valet. Si lux animae, quae mens eius est, ita se habet ad ipsam lucem, sicut animae vita ad ipsam vitam, et lux animae super immensam lucem reflectitur, necessario animae vita vitam complectitur infinitam. Quinetiam quia vita magis cum vita congruit quam lux cum vita, si lux animae suo modo, id est intellegendo vitam attingit immensam, multo magis animae vita modo suo, id est vivendo,[74] vitam assequitur infinitam.

7 Porro qui tenebras horret, secum ipse consultat, numquid semper victurus sit absque corpore an defuturus. Quae quidem consultatio significat animum, relicto corpore, iam tunc sese recipere in se ipsum. Non enim reflectitur in se ipsum corpus neque elevatur in vitam a corpore separatam. In ea ipsa consultatione diiudicat quanto praestantior sit vita sempiterna a mortali corpore li-

each of us hopes for this immortality, since we dwell always among transitory things yet do not cease to hope. It means that this hope stands firm on the steadfastness of nature.

6 I think we must also consider the fact that, even were men to possess clearer proofs for immortality than for all other questions, yet it would come as no surprise that up to now they have been more doubtful about the proofs in this matter than about those in other matters. For what we much love that we much fear for. We love nothing more, however, than eternal life, and for the reason especially that it is most natural to us. But wholly from the fear itself of death we can conclude that some sense will remain in us after death. For if the rational soul fears death because it hates perpetual shadows, and hatred proceeds from a difference of nature, then the soul is perpetual light; or it does not distinguish between everlasting shadows at least except through some everlasting light, and this it cannot gaze upon without [its own] measureless light. If the light of the soul which is its mind relates to light itself as the soul's life to life itself, and if the light of the soul is reflected back to the measureless light above, then the soul's life necessarily embraces infinite life. Furthermore, because life accords with life more than light does with life, and if the light of the soul attains to measureless life in its own way, namely in understanding, then *a fortiori* the soul's life acquires infinite life in its own way, namely in living.

7 Next, anyone who is afraid of shadows should ask himself whether he will or will not live forever without a body. To ask this question indicates that the rational soul, having left the body, is even then withdrawing into itself; for the body does not reflect upon itself, nor is it elevated into a life separate from the body. In that very inquiry the soul is judging how much everlasting life, free from the mortal body, is more eminent (and so much so) than either the present life or the privation of life; and it is choosing life that is free and eternal. But the soul could not judge and choose in

bera, quam aut vita praesens aut vitae privatio, exoptatque liberam et aeternam. Iudicare autem ita et exoptare non posset, nisi talem vitam in se ipso prius experiretur. Si vita libera longe diversa est a servili, et tamen animus corpore clausus experitur ipsam exercetque, quanto magis solutus a corpore eam potest implere.

8 Praeterea in eadem deliberatione disceptat mens, num queat aliquid per se deposito corpore agere, necne. Ac si queat, non diffidit seorsum a corpore se victuram. Ubi iam nunc, quamvis cum corpore ducat vitam, agit tamen sine ipso nonnihil, quando iudicat quid sit et quale idipsum quod dicitur sine corpore operari. Quis enim per corpus aliquod omne corpus abiiciat? Quis cum corpore hoc secernat corpora omnia? Quis operando cum corpore agat operationem illam quae fit sine corpore? Agit autem quodammodo operationem aliquam[75] quae est sine corpore, qui eam ipsam excogitat et effingit. Excogitatio enim actus est animae. Quod si, dum est in corpore, agit aliquid[76] sine corpore, longe magis poterit sine ipso agere extra ipsum. Atqui, quod mirum est, usque adeo invictus est animus ut quicumque eius aeternitati bellum indicunt, superentur ab ipso. Nam sive Lucretiani ignave certent, non expugnatur, sive alii strenue pugnent, quia eiusdem animi armis aculeisque pugnant fortiter, immo animus ipse pugnat. Ideo animus ipse quando videtur succumbere, tunc maxime superat. Excellit enim quammaxime. Ac si se perimere videatur, videt denique se peremptum. Qui videt quicquam, adhuc spirat. Ex iis patet qua ratione, si mortis metus a tenebrarum horrore proficiscatur, in eo ipso ostenditur immortalitas.

this way if it did not first experience such a life in itself. If the free life differs greatly from the servile one, and yet the rational soul imprisoned in the body experiences and exercises the free life, then all the more, when it is liberated from the body, is it capable of living that life to the superlative degree.

8 In that same deliberation, moreover, mind debates whether or not it can do anything of its own accord after it has abandoned the body. If it can, it does not doubt that it is going to live separated from the body. Even now, though it leads a life with the body, it does something nonetheless without the body when it forms a judgment about what it is that is said to act without the body and about what kind it is. For who would use a particular body in order to reject body in general? Who would use this particular body in order to cut off all bodies? And who by operating with a body would perform an operation that occurs without a body? Yet the person who thinks about and imagines that very operation is performing in a way an operation that is without a body. For thinking is an act of the soul. But if, when it is in the body, the soul does something without the body, then it will be capable of doing far more without the body when it is outside the body. Indeed, the wonderful thing is that the rational soul is so invincible that those who declare war against its eternity are conquered by it. If the followers of Lucretius fight it as cowards, it remains unconquered; and if others fight it bravely, it is because they are fighting bravely with the weapons and arrows of this same rational soul; or rather it is the rational soul itself that is fighting. Thus the rational soul when it appears to succumb [in death] triumphs most, for then it excels most of all. And if it seems to kill itself [by not believing in immortality], in the end it sees it has killed itself. But whoever sees something is still alive. From all this it is clear why, if the fear of death originates from a horror of shadows, [our] immortality is evidenced in this very fear.

9 Forsitan qui formidat mortem, non tam horret tenebras quam vel poenam vel maestitiam vaticinatur et timet. Quod equidem potius arbitror. Ex quo etiam immortalitas declaratur. Sicut enim nemo cupit illa quae profutura non sperat, neque prodesse putat nisi percipiantur, ita nemo metuit quae nocitura non iudicat, neque arbitratur obesse nisi percipi possint. Cupido enim voluptatem in boni adeptione respicit aut vitatione[77] mali; metus dolorem in mali praesentia aut absentia boni. Voluptas autem et dolor absque cognitione non fiunt. Ergo qui vitae statum cupit propter voluptatem qua in tempore vitae perfunditur, idem quoque statum post mortem metuit propter dolorem quem sit in eo tempore percepturus.

Perhaps he who fears death does not dread the shadows so 9
much as foresee his [own] punishment and fear his [own] grief. I believe this the more likely possibility, but from it immortality is proved too. For just as no one desires the things he has no hope will happen, and no one thinks things useful unless they can be perceived, so no one is afraid of things he does not judge are going to harm him, nor does he think they are harming him unless they can be perceived. For desire looks to pleasure in the acquisition of good or the avoidance of evil, fear looks to pain in the presence of evil or the absence of good. But no pleasure or pain occurs without cognition. So he who desires the state of life on account of the pleasure that bathes him in his lifetime is the same person who also fears the state after death on account of the pain he will feel at that time.

Notes to the Text

ABBREVIATIONS

A	The *editio princeps*, Florence, 1482, with printed corrigenda as noted below.
L	Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, MS Plut. LXXXIII, 10, the dedication copy written for Lorenzo de'Medici.
Marcel	The reading of Raymond Marcel's edition, *Marsile Ficin: Théologie platonicienne de l'immortalité des âmes* (3 vols., Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964–70).
Opera	The reading of the text in *Marsilii Ficini . . . Opera* (Basel: Henricpetri, 1576; repr. Turin: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1959, 1983; Paris: Phénix Éditions, 1999).

BOOK XV

1. Marsilii Ficini Florentini Theologiae de animorum immortalitate liber quintus decimus incipit *L*
2. a *A*
3. platonicus *after* Aphrodiseus *before correction in A*
4. in Quaestionibus naturalibus] tamquam platonicus in secundo Problematum suorum *before correction in A*
5. divino *L*
6. eadem *L*
7. eadem *L*
8. vocant *L*
9. *omitted in L*
10. *a second* et *after* mentes *before correction in A*
11. sit *Opera, Marcel*
12. primum *A, Opera*
13. ante *before correction in A*
14. in *after* nisi *added by Opera, Marcel*
15. neque *L*
16. et *after* motumque *added silently by Marcel*
17. Materias *L*
18. vices *L*

19. ea *after* si *added by Opera, Marcel*
20. -que *L, Opera:* -ve *A, Marcel*
21. anima *L*
22. intimae *Marcel*
23. extrinsecus *L*
24. proprietatem *L*
25. in infinitum *before correction in A*
26. corporum *L*
27. iis *L, Marcel:* his *A, Opera*
28. *Marcel corrects silently to* eundem *(but Ficino understands* fundus/um *to be neuter)*
29. *omitted in L*
30. absentia *AL: emended to* ab essentia *by Opera, Marcel*
31. materia extenditur . . . potest aliqua *is repeated by dittography in A, followed mistakenly by Marcel*
32. quadriangulum *L (Ficino understands the substantive of this and similar words to be masculine)*
33. perque *Opera, Marcel*
34. constat *Opera:* confiat *Marcel*
35. ex *before* quibus *added by Opera, Marcel*
36. e *L*
37. ergo *after* animarum *added by Opera, Marcel*
38. et *after* irrationalis *L, Marcel*
39. quia *L, misreported by Marcel as the reading of A*
40. proprie *A*
41. -imae *L*
42. haec nihil . . . gubernaculi *omitted by Marcel*
43. praecedet *before correction in A*
44. supervacanea *L*
45. proprie *L*
46. pro *before* instrumentis *added by Opera, Marcel*
47. non *Marcel*
48. quandam *Marcel*
49. scilicet *after* quia *added by Opera, Marcel*
50. id sequitur] id assequitur *L*
51. quid *L*
52. ostendet *before correction in A*
53. -que *omitted before correction in A*
54. *emended to* modus *by Marcel, but see 15.2.11 and 15.7.4, above; Opera has* nodus
55. his *L, Marcel:* iis *A:* aliis *Opera*
56. movendi *before correction in A*
57. laudas *L*
58. *omitted by Marcel*
59. sextodecimo *before correction in A*
60. discedentem *L*
61. iudicant *Marcel*
62. huius *L*
63. igitur *omitted in A before correction*

64. intentione *L, Marcel*
65. sit *before correction in A*
66. Hic *before correction in A*
67. more *A, Opera, Marcel*
68. *Marcel incorrectly reports* tum *before* argumentari *in L*
69. *omitted by Marcel*
70. transferat *L*
71. si *added after* vel *by Opera, Marcel*
72. format *A*
73. quantum *L*
74. ita] sic ita *before correction in A*
75. *omitted by Marcel*
76. se *L*
77. est *after* quod *added by Opera, Marcel*
78. eas cum] eas animi *before correction in A*
79. corporalia *L*
80. Ergo *L*
81. compositum . . . iunguntur ut *misprinted here from 15.10.8 in Marcel's edition*
82. videt *before correction in A*
83. compositum . . . iunguntur ut *misprinted mistakenly at 15.10.7 in Marcel's edition (see note 81)*
84. actus *before correction in A*
85. actu *L*
86. unus *L, Marcel*
87. atque *A, Opera, Marcel*
88. perfecté *L*: perfecte (= perfectae?) *A*: perfectae *Opera, Marcel*
89. est *after* mens *added by Opera, Marcel*
90. erit actus] erit aut actus *L*
91. *omitted silently by Opera, Marcel*
92. per- *omitted in L*
93. materia *Marcel*
94. movente *A before correction; Opera and Marcel add* immoto *after* pede
95. vanescat *before correction in A*
96. phantasiam *L*
97. in cerebro . . . qui sunt *omitted in A before correction*
98. intellegit homo. Peripatici *L, Opera*
99. Animalium et *omitted in A before correction*
100. confirmat *L*
101. quodnam *before correction in A*
102. ex *after* tum *added by Opera, Marcel*
103. etiam *after* sed *added by Opera, Marcel*
104. in] quae in *L, before correction in A*
105. amitteret *L*
106. -bitur *L*
107. universale *L*
108. a deo *after* adeo *AL: omitted by Opera, Marcel*

109. vero *L*
110. verisimile est *omitted in L*
111. *omitted by Marcel*
112. numerum *AL, Opera, Marcel, but the sense demands* unitatem
113. seu *Opera, Marcel*
114. et *after* accipit *added by Opera, Marcel*
115. singularia *before correction in A*
116. virtute servare *omitted in L*
117. singularum *AL (Ficino's spelling)*
118. absolutae *L*
119. in *omitted by A before correction*
120. quid *AL: corrected in Opera, Marcel*
121. *Marcel conjectures* altissima, *but see 16.1.18.*
122. bona *before correction in A*
123. antea] a natura *before correction in A*
124. in se fingit *omitted in A*
125. oculos *before correction in A*
126. vidit *before correction in A*
127. perspiciebat *A*
128. integre *AL; corrected to* integer *Opera, Marcel*
129. dantur *before correction in A*
130. in *omitted by Opera, Marcel*
131. Ceterum *before correction in A*
132. confert *before correction in A*
133. temporalem *L*
134. dicunt *Opera, Marcel*
135. aliquod pelligrinum *L*
136. potest *L*
137. conferet *L*
138. iungeremus *L*
139. angustias *A*
140. infectioribus *before correction in A*
141. autem *after* Absoluta *added by Opera, Marcel*
142. praebeant *L*: praebeat *A, Opera*
143. *omitted in L*
144. phantasia *L*
145. *omitted in L*
146. et *after* erat *added in Opera, Marcel*
147. *omitted in L*
148. ratio *after* Quinta *added in Opera, Marcel*
149. eadem *before correction in A*
150. enim *after* qualitatem *added in Opera, Marcel*
151. a diversis] adversis *L*
152. pareat *L*
153. repugnantias *L*
154. assertionibus *Opera, Marcel*
155. et contradictorii *omitted in Opera, Marcel*
156. iis *L*
157. illos *omitted in L*
158. naturam *L, before correction in A*
159. *omitted in Opera, Marcel*

BOOK XVI

1. Marsilii Ficini Florentini Theologiae de animorum immortalitate liber XVIus incipit *L*: XVI. Liber *A*
2. ratio *before correction in A*
3. nostrae *Opera, Marcel*
4. qualitatem *L*
5. Sed *L*
6. Quod *before correction in A*
7. *omitted before correction in A*
8. Ergo tum] Egrotum *before correction in A*
9. continet *before correction in A*
10. spirantis *L*
11. praecedit *before correction in L*
12. substantia *L*
13. quiescit *L*
14. Si *Marcel*
15. firmarum *before correction in A*
16. descendunt *before correction in A*
17. vehementer *L*
18. videmur *before correction in A*
19. tantum *L*
20. et *after* fiunt *added in Opera, Marcel*
21. anima *before correction in A*
22. utinam *before correction in A*
23. aut *L*
24. angelica *L*
25. infinitum *L*
26. *The second* sine corpore *omitted before correction in A*
27. ascendant *before correction in A*
28. aere *before correction in A*
29. *omitted by Opera, Marcel*
30. suum *after* munus *added by Opera, Marcel*
31. breve *AL*: ad breve tempus *Opera, Marcel*
32. -que *omitted in L*
33. immergitur *L*
34. extremam *L*
35. expleat *before correction in A*
36. continuo *L*
37. *Thus Cicero*: insomno *L*: in somno *A*: *corrected to* insomnio *by Opera, Marcel*
38. *Marcel's correction*: sphaeram sphaera *L*: sphaera sphaeram *A, Opera*
39. sunt *after* quot *added by Opera, Marcel*
40. duximus *before correction in both A and L*
41. media *L*
42. imitans *Opera, Marcel*
43. *omitted before correction in A*
44. *omitted before correction in A*
45. Hic *before correction in A*
46. adiungitur *MSS, Opera, Marcel*
47. eo *after* Neque *added in Opera, Marcel*
48. cessent *L*

49. sede *Marcel*
50. *Marcel's correction:* quos *AL, Opera*
51. aliquo *after correction in L*
52. tam *before correction in A*
53. est *after* mundum *added in Opera, Marcel*
54. se *after* et *added in Opera, Marcel*
55. *omitted in L*
56. terra *before correction in A*
57. longius *Opera, Marcel*
58. viles *AL: corrected in Opera, Marcel*
59. -rent *before correction in A*
60. molestia *L*
61. attentione *L*
62. surrectura *L*
63. ad ipsum e *omitted in L*
64. *omitted in L*
65. cohitur *before correction in A*
66. his *L*
67. amittere *L*
68. haec *Opera, Marcel*
69. his *L*
70. decedit *A, Opera, Marcel*
71. eis *Marcel*
72. quando *before correction in A*
73. Ergo *A, Opera, Marcel*
74. videndo *Marcel*
75. *omitted in L*
76. est animae . . . aliquid *omitted in Marcel*
77. adeptione *L*

Notes to the Translation

ABBREVIATIONS

Allen	Michael J. B. Allen, *Marsilio Ficino and the Phaedran Charioteer* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981). [With an edition of Ficino's commentary on the *Phaedrus*.]
Andrews	John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, ed. R. Andrews, in *Opera Philosophica*, vols. 3–4 (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1997).
Bidez-Cumont	Joseph Bidez and Franz Cumont, *Les mages héllenisés: Zoroastre, Ostanès et Hystaspe d'après la tradition grecque* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1938).
CAG	*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 23 vols. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1882–1909).
Cousin	Proclus, *Commentarium in Platonis Parmenidem*, ed. Victor Cousin (Paris, 1864; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961).
Couvreur	Hermias, *In Platonis Phaedrum scholia*, ed. Paul Couvreur (Paris: E. Bouillon, 1901).
Crawford	Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, Mass: Medieval Academy, 1953).
Crouzel-Simonetti	Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, eds., *Origène: Traité des principes*, 4 vols. (Paris: Cerf, 1978–84).
Diehl	Ernest Diehl, ed., *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1965).
Ficino, *Opera*	Marsilio Ficino, *Opera omnia* (Basel: Heinrich Petri, 1576; repr. Turin: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1959; Paris: Phénix Editions, 1999).

Gauthier	Thomas Aquinas, *Sentencia libri De anima*, ed. René Antoine Gauthier (Paris: Vrin, 1984).
Ideler	Julius Ludwig Ideler, ed., *Physici et medici graeci minores* (Berlin, 1841).
Kaske and Clark	Marsilio Ficino, *Three Books on Life*, ed. Carol V. Kaske and John R. Clark (Binghamton, New York: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1989).
Maltese	Pletho, *Contra Scholarii pro Aristotele obiectiones*, ed. Enrico V. Maltese (Leipzig: Teubner, 1988).
Marg	Timaeus of Locri, *De natura mundi et animae*, ed. Walter Marg, editio maior (Leiden: Brill, 1972).
Marmura	Algazel, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, ed. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 1997).
Mohler	Ludwig Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsman*, 3 vols. (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1923–1942).
PG	Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca*, 161 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1857–1866).
PL	Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina*, 221 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1844–1891).
Ricciardelli	*Inni Orfici*, ed. Gabriella Ricciardelli (Rome: Fondazione Lorenzo Valla and Milan: Mondadori, 2000).
Saffrey-Westerink	Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, ed. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, 6 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1968–97).
Sodano	Porphyry, *In Platonis Timaeum commentariorum fragmenta*, ed. Angelo Raffaele Sodano (Naples: s. n., 1964)
Théry	Gabriel Théry, *Autour du décret de 1210, II: Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Aperçu sur l'influence de sa noétique* (Le Saulchoir Kain [Belgium], 1926). [Edition of the

	medieval Latin translation of the *De intellectu* attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias.]
Van Riet, *De anima*	Avicenna, *Liber de anima, seu sextus de naturalibus*, ed. Simone van Riet, 2 vols. (Louvain: Éditions orientalistes, and Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968).
Van Riet, *Liber*	Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima, sive, Scientia divina*, ed. Simone van Riet, 2 vols. (Louvain: E. Peeters, 1977–1980).
Verbeke	Thémistius, *Commentaire sur le traité De l'âme d'Aristote, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. Gerard Verbeke (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973).
Wadding	John Duns Scotus, *Opera omnia. Editio nova, juxta editionem Waddingi*, 26 vols. (Paris, 1891).
Westerink	L. G. Westerink, ed., *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam and New York: North Holland Publishing Company, 1976–77).
Willis	Macrobius, *Saturnalia, . . . in Somnium Scipionis commentarios*, ed. James Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1963).

For Ficino's debts to Aquinas we have noted below two kinds of parallel passages from the *Summa contra Gentiles* assembled by Collins in *The Secular Is Sacred*, those indicating either "almost verbatim copying" or "a close similarity in thought" (p. 114). A third category, consisting of similarities "not marked enough to justify any conclusion about the presence of Thomistic influence," has been ignored. Throughout we follow citations from Thomas's *Summa contra Gentiles* with the paragraph numbers of the 1961 Marietti edition of the *Summa*; thus, in the citation 1.43.363, "363" refers to the paragraph number of the Marietti edition.

BOOK XV

1. Cf. 15.14.3, below.

2. Pletho, *Reply to Scholarios* 982D–983A, capp. 5–32 (ed. Maltese, p. 3); cf. Bessarion, *In calumniatorem Platonis* (ed. Mohler, 1927, vol. 2, p. 409).

3. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.61.1396–98.

4. Pletho, *De differentiis Platonicae et Aristotelicae philosophiae*, cap. 1 (*PG* 160, col. 889).

5. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De anima* (*CAG* 2, ed. Bruns, pp. 21, 22–24).

6. Themistius, *De anima* 6 (*CAG* 5, ed. Heinze, 103.20–105.12); *Commentaire* (ed. G. Verbeke, pp. 234–237).

7. [pseudo-] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Problemata medica* 2 prologus (ed. Ideler, p. 53.5–9); see E. P. Mahoney in *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 23 (1968): 280–81.

8. [pseudo-] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Problemata medica* 2 prologus (ed. Ideler, p. 53).

9. No such statement is found in the published works of Proclus. Marcel refers us to *In Timaeum* 2.90C (ed. Diehl, vol. 1, pp. 294–295), which contains a discussion of Aristotle's views on the eternity of the world.

10. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.5.430a20–25.

11. Themistius, *De anima* 6 (*CAG* 5, ed. Heinze, 101.18–27); *Commentaire* (ed. Verbeke, p. 230).

12. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.4.429a12–430a9; see Aquinas, *Sentencia libri De anima*, at 429a29–b5 (ed. Gauthier, 3.7.275–280).

13. Averroes, *Commentarium magnum* 3.5 (ed. Crawford, pp. 387–413, especially pp. 389.56–62, 404.501–405.527).

14. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.59.1–3.1353–1355.

15. *Si mens forma corporis . . . aliquam comprehenderet:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.59.1356 (Collins, No. 69).

16. *Materia formas, quas . . . prorsus agnosceret:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.59.1357 (Collins, No. 70*).

17. *Impossibile est in corpore . . . quodammodo infinita:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.59.1358 (Collins, No. 71).

18. Averroes, *Commentarium magnum* 3.5 (ed. Crawford, pp. 411–412); cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.60.1370.

19. Ibid., 3.6 (ed. Crawford, pp. 415–416).

20. The example is from Themistius, *Commentaire* 6 (ed. Verbeke, pp. 224–226), quoted by Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* 2.51 and 4.91, who disagrees with Averroes' interpretation of Themistius.

21. See Aquinas, *De unitate* 3.63.

22. Averroes, *Commentarium magnum*, 3.17–20 (ed. Crawford, pp. 436–454).

23. Aquinas' notable theory to the effect that each angel is its own species. See "The Absent Angel in Ficino's Philosophy," in Allen, *Plato's Third Eye*, essay I.

24. Horace, *Ars poetica* 78.

25. Cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.10.21.

26. Averroes, *Commentarium magnum* 3.4 (ed. Crawford, pp. 383–386).

27. Avicenna, *De anima* 5.1 (ed. van Riet, *De anima*, pp. 88–101), 5.5 (ibid., pp. 126–133); Algazel, *Metaphysics* 1.tr.1.c.10–11.

28. Books 5.15.6, 9.7.1, 10.4–6.

29. Cf. Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis* 1.6.65–70 (ed. Willis, pp. 30–31).

30. In Plato's *Timaeus* 92B6–7, the oyster is the lowest form of life to which a human soul can sink.

31. Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 9.5 (ed. van Riet, *Liber*, p. 493). This refers to Avicenna's famous doctrine that God is "the giver of forms."

32. With a nice distinction between *dimittere* and *intermittere*.

33. It is ambiguous whether Ficino means Nature in general or the nature that is the natural form glossed just a few sentences later in the next paragraph as "the vital complexion." We opt for the latter here. See §18 below for the larger sense, however.

34. Proclus, *In Timaeum* 1.4C (ed. Diehl, 1: 10–11), paraphrased.

35. Porphyry, *In Timaeum* 31 (ed. Sodano, p. 20.15–16); cf. Proclus, *In Timaeum* 2.78F (ed. Diehl, 2: 257).

36. Timaeus Locrus, *De natura mundi* 5, 94b (ed. Marg, p. 118).

37. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 2.9.992a17–21, 5.6.1016b24–30, 7.2.1028b16–17; *De anima* 1.4.409a4–7. Cf. Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis* 2.2.1–10 (ed. Willis, pp. 99–100).

38. Ficino uses *adesse* here and *inesse* for the otherwise identical heading of Chapter Five. There is a nice distinction.

39. *Timaeus* 35A–36E.

40. For the *insit* here cf. n. 38 above.

41. *Aula* can mean hall, courtyard, palace, or even, in later Latin, church.

42. *Enneads* 4.3.22.

43. Ibid. 4.5.4–7.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid. 4.8.3–4, 8.

46. Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 1.7.

47. *Timaeus* 34BC, 36D–37A.

48. *Republic* 10.617B, and in general 616C–617D.

49. *Phaedrus* 248A2–3, and in general 247A–248A; cf. Ficino's *In Phaedrum* 7 (ed. Allen, p. 99).

50. Plato, *Timaeus* 32C–33B; Aristotle, *De caelo* 2.2, 285a, 29–30; 2.12, 292a, 20.

51. Plotinus 2.1; Proclus, *In Timaeum* 2.123BC (ed. Diehl, 1: 404).

52. Cf. Themistius, *De anima* (*CAG* 5, ed. Heinze, p. 123.30); Themistius, *Commentaire* (ed. Verbeke, p. 275).

53. Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 9.4 (ed. van Riet, *Liber*, pp. 476–488).

54. Algazel, *Destructio* 8 (ed. Marmura, pp. 153–160).

55. Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos* 1.2.

56. Albumasar: see Richard Lemay, *Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the Twelfth Century: The Recovery of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy Through Arabic Astrology* (Beirut, 1962), p. 126, citing a Latin manuscript of the *Introductorium* (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 16204, f. 20v, s. XIII).

57. i.e., Abu Uthman Sahl ben Bisri, whose *Judicia* (also called *Fatidica* or *Liber sextus astronomiae*) was translated into Latin in the twelfth century by John of Seville and Hermann of Carinthia.

58. Manilius, *Astronomicon* 1.10–30.

59. *Animal* here and following is meant in the larger sense of possessing animate being, being with some kind of soul, and in man's case not just irrational but cogitative soul. It will be rendered at times therefore as "animate being."

60. As in 14.7.3 (at n. 33) and 15.1.12–13 above, Ficino is drawing on the scholastic distinction between the *ratio intellectualis* and the *ratio cogitatrix* (or *vis cogitativa* in Avicenna); see Aquinas, *Summa theologica* 1.q.78.a.4, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* a.13, *Commentarium II De Anima* 13. The *ratio cogitatrix* enables us to recognize the usefulness or harmfulness of something and to consider images perceived by the senses; it is an inferior faculty to the *ratio intellectualis* which deals with Ideas.

61. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13.1102a27 ff.

62. Ibid. 6.1.1139a3 ff.

63. *Problemata* 30.5.955b23–26.

64. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7.1097b25–1098a18.

65. Ibid. 10.7.1177a11–1177b26.

66. *De anima* 1.4.408b1–32 (?)

67. Ibid. 2.2.414a4 ff.

68. Ibid. 3.4.429a10 ff.

69. These three definitions are culled from the *De anima* 2.1.412a20–22, 2.2.413b11–12, and 2.2.414a13 respectively, but all of 2.1–3 is relevant.

70. See for example Plato's own *Timaeus* 69C–72B.

71. *De anima* 3.7.431b17–19.

72. Not found in *Physics* 2, but rather in *De anima* 2.2.413b25–28.

73. *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a1–3, 24–26; 12.5.1071a8 ff.

74. *De generatione animalium* 2.3.736b27–28, 737a7–10. *L* provides us with the interesting variant *discedentem* and thus with the meaning "though separating itself on the outside."

75. Cf. Themistius, *De anima* 6 (*CAG* 5, ed. Heinze, pp. 98–99, 107); *Commentaire* (ed. Verbeke, pp. 223–225, 241–242).

76. Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* 1.10.336a24–336b25 and passim; *De anima* 2.2.413b25ff.

77. E.g. *Timaeus* 41A–42E.

78. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.60.1375–1395.

79. In the following argument, Ficino will deploy the scholastic notion of "intention" meaning intensifying (and thus the opposite of remission), with the implication that to intend, or to be intent on, something is to focus intensely upon it.

80. *Quotiens natura una duas . . . et sentiendi:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.58.1351 (Collins, No. 72*).

81. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.11.434a13 "wish acts thus upon appetite, like a ball."

82. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.7.431a15–17.

83. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De anima* (*CAG* 2, ed. Bruns, pp. 81–82, and especially 108). Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.62.1403–1415 and 2.76.560 with reference to Alexander's *De intellectu* (ed. Théry, pp. 74–77, 82).

84. Aristotle, *De anima* 2.2.413a7, 413b24–28; 3.4.429a10 ff. et passim. Cf. Aquinas *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.61.1396–1402; 2.62.1406–1407.

85. A crux. In this whole argument Ficino seems to be referring to the soul's yearning for the resurrection of the body or possibly for returning to the body after trance or ecstasy, for which see Plato, *Symposium* 174D–175B, 220CD, and Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.8.2 et passim. Marcel, by contrast, assumes he is referring to reincarnation and adduces Plato's *Republic* 10.617 ff., and *Phaedo* 80D–81C, Plotinus' *Enneads* 3.4.2, and the *Corpus Hermeticum* 10.7.

86. Ficino is playing subtly with the distinctions between *solvere*, *resolvere*, and *dissolvere*.

87. Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.8 passim and especially 4.8.4, 8. Plotinus refers to this entity as the "idolum." For Ficino's theory of the idolum, see Kristeller, *Philosophy*, p. 369, and Allen, *Platonism*, pp. 219–220 (see Bibliography).

88. John Duns Scotus, *De rerum principio*, qu. 9, art. 2, sect. 2, solution, caps. 41–49 (ed. Wadding, 4: 414–419).

89. Aquinas, *Sentencia libri De anima* ad 405b31–406a12 (ed. Gauthier, 1.6.79–113).

90. Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.5.6–7; 5.5.7; 6.4.1, 19.

91. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.4.429a18–429b5 (specifically 429a24); Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De anima* 107–108.

92. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.4.429a25–27 (garbled).

93. Marcel refers us to Aristotle, *De partibus animalium* 4.10 687a and *De somno et vigilia* 2.455.25–30, but neither of these texts contains our quotation or anything like it. Nor does it appear in the *Historia animalium* or the *De generatione animalium*. Ficino may well be paraphrasing his understanding of Aristotle's doctrine or quoting an unidentified intermediate source.

94. This recalls the image deployed in 15.5.3 above.

95. For the principle of individuation in Plotinus see *Enneads* 4.3 and 6.9.

96. *Timaeus* 41A–42E. The "guides" at 41DE are the daemons or younger gods.

97. Proclus, *Theologia Platonica* 5.19 (ed. Saffrey-Westerink, 5: 70–72); Proclus, *In Timaeum* 5.319A–320E (ed. Diehl, 3: 260–265). However, Ficino did not have access to this later part of the *Timaeus* commentary, since his exemplar was MS Riccardianus graecus 24 which ended at 191E (ed. Diehl, 2: 169.4).

98. Scotus, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* 7 q. 19–21 (ed. R. Andrews et al., 1997, 4: 363).

99. Of higher to lower, of lower to higher, and of equal to equal. But with an implied reference to the Areopagite's ordering in the *Celestial Hierarchy* of the nine angelic orders in three hierarchies, each consisting of three choirs.

100. *Platonic Theology* 11.3.

101. Possibly referring to Averroes, *Commentarium magnum* 3.5 (ed. Crawford, pp. 362–369, 399).

102. Scotus, *In IV Sententiarum libros*, d. 43, qu. 2, n. 5 (ed. Wadding, 20: 37).

103. Themistius, as in note 6.

104. Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.5.7–8.

105. See note 31 above.

106. Ficino's terminology is ambiguous here since by *unitas* he usually refers to the soul's highest faculty, the "head" of the *Phaedrus's* charioteer in Plato's famous allegory. But he is still combating the Averroistic notion of the one intellect, and is arguing that our own mental activities and goals undermine the notion of the one intellect and require and posit a multitude or plurality of minds, a plurality he refers to as the "mind's number." In Ficino's psychology, hate (irascibility) and desire (concupiscence) are the two faculties subordinate to the reason, which is in turn subordinate to the mind and its unity.

107. Note the nice distinction between the intellective and the intellectual powers.

108. *Platonic Theology* 11.3.9, 22.

109. *Republic* 6.508E–509B, *Parmenides* 130E–133B, *Laws* 12.965B ff.

110. Averroes, *Commentarium magnum* 2.153, 155 (ed. Crawford, pp. 362–363).

111. Virgil, *Aeneid* 1.26.

112. *Platonic Theology* 8.10.14–16.

113. I.e. a permanent potentiality in an eternal mind such as a planetary intelligence.

114. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.4.429b31–430a2.

115. Cf. Ficino's *Platonic Theology* 11.3.23.

116. Notice the sequence *praecurrunt, incurrunt, concurrunt*.

117. Among the "Averroists of more recent times" Ficino might have been thinking of were Paul of Venice, the great logician of the University of Padua and the author of an Averroistic commentary on Aristotle's *De anima;* Niccolò Tignosi, a philosophy professor at the University of Florence and a fellow protégé of Lorenzo de'Medici; and Nicoletta Vernia, the famous Paduan Averroist whom Lorenzo at one time wanted to hire for the University of Florence.

118. Since there were no theaters in Renaissance Florence, Ficino must have another gathering in mind, perhaps at a pageant or triumph, or in a church (where confraternities met and sacred dramas were occasionally performed). Any (or all) of these suggestions is possible given the definition immediately following of man as "a beautiful animal, rejoicing in company, skilful, religious."

119. Ficino regarded Socrates as a philosophical saint, a "foreshadowing" even of Christ, and as the antithesis of Aristippus, a depraved hedonist. See Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, pp. 321–324; idem, "Socrates in the Italian Renaissance;" and Allen, *Synoptic Art*, chap. 4 (see Bibliography).

120. Averroes, *Commentarium magnum* 3.5 (ed. Crawford, p. 399).

121. For instance in 15.18.2 above.

122. I.e. even from having to act (for example, one does not have to be actually speaking a language to possess a command of it).

123. Moors: *Mauros*. But possibly a punning reference to the followers also of Amaury de Bène, who were called *Mauristae* and were known as pantheists.

124. Proclus surveys earlier Platonic views of the World Soul throughout the second part of Book 3 of his immense commentary on the *Timaeus* (ed. Diehl, 2: 102–316).

125. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.17.139 (on David of Dinant); Augustine *Contra epistolam Manichei* (*PL* 42, col. 173); idem, *Con-*

tra Faustum (*PL* 42.207); St. John Damascene, *Dialogue against the Manicheans* (*PG* 94.503).

126. *Platonic Theology* 1, passim.

127. Themistius, *De anima* 6 (*CAG* 5, ed. Heinze 108.35–109.3); *Commentaire* (ed. Verbeke, p. 244). Cf. Aquinas, *De unitate* 5.55.

BOOK XVI

1. The opening of Book 15 sets out the five questions and the first question is the topic of that book. The second question is postulated here at the very onset of Book 16. For the third question see Chapter 7 below; for the fourth, Chapter 8 below; and for the fifth, Chapter 1 of Book 17.

2. Pseudo-Dionysius, *Celestial Hierarchy* 6.2–9.4, 14 (*PG* 3.200D–261D, 321A).

3. Ficino, *De christiana religione* 14 (*Opera*, p. 19); *De raptu Pauli* (*Opera*, pp. 699–701).

4. Ficino, *Platonic Theology* 12.7.8.

5. Or possibly "for creating all things."

6. *Platonic Theology* 2.4.

7. I.e. when it becomes liquid.

8. See Aristotle, *History of Animals* 5.22.554a5 ff. (consistency), 9.40.627a2 ff. (honey as a salve).

9. Plato, *Second Letter* 311C, *Laws* 11.927A.

10. Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.7.15.

11. Plato, *Republic* 10.621AC.

12. Plato, *Republic* 10.614D–615A.

13. Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 3.8 (ed. van Riet, *Liber*, pp. 162–163).

14. Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.8.7; see n. 16 below.

15. Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 3.27.6–9.

16. Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.8.5–6; see n. 14 above.

17. Ibid. 4.8.5.

18. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 4.84–87 (on the incorruptible body that will be ours).

19. Plotinus, *Enneads* 3.5.6.38–43; Apuleius, *De deo Socratis* 11; Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 2.39; Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 2.3.

20. The principal texts on the theme of transmigration in Plato are the *Phaedo* 70C ff., 81B ff., 113A; *Phaedrus* 248C–249B; *Republic* 10.617D ff.; *Timaeus* 41E ff., 90E ff., *Laws* 10.903D ff., 904E, and *Seventh Letter* 335C. See too Plotinus, *Enneads* 3.4.2,6, 4.3.12, 5.2.2, 6.7.6–7. Iamblichus seems to have rejected the notion.

21. That the soul is amphibious, or double faced, or in the middle position is a Neoplatonic commonplace; see Plotinus, *Enneads* 3.2.9, 4.8.4, and Proclus, *In Timaeum* 1.40C (ed. Diehl, 1: 130.23–24). But Ficino is surely also recalling the "Ianique bifrontis imago" of Vergil's *Aeneid* 7.180. See also Avicenna, *De anima* 1.5 (ed. van Riet, *De anima*, p. 93).

22. Avenzoar Albumaron (or ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Abi al-ʿAla Ibn Zuhr), was a Muslim physician (1091/94–1161) from Spain mentioned by Averroes. His *Method of Preparing Medicines* was translated into Latin and published in Venice in 1490 under the title *Liber Teisir sive Rectificatio medicationis et regiminis*.

23. Plato, *Laws* 9.865DE.

24. Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 4.1048–51.

25. Cicero, *De divinatione* 1.27.57, reproduced almost verbatim.

26. Ibid. 1.27.56.

27. *Platonic Theology* 4.1.12–16.

28. Major sources here would be Plato, *Timaeus* 41A–42E; *Epinomis* 981C–E; and Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.2.1, 4.3.1–9, & 4.8.3–4.

29. See Aristotle, *De caelo* 2.13.293a19 ff.

30. Plato, *Timaeus* 40C3; quoted by Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.4.22.

31. Plato, *Phaedo* 108C–111C.

32. Pliny, *Natural History* 7.2.25; cf. Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 9.4.10, and Ficino's own *De vita* 2.18.10–50 (ed. Kaske and Clark, pp. 222–224). The reference to Diodorus has not been identified.

33. Ps.-Olympiodorus [Damascius], *In Phaedonem* 2.138 (ed. Westerink, p. 361).

34. Plato, *Timaeus* 31B–32C; Timaeus Locrus, *De natura mundi* 12, 95a (ed. Marg, p. 122).

35. For a full discussion of this argument and its roots in the *Timaeus*, see "Ficino, Galileo, and Renaissance Philosophy," in Hankins, *Humanism and Platonism*, 2: 155–183.

36. E.g. Homer, *Odyssey* 4.563 ff.; Virgil, *Georgics* 1.38, *Aeneid* 5.735, 6.542, 744; Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 14.111, *Amores* 2.6.49, 3.9.60, *Ibis* 173; Tibullus, 1.3.58.

37. Matthew 5:4.

38. Psalm 148:4.

39. Genesis 1:6–7.

40. Dionysius the Areopagite, *Celestial Hierarchy* 15.1; cf. *Divine Names* 4.8 (*PG* 3.328C, 704D).

41. Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.7.1–2, 8.2.

42. Dionysius the Areopagite, *Divine Names* 13.1–3 (*PG* 3.977B–980C) —summarized.

43. The following arguments are indebted to Plato, *Phaedrus* 246A–248B, and Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.3.1–12, and especially 4.3.7 (meditating on the famous lemma in the *Phaedrus* 246B6 "All soul takes care of all that is soulless").

44. Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.3.12; and Proclus, *In Parmenidem* 3.2 (ed. Cousin, cols. 817–819).

45. See note 1 above.

46. Culled from the mythological passage in Plato's *Phaedrus* 246A-D. Ficino is contrasting *accedere* with *cedere*.

47. Hippocrates, *Aphorisms* 3.1.

48. Plato, *Republic* 7.516E–518A.

49. Proclus, *In Timaeum* I, 39E–40E, 42C–43A, 49E–50A (ed. Diehl, 1: 128–132, 137–139, 161–162).

50. Plato, *Republic* 7.516A, 532BC.

51. The following arguments are again dominated by images from the *Phaedrus* 246A–248B; cf. n. 43 above.

52. For the circular motion of soul and its vehicle (and the reference here is not to the soul-circuits of transmigration), see Plato, *Phaedrus* 245CE, *Timaeus* 43D, and *Laws* 10.894B–D, 896A ff., 898AC; and Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.2.1–2.

53. Again see Plato, *Timaeus* 43DE.

54. Plato, *Laws* 10.896BD ff.; Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.3.10.

55. The doctrine is not found in the *Oracula Chaldaica* which Ficino believed to be Zoroastrian, nor is it referred to in the Greek and Latin testimonia collected in Bidez-Cumont. For Moses, see Genesis 3:17–19.

56. Hermias, *In Phaedrum* (ed. Couvreur), p. 163.24–27. See n. 57 below.

57. Plato, *Phaedrus* 240AB, with Ficino's own *In Phaedrum* 1 and summae 9 and 35 (ed. Allen, pp. 75, 137, 195); and Genesis 3:6 ("And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof . . .").

58. Plato, *Seventh Letter* 336B.

59. John 12:25: "Qui amat animam suam, perdet eam; et qui odit animam suam in hoc mundo, in vitam aeternam custodit eam."

60. Plato, *Republic* 10.611D–612A (paraphrased); cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.1.12.

61. Ephesians 6:12 (garbled).

62. Origen, *De principiis* 3.2 (ed. Crouzel-Simonetti, 3: 109); Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 9.3, 12–13 (and in general Book 9 passim).

63. Serapion the Elder (Yuhanna ibn Sarabiyun) was an Arabic medical writer in the ninth century AD and the author of a *Practicum* or *Breviarium medicinae* that was translated by Gerard of Cremona in the twelfth century. Cf. Ficino, *De vita* 1.6.35 (ed. Kaske and Clark, p. 122), where his name is again linked with Avicenna's.

64. See *Orphic Hymns* proem 31–33 (ed. Ricciardelli, p. 9).

65. Matthew 17:21; cf. Acts 13:3.

66. For the other three questions, see note 1 above.

67. Cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.40.96–97. Theramenes was an Athenian statesman of moderate views put to death by the Thirty Tyrants led by Critias in 404 B.C. Ficino has already mentioned him in 9.2.2 above.

68. Ibid., 1.43.102, 5.40.117–118. Theodorus, like Hegesias, was a member of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy, early hedonists, founded either by Aristippus, a contemporary of Socrates, or by his grandson of the same name.

69. Ibid., 1.34.84. Cicero briefly mentions (in the sentence prior to his reference to Hegesias; see n. 70 below) a Cleombrotus of Ambracia: he was celebrated in an epigram by Callimachus for having read Plato's *Phaedo* and been so convinced by the arguments for immortality therein that he had promptly drowned himself.

70. Ibid., 1.34.83–84. Hegesias was head of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy in the third century B.C. Cicero says that Ptolemy Philadelphus of Egypt stopped him lecturing on the advantages of dying after a number of his auditors had committed suicide.

71. In his *Histories* 5.3–4, Herodotus attributes the practice of mourning over births and rejoicing over deaths not to the Getae (whom he has already described in 4.93–97) but to the Trausi, another Thracian tribe whose way of life he explicitly likens to that of the Getae.

72. Plato, *Phaedo* 64A, 67E, 80E ff. and passim.

73. Daniel 12:3.

74. See Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.1.12.21–28; 4.3.10,12,32; 6.4.15–16, on the soul's *idolum* or image (with particular ref. to the shade of Heracles in the *Odyssey* 11.601–603).

75. Plato, *Timaeus* 81DE.

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